The literature on Islamism is extensive, and there are a plethora of studies that have been conducted in this field over the past couple of decades. However, among these studies, there are a select few that stand out for their substantial contributions to the field. One such work is Jerome Drevon’s new book, Institutionalizing Violence: Strategies of Jihad in Egypt. Drevon offers a comprehensive examination of the origins of Salafi jihadism in Egypt, through a thorough and rigorous approach that is grounded in extensive field research. His analysis is both insightful and thought-provoking, making it a valuable addition to the field of Islamism studies and political science more broadly.
The book traces the roots, dynamics, and trajectories of two of the most prominent Islamist groups in Egypt’s recent history: the Islamic Group (al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya) and the Jihad Group (Jama’at al-Jihad). Through a meticulous analysis of various primary and secondary sources, Drevon’s book delves into the complex factors that have shaped these groups’ trajectories and affected their actions. Drevon employs qualitative and quantitative research methods and is sensitive to historical and political context in seeking to understand the development of these two groups over the past four decades. The book provides a fresh and unique perspective on the question of why certain Islamist groups resort to violence. Rather than focusing on the traditional explanations of ideological, political, social, and cultural factors, the book instead concentrates on the role of internal and organizational dynamics, personal experiences, and emotions in understanding the decision-making process behind the use of force for political ends.
Theoretically, Drevon draws on the extensive research that has been done on Islamist movements over the past few decades and is grounded on social movements theories that have dominated the field of Islamism over the past couple of decades. While acknowledging the contribution of this research in studying Islamism, Drevon weaves his own theoretical and analytical framework by integrating insights from several research traditions such as contentious politics, civil war, political parties, and institutional studies. He employs two key concepts in order to help understand the trajectories of the Islamic Group (IG) and the Jihad Group (JG): radicalization and institutionalization. The former refers to “the processes leading to the adoption of violence, as well as the maintenance and intensification of violence” (p. 8), and the latter refers to “the process by which organizations acquire value and stability” and through which an organization “becomes valuable in and of itself, and its goals become inseparable and indistinguishable from it” (p. 9). Both concepts have been borrowed from the works of Samuel Huntington (Political Order in Changing Societies, 1968) and Angelo Panebianco (Political Parties: Organization and Power, 1988), and have been integrated into a relational model that explains the radicalization and institutionalization of violence within Salafi jihadi groups. The dynamics of the radicalization (DR) model, as the book calls it, argues that the radicalization process of armed groups happens in interactions with five potential actors: the state and political environment, the security services, the Islamist social movement, a potential countermovement, and the public. According to the DR model, the changing patterns of these interactions play a crucial role in the radicalization of jihadi groups. In tandem, the institutionalization of violence occurs along four dimensions—internal, external, structural, and attitudinal—which result in organizational consolidation.
Drevon’s book advances two primary arguments pertaining to the radicalization of jihadi groups. The first argument asserts that radicalization is a relational process that emerges through the institutionalization of the aforementioned dimensions. These dimensions give rise to diverse processes, responses, and attitudes toward violence and serve to reveal the intricate nature of the radicalization process within jihadi movements. Importantly, this argument calls into question reductionist theories on using violence by these movements, particularly in the post-September 11 era.
The second argument put forward by Drevon’s book is that the institutionalization of jihadi groups impacts their strategic choices and shapes their trajectories. This is a crucial aspect of the model as it demonstrates how the scope and degree of interactions between different actors and jihadi groups can influence and shape the political choices made by jihadi leaders. The model asserts that jihadi leaders do not make choices in a vacuum, but are also constrained by their institutional contexts. This argument is important as it highlights the different phases of the radicalization process within jihadi movements and how they are influenced by various factors, rather than being solely driven by ideological or political preferences.
After laying out the book’s arguments, Drevon delves into the historical roots of the IG and JG in Egypt. Through a detailed analysis of the emergence and spread of Salafi ideologies and groups from the early twentieth century onward, the author contextualizes the political climate in Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s, which ultimately led to the proliferation of jihadi Salafi groups in the 1970s. Despite the presence of other literature addressing these historical developments, this book offers distinct perspectives by illuminating the various mechanisms that contributed to the radicalization and institutionalization of violence within both the IG and JG since their emergence in the 1970s. To illustrate the distinctions between the radicalization experiences of the JG and IG, Drevon employs the DR model in unpacking the radicalization processes of both groups. Specifically, the radicalization of the JG is shown to be a result of interactions with the state and political environment, as well as upward spirals of political opportunities. Conversely, the radicalization of the IG is found to be associated with interactions with a countermovement, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, and with security services. This analysis provides a nuanced understanding of the several dynamics that contribute to the radicalization of these two groups. More importantly, the divergent radicalization processes of the JG and IG have had a significant impact on their views on the use of violence. The JG’s early cells that emerged in the 1970s viewed violence as a necessary means to combat regime repression and liberate the Muslim world from Western hegemony. In contrast, the IG’s adoption of violence against the regime was a gradual process and related to the changing political environment in Egypt under former president Anwar Sadat. This distinction is crucial, as other studies often fail to differentiate between these two groups when it comes to their use of violence against the regime. Additionally, the level of internal institutionalization is a crucial factor in determining the extent of the use of violence by these groups. The strong internal institutionalization of the IG resulted in a controlled and calculated resort to violence that was in line with the movement’s tactical and strategic objectives. On the other hand, the weak internal institutionalization of the Jihadi-Salafists (JG) led to a haphazard and impulsive use of violence that was often counterproductive.
Despite the contribution of Drevon’s book to the existing literature on jihadism, there are also a number of limitations that might be worth mentioning. First is the generalizability of the findings of the book and the analytical model beyond the case of Egypt, which the author admits in the conclusion of the book. While the book attempts to apply the DR model to other cases such as al-Qaeda, the results are not consistent with the book’s argument on institutionalization. Second, despite its potential utility, the DR model can be criticized for falling into the trap of causality that the author sought to avoid in the first place. This model provides insight into the internal dynamics and trajectories of the IG and JG; however, it still presents a linear view of causality. Ultimately, radicalization and institutionalization are the outcomes of the interactions between jihadi groups and different actors, with the latter being treated as independent variables. Third, the classification of these actors is not fully convincing. For example, some of them can fall into the same category (i.e., the state and security forces). It would have been more convincing if the author explained why he chose to divide them the way he did. Fourth, the book overstretched the history of violence in jihadi movements. It inaccurately conflates the ideas of Islamic revivalism and reformism, as espoused by figures such as Muhammad Abduh and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in the late nineteenth century, with the views of Islamist ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb. This is problematic as it ignores the significant ideological distinctions between these groups. Finally, the book inadvertently conflates the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and violence. While the author acknowledges the differences between the Brotherhood and jihadi groups, there are instances in which he erroneously links the Brotherhood to armed groups. This is not accurate and therefore problematic.
Nevertheless, Institutionalizing Violence is a comprehensive and important work that provides a deep understanding of the complex history of Salafi jihadism in Egypt.
