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A discussion of Melissa Schwartzberg's Counting the Many: The Origins and Limits of Supermajority Rule

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 June 2015

Gregory Koger
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Abstract

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Type
Review Symposia: The Political Consequences of Majority Rule
Information
Perspectives on Politics , Volume 13 , Issue 2 , June 2015 , pp. 458 - 460
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2015 

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