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Puzzles, Proverbs, and Omega Matrices: The Scientific and Social Significance of Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2004

Jim Granato  and
Frank Scioli
Jim Granato
Affiliation:
Jim Granato is Visiting Scientist for Political Science in the Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences Directorate at the National Science Foundation ([email protected])
Frank Scioli
Affiliation:
Frank Scioli is Program Director for Political Science in the Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences Directorate at the National Science Foundation ([email protected])
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Extract

What has changed since William Riker's statement was written? No doubt Political Science has made considerable headway in going beyond traditional methods. For example, social choice theory, formal models of party systems, and statistical methods for analyzing electoral and roll-call data have made it possible to make scientific progress in the study of democratic institutions and party systems.The authors thank Chris Achen, John Aldrich, Bill Bernhard, Norman Bradburn, Brian Humes, Mark Jones, Richard Lempert, Phil Shively, Joan Sieber, Duncan Snidal, and Paul Wahlbeck for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. They also thank Henry Brady and Jennifer Hochschild for their comments and assistance through this process. We dedicate this paper to the memory and scientific accomplishments of EITM Workshop participant Richard McKelvey.

Type
SYMPOSIUM
Information
Perspectives on Politics , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , June 2004 , pp. 313 - 323
Copyright
© 2004 American Political Science Association

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