Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace

Extract

Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace. By Timothy W. Crawford. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. 304p. $39.95.

Pivotal deterrence highlights the problem of dual deterrence in which one state (pivot) attempts to preserve the status quo and prevent conflict between two revisionist adversaries, while each depends on the pivot's support and/or neutrality for its ultimate success. Timothy Crawford's book is an important and, in several ways, original statement on a topic unduly ignored in past studies. In the first two chapters, the author carefully lays out his theoretical expectations concerning the conditions that make pivotal deterrence 1) possible, 2) probable, and 3) likely to succeed. A set of necessary conditions expected to make pivotal deterrence possible are clearly outlined: The two adversaries must see each other as more threatening than the pivot, whereas the pivot must be at least equal in power to them, prefer the status quo between them, and believe that both adversaries are revisionist and willing to go to war if assured of its support.