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On the Causes and Consequences of and Remedies for Interstate Malapportionment of the U.S. House of Representatives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 February 2008

Jeffrey W. Ladewig  and
Mathew P. Jasinski
Jeffrey W. Ladewig
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Connecticut ([email protected])
Mathew P. Jasinski
Affiliation:
Robinson & Cole, Hartford, Connecticut ([email protected])
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Abstract

Forty years ago, the Supreme Court drew attention to and made considerable efforts toward eliminating intrastate malapportionment among U.S. House districts with the one-person, one-vote rule. Today, this rule is significantly, and more severely, violated by a rarely discussed or analyzed form of malapportionment, interstate malapportionment. We identify and discuss its causes and consequences, as well as possible remedies. We argue that changing the fixed size of the U.S. House membership is the only solution that meets normative, constitutional, and practical standards. We demonstrate that the current fixed size of the chamber unreasonably corrupts the popular basis of the U.S. House, which is necessary for the proper functioning of American representative democracy.Jeffrey Ladewig is an assistant professor at the University of Connecticut in the Department of Political Science ([email protected]). Mathew Jasinski is an attorney at Robinson & Cole in Hartford, Connecticut ([email protected]). We would like to thank Oksan Bayulgen, Larry Bowman, Robert Darcy, Virginia Hettinger, David Jones, and Howard Reiter for their suggestions and assistance. We also want to thank the anonymous reviewers for their extraordinarily in-depth and helpful reviews. Any remaining errors are our own.

Type
Research Article
Information
Perspectives on Politics , Volume 6 , Issue 1 , March 2008 , pp. 89 - 107
Copyright
© 2008 American Political Science Association

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