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II. Models of the Self

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2016

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The notion of the ‘self, together with related ideas such as ‘personality’, ‘character’, can be used primarily in connection with human psychology, or ethical and social relationships, or a combination of these. In this chapter, I focus on the self as a psychological notion, taking up in Chapters III and IV related questions about ethical character and about the individual and society. On this topic, as on ethics and values, much recent debate has centred on the question whether we can trace a clear line of development within Greek culture, and on the related question of the relationship between Greek and modern conceptions of the self and the mind.

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Research Article
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New Surveys in the Classics , Volume 25: Greek Thought , 1995 , pp. 5 - 19
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Copyright © The Classical Association 1995

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References

Notes

1. Snell, B., The Discovery of the Mind, tr. Rosenmeyer, R. G. (New York, 1960, based on the 2nd edn. of the German version, 1948), chs. 1, 3, and 6, esp. pp. 123-7Google Scholar; Scenes from Greek Drama (Berkeley, 1964), pp. 52-6.

2. See Dodds, E. R., The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley, 1951), ch. 1, esp. pp. 2–8, 13-18, discussing esp. Iliad (Il.) 19. 86-94Google Scholar.

3. Adkins, A. W. H., From the Many to the One: A Study of Personality and Views of Human Nature in the Context of Ancient Greek Society, Values and Beliefs (London, 1970), pp. 1–9, 24, 47, 90, 124, 126, 196-7, 271Google Scholar. His approach to psychology is linked with his approach to the history of moral ideas in his more famous study, Merit and Responsibility: A Study of Greek Values (Oxford, 1960), on which see Ch. III, text to n. 7.

4. Vernant, J.-P. and Vidal-Naquet, P., Tragedy and Myth in Ancient Greece, tr. Lloyd, J. (Brighton, 1981), chs. 2-3Google Scholar; for this type of approach, see also Saïd, S., La Faute tragique (Paris, 1978), part 2Google Scholar. For a non-developmental reading of the combination of psychologically active and passive language in such cases, see Gill, C., ‘The Character-Personality Distinction’, in Pelling, C. B. R., ed., Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature (Oxford, 1990), pp. 1-30, esp. pp. 17-31Google Scholar.

5. Bremmer, J., The Early Greek Concept ofthe Soul (Princeton, 1983)Google Scholar; Claus, D. B., Toward the Soul: An Inquiry into the Meaning of Psyche Before Plato (New Haven, 1981)Google Scholar.

6. Padel, R., In and Out of Mind: Greek Images of the Tragic Self (Princeton, 1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also Whom Gods Destroy: Elements of Greek and Tragic Madness (Princeton, 1995). Her stress on the physical character of the Greek conception of psychological organs and experiences recalls Onians, R. B., The Origins of European Thought (Cambridge, 1954, 2nd edn)Google Scholar. But, in her case, this stress is also informed by psychoanalytic and feminist approaches, as well as anthropological ones.

7. Williams, B., Shame and Necessity (Berkeley, 1993), chs. 1-3, esp. pp. 21–31, 40-2Google Scholar; for a more detailed analysis of the assumptions of Snell and Adkins, see Gill, C., Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy: The Self in Dialogue (Oxford, 1996), 1.1 Google Scholar.

8. Williams, op. cit., pp. 68-74, and ch. 6, esp. pp. 133-9, 158-67. On the concepts of moral luck and agent regret, see Williams, , Moral Luck (Cambridge, 1981), ch. 2, esp. p. 30 n 2, suggesting the relevance of these concepts to Greek tragedyCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9. Nussbaum, M. C., The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge, 1986), esp. chs. 1-3 and 13 (on tragedy)Google Scholar; Nussbaum also sees these ideas as expressed in some Greek philosophy, esp. in Aristotle’s thinking on happiness, and, in a complex and ambivalent way, in Plato’s Symposium and Phaedrus; see her chs. 6-7, 11-12.

10. Wilkes, K., Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments (Oxford, 1988), chs. 6-7Google Scholar.

11. For a functionalist model of mind, see Dennett, D., Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology (Hassocks, Sussex, 1979), ch. 9Google Scholar; Dennett’s approach is compared with that of Plato in the Republic (R.) by Annas, J., An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford, 1981), pp. 142-6,149-52Google Scholar. On the contrast between Cartesian and functionalist models of mind, see Smith, P. and Jones, O. R., The Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction (Cambridge, 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; connections between Aristotle’s theory and functionalism are made in their pp. 75-83,177-9,254-9. See also Gill, C., ‘Is there a Concept of Person in Greek Philosophy?’, in Everson, S., ed., Psychology: Companions to Ancient Thought 2 (Cambridge, 1991), 166-93Google Scholar, considering links between Aristotelian and Stoic conceptions of human rationality and some modern non-Cartesian theories about being a ‘person’ or ‘rational animal’. On Greek theories and that of Freud (another critic of the Cartesian model) see text to n. 28 below.

12. Davidson, D., Eassays on Actions and Events (Oxford, 1980), chs. 1-3Google Scholar; LePore, E. and McLaughlin, B. P., edd., Action and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford, 1985), pp. 3-13Google Scholar.

13. In this book, I use ‘he/she’ or ‘her/him’ indifferently as indefinite personal pronouns, even when summarizing ancient authors who use only masculine forms for this purpose; however, when translating these authors, I retain their practice in this respect.

14. See e.g. Aristotle (Arist.), De Motu Animalium 701a17-28, in which 25-8 comments that not all stages of the practical syllogism are necessarily noticed by the mind. See further, on the relevance of theories such as Davidson’s to the interpretation of Aristotle’s psychological model, Anscombe, E., Intention (Oxford, 1957), p. 79 Google Scholar; Nussbaum, M. C., Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium (Princeton, 1978), pp. 165–220, esp. 165-6Google Scholar; Charles, D., Aristotle‘s Philosophy of Action (London, 1984), pp. 1–4 Google Scholar; Irwin, T., Ariswtle’s First Principles (Oxford, 1988), ch. 15, nn. 3, 6, 9, on p. 596 Google Scholar.

15. See Inwood, B., Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford, 1985), ch. 3Google Scholar; Annas, J., Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley, 1992), ch. 4Google Scholar. On the linkage with modern non-Cartesian theories, see Gill, ‘Is There a Concept of Person in Greek Philosophy?’, pp. 184-93. A further possible parallel is between Stoic psychology and modern theories centred on the idea that mental states should be analysed in terms of their ‘content’, or what they ‘represent’, regardless of whether these states are conscious or not; see Sorabji, R., ‘Perceptual Content in the Stoics’, Phronesis 35 (1990), 307-14, at p. 308 n 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16. The ‘if I do this, this will happen’ pattern is found in all four deliberative monologues in the Iliad: see 11. 404-6, 17. 91-6, 102-5, 21. 553-70, 22. 99-130. The second pattern is clearest in 11. 408-10; see also 17. 98-9. For the claim that the Homeric monologues represent valid (though non-Cartesian) modes of deliberation, see Gaskin, R., ‘Do Homeric Heroes Make Real Decisions?’, CQ NS 40 (1990), 1-15CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Williams, Shame and Necessity, ch. 2.

17. The formulaic line, ‘But why does my spirit debate this with me? ‘ (which occurs in all four Iliadic monologues), can be taken as indicating the moment at which the Homeric figure ‘says no’ to an ‘impression’ about what is worth doing in a given situation. On these parallels between Homeric, Aristotelian, and Stoic patterns of thinking, see Gill, Personality, 1.2; on Aristotle’s conception of ‘deliberation’ (a much debated topic), see e.g. Lear, J., Aristotle The Desire to Understand (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 143-51CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sherman, N., The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue (Oxford, 1989), ch. 3Google Scholar.

18. On Dodds, see n. 2 above. For an alternative reading of Agamemnon’s speech, see Ch. III, text to nn. 19-20; for criticism of the idea of’shame-ethics’, as used by Dodds and others, see Ch. Ill, text to nn. 22-5.

19. See e.g. Il. 9. 255-8, 260-1, 496-7, 515-18, 639-42.

20. See e.g. Griffin, J., Homer on Life and Death (Oxford, 1980), p. 74 Google Scholar. The possible echo of Meleager’s response, as presented by Phoenix, in his attempt to persuade Achilles, is noted by Whitman, C., Homer and the Heroic Tradition (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), p. 191 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21. See further Gill, Personality, 3.3.

22. See Medea 1021-80 esp. 1049-55 and 1078-80. The translation of κρασσων τών ¿μών βουλίυμάτων as ‘master of my [revenge] plans’ rather than ‘stronger than my [ethical] reasonings’ is that of a minority of scholars, but seems to me what the sense of the lines (esp. of βουλευμάτων) requires. Difficulties of sense and language lead J. Diggle in the revised Euripides Oxford Classical Text (Oxford, 1984) to excise the whole of 1056-80; but others excise simply all or part of 1056-64. See further Gill, C., ‘Two Monologues of Self-Division: Euripides, Medea 1021-80 and Seneca, Medea 893-977’, in Whitby, M., Hardie, P., and Whitby, M., edd., Homo Viator: Classical Essays for John Bramble (Bristol, 1987), pp. 25–37 Google Scholar; Foley, H., ‘Medea’s Divided Self’, Classical Antiquity 8 (1989), 61–85 CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Evans, S., ‘The Self and Ethical Agency in the Hippolytus and Medea of Euripides’, Cambridge Ph.D. thesis, 1994 Google Scholar.

23. Another striking instance of this is the use of the language of ‘madness’ to describe, and to criticize, Ajax’s state of mind at a time when he is no longer ‘mad’ in the ordinary sense of this word: see Sophocles, Ajax 610-11, 614-16, 625, 639-40; also Winnington-Ingram, R. P., Sophocles: An Interpretation (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 32-8, 42CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also, more generally, Goldhill, S., Reading Greek Tragedy (Cambridge, 1986), ch. 7CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gill, ‘The Character-Personality Distinction’, pp. 17-31.

24. On the relationship between psychological language, ethical debate, and the ‘argument’ or dialectic’ of the play see Gill, C., ‘The Articulation of the Self in Euripides’ Hippolytus’ in Powell, A., ed., Euripides, Women, and Sexuality (London, 1990), pp. 76-107CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Goldhill, S., ‘Character and Action: Representation and Reading: Greek Tragedy and its Critics’, in Pelling, , ed., Characterization, pp. 100-27Google Scholar.

25. See further Gill, Personality, ch. 3, esp. 3.4-5.

26. For the modern theories of mind referred to, see text to nn. 10-15 above. A striking instance is David Charles’s reading of Aristotle’s account of akrasia, Aristotle’s Theory of Action, chs. 3-4, which uses contemporary action-theory as the basis for a penetrating analysis of Aristotle’s treatment. On modern belief-based theories of the emotions, see e.g. Rorty, A. O., ed., Explaining Emotions (Berkeley, 1980), chs. 15-21Google Scholar; Taylor, G., Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment (Oxford, 1985), pp. 1–5 Google Scholar; Cairns, D. L., Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature (Oxford, 1993), pp. 5–6, esp. refs, in n. 8Google Scholar. On the problem raised by translating akrasia as ‘weakness of will’, see text to n. 32 below.

27. See Republic (R.) 439e-441c. See further Moline, J., ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche’, AGP 60 (1978), 1-26CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gill, C., ‘Plato and the Education of Character’, AGP 67 (1985), 1-26CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Annas, Introduction to Plato’s Republic, ch. 5, esp. pp. 124-52; Irwin, T., Plato’s Ethics (Oxford, 1995), ch. 13, esp. pp. 211-13,215-22CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28. On Dennett and Plato, see n. 11 above. On Plato and Freud, see Kenny, A., The Anatomy of the Soul (Oxford 1973), pp. 10–14 Google Scholar; Santas, G. X., Plato and Freud (Oxford, 1988)Google Scholar; Price, A. W., ‘Plato and Freud’, in Gill, C., ed., The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modem Philosophy (Oxford, 1990), pp. 247-70Google Scholar; Lear, J., ‘Inside and Outside the Republic’, Phronesis 38 (1992), 184–215 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29. For the idea that appetites/desires are open to persuasion in this way, see R. 554d2-3, e4-5, also 442cl0-d1: for the contrasting idea that they are not open to persuasion and need to be suppressed by force (like non-human animals), see 442a6-b3, 589a-b, 591b. See further Gill, Personality, 4.2, and refs. in n. 27 above.

30. See R. 485d-e, 500b-d, 585b-587a; see further Gill, Personality, 4.6. See also Ch. III, text to nn. 69-70.

31. R. 500d-501e, 519b-521b: on the issues raised by the latter point, see Ch. III, text to nn. 62-6.

32. Snell, Scenes from Greek Drama, pp. 47-56, esp. 56.

33. See Arist. NE 7. 3,1147a24-bl9. For analysis, see e.g. Wiggins, D., ‘Weakness of Will, Commen-surability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire’, in Rorty, A. O., ed., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (Berkeley, 1980), pp. 241-65, esp. pp. 248-9Google Scholar; Charles, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action, ch. 3; Gosling, J., Weakness of the Will (London, 1990), ch. 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Price, A. W., Mental Conflict (London, 1995), ch. 3, esp. pp. 132-9Google Scholar.

34. Arist. NE 7. 3, 1147a34-b3. See M. F. Burnyeat, ‘Aristotle on Learning to be Good’, in Rorty, Essays on Aristotle‘s Ethics, pp. 69-92, esp. pp. 82-8; Rorty, A. O., ‘ Akrasia and Pleasure; Nicomachean Ethics Book 7’, in Rorty, , Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, pp. 267-84, esp. pp. 269-79Google Scholar.

35. On Socrates’ theory, see e.g. Gosling, Weakness of the Will, chs. 1-2, Price, Mental Conflict, ch. 1; for a rather different approach, including a comparison with Freudian theory about neurosis, Ferrari, G. R. F., ‘ Akrasia as Neurosis in Plato’s Protagoras’, Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Phihsophy 6 (1990), 115-50Google Scholar.

36. See Galen, , De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, ed. De Lacy, , with tr. and commentary, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1977-84): IV 1.14-2.44, De Lacy, pp. 238-47, quotation from IV 2.5, De Lacy, pp. 240-1Google Scholar. (De Lacy’s edition is a most valuable aid to research on the Stoic theory of the passions, since books IV-V of Galen’s work are sources of fundamental importance.) See also Long, A. A. and Sedley, D. N., The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1987), 2 vols.Google Scholar (=LS), esp. 54 B, J, K. On the theory, see Frede, M., ‘The Stoic Doctrine of the Affections of the Soul’, in Schofield, M. and Striker, G., edd., The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 93-110Google Scholar; B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, ch. 5; J. Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, ch. 5; Nussbaum, M., The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton, 1994), ch. 10Google Scholar.

37. The later (1st c. A.D.) Stoic Epictetus highlights this aspect of Medea’s situation, Discourses 1.28. 7-8. A revised Everyman translation of the Discourses is now available, by R. Hard, with introduction and notes by C. Gill (London, 1995). On Epictetus’ use of Medea as part of his advice on the correct way to use impressions, see Long, A. A., ‘Representation and the Self in Stoicism’, in Everson, , ed., Psychology, pp. 102-20, esp. pp. 111-20Google Scholar.

38. Gal. PHP IV 2.8-27, De Lacy, pp. 240-5, esp. 27, De Lacy, pp. 244-5, also III 3.13-22, De Lacy, pp. 188-91. For the alternative translation of E. Med. 1079, see n. 22 above.

39. See Gal. PHP IV 6.19-39, De Lacy, pp. 274-9.

40. On the significance of Chrysippus’ reading both for understanding the Stoic theory and the psychology of Medea’s monologue, see Gill, C., ‘Did Chrysippus Understand Medea?’, Phronesis 28 (1983), 136-49CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Gill, Personality, 3.6. On the extent to which Chrysippus’ discussion and related Stoic texts constitute a theory of akrasia, see Gosling, Weakness of the Will, ch. 5; Price, Menial Conflict, ch. 4.

41. See LS 541, K-P.; also Kidd, I., ‘Posidonius on Emotions’, in Long, A. A., ed., Problems in Stoicism (London, 1971), pp. 200-15Google Scholar.

42. This has been argued by Fillion-Lahille, J., Le De Ira de Seneque et la philosophie stoïcienne des passions (Paris, 1984), pp. 121-9Google Scholar; J. Cooper, ‘Stoic Theories of the Emotions’ (unpublished). See further Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, pp. 118-20, Inwood, B., ‘Seneca and Psychological Dualism’, in Brunschwig, J. and Nussbaum, M. C., edd., Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 150-83, esp. pp. 153-6Google Scholar; Price, Menial Conflict, pp. 175-8. On Galen’s own position, see J. Hankinson, ‘Actions and Passions: Affection, Emotion and Moral Self-Management in Galen’s Philosophical Psychology’, in Passions and Perceptions, pp. 184-222.

43. On the Epicurean theory of emotions, see Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, ch. 9. For a survey of ancient philosophical conceptions of therapy, including the Epicurean, see Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire. On some related features of Hellenistic thought, see Passions and Perceptions (ref. in n. 41 above), esp. Nussbaum, ‘Poetry and the Passions: two Stoic Views’, pp. 97-149.

44. This emerged in a seminar on ancient and modern approaches to the emotions organized by Richard Sorabji at the British Academy, London, in June 1995, as well as at a seminar organized by him on the therapy of the emotions at Wolfson College, Oxford, in March 1994, Sorabji is preparing a book on the Stoic and Augustinian theories of the passions.