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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2016
It is not possible in so brief a summary to discuss the literature on Socrates or the thought about him at any length. We have had a book by Norman Gulley (The Philosophy of Socrates [London, 1968] ) and Guthrie has devoted the second half of his third volume to Socrates. There has also been lively discussion on certain ‘Socratic’ questions and positions—the unity of αρβτή and the claim ούδείς εκών αμαρτάνει— but these discussions centre rather on the questions in themselves, and the writers accept that Socrates did hold these views and that Plato’s testimony on this can be accepted—with, of course, corroboration by Aristotle.
1. But see below on A. R. Lacey’s essay in this volume of essays. It should also be noted that Gulley has chapters on the political and religious views of Socrates, and these chapters are not tied to Aristotle’s testimony about him.
2. See Saunders, T. J., Hermes 96 (1968), 421 Google Scholar—34: see also his notes in his Penguin translation of the Laws, 367—91), and recent controversy with A. D. Woozley on ‘killing in anger’ (PhQ [1972], 303-17; [1973], 350-6).
3. Havelock, in The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics (London, 1957)Google Scholar develops the view that there is a passionate and oligarchical perverseness in Plato, and also a misrepresentation of the optimistic liberal humanism to be seen in Socrates and other fifth-century thinkers.
4. In Kephalaion, , Studies in Greek Philosophy and its Continuation offered to Professor C. J. de Vogel (Assen, 1975), 39–49 Google Scholar.
5. Neither the Charmides nor the Lysis fits in easily to this summary. There has been some discussion of both. Tuckey’s, T. G. commentary on the Charmides (Cambridge, 1951 Google Scholar; reprinted recently by Hakkert, Amsterdam) was published after his untimely death in the war. Wellman, Robert discusses the difficult passage about self-knowledge in Phronesis 9 (1964), 107 CrossRefGoogle Scholar—13, and Dyson, Michael deals with the same issues in Phronesis 19 (1974), 102-11CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
The Lysis is dealt with by Hoerber, R. G. in a rather ambitious but not very convincing way in Phronesis 4 (1959), 15—28CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Vlastos has useful comment on it in a brief appendix to his essay on ‘Love in Plato’ (Platonic Studies, 35—7). Cherniss, in Lustrum 4 (1959), 114 Google Scholar, item 579, cites a contribution by one Davis, T. to the Mélanges Joseph Maréchal (Paris and Brussels, 1950)Google Scholar in which he suggests that Lysis 221d—22a and certain passages earlier in the dialogue are sources for the Aristotelian doctrine of στέρησις.
Gulley’s article on ‘Ethical Analysis in Plato’s Early Dialogues’ has some reference to the methods of discussion in these dialogues (CQ N.S. 2 [1952], 74-82).
6. Robinson’s essay ‘Plato’s Consciousness of Fallacy’ first appeared in Mind 51 (1942), but was reprinted in his Essays in Greek Philosophy (Oxford, 1969).
7. Many continental scholars dispute the attribution of the myth to Protagoras himself, but Friedländer insists on its relevance. Guthrie agrees with Kerferd in taking it as essentially Protagoras’ position (vol. 3, 63—8). See also Cherniss, , Lustrum 4 (1959), 151 Google Scholar, item 763.
8. On the issue of the supposed hedonism of the Protagoras, see ch. VII below.
9. Bluck’s unfinished edition of the Sophistes edited by G. Neal (Manchester, 1975) has a diagrammatic summary of them (pp. 53—6).