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An important theme of David Burrell’s thoughtful and thought- provoking book is that it is a mistake to elevate the discussion of analogous usage in language to a systematic theory. The difference between Aquinas and Duns Scotus, and even more Cajetan lies just here : Scotus turns analogy into a metaphysical theory, Cajetan turns it into formula for constructing the logical arguments. Aquinas, on the other hand, despite occasional gestures in that direction, is mainly concerned to avoid systematisation. If Burrell is right, then for Aquinas there is no such thing as a ‘theory of analogy’, only a need to examine and where necessary try to justify the way we actually use words analogically. Indeed, in a sense the burden of Aquinas’ treatment is that there cannot be a theory. And of course if there cannot be a theory of analogy, a fortiori there cannot be such a thing as a theory of analogy for theologians in particular.
I say all this because it is the presumption of Humphrey Palmer’s book that there is such a theory, that it is designed for specifically theological purposes, and that it is no good. It is also his presumption that Aquinas had such a theory and that therefore what he says is no good. So if Burrell is right, then Palmer’s critique, however valid against theorists and metaphysicians like Scotus or Cajetan, does not really touch Aquinas at all. Which is a pity, since there seems little point in attacking straw arguments when there are arguments of tougher metal to be dealt with.
1 Analogy and Philosophcial Language. Burrell, David. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1973, 278 pp. £4Google Scholar.
2 Analogy. Palmer, Humphrey. Macmillan, London, 1973. 193 pp. £3.50CrossRefGoogle Scholar.