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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 July 2024
Marx denied that he was a moralist. But it can hardly be disputed that anyone who thinks seriously about certain matters which have to do with morals—the nature and causes of wrongdoing and suffering in human society, and how they may be remedied—must come to grips with his arguments. To put the matter bluntly, any responsible intellectual who is not a Marxist must at times ask himself just why he is not; and in what follows, I shall try to explain why I am not. To cope with the whole range of Marx’s writings, one needs to be a specialist; those who are not so may well be, as I am, deeply indebted to David MacLellan for his admirable summary, supported with copious quotations, of the main features of Marx’s thought. For better or for worse, anyway, my Marx will be largely Marx as McLellan presents him.
It is fundamental to Marx’s thought that human relationships, and consequently the whole web of institutions which make up society, are determined by the material circumstances in which men live and work; and consequently that if you change these material circumstances, you will change human ideas and behaviour at large. This thesis is generally labelled ‘historical materialism. Now the word ‘determined’ may be understood here in a relatively strong or a relatively weak sense. If it is taken in a strong sense, the thesis is that, given the material circumstances and the means of production prevalent in a society, its members cannot but behave very much as they do. (It would appear to be incorrect to ascribe to Mans a rigid determinism applying to the details of every individual action.)
1 The Germman Ideology, ed. Arthur, C. J. (London,1970); p. 104Google Scholar.
2 McLellan, David, The Thought of Karl Marx (London 1971)Google Scholar. All references not othherwise assigned will be to this volume.
3 Marx himself did not use this expression; yet it seems a convenient label for his philosophy (cf. 123). Engels admited (cf. 124) that some statements by Marx an himself had encouraged and extreme and erronueos view of the dependence of ideas on material circumstances. Cf. also the Third Thesis on Feuerbach, to the effect that men change their circumstances as well as being the product of circumstances. In The Communist Manisfesto the question is asked: ‘Does it require intuition to comprehend that man's ideas, views and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence. In his social relations and in his social life?’ (45). It is highly reasonable to believe that they do; but the question remains whether these material conditions are the sole or even the principal determinant. Marx, to do him justice, argues for the proposition that social and economic revolution, and not arguments, will alter people's basic pattern of ideas and beliefs (129); but one wonders how, on his own premisses taken on a strong interpretation, there is any point in his doing so.
4 Critique de la Raison Dialectique, particularly the opening section.
5 199–201.
6 This poitn has been well argued by H. B. Acton. Cf. The Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. XLIV, 1970; 143–156, On Some Criticisms fo Historical Materialism.
7 Cf. Engles' Anti‐Dühring, where such questions are dealt with at length.
8 Man's productinve activity, says Marx, is fundamental; his ideas; in politics. Philosophy, law, metaphysics, and religion ‐ are secondary (cf. particularly the beginning of The German Ideology; and McLellan, 123, 128). Does this apply to science or does it not? If does not, I fail to see why this one particular field of ideas should have any privilege over the rest. If it does, but all the same it is to be admitted that some scientific doctrines are true, Marx owes us an account of why this should not apply to some of the ideas of philosophy, metaphysics and religion as well. If he says that scientific ideas correspond to visible and tangible realities. Modern nuclear physics has proved him to be wrong. One may agree with Marx that discourse ought to aspire to correspond with the facts. While wondering whether he has quite hit off what such correspondence amounts to.
9 Cf., e.g. the first three of Marx's Theses on Feuerbach.
10 In The Holy Family we read of ‘the teaching of materialism on the original goodness and equal intellectual endowment of men, the omnipotence of experience, habit and education’ (127). This sounds to me more like ideology, in that it suits the aspirations of a particular section of society, admittedly a worthy one; and does not attend to much to inconvenient facts. One may contrast Satre, who conceives genuinely Marxian materialism to amount to a careful scrutiny of evidence, and constant revision of one's theoretical scheme in deference to it. In this sense, as Sartre points out, some excessively doctrinaire marxist, who dismiss thier opponent with a ready‐made label rather than attending to thier arguments, may be called ‘idealists’. Cf. Sartre, op. cit. p. 82.
11 The expression ‘groups bias’ is due to Bernard Lonergan (Insight, London 1957Google Scholar, especially 225–5). In The German Ideology Marx speaks of men ‘who make the perfecting of the illusion of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood’ (McLellan, 154). But he does admit that some individuals may achieve a correct assessment of certain aspects of their situation in spite of thier class background (loc. cit.). I would agree with Marx to the extent of holding tht great watchfulness and perseverance are neede if one is to escape the illusions of one's class: but would add the suggestion that this applies to proletarians as well as to bourgeois.
12 On the question of whether, and to what extent, the proletarait counts as a class (155–6), cf. especially a passage from Introduction to a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (158).
14 Cf. particularly Lorenz, K., On Aggression (London 1966)Google Scholar. The awe‐inspiring badness of the usual counter‐arguments to Lorenz's central thesis may be gauged from Man and Aggression, ed. Ashley Montague (London 1968).b Max does advert to the distinction between human drives which could exist in al social and economic circumstance, and those which depend only on particular forms of production and exchange, in The German Ideology (McLellan, 215); but he seems to assume rather than argue tht all individual and group selfishness belong to the second category. His argument against Max Stirner i Part II of The German Ideology (ed. Atrthur, 103–5), to the effect that there is no necessary clash between the different interests of human beings, is an illustration of the point. ‘Communists…do not put egoism agaisnt sefl‐sacrifice or self‐sacrifice agaist egoism…On the COntrary, they demonstrate the material basis engendering it (egoism), with which it disappears of itself’ (ibid. 104). But the question is, whether this basis is merely a particular economic and social order, or whether it is not also the central nervous system with which human beings happen to have evolved. I should add that I do not think Lorenz's theories to be necessarily inconsistent with every conceivable form of Marxism.
14 Social Determinants of Moral Ideas, London 1971.Google Scholar
15 The German Ideology, ed. Arthur; 95.
16 107, 111 il.
17 Martin Milligan has pointed out to me that Marx admits as much in Part III of Capital, p. 955.
18 Cf. A. Manser, Rousseau as Philosopher (Reason and Reality, ed. G. N. A. Vesey, 119), quoting Rousseay's Considerations on the Government of Poland.
19 The fact that literature and visual art from very different ages and cultures remain sources of enoyment and enlightenment is a strong indication that human nature is more constant, less amenable to historical variation, than Marx will allow. Marx just touches on the point I have mentioned in the Grundrisse; why should Grek art, which is bound up with a past form of social development, stil be for us a source of aesthetic enjoyment (123, 133)? He suggests rather lamely that the Greek's represnt the childhood of human society, and everyone loves a child.
20 A system of thought at once rigorous and flexible enough to provide an Aufhebung of Marx's view of human nature, while providing room for the discoveries of Freud and his disciples. Is urgently needed. In fact this has been provided by Bernard Lonergan in Insight, a really great book which ought to be much more widely read. In conclusion, my thanks are due to Fr. Herbert McCabe, whose advice has mitigated some of the crudities of the first draft on this article.
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