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Morality is Marxism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 July 2024

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I have written this paper on the basis of the hunch that there is something very misleading about the relationship, as Marx sometimes describes it, between the scientific analysis of society and morality. I have the hunch, also, that many of Marx’s followers have been misled in the way one would expect them to be, given his false clues. I should say, however, that this suspicion of confusion concerns more what Marx and his followers call by the name ‘morality’ than what they offer as a method and a substance for the analysis of society. This misleading confusion is that Marx and subsequent Marxists more or less explicitly define their stance as scientists by way of contrast with the status the moralist or moral theorist is, on their view, supposed to have. I shall not discuss in any detail the various ways in which this false contrast has been made out. Rather I shall mention some guiding lines of thought which lead to it.

The hypothesis which I will offer as an alternative to this contrast is simply that it would best serve both clarity and the history of moral thought if we were to agree on the following proposition: Marxism, as the science of society is, if a true science, nothing but morality and morality nothing but Marxism. Hence, the judgments about how to act which may be based on the results of that science, if true, are moral judgments. If, however, the science has produced more than trivially false results it is nothing but vice to act, or want to act on the judgments about acting which are entailed by them. The question, therefore, whether Marxism is or is not identical with morality is, to my mind, an empirical question, to be settled one way or the other by reference to the very same facts which show it to offer either crucially true or else false statements about contemporary society.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1973 Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers

References

page 57 note 1 For an interesting attempt to relate T. S. Kuhn's scientific paradigms to the way anthropologists have discussed the relation of beliefs to social structure, see S. B. Barnes, ‘Paradigms‐scientific and social’, Man, March 1969, pp. 94‐102. Perhaps further stuthes will show some oral cultures ‘think’ paradigmatically, others conversationally. How this presence or absence of sharply marked boundaries in beliefs relates to the presence or absence of social boundaries is yet another question.

page 60 note 1 This point was suggested by Mrs P. Foot in the course of seminar classes given in Oxford in the Trinity term of 1972. Other points in the same spirit are set out in her paper ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’ in Philosophical Review, June, 1972. The title of her paper suggests for me an alternative title for mine: ‘Morality as a System of Categorical Facts’.

page 60 note 2 By Professor H. Bracken of McGill University, Montreal, to whom I owe the substance of the points made in this paragraph.

page 61 note 1 Freedom and Reason, Oxford, 1961.Google Scholar