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Human Nature, Human Cultures and the Communication of the Knowledge of God
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
Abstract
The Catechism of the Catholic Church speaks of “the ability of human reason to know God [and the Church's] confidence in speaking about him to all men….” Such claims involve both philosophical and theological questions concerning the possibility of transcending cultures. Philosophy can vindicate the capacity of the intellect to speak of God, and despite varying intellectual traditions, the Church has been able to communicate the Gospel across cultural boundaries. In fact, historically Christendom was built up by preaching not to individuals but to cultures. Conversion of a culture means that its fundamental principle has changed, and individuals will usually begin to change with it. This does not necessarily imply an inauthentic or merely formal religious adherence, but highlights the fact that cultures as well as individuals are susceptible of evangelization.
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1 The following (summarizing Maritain's views) expresses my own opinion. “If we consider philosophy ‘abstractly,’ we can say that it is autonomous both in its principles and its methods, so that a pagan philosopher would have as good a chance of attaining philosophical truth as a believer. If, however, we consider it in ordine exercitii, we have to speak of a ‘Christian state of philosophy’ intrinsically potentiated by revelation. It seems, then, that we can say the following: In ordine exercitii the philosopher cannot have [a] neutral attitude towards revelation….” Noce, Augusto Del, “Thomism and the Critique of Rationalism: Gilson and Shestov,” Communio, International Catholic Review, vol. 25, no. 4, winter 1998, p. 735Google Scholar.
2 Curran, Charles, Catholic Social Teaching 1891-Present: a Historical, Theological, and Ethical Analysis (Washington : Georgetown University, 2002), pp. 8–9Google Scholar. Obviously Fr. Curran is hardly associated with any rigid or old-fashioned Thomism.
3 See Mitias, Michael H., “Universalism as a Metaphilosophy,” Dialogue and Universalism, vol. 14, no. 10–12, 2004, pp. 87–101CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 Ibid., p. 92.
5 Thomas, in fact, in contrast generally to later European philosophy, recognized philosophers outside European Christendom, e.g., the Arab philosophers, as among those with whom he was in intellectual dialog.
6 See, for example, Gawlikowski, Krzysztof, “From False ‘Western Universalism’ Toward True ‘Universal Universalism,’” Dialogue and Universalism, vol. 14, no. 10–12, 2004, pp. 47–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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10 Of course the Arab philosophers mentioned earlier were working within the Greek philosophic tradition.
11 “Meeting with Representatives from the World of Culture,” Paris, September 12, 2008. Available at www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2008/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20080912_parigi-cultura_en.html
12 ‘Paganism’ here is not meant as a derogatory term, but as a handy way of designating ways of worship which do not make truth claims in the same way that religions claiming revelation do and which rest in the end solely upon tradition.
I should say something briefly about Buddhism. Originally it was hardly a religion as Westerners are accustomed to use that term. “The Buddha himself, according to scripture, took an agnostic position with regard to the existence of God as known in the Indian tradition.” Bary, William Theodore de, “Introduction” to The Buddhist Tradition in India, China and Japan. (New York : Vintage, c. 1969, pp. xvii-xviiiGoogle Scholar.) Thus John Paul II, in Crossing the Threshold of Hope states, “Buddhism is in large measure an ‘atheistic’ system” in which “We do not free ourselves from evil through the good which comes from God; we liberate ourselves only through detachment from the world, which is bad. The fullness of such a detachment is not union with God, but what is called nirvana, a state of perfect indifference with regard to the world.” (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1994, p. 86.) There is reason to regard the later development of the Mahayana doctrine as a religion, however. Cf. de Bary, The Buddhist Tradition in India, China and Japan, p. 73. Whether it is properly called pagan or not cannot be adequately addressed here.
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14 “Even certain conceptions of life coming from the East betray this lack of confidence, denying truth its exclusive character and assuming that truth reveals itself equally in different doctrines, even if they contradict one another.” John Paul II, Encyclical Fides et Ratio, no. 5.
15 Denzinger 3009. Cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 156, where miracles and prophecy are mentioned as among the chief motives of credibility.
As a matter of fact, such an approach might be useful for philosophers like A. J. Ayer who confidently utter such assertions as “The point which we wish to establish is that there cannot be any transcendent truths of religion” or “…the sentence, ‘There exists a transcendent god’ has, as we have seen, no literal significance.” (Language, Truth and Logic, New York : Dover, 1952, pp. 117–18 and 119Google Scholar). But the claim of a miracle is a claim that would necessarily have potential meaning even within such a philosophical system and, if verified by sufficient evidence, would seem to require some explanation by way of an adequate cause.
16 It is true, of course, that the religious stories of pagans are replete with miraculous occurrences and that it is not unknown to claim such occurrences as happening even today, which are explained of course according to their own religious ideas.
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20 But as we will see below, in fact people today often approach these questions in ways not altogether dissimilar to that of their ancestors who lived in more rude times.
21 In the case of Hawaii, recounted above, there was in fact resistance to the overthrow of paganism by a member of the royal family, who “rescued one of the god figures and strode with it from the assembly. He rallied a following of the pious and raised a revolt.” Kroeber, Anthropology: Culture Patterns and Processes, p. 212. There would have been no other way except by armed resistance to oppose the royal policy.
22 Hitchcock, James, The Recovery of the Sacred (New York : Seabury, c. 1974) pp. 120–21Google Scholar. Emphasis omitted.
23 Martínez, Francisco Javier, “To Speak of God or to Show the Redemption of Christ?” Communio, International Catholic Review, vol. 21, no. 4, winter 1994, p. 689Google Scholar.
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25 Cf. Paul VI, Evangelii nuntiandi, no. 80 and John Paul II, Encyclical Redemptoris Missio, no. 36.
26 Cf. Gilkey, Langdon, “Plurality and Its Theological Implications” in Hick, John and Knitter, Paul F., eds., The Myth of Christian Uniqueness (Maryknoll : Orbis Books, 1987), pp. 39–40Google Scholar, for a clear statement that “cultural changes” – the fact that the West, once dominant “militarily, scientifically, industrially, politically, sociologically, morally, and religiously,” now perceived itself to have lost that unchallenged “assumption of superiority” – were largely responsible for the new theological atmosphere of pluralism or relativism. While it is true that the shift in theological outlook reflected a changed cultural atmosphere, the situation was always more complex than Gilkey allows. Perceptive observers were always able to separate their theology from their assessment of military and economic factors. Hilaire Belloc, for example, no proponent of theological pluralism, wrote in the 1920s, “There is no reason why [Islam's] recent inferiority in mechanical construction, whether military or civilian, should continue indefinitely.” Survivals and New Arrivals, p. 195. See pp. 188–95 for his discussion of the historical position and strengths of Islam.