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Do you, when speaking informally in your own words, talk of particular other people as ‘holy’, or say you desire ‘holiness’? Christians today vary widely on this—from omission of the word ‘holiness’, through assorted hesitations, to unselfconsciously terming certain others holy and voicing a wish to be holy themselves. People may often have deep down a lot more inklings regarding holiness than commonly become explicit. But faced here with an invitation to consider how ‘our perceptions’ of holiness relate to ‘our perceptions’ of sin, it is wise to note that initial reactions on the former front as well as the latter can prove less than clear-cut. In my own case, I tend to be fairly reticent in singling out specific individuals as markedly holy, while quick—amidst theologizing—to state that all are called to holiness, and that some growth towards it is widespread.
The central ideas in this article are the possibility for humans of close relationship with God and alignment with God’s purposes; the primacy in this of God’s gracious outreach; yet the place also of human personal responsibility. These ideas lie at the heart of my account of holiness; and they help assessment of statements about holiness as ‘virtue’, or as ‘wholeness’. Notions of sin are correspondingly clarified. And light is thrown—so I think—on some issues evident during reflection on engagement within history, including in political arenas.
From biblical times onwards, ‘holiness’ has been applied to certain collective referents: specially ‘People’ and ‘Church’. ‘Sin’ terminology too has had collective referents, whether defined religiously or by other social concepts. The immediate focus of this paper is on individuals, and ascriptions of holiness or sin to them. But such focus spans not just any particular individual’s private concerns, but also the individual’s stances vis-à-vis broad social affairs and structures.
I am grateful to Michael Hollings, Gerard J. Hughes and Richard Price for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1 I have amplified some of these points in King's liieologicu/Review 10 (1987), pp. 5–10.
2 Jesus is by no means only to be portrayed as the distinctive optimal case of human response: see my articles in Heyfhrop Journal 25 (1984), pp. 19–38. Heythrop Journul 28(1987), pp. 144–164, Downside Review 107(1989). pp. 1–21, in note I above.
3 Within history, does God give all an equal opportunity to be markedly holy? Do emergent differences stem just from variations in the fervour of human ‘input’, and/or from ‘contingent’ factors/ Or does God give some persons particular grace to respond well and become on earth very close to God‐this for building up the Church? A full study would explore these issues.
4 Pudre Pi0 of Piefrelcinu, Letters, Volume I1 (Foggia: Capuchin Friary 1975). pp. 561f.
5 Space does not permit probing other religions, and holiness therein.
6 Spirifuulity of Liberufion (Maryknoll: Orbis 1988), p. 80Google Scholar.
7 That the situation is indeed as thus avowed‐involving distinctively more than a person's uprightness and devotion‐surely contributes to why we tend to such resewe in ascribing holiness.
8 Note my use of the phrase ‘wholeness as persons’ at the start of section I a).
9 Moreover, see note 3 above.
10 Profanity or unholiness in the sense of irreverence is a separate issue.
11 See Otto, R., The Ideu offhe Holy, 2nd Edn. (London: OUP 1950)Google Scholar. chapter 8.
12 If it is apposite to talk of ‘sinning against fellow humans’ (compare, doing wrongs against them), this is surely because of the positions of victims and illdoers relative to God's purposes.
13 For a sensitive general discussion of some analytical distinctions regarding the tenn ‘responsibility’, see Hart, H.L.A., Punishmenf und Responsibilify (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1968)Google Scholar, chapters 6 and 9.
14 Heurts Not Garments(London: DLT 1982), pp. 51. 53Google Scholar.
15 Living Prierthood (Southend: Mayhew‐McCrimmon 1977), pp. 92fGoogle Scholar.
16 When elaborating, with due refinements and warnings, this outlook on faith, contemplation and mysticism, I adduce the support among others of L. Bouyer, Introduction a lo Vie Spirifuelle (Paris: Desck 1960); and I. Trethowan, The Absolute und fhe Afonemenr (London: George Allen and Unwin 1971). pp. 227–2436, and Mysfickm and Theology (London: G. Chapman 1975).
17 Compare Sobrino's comments in Spirifuulify of Liberufion, pp. 6f, 21, 68f.
18 Moreover, while Sobrino and I both hold that Christians should urgently be concerned with politics, he sets out a more spacifK norm than I do regarding the style of political action, and analysis of ‘structures’, to be adopted.
19 We should shun any idea that, despite the other people's conscious will, their ‘true’ selves ‘really’ will the corredve measures, so that they are not actually bcing werd after all. For comments on that ‘monstrous’ idea, see 1. Berlin, Four Essuys on Liberfy (London:OUP 1%9), pp. 132–134Google Scholar.
20 Spirifuulify of Liberufion, p. 129. In this book Sobrino explicitly indicates that he maintains‐as I do‐the view that in strictly limited cases, military measures against unjust regimes can be justified: see pp. 82–85.
21 Compare objections to citing ‘sin’, or indeed ‘immorality as such’, as a ground for coercing by means of the criminal law. I discussed that topic in ‘Morality, Metaphysics and the Criminal Law’, word Review (1968), pp. 83–93.
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