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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2024
In order to understand how God could know evil intentions, two things are requisite: an understanding of how God knows and an understanding of the nature of evil. It is a well-known doctrine of Thomas Aquinas that God knows his creation through knowing himself. As the ultimate explanation of potentiality and change in the world, it could not be that God himself is in any way potential. Hence he does not learn about his creation from his creatures. Rather, God knows all his creatures and their actions through knowing his own simple nature. It is also a well-known doctrine that evil is the privation of good, and that evil is only known through knowing good. Putting these two doctrines together, it follows that God knows evil in the world by knowing the good that he is. While this explanation seems adequate to explain physical evils (e.g., the mouse’s demise is explained by God’s understanding himself as able to be participated by the good which is eagle), it is not clear how this explanation can handle God’s knowledge of evil intentions since these intentions do not seem capable of being explained in terms of something essentially good.
In order to better understand this problem and set up the grounds for some legitimate answer, it is necessary to treat each of these issues separately and in some greater detail. Thus, in the first section, God’s knowledge as it concerns his creation in general and in particular will be discussed.
1 Summa Theologiae (hereafter ST) I, 2, 3.
2 ST I, 14, 7.
3 ST I, 14, 7, c.
4 ST I, 14, 5, c.
5 Metaphysics VIII, 6 [foil. 100rb–100va].
6 ST I, 14, 6.
7 ST I, 48, 1. This doctrine he inherits from Aristotle (see Metaphysics IX, 4 [1055 a 33]) and Augustine (see Enchiridion XI).
8 … neque definiri, neque cognosci potest, nisi per bonum. ST I, 14, 10, ad 4, ed. Commissio Piana (Ottawa: Harpell's Press, 1953), Tomus I, p. 101b. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own.
9 ST I,14,8.
10 ST I,105,5.
11 See ST I,3.
12 Aquinas does say that these powers are clouded by the growing tendency toward vice that evil intentions incur. See ST I, 64,1 & 2, where Thomas discusses the powers of the angels after the fall. I am not sure that he is right in saying that these powers are clouded in the angel, since a purely intellectual creature (as immaterial) does not grow or change in time. I do think that these powers are clouded in us by our evil intentions, but that is because every human act is the act of the whole human being, which is irreducibly composite (intellectual and material). Thus, human intentions involve the passions, and through repeated choices involving these passions, we develop habits or dispositions to do good or evil–the moral virtues and vices.
13 Summa contra gentiles (hereafter, CG) I, 71, ed. Leonina, Commissio (Romae: Desclee & Herder, 1934), p. 68Google Scholar.
14 Such an explanation can be used as a way to address the problem of evil; and since God's knowledge and his will are the same, such an issue is bound to come up. However, in this paper, I am not so much interested in defending God from the charge of being evil as in the question of how God knows the evils that occur in his world.
15 On the perfection of the universe as best created good, see CG I, 71, [8].
16 CG III, 10, [11].
17 Praeter intentionem enim peccantis est quod ex hoc sequatur all quod bonum. ST I, 19, 9, ad 1, Piana, Tomus I, p. 140b.
18 ST I, 113, l, ad l & ad 3, CG III,6, [7 & 9].
19 CG III, 4 & 6, CG I, 95, [3]; ST I, 103, 8.
20 ST I, 115,4, c.
21 ST I, 49, I.c.
22 ST I,14,10; 19, 9; CG I, 63, [8].
23 Nam si cognosceret aliquid per speciem quae non est ipse, sequeretur de necessitate quod proportio eius ad illam speciem esset sicut proportio potentiae ad actum. Unde oportet quod ipse intelligat solum per speciem quae est sua essentia. CG I, 71, [12].
24 Sic autem est cognoscibile unumquoque, secundum quod est Unde, cum hoc sit esse mali, quod est privatio boni, per hoc ipsum quod Deus cognoscit bona, cognoscit etiam mala; sicut per lucem cognoscuntur tenebrae. ST I, 14, 10 c, Piana, Tomus I, pp. l0la—‐lOlb.
25 See CG III 11; 1, 71, [6];ST I, 19, 9; 49, 1 & 2
26 CG I, 71, [2].
27 ST I, 19, 9, c. Here Thomas says that the lion's object in killing the stag is the good of food. CG I, 71, [8]. Here Thomas speaks of the best created good as the order of the universe.
28 ST I, 19, 9, c. Here Thomas gives the example of the good of pleasure as the object of the fornicator.
29 ST I, 19, 9, ad 1.
30 … malum culpae, quod privat ordinem ad bonum divinum, Deus nullo modo vult. ST I, 19, 9, c, Piana, Tomus I, p. 140b.
31 ST I, 14, 5, c.
32 ST I, 14,10, c & ad 4.
33 ST I, 19, 9, ad 1.
34 ST I, 2, 3, ad 1.
35 On the weakness of affections, see ST I, 113, 1, ad 1; on the assault of the demons, see ST I, 114, 1.
36 … voluntas non ex necessitate sequitur inclinationem appetitus inferioris, licet enim passiones quae sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili, habeant quandam vim ad inclinandam voluntatem; tamen in potestate voluntatis remanet sequi passiones, vel eas refutare. ST I, 115, 4, c, Piana, Tomus I, p. 688a. At ST I, 114, 3, c, Thomas says that not all sins arise from the instigation of the devil “but some from free choice and the corruption of the flesh” (sed quaedam ex libertate arbitrii et camis corruptione, Piana, Tomus I, p. 680).
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