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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
The enduring value of the Pascal's Wager is that, bypassing intractable debates over God's existence, it brings the question of God into a practical, existential focus. This essay seeks to re-examine this famous Wager for its possible application to the current context of widespread agnosticism and increasingly assertive atheism. The essay argues that if rightly contextualised the Wager reminds people to seriously address their need for meaningful commitments and to confront their mortality. Rather than focusing on winning and losing in the afterlife, the Wager in our modern context can serve to highlight how human life is structured according to meaning, giftedness and relationality. Revealing the gifted and finite nature of existence provides grounds for a discussion of ultimate meaning and God.
1 Pascal, Blaise, Pensées, trans. Krailsheimer, A. J. (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1966), p. 150 (no. 418)Google Scholar; Cf. Pascal, Blaise, Pensées and Other Writings, trans. Levi, Honor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 152–8 (no. 680)Google Scholar.
2 Pascal, Pensées, p. 150 (418). Pascal further argues that Christians should not be condemned for not offering rational proofs for God because God is infinitely beyond comprehension and to offer such proofs would be to neglect this fact (making God reducible to reason), while also contradicting the experience of God's absence in the world (because, according to Christian understanding, God is infinite being outside finite existence, making finite existence possible).
3 Following Pascal's logic of wagering can be difficult in sections, though his aim seems to be to emphasise the logic of infinity: that all is to be gained with an infinite God, even if the chances are small. In other words, the end of a finite human being can only be truly satisfied in an infinite God. Cf. Alan Hájek, “Pascal's Wager”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 6 Nov 2012, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pascal-wager/.
4 Pascal, Pensées, pp. 156–164 (427–31).
5 Pascal, Pensées and Other Writings, pp. 160–1 (681). Cf. Pascal, Pensées, pp. 157–8 (427). It is interesting to note that the indifferent person formulates the question in terms of nothingness or an angry God. It seems that the conception of God, which I will discuss later in the essay, influences how one views the question of life and death.
6 Pascal, Pensées, p. 156 (427).
7 Pascal, Pensées, pp. 156–162 (427).
8 Pascal's Wager is criticised for its vulgar appeal to self-interest to stimulate belief in God, yet it is important to note how Pascal contextualises the Wager as involving an authentic search for truth and purpose by a being with an immortal soul. Cf. Hájek, “Pascal's Wager”.
9 Denying purpose, as Richard Dawkins and others do, is problematic. One ends up making contradictory statements like: the truth is that there is no truth; or, the purpose of life is that there is no purpose. Each makes a claim about truth and purpose, though in a negative way. To deny purpose is to deny the very nature of our actions and our living – because we naturally seek the good that contributes to our fulfilment.
10 In relation to ethical activity, see Veatch, Henry B., Rational man: a modern interpretation of Aristotelian ethics (Bloomington, ID: Indiana University Press, 1962)Google Scholar.
11 Ratzinger, Joseph, Introduction to Christianity, trans. Foster, J.R. (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1990), pp. 15–49Google Scholar.
12 It is interesting to note that in a recent study, Andrew Hodge concluded that those who contemplate the meaning of life within the context of religious belief are happier than those who do not. Cf. Hodge, Andrew, Happiness, Philosophy and Economics, PhD Thesis (Brisbane, Aus: The University of Queensland, 2012)Google Scholar.
13 While Pascal argues that we cannot know God in his nature, he critiques other beliefs in God (e.g., paganism, Islam) and argues that Christianity is the most reasonable in terms of its end (an infinitely loving God) and the means to achieving this end. Cf. “Pascal's Wager”, Wikipedia, 28 May 2013, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pascal%27s_Wager.
14 A critique of this argument is that if God does not exist, one does lose truth; in other words, what one believed to be true – namely, God's existence – is not true if the wager is lost (Cf. Hájek, “Pascal's Wager”). Nevertheless, Pascal's emphasis seems to be existential here – if God does exist, purpose and infinity are gained, while if God does not exist, all is lost. Nevertheless, there is a problem that forcing oneself to believe in God can mean one loses one's existential and intellectual authenticity. I return to this problem later in the essay.
15 “Pascal's Wager”, Wikipedia.
16 Pascal, Pensées, pp. 155–164 (427–31).
17 McCabe, Herbert, God Matters (London and New York: Continuum, 1987), p. 6Google Scholar.
18 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Notebooks 1914–16, ed. von Wright, G. H. and Anscombe, G. E. M., trans. Anscombe, G. E. M. (New York: Harper, 1961)Google Scholar, Journal entry (8 July 1916), p. 74e.
19 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, pp. 67–72.
20 The Australian swimmer and three-time Olympic gold medallist, Stephanie Rice, expresses this experience succinctly: “There is just someone out there who looks out for you. I always ask for help and guidance before meets [swimming competitions], and make a habit of going to church before a meet to pray for help and guidance” (Brigid Delaney, “Stephanie Rice 3.0: swimming star grows up”, The Age, 2 July 2012, http://www.theage.com.au/olympics/swimming-london-2012/stephanie-rice-30-swimming-star-grows-up-20120702-21c5u.html).
21 Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, pp. 39–46.
22 McCabe, God Matters, p. 2.
23 McCabe, God Matters, p. 2.
24 McCabe, God Matters, pp. 2–3.
25 McCabe, God Matters, p. 3.
26 McCabe, God Matters, p. 5.
27 McCabe, God Matters, pp. 3–5.
28 McCabe, God Matters, p. 5.
29 McCabe, God Matters, p. 5.
30 McCabe, God Matters, p. 7.
31 McCabe, God Matters, p. 7. McCabe acknowledges that while asking this question is to stretch our language beyond its capacity into areas humans do not fully comprehend, it is still necessary for us to contemplate the mystery of existence and infinity.
32 Williams, Rowan, Tokens of Trust (Louisville, KY, and London, UK: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), p. 32Google Scholar.
33 Cf. Bailie, Gil, Violence Unveiled: Humanity at the Crossroads (New York: Crossroad, 1995), pp. 234–59Google Scholar.
34 Williams, Tokens of Trust, p. 33.
35 Williams, Tokens of Trust, pp. 33–34.
36 Williams, Tokens of Trust, p. 35.
37 Williams, Tokens of Trust, p. 37.
38 Cf. Damon Young, “Is God interesting?”, ABC The Drum, 27 July 2012, http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/4156730.html.
39 Cf. Ratzinger, Joseph, Values in a Time of Upheaval, trans. McNeil, B. (New York, NY: Crossroad Publishing and San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2006), pp. 47–8Google Scholar; Cf. Spaemann, R., “La perle précieuse et le nihilisme banal,” Catholica 33 (1992), pp. 43–50Google Scholar.
40 Flew, Antony, There is a God: How the World's Most Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2007), pp. 133–45Google Scholar.
41 Williams, Tokens of Trust, pp. 42–3.
42 Williams, Tokens of Trust, p. 54.
43 This is why Pascal recommends that doubters and unbelievers continue to seek the truth and try to undertake the practices of belief, so to become accustomed to life with God and develop a desire and understanding for it that could make sense of their lives.