Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-mlc7c Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-10T05:19:12.849Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Metaphilosophy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2024

Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

The basic reason why it is so difficult in practice to give an account of philosophy’s aims and method is undoubtedly that there is no agreement among philosophers themselves about what they are trying to do and how; and this means that they often find it as difficult to explain themselves to each other as to those whose home is in other disciplines. This is especially so when the philosophers in question belong to different traditions. It is well known that philosophers today fall broadly into two camps, those who belong to the Englishspeaking tradition of analytic philosophy which was born of a reaction against Hegel at the beginning of this century, and those who remain if not in the Hegelian, then at least in the Cartesian tradition and who are now represented primarily in France and Germany. I suppose that we may add as a third group the neoScholastic philosophers of the seminaries and Catholic universities, who at least until recently represented a revival of the medieval tradition, but are now being more or less absorbed by the first two groups (and especially the second) according to their physical location and that of the universities in which their staff are trained.

To each of these traditions there corresponds an attitude towards philosophical aims and methodology which may be associated with a turning-point in the history of philosophy.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1968 Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers

References

page 420 note 1 This interpretation must nevertheless reckon with a passage such as B167–168.

page 422 note 1 British Analytical Philosophy, edited by Williams, Bernard and Montefiore, Alan; London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966Google Scholar. Henceforth BAP.

page 422 note 2 BAP, 2.

page 422 note 3 BAP, 3.

page 422 note 4 Cahiers du Royaumont, Philosophie No. IV; Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1962.

page 423 note 1 BAP, 177.

page 425 note 1 Philosophical Investigations, I, 87.

page 425 note 2 Stenius, Erik, Wittgenstein's Tractatus: A Critical Exposition of its Main Lines of Thought. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960Google Scholar. Ch. XI. Wittgenstein as a Kantian Philosopher.

page 426 note 1 BAP, 143.

page 426 note 2 The Development of Logic, 637, 707.

page 427 note 1 II, xii.

page 428 note 1 I am indebted to my colleague Mr R. M. White for his comments and suggestions on this paper.

A correction has been issued for this article: