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Feelings and Decision Making

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

Jason King
Jason King*
Affiliation:
Saint Vincent College, Latrobe, PA
*
[email protected]
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Type
Original Article
Information
New Blackfriars , Volume 97 , Issue 1067 , January 2016 , pp. 39 - 51
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 The Dominican Council. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

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References

1 This research has become broadly available in works such as Arliely, Dan, Predictably Irrational (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008)Google Scholar; Gladwell, Malcolm, Blink (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2005)Google Scholar; Goleman, Daniel, Emotional Intelligence (New York: Bantam Dell, 1995)Google Scholar; Kahneman, Daniel, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011)Google Scholar; Lehrer, Jonah, How We Decide (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2009)Google Scholar; Medina, John, Brain Rules (Seattle: Pear Press, 2009)Google Scholar; Nussbaum, Martha, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pink, Daniel, Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us (New York: Riverhead Books, 2011)Google Scholar; Schwartz, Barry, Paradox of Choice (New York: Harper Perennial, 2004)Google Scholar.

2 Cates, Diana Fritz, Choosing to Feel: Virtue, Friendship, and Compassion for Friends (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997)Google Scholar, Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009)Google Scholar, and “Love: A Thomistic Analysis,” Journal of Moral Theology, 1.2 (2012), pp. 1–30Google Scholar; Ferry, Leonard, “Passionalist or rationalist: the emotions in Aquinas’ moral theology,” New Blackfriars 93 (2012), pp. 292–308CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fitterer, Robert J., Love and Objectivity in Virtue Ethics: Aristotle, Lonergan, and Nussbaum on Emotions and Moral Insight (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Harak, Simon J., Virtuous Passions: The Formation of Christian Character (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1993)Google Scholar; Leget, Carlo, “Martha Nussbaum and Thomas Aquinas on the emotions,” Theological Studies 64.3 (2003), pp. 558–581CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lombardo, Nicholas, The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2010)Google Scholar; Mattison, William C. III, “Movements of Love: A Thomistic Perspective on Agape and Eros,” Journal of Moral Theology, 1.2 (2012), pp. 31–60Google Scholar; Miner, Robert, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011)Google Scholar; Ryan, Thomas, “Aquinas on compassion : has he something to offer today?” Irish Theological Quarterly 75.2 (2010), pp. 157–174CrossRefGoogle Scholar and “Revisiting affective knowledge and connaturality in Aquinas,” Theological Studies 66.1 (2005), pp. 49–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Waddell, Paul, The Primacy of Love: An Introduction to the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1992)Google Scholar.

3 See Lonergan, Bernard, “The Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical Mindedness,” A Second Collection (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Carr, Anne, “The New Vision of Feminist Theology: Method,” in Lacugna, Catherine, ed., Freeing Theology: The Essentials of Theology in Feminist Perspective (New York: HarperOne, 1993)Google Scholar.

4 In particular, see Cates, Aquinas on Emotions.

5 The main work by Bernard Lonergan on feelings is in the chapter “The Human Good” in Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994)Google Scholar. For reflections on this work, see Barden, Garrett, “Sources of Value,” Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 7 (1989), pp. 132–140Google Scholar; Conn, Walter, “Affective Conversion: The Transformation of Desire,” in Fallon, Timothy P and Riley, Philip Boo, eds., Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J. (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1987)Google Scholar; Doorley, Mark, The Place of the Heart in Lonergan's Ethics: The Role of Feelings in the Ethical Intentionality Analysis of Bernard Lonergan (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996)Google Scholar; Dunne, Tad, “Being in Love,” Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 13 (1995), pp. 161–175Google Scholar; Tekippe, Terry and Roy, Louis, “Lonergan and the Fourth Level of Intentionality,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1996), pp. 225–242CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tyrrell, Bernard, “Feelings as Apprehensive-Intentional Responses to Values,” Lonergan Workshop 7 (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1988)Google Scholar; and Vertin, Michael, “Judgments of Value for the Later Lonergan,” Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 13 (1995), pp. 221–248Google Scholar.

6 See Ryan, William and Tyrrell, Bernard, “Introduction,” in Lonergan, Bernard, A Second Collection (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), pp. vii-viiiGoogle Scholar.

7 This continuity is suggested in Doorley, The Place of the Heart in Lonergan's Ethics and Fitterer, Love and Objectivity in Virtue Ethics.

8 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 236.

9 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 30.

10 Lonergan, , Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 3: Insight (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997 ), p. 205Google Scholar.

11 Lonergan, Insight, p. 205.

12 See Robert Doran's work on this subject in Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990Google Scholar). Also Gladwell's Blink is also an exploration of this topic.

13 See Tversky, Amos and Kahneman, Daniel, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” Science 211.4481 (1981), pp. 453–458CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed. See also Tversky, Amos and Thaler's, Richard “Preference Reversals,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 4.3 (1990), pp. 201–211CrossRefGoogle Scholar (republished as chapter seven in Thaler's, Winner's Curse (NY: Princeton University Press, 1994))Google Scholar.

14 Lehrer, How We Decide, p. 106.

15 Ariely, Predictably Irrational, p. 4.

16 Goleman, Emotional Intelligence, p. 18.

17 Lehrer, How We Decide, p. 18

18 Goleman, Emotional Intelligence, p. 24. See also Lehrer, How We Decide, p. 18 & p. 35 and Gladwell, Blink, pp. 189–194 for similar discussions on how emotions can comprehend and move person to react before consciousness has fully assessed situation.

19 Goleman, Emotional Intelligence, p. 51.

20 Ibid., p. 50.

21 Ibid., p. 52.

22 Lehrer, How We Decide, p. 186. His discussion goes from pp. 186–188.

23 Gladwell, Blink, pp. 214–221. Gladwell relies on Ami Klin's (and Warren Jones, Robert Schultz, Fred Volkmar, and Donald Cohen) “Defining and Quantifying the social Phenotype in Autism,” American Journal of Psychiatry 159 (2002) pp. 895–908CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24 Lonergan, Insight, p. 205.

25 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 31.

26 Ibid.

27 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, p. 131.

28 Ibid., p. 28. See also, pp. 130–131.

29 Ibid., p. 31.

30 Ibid., p. 30. See also, p. 23, “Nonetheless, I shall argue that emotions always involve thought of an object combined with thought of the object's salience or importance; in that sense, they always involve appraisal or evaluation.” And p. 88, emotions are understood to be “a certain sort of vision or recognition, as value-laden ways of understanding the world.”

31 Ibid., p. 117.

32 See Medina, Brain Rules, chapters 4 and 9.

33 Pink, Drive, chapter 3.

34 Goleman, Emotional Intelligence, p. 6.

35 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, p. 135.

36 From Laws, J. and Schwartz, P., Sexual Scripts: The Social Construction of Female Sexuality (Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press, 1977)Google Scholar as quoted in “Script,” The Complete Dictionary of Sexology (New York, NY: Continuum, 1995)Google Scholar.

37 Lehrer, How We Decide, pp. 95–96

38 Lonergan, Method, p. 34.

39 Ibid., p. 35.

40 Ibid., p. 38.

41 Ibid., p. 34.

42 Ibid., p. 36.

43 Ibid., p. 48.

44 Lonergan, Insight, p. 237.

45 In his section on “Beliefs” in Method in Theology (pp. 41–47), Lonergan indicates that while people come to know things through their own insight, the vast majority of what people know are mediated to them from others.

46 Ibid., p. 36.

47 Ibid., p. 37.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 Lehrer, How We Decide, pp. 134–139.

53 Ibid., p. 136.

54 Ibid., p. 140.

55 For a similar discussion of this same phenomenon see Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice, chapter 4.

56 See Tetlock, Philip, Expert Political Judgment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006)Google Scholar as cited in Lehrer, How We Decide, pp. 207–210.

57 Lehrer, How We Decide, p. 208.

58 Ibid., pp. 208–209.

59 For Lonergan's discussion of this phenomenon, see Method in Theology, pp. 37–38, when judgments of values do not result in doing.

60 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 32.