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The shifting laws on the use of force and the trivialization of the UN collective security system: the need to reconstitute it*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2009

Nicholas Tsagourias
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Abstract

The war on Iraq has fuelled the debate about the nature and meaning of the international security system premised on the United Nations. This paper begins by examining the nature and subsequent modification of the UN collective security system. It focuses on the practice of Security Council authorisations to use force and the expanded notion of self-defence. It identifies as causes of such transformation the changing security environment, power asymmetries and the structural inability of the UN to adapt accordingly. The paper examines the failings of such a system and concludes by offering a framework for an international security system based on legitimacy interpreted as the congruence between processes, actors, claims and practices.

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Netherlands Yearbook of International Law , Volume 34 , December 2003 , pp. 55 - 87
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Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 2003

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References

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37. When the SC authorises the use of force, it customary employs the term ‘all necessary means’. See for example Resolution 678 (1990) and more recently in Resolution 1464 (2003) in relation to Côte d'Ivoire. On a previous occasion, the British government maintained that ‘Resolution 949 does not as such authorise the use of force’ by threatening Iraq with serious consequences. BYIL (1995) p. 727. During the adoption of Resolution 1441 Mr Negroponte, US Representative to the United Nations declared ‘[t]his resolution contains no “hidden triggers” and no “automaticity” with respect to the use of force’; See also the statement by Sir Jeremy Greenstock, British Representative ‘[t]here is no “automaticity” in this resolution. If there is a further Iraqi breach of its disarmament obligations, the matter will return to the Council for discussion as required in paragraph 12. We would expect the Security Council then to meet its responsibilities.’ S/PV.4644.

38. See for instance in relation to Iraq SC Res. 1154 (1998) and SC Res. 1204 (1998). For the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the ‘US should consult the Security Council before military strikes take place’ whereas according to the US it ‘did not preclude the unilateral use of force’. Keesings (1998) at p. 42163. On 16–20 December 1998, the US and UK forces carried out air strikes on Iraqi military facilities. Keesings (1998) at p. 42697; Torrelli, M., ‘Le nouveau défi iraqien à la communauté internationale: la dialectique des volontés’, 102 RGDIP (1998) p. 435.Google Scholar

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48. ‘… this resolution [1441] does not constrain any Member State from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and security’. Statement by Mr Negroponte, Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, S/PV. 4644 (8 November 2002).

49. A/57/PV.2, p. 10.

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65. Dinstein, op. cit. n. 59, at pp. 169–173; Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, ICJ Rep. (1986) p. 14 (hereinafter referred to as Nicaragua case) paras. 194–195, 210–211, 247–249.

66. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ distinguished between ‘grave forms of the use of force’, those constituting an armed attack, from other, less grave forms, that may justify ‘proportionate countermeasures’ by the victim state. Nicaragua case, paras. 247–249. Even in such a case, according to Article 48 of the ILC's Articles on State Responsibility, third states can invoke the responsibility of the breaching state for erga omnes or jus cogens obligations only, whereas their right to take countermeasures either individually or collectively is disputed. The use of force is always impermissible. Crawford, J., International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2002) at pp. 302–305.Google Scholar

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71. Nicaragua case, para. 195; Simma, ed., op. cit. n. 13, at pp. 803 et seq.

72. Nicaragua case, para. 193.

73. Nicaragua case, para. 249.

74. The Caroline case (1841) 29 BFSP 1137–1138. Waldock, C.H.M., ‘The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law’, 81 Hague Receuil (1952) p. 451, at p. 498Google Scholar: ‘… where there is convincing evidence not merely of threats and potential danger but of an attack being actually mounted, then an armed attack may be said to have begun to occur, though it has not passed the frontier.’ Woolsey, T.D., Introduction to the Study of International Law, 6th edn. revised and enlarged (London, Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivingston 1888) p. 185Google Scholar: ‘[t]he prevention of intended injury is a ground of war. This indeed is a case of self defence; only the injury must be not remote nor constructive but fairly inferable from the preparations and intentions of the other party’. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) p. 15: ‘For centuries, international law recognised that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack.’ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>.

75. In relation to the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 see UN Doc. S/PV.2280 (1981); Beres, L.R., ‘Israel and Anticipatory Self-Defence’, 8 Arizona JI & Comp. L (1991) p. 89Google Scholar. The Security Council condemned the Israeli action as ‘clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct.’ SC Res. 487 (1991). Israel has also justified the Six Day War (1967) on the basis of self-defence. UN Doc. S/PV. 1348(1967).

76. Pre-emptive self-defence is distinguished from anticipatory self-defence because the latter requires an imminent attack. Pre-emptive self-defence sometimes is called preventive self-defence. See Dinstein, op. cit. n. 59, at p. 168.

77. In relation to Iraq, see ‘Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government’, <www.official-documents.co.uk/document/reps/iraq/cover.htm>. Of course intelligence proved to be inflated and inaccurate and probably used to justify the political aims of the coalition. This led the US Weapons Hunter in Iraq, Mr Kay, to say ‘if you cannot rely on good, accurate intelligence that is credible to the American people and to others abroad, you certainly can't have a policy of pre-emption. Pristine intelligence is a fundamental bench stone for any policy of pre-emption to even be thought about’, The Times (22 November 2003).

78. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (September 2002) p. 15 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>.

79. de Vitoria, F., Political Writings, Pagden, A. and Lawrence, J., eds. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1991) ‘On the Law of War’, 1.2, para 9Google Scholar: ‘… the injured party … may not only defend itself, but may also carry the war into its attacker's territory and teach its enemy a lesson … Otherwise the injured party would have no adequate self-defence; enemies would not abstain from harming others, if their victims were content only to defend themselves’.

80. de Vattel, E., Le Droit Des Gens ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle, appliqués à la Conduite et aux Affaires des Nations et des Souverains, translation Fenwick, C.G. (Washington, Carnegie Institution of Washington 1916)Google Scholar in Classics of International Law, Bk I, ch. II, para 16; Bonfils, H., Manuel de droit international public, 6th edn. (Paris, A Rousseau 1912) para. 242, p. 143Google Scholar: ‘Un état a incontestablement le droit de prendre toutes les mesures destinée a garantir son existence contre les dangers qui la menacent. La conversation de soi-même est un devoir pour les Etats. Il est presque puéril de le constater.’

81. Fiore, P., Nouveau droit international public tome premier, translation from Italian by Pradier-Fodéré, P. (Paris, Auguste Durand et Pedone-Lauriel 1868) p. 261Google Scholar: ‘Toutes les nations ont non seulement le droit de se perfectionner et de s'agrandir, mais encore celui de se conserver, car la conservation est la base fondamentale qui assure le progrès et favorise les développements de la civilisation. Le droit de conservation implique d'autres droit secondares; parmi ceux-ci, non seulement est compris le droit de repousser toute attaque extérieure contre sa propre conservation, d'ou naît le droit de légitime défense, mais encore celui d’éloigner et de repousser toutes les conditions qui pourraient nuire a sa propre conservation et empêcher le propre perfectionnement.’ Giraud, E., ‘La Théorie de la légitime défense’, 49 Hague Receuil (1934) p. 687, at pp. 738–739Google Scholar: ‘Les états ont le droit et le devoir d'assurer leur conversation et leur développement. La sauvegarde de ces intérêts justifie alors le recours a la force, alors même que l’état n'est victime d'aucune agression, ou n'est pas sous unemenace actuelle d'agression’.

82. ‘Tout état, en vertu de son existence même, a le droit d'exister, de se maintenir, de se développer. Ce droit, qu'on appelle le droit de conservation, est le premier des droits des Etats et le plus absolu. C'est le droit essentiel par excellence. Rivier, A., Principes du Droit des Gens, Vol. 1 (Paris, A. Rousseau 1896) p. 255.Google Scholar

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84. Rivier, op. cit. n. 82, at p. 398: ‘L'Etat en danger est seul appréciateur de ce qui le concerne; son droit d'indépendance s'oppose a tout contrôle que d'autres prétendraient exercer a son égard.’ Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser to the State Department criticised such interpretation of self-defence in relation to the Cuban Missile Crisis: ‘To accept that reading is to make the occasion for forceful response essentially a question for unilateral national decision that would not only be formally unreviewable, but not subject to intelligent criticism either. There is simply no standard against which this decision could be judged …. In this sense, I believe that an Article 51 defence would have signalled that the United States did not take the legal issues involved very seriously, that in its view the situation was to be governed by national discretion, not international law.’ Chayes, A., The Cuban Missile Crisis (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1974) p. 63.Google Scholar

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86. See criticism by the UN Secretary-General: ‘Rather than wait for that [attack] to happen, they argue, States have the right and obligation to use force pre-emptively … they reserve the right to act unilaterally, or in ad hoc coalition. This logic represents a fundamental challenge to the principles on which, however, imperfectly, world peace and stability have rested for the last fifty-eight years.’ ‘Pre-emption must be considered responsibly, on a case by case basis, but it remains one aspect of every government's duty to protect its people.’ Sofaer, A.D., ‘On the Necessity of Pre-emption’, 14 EJIL (2003).p. 209, p. 226.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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88. ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (1992) UN Doc. A/47/60, p. 3Google Scholar: ‘In these past few months a conviction has grown among nations large and small, that an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter …’

89. For a defence of a selective and, consequently, effective collective security system see Murphy, S. D., ‘The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of Collective Security After the Cold War’, 32 Columbia J Transn. L (1994) p. 201, at pp. 258–260Google Scholar. As he says ‘… the major powers must be permitted to bring into the process those matters they consider vital to their own interests and to push for those matters to be addressed in a satisfactory manner. … the system should not aspire to treating all threats to the peace equally through automatic and reliable responses’.

90. Tigroudja, H., ‘Quel(s) droit(s) applicable(s) à la “guerre au terrorism”’, 48 AFDI (2002) p. 81, at pp. 86–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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92. Cronin, B., ‘The Paradox of Hegemony: America's Ambiguous Relationship with the United Nations’, 7 EJIR (2001) pp. 103 et seq.Google Scholar

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94. ‘Statement by the Attorney General’, supra n. 21.

95. GA Res. 377 (1950) [Uniting for Peace].

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102. ‘Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration’, Report of the Secretary-General, A/58/323 (2 September 2003) para. 12.

103. See also ‘Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned’ (2002) particularly pp. 185–198 where NATO's action is characterised as illegal but legitimate.Google Scholar

104. UN Press release SG/SM/8600, ‘Secretary General Says United Nations Has Duty to Exhaust All Possibilities of Peaceful Settlement Before Resorting to Use of Force’ (10 February 2003). <http://www.un.org>. According to the UN S-G Kofi Annan ‘if the military action is to take place without the support of the Council, its legitimacy will be questioned’. Keesings (2003) p. 45315, 45317–453178.Google Scholar

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106. ‘But it is not enough to denounce unilaterism, unless we also face up squarely to the concerns that make some States feel uniquely vulnerable, since it is those concerns that drive them to take unilateral action. We must show that those concerns can, and will, be addressed effectively through collective action.’ ‘Secretary-General's Address to the General Assembly’ (23 September 2003)Google Scholar <www.un.org>.

107. Habermas, J., Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, translated by Rehg, W. (CambridgeMA, MIT Press 1996) p. 119.Google Scholar

108. ‘In particular, the ability of the Security Council to garner the widest possible support for its decisions and its actions will be enhanced if it is perceived to be broadly representative of the international community as a whole as well as the geopolitical realities of the contemporary world. I hope, therefore, that Member States will redouble their efforts to reach agreement on the enlargement of the Security Council.’ ‘Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, Report of the Secretary-General’, A/58/323 (2 September 2003) para. 15.

109. Habermas, op. cit. n. 107, at p. 228: ‘The essential intention we connect with the practice of argumentation is characterised by the intention of winning the assent of a universal audience to a problematic proposition in a non-coercive but regulated contest for the better arguments based on the best information and reasons. It is easy to see why the discourse principle requires this kind of practice for the justification of norms and value decisions: whether norms and values could find the rationally motivated assent of all these affected can be judged only from the intersubjectively enlarged perspective of the first-person plural. This perspective integrates the perspectives of each participant's worldview and self-understanding in a manner that is neither coercive nor distorting.’

110. Discussing a common security agenda, the UN Secretary-General observed ‘[t]his can only be achieved if States, in pursuing their national interests, show understanding and respect for global realities and the needs of others.’ ‘Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration’, Report of the Secretary-General, A/58/323 (2 September 2003) para. 12.

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