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Refusal of Extradition and the United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition***
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 July 2009
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On 29 November 1985 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a Model Agreement on the Transfer of Foreign Prisoners. Five years later, on 14 December 1990, it adopted four more Model Treaties on international cooperation in criminal matters. The first concerned extradition, the second mutual assistance in criminal matters together with a Protocol concerning the proceeds of crime, the third transfer of proceedings in criminal matters, and the fourth transfer of supervision of offenders conditionally sentenced or conditionally released. A Model Treaty on the transfer of enforcement of penal sanctions is being prepared.
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References
1. A/RES/40/32.
2. A/RES/45/116. See also 30 ILM (1991) pp. 1407–1418.
3. A/RES/45/117. See also 30 ILM (1991) pp. 1419–1433.
4. A/RES/45/118. See also 30 ILM (1991) pp. 1434–1441.
5. A/RES/45/119. See also 30 ILM (1991) pp. 1442–1449.
6. A/CONF. 144/28/Rev. 1, 196.
7. A/CONF. 121/22/Rev. 1.
8. Para. 37 of the Guiding Principles for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in the Context of Development and a New International Economic Order, A/CONF. 121/22/Rev. 1, 15.
9. For more information see Szasz, P.C., ‘Introductory Note to General Assembly Resolutions Adopting Rules, Basic Principles, Guidelines and Model Treaties Relating to the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders’, 30 ILM (1991) pp. 1357–1359Google Scholar. Res. 45/116 and 45/117 acknowledge the valuable contributions of governments, non-governmental organisations and individual experts, in particular the Government of Australia and the International Association of Penal Law.
10. A/CONF. 144/28/Rev. 1.
11. Clark, R.S., ‘Crime: The UN Agenda on International Cooperation in the Criminal Process’, 15 Nova LR (1991) pp. 480, 474–500.Google Scholar
12. Cf., Clark, loc. cit. n. 11, at p. 479.
13. Arts. 3 and 4 of the Model are added as an Appendix.
14. Trb. 1965 No. 9; ETS No. 24; 359 UNTS p. 273.
15. Cf., inter alia, Van den Wijngaert, C., ‘The Political Offence Exception to Extradition: How to Plug the “Terrorist Loophole” without Departing from Fundamental Human Rights’, 19 Israel YHR (1989) pp. 298, 303–322Google Scholar also published in 62 Int. Rev. Penal L. (1991) pp. 291–310.Google Scholar
16. Cf., Stein, T., Die Auslieferungsausnahme bei politischen Delikten (1983) pp. 338–371Google Scholar. See also Lagodny, O., ‘The Abolition and Replacement of the Political Offence Exception: Prohibited by International or Domestic Law?’, 19 Israel YHR (1989) pp. 317–329.Google Scholar
17. ECHR 7 July 1989, Series A vol. 161.
18. Of course, in immigration cases it is the daily business of courts in many countries to make similar inquiries if an alien claims to be a refugee. But in other respects, immigration procedures are hardly comparable to extradition procedures. In the former, courts do not decide on formal requests by other States, while the refusal to consider someone a refugee does not necessarily entail his removal to his country of origin.
19. Cf., inter alia, Stein, T., ‘Rendition of Terrorists: Extradition versus Deportation’, 19 Israel YHR (1989) pp. 282–283, 281–295.Google Scholar
20. Cf. on the Achille Lauro Affair, Cassese, A., Terrorism, Politics and Law (1989)Google Scholar; McGinly, G.P., ‘The Achille Lauro Case: A Case Study in Crisis Law, Policy and Management’, in Bassiouni, M.C., ed., Legal Responses to International Terrorism (1988) pp. 323–362.Google Scholar
21. S/RES/731 (1992) and S/RES/748 (1992).
22. ICJ 14 April 1992, Communiqué Nos. 92/8 and 92/9.
23. Trb. 1971 No. 218, Trb. 1973 No. 159; 10 ILM (1971) p. 1151.
24. Trb. 1977 No. 63; ETS No. 90; 15 ILM (1976) p. 1272.
25. Trb. 1951 No. 154; ETS No. 5; 213 UNTS p. 221.
26. Although the European Court does not assume an obligation for the parties to the Human Rights Convention to comply with an indication from the European Commission not to expel or to extradite a person pending an examination of his complaint. Cf., ECHR 20 March 1991, Series A Vol. 201 (Cruz Varas and others).
27. Trb 1971 No. 50; 10 ILM (1971) p. 132.
28. Cf., Clark, loc. cit. n. 11, at p. 486.
29. Trb. 1960 No. 32; 78 UNTS p. 277.
30. 13 ILM (1974) p. 50.
31. Trb. 1962 No. 97, Trb. 1964 No. 108; 616 UNTS p. 79.
32. See, however, Recommendation (87) 8 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. Cf., for a discussion of present international law Lippman, M., ‘The Recognition of Conscientious Objection to Military Service as an International Human Right’, 21 California Western ILJ (1990) pp. 31–66.Google Scholar
33. Trb. 1979 No. 120; ETS No. 98; 17 ILM (1978) p. 813.
34. Trb. 1990 No. 145; 30 ILM (1991) p. 84.
35. Ibid., at p. 110.
36. Cf., e.g., European Commission of Human Rights 27 May 1974, 17 Yearbook of the European Convention of Human Rights (1974) pp. 458–479 (Brücfanann).Google Scholar
37. Trb. 1983 No. 74; ETS No. 112.
38. Trb. 1971 No. 137; ETS No. 70; 9 ILM (1970) p. 450.
39. Trb. 1973 No. 84; ETS No. 73; 11 ELM (1972) p. 709.
40. Cf., inter alia, Shearer, I.A., Extradition in International Law (1971) pp. 126–130Google Scholar; H. Schultz, ‘Das Ende der Auslieferung?’, in Oehler, D. and Pötz, P.-G., Aktuelle Probleme des Internationalen Strafrechts (1976) p. 146Google Scholar. See also the Resolution adopted by the tenth Congress of the Association Internationale de Droit Pénal in Rome 1968, 39 Rev. int. dr. pen. (1968) p. 838.
41. For a survey of the present situation see Hecker, H., ‘Auslieferungsverträge und Staatsangehörigkeit’, 26 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1988) pp. 216–239.Google Scholar
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43. Gauthier, J., ‘La nouvelle législation suisse sur l'entraide Internationale en matière pénale’, 101 Revue suisse de droit pénal (1984) pp. 71, 51–88.Google Scholar
44. For more details see Paridaens, D.J.M.W., ‘The Extradition of Nationals According to Dutch Law’, 62 Int. Rev. Penal L. (1991) pp. 515–521.Google Scholar
45. Cf., also Art. 8 of the European Convention on the Transfer of Criminal Proceedings.
46. Trb. 1951 No. 131. Trb. 1954 No. 88; 189 UNTS p. 709.
47. Neither the 1962 Benelux Convention on Extradition nor the Extradition Treaty between the United States and the Netherlands contains such a provision. The argument in both cases is that such provisions are superfluous, because the Contracting Parties can be trusted never to violate human rights on account of a person's race, religion, etc. Supposing this to be true, there is nevertheless no harm in including the provision in extradition treaties.
48. See far a discussion, among others, Kälin, W., Das Prinzip des non-refoulement (1982) pp. 59–85Google Scholar; Stein, T., Die Auslieferungsausnahme bei politischen Delikten (1983) pp. 363–364.Google Scholar
49. Of course, the idea of proportionality plays also a role in the definition of extraditable offences, as far as the severity of punishment and die severity of the sentence are concerned.
50. Trb. 1969 No. 99; 999 UNTS p. 171; 6 ILM (1976) p. 368.
51. Of recent times and of minor practical importance is an exception which can be found in supplementary bilateral agreements to the European Convention on Extradition, concluded by the Federal Republic of Germany with other European States. These agreements provide for extradition in the case of ‘Ordnungswidrigkeiten’. However, appeal to a criminal court must be open from decisions of administrative bodies imposing a sanction. This restriction is in accordance with Art 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights in its decision of 21 February 1984 in the Öztürk case, Series A vol. 85.
52. To my knowledge, the reservations of Luxembourg and the Netherlands to the European Convention are the first examples. See also the Second Additional Protocol to the Convention.
53. ECHR 12 February 1985, Series A vol. 89.
54. Trb. 1980 No. 111; 20 ILM (1981) p. 723.
55. See for instance the new laws on judicial co-operation of Austria, Germany and Switzerland.
56. Supreme Court 1 July 1985, NJ (1986) No. 162, 17 NYIL (1986) pp. 280–284.
57. Trb. 1985 No. 69; 23 ILM (1984) p. 1027 and 24 ILM (1985) p. 535.
58. European Commission 10 October 1985 (complaint 11615/85; Rechtspraak Vreemdelingenrecht (1985) No. 111. This decision in the Geller case is severely critisized by Trechsel for neglecting that disregard of the principle of proportionality may also be contrary to Art 3. See Trechsel, S., ‘Gnmdrechtsschutz bei der internationalen Zusammenarbeit in Strafsachen’, 14 Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift (1987) pp. 73, 69–78.Google Scholar
59. Trb. 1979 No. 119; ETS No. 86.
60. Human Rights Committee 2 November 1987, Communication No. 204/1986 (A.P.-Italy), Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol, Vol. 2 (1990) pp. 67–68.
61. Cf., the new German law on international judicial co-operation.
62. Cf., the First Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition with respect to amnesty. See also the Resolution adopted by the Association Internationale de Droit Pénal supra, n. 35.
63. It is to be deplored, however, that the Model does not refer to Art. 15 of the International Covenant, the provision on nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege.
64. Supra, n. 15, para. 85.
65. Ibid., Paras. 86–91.
66. Ibid., Para. 113.
67. Would, for instance, execution of a judgment given in absentia against which no appeal is possible, qualify as such a risk? Or execution of judgments based on the evidence of witnesses whom the accused has not been able to question? Cf., the decisions of the European Court in the cases of Colozza, supra, n. 53, and of Unterpertinger (ECHR 24 November 1986, Series A vol. 110).
68. Trb. 1972 No. 51; 8 ILM (1969) p. 679.
69. See Swart, A.H.J., Nederlands uitleveringsreckt (1986) pp. 85–86Google Scholar. A different opinion is held by Lagodny, O., Die Rechtsstellung des Auszuliefernden in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1987) pp. 100–104.Google Scholar
70. Strictly speaking there is no conflict between the European Convention and the 1972 United Kingdom-United States Extradition Treaty in the Soering case. Art. IV of the 1972 Treaty gives the UK the right to ask for satisfactory assurances that a death penalty will not be carried out. What is at stake in the case is the question of whether the assurances accepted by the British Government may be considered to be adequate.
71. Trb. 1969 No. 99, p. 105; GAOR 3rd sess. Part I p. 71.
72. Trb. 1951 No. 114, Trb. 1953 No. 10; 199 UNTS p. 67.
73. Trb. 1983 No. 86; ETS No. 114; 22 ILM (1983) p. 539.
74. Supreme Court 30 March 1990, NJ 1991, No. 249, 22 NYIL (1991) pp. 432–438 (Short). A summary of the Court's decision can be found in 29 ILM (1990) pp. 1375–1389.
75. For a more detailed discussion of such questions see Lagodny, op. cit n. 69, and Swart, op. cit. n. 69.
76. Van den Wijngaert, C., ‘Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Extradition: Opening Pandora's Box?’, 39 ICLQ (1990) pp. 757–779.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
77. Supreme Court 28 May 1985, NJ 1985, No. 892.
78. This is one of the issues in the case of Kolompar v. Belgium, decided by die European Commission on 16 May 1990 (complaint 11613/85, not published). The applicant, inter alia, complained against his extradition by Belgium to Italy by stating that his conviction in absentia in Italy had violated Art. 6 of the European Convention. The Commission did not have to consider the issue since it held that the applicant had not exhausted all domestic remedies available to him according to Belgian law.
79. See also Blakesley, C.L. and Lagodny, O., ‘Finding Harmony Amidst Disagreement Over Extradition, Jurisdiction, the Role of Human Rights, and Issues of Extraterritoriality Under International Criminal Law’, 24 Vanderbilt J. Trans. L. (1991) pp. 1–73.Google Scholar
80. See on the nationality of the offender supra, section 4.
81. If the rule of double criminality is understood as requiring double criminality ‘in concreto’, one could perhaps argue that according to the law of the requested State the offender is not punishable.
82. This can also be said of another classic exception with respect to concurring jurisdiction: the nationality of the offender.
83. An exception must be made for offences with respect to which the universality principle is applicable by virtue of customary law.
84. The dispute between Libya, on the one hand, and the United States and United Kingdom, on the other, in the matter of the extradition of persons suspected of having caused the crashing of Pan-Am flight 103 at Lockerbie specifically concerns Libya's obligations under the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. Whether Res. 731 (1992) and 748 (1992) of the Security Council and the decision of the International Court of Justice of 14 April 1992, assume that the obligation to extradite or to punish may also exist in the absence of a treaty is not very clear.
85. See also Schutte, J.J.E., ‘Enforcement Measures in International Criminal Law’, 52 Rev. int. dr. pen. (1981) pp. 445–447, 441–453.Google Scholar
86. Trb. 1990 No. 94. On the subtle solutions laid down in Art. 6 see J.J.E. Schutte, ‘Extradition for Drug Offences; New Developments Under the 1988 UN-Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances, 62 Int. Rev. Penal L. (1991) pp. 142–148, 135–157.Google Scholar
87. See for German practise in this respect, inter alia, Uhlig, S. and Schomburg, W., Gesetz über die internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen (1983) p. 69.Google Scholar