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Inspection in international law: Monitoring compliance and the problem of implementation in international law*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2009

Stefan Oeter
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The international legal community seems to be in a state of transition. Contemporary perspectives of international law are still generally dominated by traditional concepts of international community as a grouping of sovereign nation States the rules of which are in in principle based on consent. But at the same time there exists a prevailing impression that traditional international law is too cumbersome and archaic in order to cope with the pressing needs of mankind. A ‘World Public Order’ is demanded by not small an amount of political and legal writers.

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Netherlands Yearbook of International Law , Volume 28 , December 1997 , pp. 101 - 169
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Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 1997

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References

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43. On the two different regimes of IAEA safeguards see Szasz, op. cit. n. 41, in particular pp. 550–553; Fischer, D., ‘International Safeguards’, in D. Fischer and P.C. Szasz, Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal (1985) p. 3 at pp. 23–32Google Scholar; D. Fischer, ‘The IAEA Safeguards Model’, in Schiefer and Keeley, eds., op. cit. n. 40, pp. 28–36, as well as Von Baeckmann, loc. cit. n. 40, p. 41; see also in detail Lohmann, T., Die rechtliche Struktur der Sicherheitsmaßnahmen der Internationalen Atomenergie-Organisation (1993)Google Scholar. For the two different systems of guidelines for the negotiation of safeguards agreements (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2and INFCIRC/153) see ElBaradei, M.M. et al. , eds., The International Law of Nuclear Energy: Basic Documents (1993) part II, pp. 1678 et seq., 1695 et seq.Google Scholar

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45. See Keeley, op. cit. n. 35, p. 21; Monahan, B., ‘Giving the Non-Proliferation Treaty Teeth: Strenthening the Special Inspection Procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency’, 33 Virginia JIL (1992) p. 161 at pp. 169–171‥Google Scholar

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50. On the general system of inspection by IAEA inspectors see Keeley, op. cit. n. 35, pp. 44–47; Von Baeckmann, loc. cit. n. 40, pp. 37 et seq.; Fischer, D., ‘The International Atomic Agency and Nuclear Safeguards’Google Scholar, in Howlett and Simpson, op. cit. n. 47, p. 37 at pp. 43–44. On the staffing policies concerning inspectors see Keeley, op. cit. n. 35, pp. 38–39; von Baeckmann, loc. cit. n. 40, pp. 42–43.

51. Concerning the practice of routine inspections, see Keeley, op. cit. n. 35, pp. 4–9, 42–47.

52. On the information policy of the IAEA see Keeley, op. cit. n. 35, pp. 31–32.

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56. See Fischer, loc. cit. n. 50, p. 41.

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83. See Trapp, On-Site Inspection, op. cit. n. 81, pp. 62–65; Goldblat, op. cit. n. 26, p. 222; Black, loc. cit. n. 81, pp. 208–209.

84. See Trapp, On-Site Inspection, op. cit. n. 81, pp. 67–70.

85. See Goldblat, op. cit. n. 26, p. 222.

86. See Goldblat, op. cit. n. 26, pp. 222–223.

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95. See Valticos, loc. cit. n. 94, p. 383.

96. See Köhler, loc. cit. n. 93, p. 720, and – much more in detail – von Potobsky, G., ‘Visits on the Spot – The Experience of the ILO’, in Ramcharan, B.G., ed., International Law and Fact-Finding in the Field of Human Rights (1982) pp. 160–175Google Scholar; see also Wolf, F., ‘Human Rights and the International Labour Organization’, in Meron, T., ed., Human Rights in International Law – Legal and Policy Issues (1984) p. 273 at pp. 285-86.Google Scholar

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104. See only Dormenval, op. cit. n. 100, pp. 158–179.

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108. As to the ‘1503 procedure’ see Rodley, loc. cit. n. 105, pp. 64–70; Robertson and Merrills, op. cit. n. 105, pp. 74–78; Alston, P., ‘The Commission on Human Rights’, in Alston, P., ed., The United Nations and Human Rights. A Critical Appraisal (1992) p. 126 at pp. 146–151Google Scholar; Newman, F. and Weissbrodt, D., International Human Rights (1990) pp. 113–125.Google Scholar

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111. Cf., Rodley, loc. cit. n. 105, p. 66; Alston, loc. cit. n. 108, p. 163.

112. See Robertson and Merrills, op. cit. n. 105, p. 77.

113. As to the different features (and functions) of special rapporteur investigations see Alston, loc. cit. n. 108, p. 165.

114. See in particular Robertson and Merrills, op. cit. n. 105, pp. 79–83.

115. Ibid., at p. 79.

116. Ibid., at p. 80.

117. Ibid., at p. 81.

118. Ibid., at pp. 81–82.

119. Ibid., at p. 82.

120. Robertson and Merrills, op. cit. n. 105, p. 82.

121. See Rodley, loc. cit. n. 105, p. 63.

122. Alston, loc. cit. n. 108, p. 67.

123. UN Doc. A/33/331 (1978), Annex VII – reprinted in: Steiner, H.J. and Alston, P., eds., International Human Rights in Context (1996) pp. 395-98.Google Scholar

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126. See Rodley, loc. cit. n. 105, pp. 73–74.

127. See Rodley, loc. cit. n. 105, pp. 82–83, see also van Boven, T., ‘The Role of the United Nations Secretariat in the Area of Human Rights’, 24 NY Univ. J Int.L and Pol. (1991) pp. 69–107.Google Scholar

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143. On the fact-finding activities of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights see Vargas Carreno, op. cit. n. 133, pp. 137–150; Buergenthal, T., ‘The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights’, in Meron, T., ed., Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues (1984) p. 439 at pp. 479–484Google Scholar; see also Grossman, C., ‘Proposals to Strengthen the Inter-American System of Protection of Human Rights’, 32 GYIL (1989) pp. 264–279Google Scholar; and Padilla, D.J., ‘The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States: A Case Study’, 9 Am. Univ. J Int.L and Pol. (1993) pp. 95–115.Google Scholar

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145. See Vargas Carreno, loc. cit. n. 133, p. 138.

146. On the usual practice of conducting such visits see Vargas Carreno, loc. cit. n. 133, pp. 139–145.

147. See Buergenthal, loc. cit. n. 143, p. 482.

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152. See Tanca, A., ‘The Public Statement on Turkey by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture’, 4 EJIL (1993) pp. 115–118CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cohen-Jonathan, G., ‘Le Comité européen pour la prévention de la torture et la déclaration publique relative à la Turquie’, 97 RGDIP (1993) pp. 419–428.Google Scholar

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163. For this example, see Szell, loc. cit. n. 159, at pp. 97–98.

164. Adopted in Washington, 2 December 1946, 161 UNTS, p. 72. On the Convention see Lyster, S., International Wildlife Law (1985) pp. 17–38Google Scholar; Birnie, P., ‘International Legal Issues in the Management and Protection of the Whale: A Review of Four Decades of Experience’, 29 Natural Resources Journal (1989) pp. 903–934Google Scholar, and – as a comprehensive monographical study – Birnie, P., The International Regulation of Whaling (1985).Google Scholar

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170. See Birnie, loc. cit. n. 167, at pp. 927–928; Rose and Paleokrassis, loc. cit. n. 165, at pp. 164–165.

171. Rose and Paleokrassis, loc. cit. n. 165, at p. 165.

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173. See only Rose and Paleokrassis, loc. cit. n. 165, at p. 166.

174. For both examples, see Rose and Paleokrassis, idem.

175. See only Rose and Paleokrassis, loc.cit. n. 165, at pp. 167–168 (with further references).

176. Adopted in London, 12 May 1954, 327 UNTS 3.

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183. Adopted in Paris, 26 January 1982, 21 ILM (1982) p. 1.

184. See only Birnie and Boyle, op. cit. n. 178, at p. 270.

185. Adopted in Washington, 1 December, 1959, 402 UNTS p. 71. On the system of the Antarctic Treaty see only the Handbook on the Antarctic Treaty System, 5th edn. (1987) as well as Wolfram, R., ed., The Antarctic Challenge, Vol. I (1984Google Scholar); Watts, A.D., International Law and the Antarctic Treaty System (1992)Google Scholar; and Francioni, F. and Scovazzi, T., eds., International Law for Antarctica / Droit international de l'Antarctique (1987)Google Scholar; see also – as a succinct survey – Wolfram, R. and Klemm, U.-D., ‘Antarctica’, in Bernhardt, R., ed., Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. I (1992) pp. 173–182.Google Scholar

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189. Adopted in Madrid, 4 October 1991, 30 ILM (1991) p. 1455. On the history and the substantial rules of the Madrid Protocol see only Blay, loc. cit. n. 186, pp. 377 et seq., and Pannatier, op. cit. n. 186, at pp. 157–185.

190. Vinogradov, loc. cit. n. 187, at p. 100.

191. For instance, see Elliott, op. cit. n. 186, at pp. 79–80.

192. Adopted in Ramsar, Iran, 2 February 1971, 11 ILM (1972) p. 963. On the Convention see Lyster, op. cit. n. 164, at pp. 183–207, and Birnie and Boyle, op. cit. n. 178, at pp. 465–468.

193. See Birnie and Boyle, op. cit. n. 178, at p. 468.

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196. See only Marauhn, loc. cit. n. 194, at p. 712.

197. For this general assessment, see Birnie and Boyle, op. cit. n. 178, at p. 480.

198. EC Regulation 3626/82, OJ L 384, p. 1, and EC Regulation 3418/83, OJ L 344, p. 1.

199. On the implementation of CITES by the EC see Bendomir-Kahlo, G., CITES – Das Washingtoner Artenschutzübereinkommen. Regelung und Durchführung auf internationaler Ebene und in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (1989) pp. 173–206.Google Scholar

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206. Adopted in Geneva, 18 November 1991, 31 ILM (1992) p. 568. For the negotiating history, see Gehring, op. cit. n. 161, at pp. 173–181.

207. See Szell, loc. cit. n. 159, at pp. 103–104.

208. The Protocol was adopted in Oslo, 13 June 1994, Doc. EB./AIR/R. 84, but is not yet in force (at least as of 31 Dec. 1996). On the negotiating history and normative structure of the second Sulphur Emissions Protocol seeT. Gehring, op. cit. n. 161, at pp. 185–193, and Szell, loc. cit. n. 159, at pp. 104–106.

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213. Ibid., p. 188.

214. Ibid., p. 27.

215. Ibid.

216. van der Graaf, H.J., in Altmann, J. et al. , eds., Verification after the Cold War. Broadening the Process (1994) p. 3 at pp. 6–7.Google Scholar

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218. For further elaboration on that point, see Chayes and Handler Chayes, op. cit. n. 10, pp. 191–192.