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Coercion in the conclusion of treaties: A consideration of Articles 51 and 52 of the Convention on the the Law of Treaties*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2009

H.G. de Jong
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Extract

After years of preparation the Convention on the Law of Treaties was concluded in Vienna on 23 May 1969; it was about another ten years before the Convention entered into force on 27 January 1980. Shortly afterwards, the Government of the Netherlands decided to initiate the constitutional procedure required to become a party to the Convention. For that purpose, a Bill of Approval was submitted to the States-General in March 1983.

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Articles
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Netherlands Yearbook of International Law , Volume 15 , December 1984 , pp. 209 - 247
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Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 1984

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References

1. Parliamentary papers 17798 (R 1227). The English and French texts of the Convention have been published in Trb. 1972 No. 51, the Dutch translation in Trb. 1977 No. 169. Under Article 84, the Convention entered into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or accession. In June 1984, 44 States were a party to the Convention.

2. E.g., Brosche, H., Zwang beim Abschluss völkerrechtlicher Verträge (1974)Google Scholar. Malawer, S., Imposed treaties and international law (1977)Google Scholar. These studies include an analysis of the relevant state practice. See also: Bothe, M., “Consequences on the prohibition of the use of force. Comments on Arts. 49 and 70 of the ILC's Draft articles on the Law of Treaties”, 27 ZaöRV (1967) p. 507.Google Scholar

3. For the origin of the rule, see Whitton, J.B., “La règie ‘pacta sunt servanda’”, 49 Hague Recueil (1934) pp. 151–268, at p. 160Google Scholar. The background of the rule was slightly different for the purposes of international relations treaties. For the theory that, within this context, the rule was transferred from the medieval procedural law of the commentators on Roman law, see: E. Reibstein, Völkerrecht. Eine Geschichte seiner Ideen in Lehre und Praxis. (1957–1963). Part II. p. 569.

4. For a historical survey, including the earliest history, see: de Taube, M., “l'inviolabilité des traités”, in 32 Hague Recueil (1930) pp. 295–383Google Scholar, with a bibliography on p. 384.

5. F. Suarez, De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore, L. II, chapter VII, paras. 4 and 5; and II, XVIII, 19.

6. A. Gentili, De Iure Belli, L. III, ch. XIV.

7. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, L. III, XXV, s.1.; [Transl.: The Classics of International Law (1925)].

8. L. III, XIX, paras. 1, 2, 3.

9. S. Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium, L. III, IV, para. 2. [Transl.: The Classics of International Law (1934)]. Cf. also, L. II, III, s. 23 and his Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis, L. I, ch. XII.

10. Wolff, Chr., Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum [first edn. 1764; adaptation: The Classics of International Law, (1934)].Google Scholar

11. de Vattel, E., Le droit des gens, ou principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverainsGoogle Scholar, L, II, XII, para. 163. [Transl.: The Classics of International Law (1916)].

12. Droit des gens, L. II, XV.

13. Ibid., para. 218–221.

14. Oppenheim, L., International law, para. 12., 8th edn. (1955/1967) p. 17.Google Scholar

15. ibid., para. 493. In a comparable sense, e.g., Cavaglieri, A., “Règles générales du droit de la paix”, in 26 Hague Recueil (1929), at p. 525.Google Scholar

16. This also applies to Lauterpacht, who subsequently adapted Oppenheim's original edition of International Law (1905). In the 8th edition, adapted by Lauterpacht, the following remarks are made on Oppenheim's contention that “common consent is the basis of all law” (para. 11): “It will be noted that “common consent” is a sociological rather than a legal explanation of the validity of the law. In law the question still arises: Why is consent binding? Probably the answer to that question as to the validity of the first source of law cannot itself be a legal one. Its validity cannot be proven as a legal proposition; it must be assumed by reference to what has been called the initial hypothesis adopted on the basis of non-legal considerations.” This is equally clear from the section on the binding force of treaties (para. 493). Oppenheim's categorical answer is replaced here with a “probably” answer, with the additional remark that “The binding effect of that rule,” viz., the rule of customary law that treaties are binding, “rests in the last resort on the fundamental assumption, which is neither consensual nor necessarily legal, of the objectively binding force of International Law”. (8th. edn., p. 881).

17. First formulated by Jellinek, in Die rechtliche Natur der Staatenverträge (1880).Google Scholar

18. Triepel, M. first set out his theory in Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (1899).Google Scholar

19. For a critical assessment of not only Triepel but also other “will theories”, see: Kooijmans, P.H., The doctrine of the legal equality of states (1964) p. 127 et seq.Google Scholar

20. Völkerrecht und Landesrecht; [French translation (Droit international et droit interne)] (1920) pp. 80–81.Google Scholar

21. Le Fur, L., Précis de droit international public, (1939)Google Scholar; more specifically, “Le droit naturel ou objectif, s'étend-il aux rapports internationaux?”, in VI Revue de droit international et de législation comparée, (1925) p. 59 et seq.Google Scholar; “Le droit naturel et le droit rationnel ou scientifique”, I Revue de droit international (1927) p. 658 et seq.Google Scholar; “La théorie du droit naturel depuis le XVIIe siècle et la doctrine moderne”, 18 Hague Recueil (1927) p. 261 et seq.Google Scholar; “Le développement historique du droit international. De l'anarchie internationale à une communauté internationale organisée”, in 41 Hague Recueil (1932) p. 503 et seq.Google Scholar

22. “Le droit naturel proprement dit n'est pas variable, car il ne contient que les applications immédiates de ce sens de la justice, universel chez l'homme, ce qui précisément lui a fait donner le nom de naturel, conforme à sa nature. II ne comprend essentiellement que deux règies de fond, qui peuvent même, à la rigueur, se ramener à une seule. La première est l'obligation de respecter les contrats librement conclus.” In Le Fur's view the second fundamental rule is the obligation of making good any unlawful damage. (Droit naturel et droit rationnel ou scientifique, op. cit. pp. 692–693.

23. Le développement historique du droit international, op. cit., p. 575.

24. Kelsen, H., Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts. Beitrag zu einer reinen Rechtslehre (1920)Google Scholar; “Les rapports de système entre le droit interne et le droit international public”, 14 Hague Recueil (1926) p. 227 et seq.Google Scholar; “Théorie du droit international public,” 84 Hague Recueil (1953), p. 5 et seq.Google Scholar, in particular pp. 128–134.

25. Anzilotti, D., Cours de droit international. [French translation by Gidel] (1929)Google Scholar. Here Anzilotti remarks on the principle of pacta sunt servanda. (p. 44) “Ce principe, précisément parce qu'il est à la base des normes dont nous parlons, n'est pas susceptible d'une démonstration ultérieure de point de vue de ces normes elles-mêmes: il doit être pris comme une valeur objective absolue, ou, en d'autres termes, comme l'hypothèse première et indémontrable à laquelle se rattache d'une façon nécessaire cet ordre, comme tout autre ordre, de connaissances humaines.” This is also the difference between a municipal legal system and the international legal system: in the international legal system, the rule of pacta sunt servanda does not, as is the case in municipal law, rest on another rule, but is itself the ultimate basic norm.

26. Kelsen, H. and Tucker, R.W., Principles of international law (1966). See p. 564Google Scholar: “The basic norm of international law, therefore, must be a norm which countenances custom as a norm-creating fact, and might be formulated as follows: The states ought to behave as they have customarily behaved.”

27. Spinoza, B., Tractatus theologico-politicus (1670).Google Scholar

28. Hegel, G.W.F., Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1820)Google Scholar, in particular, para. 330 et seq.

29. Hobbes, Th, Leviathan (1651).Google Scholar

30. For examples, see the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties of the Harvard Law School, 29 AJIL (1935), Supp.; comments on Art. 20 (pacta sunt servanda) p. 977 et seq. ILC comments on Art. 23 of the draft Law of Treaties of 1966, II ILC Yearbook (1966).

31. For the Conference proceedings, see United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records (two volumes of summary records of the plenary meetings and the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, and one volume of documents), A/CONF. 39/11 and Add. 1 and 2. The Conference proceedings will be referred to below merely as: Official Records, First Session (A/CONF.39/11) and Official Records, Second Session (A/CONF.39/11/ Add.1). Good surveys of the Vienna Convention's history, including the Conference proceedings, are provided by Rosenne, S., The Law of Treaties. A guide to the legislative history of the Vienna Convention (1970)Google Scholar; R.G. Wetzel and D. Rauschning, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Travaux préparatoires. Die Wiener Vertragskonvention. Materialien zur Entstehung der einzelnen Vorschriften, 1978.

32. François, J.P.A., Grondlijnen van het Volkenrecht (1967) p. 27.Google Scholar

33. Brierly, J.L., The Law of Nations, 6th edn, ed. Waldock, (1963), p. 332.Google Scholar

34. Cf. Nahlik, S.E., “The grounds of invalidity and termination of treaties”, in 65 AJIL (1971) pp. 736–756.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

35. The Vienna Convention gives the following definition (a relative definition, for the purposes of this Convention): “‘treaty’ means an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.”

36. The most far reaching amendment in this respect was from the Ecuador delegate. It was submitted at the first session of the Conference (A/CONF.39/C.1/L.25), and a proposal was made to add four elements to the definition of ‘treaty’ in Art. 2(1)(a): “concluded in good faith, dealing with a licit object, freely consented to, and based on justice and equity.”

37. Art. 39 ILC's Draft 1966, comments para. (1).

38. See Arts. 65–68 of the Convention. Cf., also Briggs, , “Procedures for establishing the invalidity or termination of treaties under the ILC 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties”, in 61 AJIL (1967) pp. 976–989CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In addition, the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill approving the Convention for the Netherlands discussed the question of dispute settlement: parliamentary papers 17798(R1277), No. 3, p. 26.

39. E.g., Verdross, A., Die Quellen des universellen Völkenechts, (1973) pp. 60–61.Google Scholar

40. In Western Europe, since the acceptance of Roman law, three kinds of lack of consent are generally mentioned which may affect a contract's validity: force or coercion (vis metus), fraud (dolus) and error.

41. Similarly, Grotius, Wolff, Pufendorf, Vattel. Cf. Tomsic, I., La reconstruction du droit international en matière des traités. Essai sur le problème des vices du consentement dans la conclusion des traités internationaux (1931) p. 38.Google Scholar

42. The problem here was not always posed as the question of possible duress as lack of consent. Most of these writers started from the basic question whether a sovereign in confinement could, in general, make a declaration of will that would be binding on the State. The problem became that of an imprisoned sovereign's legal competence. In this connection see, e.g., Wenner, G., Willensmängel im Völkerrecht (1940) p. 129 et seq.Google Scholar

43. Vitta reports that during and following the acceptance of Roman law, exceptions based on lack of consent were also frequently invoked where treaties were concerned; this resulted in the custom of including in treaties a clause that expressly excluded any possible ground for the nullity of the treaty. Vitta, E., La validité des traités internationaux (1940) p. 99, n. 1.Google Scholar

44. A good survey of the relevant literature up to the beginning of the 1930s may be found in the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties of the Harvard Law School, 29 AJIL (1935) Supp.

45. A clear description of this evolution is given by Lauterpacht, H., Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (1927) ch. I.Google Scholar

46. ibid., p. 167.

47. ibid., p. 165.

48. Bindschedler, for example, begins his discussion of Articles 48 and 49 of the ILC 1966 Draft as follows: “Das allgemeine Völkerrecht hat bei den völkerrechtlichen Verträgen die Lehre von den Willensmängeln übergenommen. Zu diesen gehört auch der Zwang oder die Drohung” Bindschedler, R.L., “Völkerrechtliche Verträge und Zwang”, in 21 Revista Española de Derecho Internacional (1968) pp. 309–319.Google Scholar

49. 29 AJIL (1935) Supp., p. 1149.

50. The above quotation (n. 48) should be viewed against the background of this distinction also as regards Bindschedler's reflections. ibid., p. 309.

51. Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, op.cit., p. 1152. A subsequent study undertaken at the Harvard Law School, the Draft Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression proposes that the validity of a treaty will be impaired if the treaty is a consequence of the use of armed force by the aggressor State. 33 AJIL (1939) Spec. Supp., p. 895.

52. There are a few examples in addition to the writers already mentioned: François, J.P.A., Grondlijnen van het volkenrecht (1967) p. 304Google Scholar; Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law (1966) p. 495Google Scholar; Parry, C., “The Law of Treaties”, in Manual of Public International Law, ed. Sørensen, M. (1968) p. 202Google Scholar. In addition, the various rapporteurs on the law of treaties who reported to the ILC on the question of imposed treaties (H. Lauterpacht, G. Fitzmaurice and H. Waldock) based their reports on the same assumption.

53. Roman law speaks of both vis and metus, the latter in the sense of “fright”. Grotius also makes a distinction between the two concepts.

54. E.g. Wenner, op.cit.,(n. 421), p. 121 and Weinschel, H., “Willensmängel bei völkerrechtlichen Verträgen”, 15 Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht, (1930) p. 460.Google Scholar

55. Wenner, op.cit., p. 124.

56. Cf., Tomsic, op.cit., (n. 41), p. 42. For a review of the various opinions, see Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, op.cit., (n. 44), pp. 1150–51. In this Draft, no distinction is attributed any practical significance: “The kind of coercion envisaged by Article 32 may or may not involve the use of violence. It may be actual or threatened; it may be physical or mental…”

57. Von Liszt, for example, considers that confinement is a case of vis absoluta. von Liszt, F., Das Völkerrecht systematisch dargestellt, 12th edn., ed. Fleischmann, (1925) p. 246Google Scholar. Strupp mentions, as an example of vis absoluta, a situation where the presence of armed forces in the building where the conclusion of the treaty takes place, forces the competent authority to sign. Strupp, K., “Règies générates du droit de la paix”, in 47 Hague Recueil (1934) p. 366.Google Scholar

58. E.g., Strupp, op.cit., p. 366 [Cf., also his Eléments du droit international public, 2 nd. edn. (1930) p. 263Google Scholar]. Cavaré, L., “L'idée de sanction et sa mise en oeuvre en droit international public”, 11 RGDIP (1937) p. 406Google Scholar. Verzijl, J.H.W., “La validité et la nullité des actes juridiques internationaux”, in 15 Revue de Droit International (1935) p. 325Google Scholar, J.P.A. François, op.cit., (n.52) p. 304.

59. The use or threat of force against States will be discussed below in section 3.3.

60. De Visscher, op.cit., (n. 74) p. 524.

61. Golbs-Wilms, C., Erzwungene Staatsverträge (1933) p. 26Google Scholar; Wenner, op.cit., (n. 42) p. 171.

62. Wenner, op.cit., p. 99.

63. Official Records, Second Session, p. 90.

64. De Jure Belli ac Pacis, L II, 17, para. 7.

65. L III, 19, para. 11.

66. L II, 17, para. 19.

67. S. Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium libri octo, L VIII, 8, para. 1.

68. Vattel, L. IV, 4, para. 37.

69. Atassy, A., Les vices de consentement dans les traités internationaux à l'exclusion des traités de paix (1929).Google Scholar

70. de Martens, G.F., Précis du droit des gens moderne de L'Europe fondé sur les traités et l'usage French edition, (1858)Google Scholar. para 50. Halleck-Baker, , International Law 2 Vols. (1873) p. 309.Google Scholar

71. Thus, views in which moral considerations are regarded as decisive for the unlawfulness of treaties will not be discussed; here we are concerned only with opinions attempting to establish connections with positive law.

72. E.g. Klüber, J.L., Droit des gens moderne de l'Europe, 2nd edn. by Ott (1874) p. 205.Google Scholar

73. E.g., Heffter, A.W., Das europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart, 8. Aufl. von Geffken (1888)Google Scholar para. 85. See also infra section 3.2.2.

74. E.g., J.B. Whitton, op.cit., (n.3), p. 267. F. de Visscher, “Des traités imposées par la violence”, in 12 Revue de droit international et de législation comparée, 3e série, (1931), pp. 532–535. This theory has developed in particular since the establishment of the League of Nations and the conclusion of the Briand-Kellogg Pact in 1928. See section 3.3.

75. De Visscher, op.cit., p. 529. Similarly, Westlake, J., International Law, French edn. by La, Pradelle [Traité de droit international] (1924) p. 304.Google Scholar

76. Art. 48 of the 1966 Draft. ILC comments in Yearbook ILC 1966, Vol. II; also included in A/CONF. 39/11/Add. 2: Official Records, Documents of the Conference.

77. Correctly, in my view, Article 51 – like the other Articles of section 2: ‘Invalidity of treaties’ – takes the line of the State's declaration of will. It is, certainly from the theoretical point of view, not quite correct to speak of a treaty being ‘void’, for although, e.g., in the event of enforced accession to a multilateral treaty, the consent of the State concerned could well be void, the treaty would continue to be in force between the other Parties.

78. At the Vienna Conference a few amendments aimed at including a relative invalidity in Article 51 were rejected (amendments submitted by the United States: A/CONF.39/C.1/ L.277. Australia: A/CONF.39/C.1/L.284 and France: A/CONF.39/C.1/L.300).

79. Art. 51 provides for nullity ab initio, viz. with regard to the operation of time, but not for nullity de piano, viz., with regard to the procedure. Also in the event of coercion of a State's representative, Article 65 of the Convention requires this Party to notify the other Parties of its claim for invalidation. Articles 65–68 provide further rules of procedure. For the consequences of a Convention's invalidity, see also Art. 69

80. Weinschel, op.cit., (n.54), p. 446 et seq.

81. Loc.cit., p. 458.

82. The theory has been rejected by De Visscher, op.cit., (n.74), pp. 517–518, Vitta, op.cit., (n. 43), p. 122, Wenner, op.cit., (n.42), pp. 92–95, Verdross, A., “Anfechtbare und nichtige Staatsverträge”, 15 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (1935), p. 289 et seq.Google Scholar

83. De Visscher, op.cit., (n. 74), p. 522.

84. Brierly, J.L., “Règies générates du droit de la paix”, 58 Hague Recueil (1936), p. 207.Google Scholar

85. E.g., Verdross, : “Mais cette difference n'est pas claire. Car, comme tout Etat ne peut agir que par l'intermédiaire dx'un organe, chaque menace de violence envers un Etat pour obtenir son consentement à une convention déterminée, ne peut être dirigée que contre l'organe compétent pour conclure le traité,” Règles générales du droit international de la paix, 30 Hague Recueil (1929) p. 429Google Scholar. Similarly, Vitta, op.cit., (n. 43), p. 120.

86. Wenner, op.cit., (n. 42), pp. 83–86. A slightly different, though still corresponding line of thought is followed by Vitta where he makes a distinction between “violence contre le fonctionnaire en tant que personne” [against the personal interests of the agent] and “violence contre le fonctionnaire en tant que fonctionnaire” [against the interests of the State on whose behalf the agent is acting], Vitta, op.cit., p. 121.

87. De Visscher, op.cit., (n. 74), p. 523.

88. Loc.cit., p. 528 et seq.

89. Brierly, Règies, op.cit., (n. 84), pp. 206–207.

90. Loc.cit., p. 207.

91. A synopsis of theories on “imposed treaties” of writers of the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union can be found in S. Malawer, op.cit., (n.2), p. 89 et seq. Cf., also Detter, I., “The problem of unequal treaties”, 15 ICLQ (1966), pp. 1069–1089.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

92. van Oven, J.C., Leerboek van het Romeinsch privaatrecht 3rd edn. (1948) p. 247.Google Scholar

93. Only a few of the numerous studies relating to this question in all its various aspects will be mentioned here. Scheuer, H., “Die laesio enormis im römischen und im modemen Recht”, 47 ZvRW (1932) p. 77 et seq.Google Scholar, 48 ZvRW (1933) p. 304 et seq., Maury, J., “La lésion dans les contrats”, Revue critique de droit international (1936) p. 344 et seq.Google Scholar, Dekkers, R., La lésion énorme (1937)Google Scholar. Ossipow, P., De la lésion (1940)Google Scholar. Stein, P.A., Misbruik van omstandigheden (1957)Google Scholar. van Zeben, C.J., De leer van het justum pretium en misbruik van omstandigheden (1960)Google Scholar. Ruitinga, D.P., Misbruik van economisch overwicht als grond voor het aantasten van overeenkomsten. Een studie naar Frans, Amerikaans en Nederlands recht (1982).Google Scholar

94. Grotius, op.cit., L. II, ch. XV, para. 7, Vattel, op.cit., L. II, ch. XII, para. 158. Wolff, Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum, para. 405. Pufendorf, op.cit., L. VIII, ch. IX, para. 4.

95. de Louter, J., Het stellig volkenrecht Vol. I (1910) p. 469Google Scholar. Lauterpacht, Private law sources, op.cit., (n. 45), p. 177. Strupp, Eléments, op. cit., (n. 58), p. 263. Klüber, op.cit., (n. 72), p. 204. Wheaton, H., Elements of international law (first edn. 1866; adaptation: The Classics of International Law, 1936)Google Scholar, part III, ch. II, para. 267. Wenner, op.cit., (n. 42), pp. 238–239. Vitta, op.cit., (n. 43), pp. 152–153.

96. Wheaton, ibidem.

97. E.g., Vitta (who rejects the laesio enormis) p. 153: “Ces raisons ne sont pas sans réplique. Les difficultés du fonctionnement pratique ne suffisent pas à exclure la lésion: elles ne sont pas plus fortes ici que dans beaucoup d'autres cas, et il n'est pas licite de se retrancher derrière de simples raisons de convenance pour en tirer des conclusions d'ordre juridique.”

98. Here conceived in the sense of principles prevailing in the municipal law systems of civilized nations. See also section 3.2.2. See, in general, Vitányi, B., “Les positions doctrinales concernant le sens de la notion de ‘principes généraux de droit reconnus par les nations civilisées’,” in RGDIP (1982) pp. 48–116.Google Scholar

99. Private Law Sources, op.cit., p. 177.

100. Vattel, op.cit., L.II, ch. XII, para. 159. (For Vattel's view on the legal effects of unequal treaties, see ibid., 172–175). Wolff, op.cit., para. 407. Furthermore, Vattel declares that if a sovereign sees that the agreement is disadvantageous to the other party, nothing is ‘more honorable, more praiseworthy, and more conformable to the mutal duties of Nations” than relaxing the terms of the agreement wherever he can do so without neglecting his duty towards himself, jeopardizing himself, or suffering considerable loss. Wolff, who considers that sovereigns should receive thorough instruction on the principles of equity (including first and foremost the duty to implement an agreement), does not seem to expect too much from moral obligation. He writes: “If, indeed, good men in making treaties should desire as far as possible to perform their duty in all respects, it would promote the happiness of nations. “But”, he continues, “this is more to be desired than hoped for.”

101. E.g., Calvo, C., Le droit international théorique et pratique, 6 Vols., 5th edn. (1896) vol. 3, p. 355Google Scholar, Vol. 5, p. 390. Heffter, op.cit., (n. 73), p. 47.

102. Houlard, M., La nature juridique des traités internattonaux et son application aux théories de la nullitié, de la caducité et de la révision des traitüs (1936) in particular pp. 137–139.Google Scholar

103. Haekal Pacha, M.H., “Les traités inégaux”, 5 Revue égyptienne de droit international (1949) pp. 1–16.Google Scholar

104. Ibidem, p. 4.

105. For a survey of the various municipal regulations, see in particular the above-mentioned (n. 93) theses of Ossipow and Stein. For the “undue influence” doctrine in Anglo-American law, see, e.g., Arenson, J.T., The doctrine of undue influence in Anglo-American law (1953).Google Scholar

106. Thus, Vitta's discussion of “lésion” in his chapter on lack of consent (op.cit., p. 152). Wenner, by contrast, is strongly opposed to such a system: “Die Laesio enormis hat in einer Untersuchung über die Willensmängel keinen Platz, sie gehört systematisch in eine Untersuchung über das Willensobjekt.” (op.cit., p. 239).

107. Cf., supra, s. 2.2.

108. Grotius, op.cit., L. II, ch. XV, para. 7, Vattel., op.cit., L.II, ch. XII, para. 160. Wolff, op.cit., paras. 399–400. Pufendorf, op.cit., L.VIII, ch. IX, para. 4.

109. Loc.cit., para. 160.

110. Loc.cit., para. 170.

111. For a survey of the natural law theories and the positivist theories, see Gidel, G., “Droits et devoirs des nations; la théorie classique des droits fondamentaux des états”, 10 Hague Recueil (1925) pp. 541–599.Google Scholar

112. Jellinek, G., System der subjektiven öffentliche Rechte, (1919) p. 318.Google Scholar

113. Gidel, op.cit., p. 586.

114. François, op.cit., p. 353. Gidel, op.cit., p. 542. Among the various rights regarded by writers as a State's fundamental rights the most important include the right of self-preservation, independence, equality, integrity and international trade. Cf., also, Phillimore, W.G.F., “Droits et devoirs fondamentaux des États”, 1 Hague Recueil (1923) pp. 29–71.Google Scholar

115. Loc.cit.. p. 542.

116. Oppenheim, L., International Law, first edn. (1905), Vol. I, p. 550Google Scholar. In the subsequent edition by Lauterpacht (8th edn.) a far less outspoken position is taken in this respect. For the sake of completeness, it must be added that Oppenheim is referring in the above quotation to the consequences of a change of circumstances after the conclusion of the treaty. After the quoted passage Oppenheim continues: “No State would consent to any such treaty as would hinder it in the fulfilment of these primary duties. The consent of a State to a treaty presupposes a conviction that it is not fraught with danger to its existence and vital development.” Brierly correctly observes on this point that this could hardly be said to apply to pretty well any treaty to which a State agrees after having suffered a military defeat.

116a. It should be noted that rights and duties of States have now been included in various international documents. Examples are the Convention on Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the seventh Pan-American Conference in December 1933, the Bogotà Charter of the Organization of American States of 30 April 1948, and the draft declaration on rights and duties of States of the International Law Commission (Yearbook ILC 1949, pp. 286–290).

117. However most writers only deal in this context with violation of fundamental rights generally and many do not always make it clear whether they have in mind the rights of one of the Parties or the rights of States that are not a party to the treaty. Clearly, it is the fundamental rights of contracting States that are considered in, e.g., Vattel, op.cit., L.II, ch. XII, para. 160, Taylor, , A treatise on public international law (1901) p. 339Google Scholar. A. Verdross, Völkerrecht, 2 Auflage, 1950, p. 136. Sibert, M., Traité de droit international public (1951) vol. I pp. 226–227Google Scholar. Sibert remarks, with respect to the fundamental rights of States, that these rights which have their origin in “le sentiment commun qui existe chez les hommes de leur nécessité absolue pour le maintain de la solidarité Internationale et de la paix,” in his view,” bénéfident automatiquement à tout nouveau membre de la Sociéte des États sans qu'il soit besoin d'une declaration qui les lui octroie ou reconnaisse. C'est en vain quela politique ou les juges prétendraient les ignorer” (p. 227). No further attention has been devoted to the various treatises of German writers querying the validity of the Treaty of Peace of Versailles on the ground of an excessive restriction in this Treaty on Germany's sovereignty, except to the extent that they deal with the problem in a more general sense. However, most of these treatises dating back to the 1920s and 1930s are concerned only with this Treaty.

118. A. Verdross, “Anfechtbare und nichtige Staatsverträge”, op.cit., (n. 82), “Heilige und unsittliche Staatsverträge”, Völkerbund und Völkeirecht, Vol. II (1935-1936), p. 164 et seqGoogle Scholar. “Der Grundsatz ‘pacta sunt servanda’ und die Gienze der guten Sitten im Völkerrecht”, XVI Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, (1936) p. 59 et seqGoogle Scholar. “Forbidden treaties in international law”, 31 AJIL (1937), p. 571 et seq.Google Scholar, Völkerrecht, op.cit., (n. 117), pp. 135–136.

119. Forbidden treaties, p. 573.

120. Cf. Vitta, op. cit., p. 169.

121. Forbidden treaties, p. 573.

122. Loc. cit., p.571.

123. See Art. 53: “A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Conventions peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” Art. 54 contemplates the emergence of new peremptory norms of general international law: “If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.” For the significance of the term jus cogens, see, inter alia, Schwelb, E., “Some aspects of international jus cogens as formulated by the International Law Commission,” 61 AJIL (1967) p. 946CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Scheuner, U., “Conflict of treaty provisions with a peremptory norm of general international law,” 29 ZaöRV (1969) p. 28Google Scholar; de Visscher, Ch. “Positivisme et jus cogens”, 75 RGDIP (1971) p. 7Google Scholar; Rozakis, C.L., The concept of jus cogens in the Jaw of treaties (1976).Google Scholar

124. van Blokland, F. Beelaerts, Eenige beschouwingen over net tot stand komen en de rechtskracht van verdragen (1895) pp. 33–34Google Scholar. Similarly, Rivier, A., Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts, 2nd edn. (1899) p. 327.Google Scholar

125. Op. cit., (n.76), p.66.

126. Similarly M. Bothe, op.cit., (n.2), p. 508, and T. Elias, “Problems concerning the validity of treaties”, By Hague Recueil (1971) p. 381.

127. Thus, e.g., Bleiber, F., “Aufgezwungene Verträge im Vülkenecht”, 19 Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht (1935), p. 385 et seqGoogle Scholar. Hyde, C., International law, chiefly as interpreted and applied by the United States, 2nd (1945) p. 1380Google Scholar. See also: “Nature and interpretation of treaties: treaties made under duress”, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, Vol. 26 (1932) pp. 45–53.Google Scholar

128. See, e.g., the above-mentioned (n. 51) research of the Harvard Law School on the Draft Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in case of Aggression (1939).

129. For a discussion of post-war views in literature (after 1945): H. Brosche, op.cit., (n.2), p. 158 et seq; S. Malawer, op.cit., (n.2), p. 74 et seq. In 1963 Brownlie was more hesitant. Although he recognized the importance of theory and practice in favour of the nullity theory, he considered that this theory had not yet found general recognition: Brownlie, I., International Law and the Use of Force by States (1963) p. 405.Google Scholar

130. Nor in earlier comments by governments on the 1963 ILC Draft. Cf., Waldock, 5th Report on the Law of Treaties, A/CN.4/183/Add.1, p. 13. As regards the concept of “force”, the Conference amended the draft of the International Law Commission on one point. The Commission had failed to specify in its draft and accompanying explanation from what time the prohibition of the use of force could be regarded as a rule of general international law. An amendment submitted and subsequently adopted was intended to indicate that the prohibition was included as a lex lata in the UN Charter as early as 1945. Therefore the provision should read: “the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations” (amendment: A/CONF.39/C.1/L.289and Add. 1).

131. ILC Comments, op.cit., (n. 76), p. 66.

132. Accordingly, Art. 52 – as well as Art. 51 – is excluded fiom the scope of Art. 45. Art. 45, dealing with the “Loss of a right to invoke a ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty” reads: “A State may no longer invoke a ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty under Articles 46 to 50 or Articles 60 and 62, if, after becoming aware of the facts: (a) it shall have expressly agreed that the treaty is valid or remains in force or continues in operation, as the case may be; or (b) it must by reason of its conduct be considered as having acquiesced in the validity of the treaty or in its maintenance in force or in operation, as the case may be”. Also in Art. 52 nullity ab initio does not, of course, mean nullity de plano. Cf., supra n. 79.

133. In addition to the above-mentioned studies of Brosche (n.2), Malawer (n.2) and Brownlie (n.129), see also: Derpa, R.M., “Das Gewaltverbot der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen und die Anwendung nichtmilitärischer Gewalt”, 8 Völkerrecht und Auszenpolitik (1970)Google Scholar. On the concept of “force” in Art. 2 of the UN Charter, see also: Goodrich, L.M., Hambro, E., and Simons, A.P., Charter of the United Nations, third edn. (1969) p. 43 et seq.Google Scholar

134. ILC Comments, op.cit., (n. 76), p. 66.

135. A/CONF.39/C.1/L.67/Rev.1/Corr.1, proposed by Afghanistan, Algeria, Bolivia, Congo (Brazzaville), Ecuador, Ghana, Guinea, India, Iran, Kenya, Kuwait, Mali, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Syria, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

136. Official Records, First Session, p. 269.

137. Thus, for example, the Netherlands representative, Official Records, First Session, p. 275.

138. Doc. A/CONF. 39/26.

139. Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), 1973 ICJ Rep. 49 (jurisdiction), 59 (author's emphasis added). The Court failed to see in this case any reason to question that the instruments – an exchange of notes of 1961 – “were freely negotiated by the interested parties on the basis of perfect equality and freedom of decision on both sides.” The Court delivered a similar judgment in the dispute between the United Kingdom and Iceland (Fisheries Jurisdiction case). (United Kingdom and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), 1973, ICJ Rep. 4 (jurisdiction).

140. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX). Art. 1 of the definition reads: “Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition” (Author's emphasis added).