A feature of the end of the Cold War has been the tendency in state practice to expand the right of lawful resort to force by introducing novel grounds for the exercise of the right of self-defence. These are an alleged right to use force in self-defence against armed bands, regardless of the precise involvement of another state in their activities and the introduction of a right of pre-emptive self-defence against likely threats to the security of a state. Action by armed bands is viewed as an autonomous instance of an armed attack, while at the same time the alleged right of pre-emptive self-defence marks a departure from the hitherto controversial concept of anticipatory self-defence by dispensing with the requirement of imminence of an armed attack. A factual assessment of ‘imminence’ is replaced by considerations of state security. This tendency in state practice faces the persistence by the ICJ to view the use of force as an inter-state phenomenon and to interpret resort to defensive action as narrowly as possible.

The rapid deterioration of the environment has become a threat to the survival of mankind and concerted action of all states is required in order to overcome the current problems. The perplexing question that arises is whether and how the notion of sovereignty can face up to the global environmental challenge? It is therefore important to reconcile the concept of sovereignty with the need for a global approach to problems of an environmental nature. This approach furthermore needs to take account of the dynamics of the North-South relationship. In this article the author introduces the notion of ‘custodial sovereignty’ as a solution to the problem.

Over the last couple of years, international lawyers have hotly debated the correct way to apply Article 31, paragraph 3(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Discussions have focused on the meaning of ‘the parties’. Traditionally this expression has always been interpreted in the stricter sense of all parties to the interpreted treaty. Voices are now raised suggesting a broader interpretation. According to this view, the correct meaning of ‘the parties’ is the two or more parties to a specific dispute. Given that the two interpretations of Article 31, paragraph 3(c) will often be mutually exclusive, international legal literature provokes a review of the possible reasons that give us ground to adopt them. This article provides such a review. It arrives at the conclusion that only the stricter interpretation can be seriously defended as being correct. First, only the stricter interpretation agrees with the clear ordinary meaning of Article 31, paragraph 3(c). Secondly, even assuming that the ordinary meaning of the provision is ambiguous, a strong case can be made in favour of the stricter interpretation using other data of interpretation, such as the context, the object and purpose of the treaty, and the preparatory work.

This paper focuses upon a comparatively overlooked issue with regard to the scope of self-defence in international law: whether the subjective ‘psychological’ positions of the states concerned in a dispute involving the use force have any impact upon the lawfulness of an action avowedly taken in self-defence. There exists a long standing conception that the motives of a state responding in self-defence are relevant to the lawfulness of that response. The purity (or impurity) of a state's motive forms the basis of a distinction for many writers between a lawful self-defence action and an unlawful armed reprisal. Similarly, in recent decisions of the ICJ, the implication has been that the subjective intention of the attacking state may be relevant to the question of whether the attack perpetrated by that state can trigger the right of self-defence. The conclusion is reached here that the lawfulness of an avowed self-defence action should be premised upon objective criteria alone. Moreover, this reflects the law as it is in fact applied in practice. It is argued that the subjective ‘psychological’ position of either the responding or attacking state has no place in the final analysis of whether an action in self-defence was lawful or unlawful.

The attempt to establish a New International Economic Order (NIEO) during the 1970s was an acrimonious period in international diplomacy and quite clearly failed, in retrospect, to achieve anything like the substantive change envisaged. This article considers one non-governmental attempt to move the debate forward, the 1986 International Law Association (ILA) Declaration on Progressive Development of Principles of Public International Law relating to a New International Economic Order. The article revisits the 1986 Seoul Declaration and considers to what extent its principles of international law remain valid for an economic system that has changed dramatically over the last twenty years. The article concludes that not only is the Seoul Declaration remarkably apposite to the current situation, but it has been re-energised by the emergence of the notion of sustainable development, itself a major topic within the International Law Association. In that sense, the Seoul principles – as now supplemented by the 2002 ILA New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law relating to Sustainable Development – remain foundational not only to the functioning of an equitable economic system but also, in the light of changing expectations, a sustainable international community, more generally.

This article examines the importance of compulsory licensing – using a human rights lens – to facilitate access to life-saving medications for Africans and its use after the historic decision at Doha in 2001 (popularly called ‘Doha Declaration’). It further considers the August 2003 Decision of the Council for TRIPS and the subsequent December 2005 amendment of the TRIPS Agreement in an attempt to resolve paragraph 6 of Doha Declaration. It submits that both are neither faithful to the spirit of Doha nor are they in line with provisions of human rights instruments, which guarantee the rights to health and life. Also, the article reasons that recent developments in the world on the use of compulsory licensing, such as the new Canadian legislation on this issue, have not in any way brought succor to Africans. The article further argues that in view of the above situations, particularly the failure of both the August 2003 Decision of the Council for TRIPS and its amendment of the TRIPS Agreement to find a lasting solution to the unresolved paragraph 6 of Doha, African countries may need to be creative in invoking other provisions of the TRIPS such as Article 31(k) so as to ensure affordable medicines for their citizens. The article then considers the likely tension that may exist between human rights and intellectual property rights, and submits that the obligations of states under the former should supercede the latter.

This article examines the centrality of domestic location in transitional justice, using the example of the removal of the Charles Taylor trial from the Special Court for Sierra Leone's base in Freetown to The Hague to illustrate what is lost when trials are removed from the survivor population. While transitional criminal trials are usually justified on the basis of their ability to herald the return of the rule of law, the emergence of hybrid courts and the principle of complementarity demonstrate a growing realisation that purely international paradigms of transitional justice do little to normalise court processes that are at the core of the rule of law. This article argues that the transfer defeats the distinctive rule of law reconstruction potential of hybrid courts which emphasizes the integration of local staff and voices into the transitional justice process to make it more relevant to the survivor community and to inculcate international norms and practice. It does so for two reasons. Firstly, the transfer of the trial from the local population impairs the suggested ability of hybrid courts to legitimize the idea of resolving disputes through the domestic courts. Secondly, the removal risks undoing positive advances made in earlier SCSL trials by compounding the local perception that these advances are the product of international dominance of the court, and in the process undermines local confidence that these advances are sustainable or applicable domestically. Though the Taylor removal was arguably unavoidable, cataloguing what has been lost will be of relevance in future when decisions about the location of a trial are made under the ICC's complementarity regime.

Doctrinal contributions on international law and politics broadly build upon the merits of international criminal justice. This applies especially to the prosecution of international crimes before national courts, which assumes the predominant importance given the limited ambit of jurisdiction of international criminal jurisdiction. A number of doctrinal contributions develop the policy view of these processes, which does not always overlap with the requirements under the international legal standards on this subject-matter. This contribution assesses the general merit of policy approaches, and their relevance in terms of more specific issues, such as universal jurisdiction, amnesties for perpetrators of international crimes, and immunity of state officials. Having analysed the pertinent evidence, this contribution concludes that the policy argument possesses no independent relevance in the legal discourse on international criminal justice, and should not be used in a way that contradicts the international legal argument.

International law has long recognized the right to vote in elections as a fundamental democratic right and the act of voting as the most basic form of popular participation. In post-conflict African countries as well as those struggling to make the transition from single-party autocratic rule to multiparty democracies, competitive elections have become the barometer for measuring how close they are to this goal. Yet, across Africa this internationally-protected right to vote is under siege as elections have been transformed into elaborately staged events designed to hoodwink external donors. Rather than serving as a measure of democratic participation, the act of voting in a disturbingly sizeable number of African countries has been used by cynical political leaders to provide their authoritarian regimes with a veneer of legitimacy. Despite these hiccups, this article argues that a careful review of state practice in the continent reveals an emerging regional customary law norm in support of the right to popular participation.

The end of nuclear testing has been a goal and dream of a number of generations for five decades. The actual date of entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT, or Treaty), however, is still unclear at this stage. One of the lessons learned by the international community is that mere negotiations of an arms control treaty are not enough. The raison d'être of creating an international treaty is that it be implemented. Without implementation, the treaty just conserves certain normative provisions elaborated through the international negotiations for an indefinite time in the future.

Modern international law offers certain legal practices to implement relevant norms in a treaty that formally does not meet the requirements for entry into force. In this article an attempt has been made, bearing in mind the existing international legal practice and the present stage of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization activities, to study alternative means of applying the CTBT provisionally. The analysis has been done on the basis of international treaty law, international organizations and arms control. The article pretends neither to propose concrete practical steps towards the full implementation of the CTBT, nor to ignore the importance of its entry into force. The intention of the author is to look for alternatives that might be helpful to achieve a safer world, without nuclear explosions. The article is intended to provide ideas for possible debate, which appropriate conclusion would definitely promote the values of nonproliferation and peace in the years to come.

The article begins by analysing the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as an authoritative basis for provisional application of international treaties. It then considers the CTBT and the legal prerequisites for provisional application. The article concludes with an assumption that the completion of the CTBT verification regime would accelerate the need to discuss alternative means of applying CTBT without substituting its entry into force.