Wer heutzutage eine auf nationaler wie auf internationaler Ebene zutreffende Charakteristik seiner Zeit zu geben versucht, darf an zwei Tatsachen nicht vorübergehen. Die erste ist die Durchbrechung aller Grenzen, die zweite das Fehlen aller Diskretion. Beide Tatsachen sind verschieden, wie eng sie auch mit einander verbunden sein mögen. Unterscheiden soll man sie, weil derjenige, der eine Grenze durchbricht, das jenseits der Grenze Angetroffene nicht notwendigerweise der Öffentlichkeit preiszugeben braucht. Veröffentlichung ist jedoch eine so natürliche Folge, ja vielleicht eben das erhoffte Ziel des Durchbrechens, dass eine enge Beziehung zwischen den beiden Fakten einfach nicht zu leugnen ist.

The following translation of the draft of Book 6 of the new Netherlands civil code was prepared by Mrs. E. J. Drion-van Rooyen and Mr. R. H. van Dijk under supervision of Prof. F. H. Lawson, D.C.L., F.B.A., Professor of comparative law at the University of Lancaster. The translation was made by order of the Minister of Justice of the Netherlands, but is not to be considered as an official translation. It was ordered primarily to make this part of the new codification accessible to comparative lawyers who do not understand the Dutch language. The draft may be of considerable interest to them since the drafters made a comprehensive study of comparative law.

The first three paragraphs of article 13 of the Benelux Uniform Law on Conflicts of Law, as revised in 1969, read as follows.

1. In respect both of compulsory and not compulsory legal provisions, contracts shall be governed by the law as chosen by the parties.

2. As far as the contract is clearly localized in a given country, the choice of the parties cannot overrule such legal provisions of the said country as, in virtue of their particular character and purport, exclude the application of any different law.

3. Failing a choice by the parties, either explicit, or implicit but certain, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country with which it shows the narrowest points of contact.

The criticism to these paragraphs as offered in the foregoing paper, does not bear on the principles, as set out above, but on the wording thereof.

In a sense, this paper is not more than a reminder—result of a respect readily paid by any student of International Law to a group of great scholars—the purpose of which it is to find out what a doctrine of Pure Law had, and might also in future, contribute to the maintenance of law in international relations. Put in a nutshell, the achievement of this School was to re-emphasize—twice, during the post-war periods of great and critical importance for the authority of law—the standing of the legal discipline as an independent factor of international order. Essentialia and accidentalia being intertwined, much of its development is due to the fact that the School was repeatedly “called to order” by its founder, Hans Kelsen, who, through a specific historic concatenation of circumstances, has since his expatriation from Austria remained a researcher with no other but scholarly responsibilities; he spoke on behalf of his philosophical cognizance only and exclusively, and where authority is being appreciated by virtue of its freedom from subservience to any specific interest, this School shall enjoy the respect due to its founder and long-time genius rector.

The International Law Association was founded in Europe. From its birth it has been strongly supported by European jurists and organisations, among which we can, with gratitude, reckon those from the Netherlands as outstanding in number and quality. But equally it has extended its reach overseas. The United States of America and Canada, both of which have contributed so powerfully to the development of International Law, have for long possessed active branches, and, without attempting a total enumeration, it is sufficient to point to the fact that recent conferences have been held in Japan, Finland and Argentina. Australia is notably represented and there are many other countries in Asia and Africa which, but for currency restrictions, would be capable and anxious to take part in the Association's discussions and work.

There is increasing disquietude, both among authors and practising lawyers, as regards the application of private international law on the basis of Von Savigny's doctrine, i.e. the principle that international legal relations are subject to the law of the country where such a relation has its “natural seat”: a study has therefore been undertaken as to the merits and practical applicability of this doctrine.

Such a study must start from a consideration of factual relationships and the actual interests stemming from such relationships. Where man admits to the existence of ethical norms for his behaviour, he necessarily finds himself confronted with obligations derived from these norms, but he also derives therefrom positive rights exercisable against his fellows; his inborn sense of justice is his criterion in determining where such rights lie. If his claims to such rights are indeed to be admitted, their validity must be tested against the legal rules which regulate mutual relations within a defined community; in the case of international relationships the question arises as to the criteria to be used in identifying the law to be applied, i.e. in determining within which complex of contacts the specific relation concerned can be said to lie, and hence where its “centre of gravity” or its “natural seat” is to be found.

1.—Description and characterization—such should be the double aim of this short contribution in the nature of a “visiting-card” handed out at the start of the 1970 Hague Conference of the International Law Association. The participant in the Congress should, indeed, be somewhat orientated as to the place international law occupies in the Netherlands community. The period chosen is the one from the 1938 Amsterdam Conference to the one convened in The Hague. Were it not for this link with two I.L.A.-Conferences, the period might otherwise be deemed to be entirely arbitrary. Yet, it happens almost to coincide with a new phase in Dutch political history. Having stood aside from partisan international politics as much as it could ever since the Napoleonic era, and, in particular, having been neutral in the First World War, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, centre of a far-flung Empire, in 1940, i.e., after 125 years, all of a sudden found itself involved in what was to become World War II. The event came as a heavy blow to a nation which, throughout that one century and a quarter, had been content, without any ambitions on the political scene, quietly to administer and develop its ancient heritage. The cause of international law could not fail, in those circumstances, to be dear to its heart. Small countries, and especially those on the lee side of history, are easily given to the devotion of orderly processes. They cannot but benefit from them. In the case of the Netherlands, however, material interest alone, as it appears, does not account for the totality of its attitude towards international law. Over the centuries, the country's outlook was also determined by spiritual factors. Grotius' personality—he was a theologian as much as a lawyer—most happily bespeaks this state of mind, even though no Dutch writer after him succeeded in blending the two as evenly, and in such lofty manner, as he did. The spiritual strain in Dutch writings on international law after Grotius never filled more than the role of an under-current, stronger or weaker, but its presence is not to be denied. Its influence may also be discerned in the Netherlands' League of Nations policy. Dutch official enthusiasm for the League was sufficiently cautious, in the meantime, to allow the Netherlands in 1938, together with a number of other powers, no more to subscribe to the obligatory character of sanctions as provided for under the Covenant.

In 1938 the International Law Association held its 40th congress in Amsterdam. This year, 1970, the organization will again meet in the Netherlands, this time in the Hague. In this review we shall summarize the most important developments in Dutch scholarly practice regarding private international law during the intervening period.

The Security Council each year, under the specific provisions of Article 15(1) and 24 (3) submits a report on its work to the General Assembly. Under the provisions of Article 15 (2) the Assembly also receives the reports of the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council. Each year the reports of the three Councils are included in the Agenda of the current Assembly session.

In an article published in this Journal in 1969, entitled “An Evaluation of the Leading Principles of the Treaty on Outer Space of 27th January 1967”, the present writer gave some consideration to the nature and content of the fundamental principles laid down in this Treaty viz. the principle of freedom of outer space for exploration and use and the principle of outer space including the Moon and other celestial bodies being not subject to national appropriation. Attention was drawn to certain ambiguities and inconsistencies in the text and to the difficulties in ascertaining the common intention of the authors of the Treaty.

The primary object of writing this article in the Conference issue of the Netherlands International Law Review is to acquaint those who want to participate in the discussions on the Conference Topic “Anti-Trust” with the previous work done by the I.L.A. Committee on Anti-Trust and reported in the Tokyo, Helsinki and Buenos Aires Conference Reports. In the absence of some introduction to the subject matter, Conferees would have to study no fewer than 288 pages of the Tokyo Report, 116 pages of the Helsinki Report and 66 pages of the Buenos Aires Report. Obviously, this introduction can only cover the main lines of the work done during the past six years.