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Theory and Practice of Treaty Interpretation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 May 2009

Maarten Bos
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Extract

At p. 10 supra, it was proposed to limit the use of the term “interpretation” to the written manifestations of law, i.e., to treaty (as defined in Article 2, paragraph 1(a), of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), certain decisions of international organizations, and certain judicial decisions. The present study is concerned with the interpretation of treaties only. With regard to unwritten agreements (not coming under the said definition of treaty), it remains to be seen whether the methods and rules of interpretation also apply to them.

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Netherlands International Law Review , Volume 27 , Issue 2 , August 1980 , pp. 135 - 170
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Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 1980

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References

198. In so far as unilateral declarations should be deemed to produce unwritten agreements, the following dictum of the International Court of Justice may be quoted in passing: “When states make statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for” (judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests Case, ICJ Reports, 1974 p. 267, para. 44)Google Scholar. Cf. pp. 166–167 infra.

199. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1964, Vol. II (New York 1965), p. 53.Google Scholar

200. Note here the influence on the extent of proof to be given. According to ProfessorHyde, Charles Cheney, “The Interpretation of Treaties by the Permanent Court of International Justice”, AJIL (1930) p. 19Google Scholar, interpretation, indeed, merges with the handling of evidence of the intentions of the parties. With Professor Sur, one sees the opposite happening: evidence becoming interpretation (see p. 7 supra).

201. Op.cit., p. 54.

202. Pitlo, A., op.cit., pp. 123–124Google Scholar (this writer's translation; the other quotations from Pitlo to follow were likewise translated by him).

203. Ibid., pp. 124–125; Dutch readers may be reminded, here, of Professor Scholten's incisive observations on historical interpretation under the title “Eggens' Bewijsrecht” (Eggens on Evidence), Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notarisambt en Registratie (16–23 02 1935)Google Scholar Nos. 3399–3400.

204. Ibid., p. 124.

205. Ibid., p. 125.

206. Ibid., p. 158.

207. Ibid., p. 125. On teleological interpretation in international law, see Sur, , op.cit., pp. 228–231Google Scholar. According to the author, p. 229, interpretation is teleological whenever the interpreter himself rationally constructs the purpose of the treaty and, in interpreting its text, derives conclusions from it. To the interpreter, the purpose of a treaty almost constitutes a pretext for developing the law and opposing himself to the sovereignty of States. “Objectivist” authors, therefore, mostly favour the teleological method, whereas “voluntarists” seek to limit recourse to it.

208. Ibid., p. 126.

209. Ibid., p. 127.

210. See Wiarda, , op.cit., p. 25Google Scholar. A proponent of sociological interpretation as a regular feature of judicial practice is ProfessorSchoordijk, H.C.F., Oordelen en vooroordelen (Judgment and Prejudice) (Deventer 1972) p. 13, n. 3.Google Scholar

211. Tammelo, , op.cit., p. 39Google Scholar: philosophically speaking, the arguments a simili, a fortiori, and a contrario are “formally invalid” (and see p. 43: “quasi-logical arguments”) “but nevertheless have obtained through intelligent use by reputable men in appropriate contexts a [certain?] cogency and dignity”.

212. ICLQ, 1952 p. 251.Google Scholar

213. On these arguments, see, e.g., Jokl, Marcelle, De l'interprétation des traités normatifs d'après la doctrine et la jurisprudence Internationales (Paris 1935) pp. 109 et seq.Google Scholar

214. See, e.g, the argumentum ab absurdo developed by the famous Dutch jurist Everaerts (1462–1532), as quoted by ProfessorCoopmans, J.P.A., “Vrijheid en gebondenheid van de rechter vóór de codificatie” (Freedom and Limitations of the Judiciary before the Codification), in the volume Rechtsvinding (Deventer 1970) pp. 90–91.Google Scholar

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216. Ibid., p. 31 (italics supplied).

217. ICJ Reports 1951 p. 22 (italics supplied).Google Scholar

218. ICJ Reports 1954 p. 55.Google Scholar

219. Ibid., p. 56 (italics supplied).

220. Comp. Bourquin, as quoted at p. 31supra.Google Scholar

221. ICJ Reports, 1954 p. 56.Google Scholar

222. See Art. 1 and 3 of the Brussels International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Penal Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision and Other Incidents of Navigation of 10 May 1952, and Art. 11, para. 1, of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas of 29 April 1958. On the Brussels Convention, comp. ProfessorFrançois', Fifth Report to the International Law Commission, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1953), Vol. II pp. 51–53.Google Scholar

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224. See on the Permanent Court's positivism SirWilliams, John Fischer, “L'affaire du ‘Lotus’”, Revue générate de droit international public (1928) pp. 361–376Google Scholar, as well as Cavare, Louis, “L'arrêt du “Lotus” et le positivisme juridique”, in Travaux juridiques et économiques de l'Universite de Rennes, Tome X (1930) pp. 144–194.Google Scholar

225. ICJ Reports, 1974 pp. 286 and 306, respectively.Google Scholar

226. Ibid., pp. 365–366 (para. 109).

227. It comes very close to the technique of comparing situations in the light of a rule of law of an outspokenly general nature, as, e.g., a rule on tort. On the comparative method then used, and on the result of a ius in causa positum, see Wiarda, , op.cit., pp. 62–63 and 65–67.Google Scholar

228. In its advisory opinion of 13 July 1954 (Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal), ICJ Reports, 1954 p. 62Google Scholar, the International Court, invited to interpret (not a treaty, but) the Statute of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, refused to do so in the light of an alleged precedent under the League of Nations.

229. De Visscher, , op.cit., p. 38Google Scholar. Comp. Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international (Paris 1960) p. 44Google Scholar, sub voce Analogie: “Procédé d'interprétation consistant à pourvoir à une lacune ou à l'obscurité d'une règie de droit en se référant à ce qui est admis dans une situation ressemblant à celle qui est consideree.”

230. Degan, , op.cit., p. 100Google Scholar. See also Neri, Sergio, op.cit., p. 230.Google Scholar

231. Black, , Law Dictionary, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn. 1951) p. 110Google Scholar. Wharton's version of analogy differs from Wiarda's technique (see p. 140, n. 227 supra) in that instead of statute law it concerns judge-made law.

232. Akehurst, Michael, “The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law”, BYIL, 1974–1975 p. 279, n. 1.Google Scholar

233. Comp. “The Recognized Manifestations” p. 38.Google Scholar

234. But see De Visscher, , op.cit., p. 39Google Scholar: the International Court does not distinguish between analogy and the general principles of law.

235. See, e.g., Lammasch, , Die Lehre von der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in ihrem ganzen Urnfange, in Handbuch des Völkerrechts, Vol. III–3 pp. 180–181Google Scholar. ProfessorVerzijl, , International Law in Historical Perspective, Vol. I (Leyden 1968) pp. 50–51Google Scholar, subscribes to the view, as does Siorat, , Le problème des lacunes en droit international (Paris 1958) p. 148.Google Scholar And comp. p. 141, n. 229, supra.

236. Wiarda, , op.cit., p. 13.Google Scholar

237. See pp. 18–20 supra.

238. See the judgment handed down by the Permanent Court of International Justice on 17 August 1923 (The S. S. “Wimbledon”), Series A, No. 1 p. 24; and comp. Andreae, J.P. Fockema, op.cit., pp. 64 and 134.Google Scholar

239. Scholten, , op.cit., p. 6.Google Scholar

240. See p. 19 supra.

241. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, Vol. II p. 219 (para. 6)Google Scholar. Comp. Sur, , op.cit., p. 203Google Scholar: extensive interpretation, instead of denying it, only waters down the principle that interpretation should abstain from modifying a treaty (quoting Professor Monaco); and see ibid., pp. 203–206, 269, and 276, on extensive interpretation (effet utile). Tammelo, , op.cit., p. 13Google Scholar, sees the principle embodied in what now is Article 32(b).

242. See p. 136 supra.

243. For all practical purposes, attention is drawn to the fact that the present distinction of “methods” and “rules” bears no relation to Professor Sur's as reported at p. 8 supra.

244. Permanent Court of International Justice, advisory opinion of 15 May 1931 (Access to German Minority Schools in Upper Silesia), Series A/B No. 40 p. 19.

245. International Court of Justice, advisory opinion of 18 July 1950 (Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania), ICJ Reports, 1950 p. 229; judgment of 27 August 1952 (Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco), ICJ Reports, 1952 p. 196Google Scholar; and judgment of 18 July 1966 (South West Africa Cases – Second Phase), ICJ Reports, 1966 p. 48.Google Scholar

246. Permanent Court of International Justice, advisory opinion of 21 November 1925 (Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne). Series B, No. 12 p. 25.

247. See Asquith, Lord's award as quoted at p. 138supra.Google Scholar

248. See p. 21 supra. Endeavours preceding those made by Waldock and the International Law Commission were those of the Harvard Law School, op.cit., pp. 937–977Google Scholar, of the Institut de Droit International, Annuaire, 1956 p. 359Google Scholar, of the American Law Institute, Second Restatement of the Law: Foreign Relations Law of the United States (St. Paul Minn. 1965) pp. 449–456Google Scholar, and of SirFitzmaurice, Gerald, BYIL, 1957 pp. 210–212Google Scholar. Comp. Tammelo, , op.cit., pp. 18–25Google Scholar, on the Institut Draft.

249. Comp. Sur, , op.cit., p. 278.Google Scholar

250. See Diagram.

251. See p. 11 supra on Waldock's Draft Article 65, and this writer's book-review in Rechts-geleerd Magazijn Themis, 1978 pp. 31–35Google Scholar, for details of the development from this article to Art. 31, para. 3(c), of the Vienna Convention.

252. See p. 28 n. 149 supra.

253. On the scope of Art. 31, para. 3(c), see Sur, , op.cit., p. 284Google Scholar: the provision “consacre le principe de la réintégration du traité dans l'ensemble du droit international”.

254. On a possible hierarchy among Arts. 31 and 32, see Sur, , op.cit., pp. 277–278.Google Scholar

255. See p. 27 supra.

256. Comp. p. 37 supra.

257. A similar opinion may be Professor Sur's, according to whom, even under Arts. 31–33 of the Vienna Convention, “la liberté de l'interprète doit connaitre des butoirs”. See op.cit., p. 276.

258. Comp. Sur, , op.cit., pp. 226–227Google Scholar, quoting from practice.

259. On Art. 33, comp. Sur, , op.cit., pp. 273–275Google Scholar. The International Law Commission dismissed the idea of a necessarily restrictive interpretation to solve the problems arising from authentication in two or more languages (ibid. p. 274).

260. See p. 137 supra.

261. Le Fur, Louis and Chklaver, Georges, Recueil de Textes de Droit International Public, 2nd ed. (Paris 1934) pp. 165–166Google Scholar. And see an Lnglish translation as prepared by the United States Department of State in Schindler, Dietrich and Toman, Jiri, The Laws of Armed Conflicts (Leyden 1973) pp. 99–100.Google Scholar

262. At the time of the attack, all belligerents were parties to the Declaration which, to all intents and purposes, was to be considered as a treaty. The United States of America never acceded to the Declaration. Since the United States did not enter the First World War before 6 April 1917, the reservation that the Declaration “shall cease to be binding from the time when, in a war between the Contracting Powers, one of the belligerents shall be joined by a non-Contracting Power” was not operative on 22 April 1915. Comp. Spetzler, Eberhard, Luftkrieg und Menschlichkeit (Göttingen 1956) p. 93Google Scholar: “Nach seinem Wortlaut untersagt es [das II. Haager Abkommen vom 29.7.1899] auch nicht (….) den Giftgaseinsatz vermittels anderer Verfahren als durch Verschiessen”, and n. 37 (supporting the legality of the German attack). But see also Verwey, Wil D., Riot Control Agents and Herbicides in War (Leyden 1977) pp. 222–225.Google Scholar

263. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, Vol. II pp. 220–221.Google Scholar

264. McDougal, Myres S., “The International Law Commission's Draft Articles Upon Interpretation: Textuality Redivivus”, AJIL, 1967 p. 992.Google Scholar

265. Klinger, R.D. in Tammelo, , op.cit., p. 87.Google Scholar

266. Comp. pp. 14–15 supra.

267. See p. 136 supra.

268. In his dissenting opinion, Section IV (The Historical Background of the Drafting of the Mandate), as appended to the International Court's judgment of 18 July 1966 (South West Africa Cases – Second Phase), ICJ Reports, 1966 pp. 352–373Google Scholar, Judge Jessup showed himself to be a strong supporter of the historical method.

269. McNair, , op.cit., pp. 422–423Google Scholar. And see Sur, , op.cit., pp. 256–259Google Scholar, for a careful analysis of the arguments pro and contra the use of travaux préparatoires. Ibid., p. 279, the author rightly observes that the Vienna Convention, though permitting the use of travaux préparatoires, left the problems surrounding it unsolved. In particular, a definition of travaux préparatoires is sorely missed (do ILC documents and transactions qualify, for example?), and their opposability as to third States adhering to a treaty is an open question. Comp. Tammelo, , op.cit., pp. 14–15Google Scholar (a number of judicial pronouncements on travaux préparatoires), and 18–22 (references to Lauterpacht, Beckett; McNair, Huber).

270. See p. 145 supra.

271. Op.cit., p. 221 (as quoted at pp. 147–148 supra).

272. ICJ Reports, 1952 pp. 183, 184, 197 and 198Google Scholar. And see already the Permanent Court of International Justice, judgment of 26 April 1928 (Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia – Minority Schools), Series A, No. 15 p. 33: “The Treaty would fail in its purpose if it were not to be considered as an established fact that persons who belonged de facto to such a minority must enjoy the protection which had been stipulated.”

273. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, Vol. II p. 219, para. 6.Google Scholar

274. See Sur, , op.cit., p. 228.Google Scholar

275. Ibid.

276. Ibid., p. 229, and Tammelo, , op.cit., p. 34Google Scholar. And see Sur's further observations on “object” and “purpose” of a treaty, op.cit., pp. 227–231.

277. See pp. 135–136 supra (Waldock on Cavaré and Alvarez).

278. See n. 273 at p. 150 supra.

279. Tammelo, , op.cit., p. 51Google Scholar (quotations are from Radbruch, Gustav, Rechtsphilosophie, 5th ed. (Stuttgart 1956), pp. 210 and 214).Google Scholar

280. See p. 19 supra. And comp. McDougal, as quoted at p. 148Google Scholarsupra on “the rational employment of principles of interpretation”.

281. See p. 148 supra.

282. Lasswell, McDougal, and Miller, , The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order (New Haven 1967) p. 111.Google Scholar

283. Bernhardt, Rudolf, Die Auslegung völkerrechtlicher Verträge (Cologne 1963) p. 31.Google Scholar

284. SirLauterpacht, Hersch, International Law: Collected Papers (Cambridge 1970) p. 365Google Scholar. And comp. p. 15 supra.

285. As a partisan of this new current in the Netherlands, see van Dunné, J.M. and his book Normatieve uitleg van rechtshandelingen (Deventer 1971).Google Scholar

286. See this writer's “Legal Archetypes” (as quoted at p. 20, n.100 supra) pp. 74–75.Google Scholar

287. Ibid., p. 74. Comp. Tammelo, , op.cit., p. 58, n. 30Google Scholar: “Ex nunc interpretation enters into the decisions of international courts above all through their allowing for equitable considerations”, with reference to Schwarzenberger, Georg, International Law, Vol. I, 3rd. ed. (London 1957) p. 494.Google Scholar

288. Quoted at p. 143, n. 244 supra.

289. Series A/B, No. 40 p. 19.

290. Tammelo, , op.cit., p. 10.Google Scholar

291. See “Legal Archetypes” p. 86.Google Scholar

292. As suggested by Schwarzenberger, Georg, op.cit., pp. 489–490Google Scholar, and Sur, , op.cit., p. 202.Google Scholar

293. See p. 143, n. 245 supra.

294. ICJ Reports, 1950 p. 229.Google Scholar

295. See p. 143, n. 245 supra.

296. ICJ Reports, 1952 p. 196.Google Scholar

297. Tammelo, , op.cit., p. 10Google Scholar, once more referring to Schwarzenberger, , op.cit., p. 488.Google Scholar

298. See further Sur, , op.cit., pp. 200–210, 343–344, and 348 on the no revision-rule.Google Scholar

299. See p. 143, n. 246 supra.

300. Pillet, Antoine, “Recherches sur les droits fondamentaux des états dans l'ordre des rapports internationaux et sur la solution des conflits qu'ils font naitre”, Revue générate de droit international public, 1898 pp. 55–89, and 236–264Google Scholar; and 1899 pp. 503–532. And see ProfessorTammes, Arnold' comments in his study De wet van het geringste offer (The Law of the Least Sacrifice) for the Royal Academy of Sciences of the Netherlands (Amsterdam 1963).Google Scholar

301. See ProfessorTammes, ' résumé, op.cit., pp. 1–4.Google Scholar

302. See p. 143 supra.

303. Comp. this writer's contribution “De betekenis van het rechterlijk proces voor de rechtsvorming” (The Significance of Judicial Proceedings in the Process of Law) (as quoted at p. 35, n. 188 supra) p. 33, and p. 18 supra on the esprit de finesse.

304. McNair, , op.cit., pp. 464–465.Google Scholar

305. Series A, No. 21 p. 114.

306. Op.cit., p. 251.

307. Further on this rule, see Ch. De Visscher, , op.cit., pp. 110–112.Google Scholar

308. See a survey of learned opinion in ProfessorJeukens, ' “De interpretatie van de grondwet” (The Interpretation of the Constitution), in Rechtsvinding (Finding the Law) (Deventer 1970) pp. 173–177Google Scholar; and comp. Prakke, , “Constitutional Interpretation in the Netherlands”, Netherlands Reports to the VIIIth International Congress of Comparative Law, Pescara, 1970 (Deventer 1970) pp. 267–287.Google Scholar

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311. Ibid. p. 148. In so far as jurisdiction may be considered a matter of procedure, there is an important exception to be made, here, concerning the Netherlands, the Dutch Hoge Raad not basing its case-law regarding jurisdiction on the text of statutory provisions, nor on any expressed legislative intent, but autonomously seeking to establish a reasonable system of jurisdiction. See that Court's judgment of 15 December 1950, Nederlandse Jurisprudence, 1951, No. 221.Google Scholar

312. Scelle, Georges, Précis de droit des gens, Vol. II (Paris 1934) p. 334.Google Scholar

313. See his “Kartels en Euromarkt” (Trusts and Common Market) in De kartelbepalingen in het EEG- Verdrag (The Anti-Trust Provisions in the European Common Market Treaty) (Zwolle 1960) pp. 11, 17–18, and 39–40.Google Scholar

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315. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1964, Vol. II p. 55 (para. 9)Google Scholar. And comp. McNair, , The Law of Treaties (Oxford 1961) pp. 739–754Google Scholar (“The Functions and Differing Legal Character of Treaties”), and Tammelo, , op.cit., p. 24.Google Scholar

316. See “The Recognized Manifestations” p. 23Google Scholar (and comp. p. 21, n. 101 supra).

317. Ibid., p. 24.

318. It is realized that the nomenclature used here and below – private versus public law – is by no means ideal, but there seems to be no better one at hand.

319. SirLauterpacht, Hersch, International Law: Collected Papers (Cambridge 1970) p. 366. 320Google Scholar. Seep. 15 supra.

321. See Brierly, J.L., The Law of Nations, 3rd. ed. (Oxford 1942) pp. 240–244Google Scholar; ibid. p. 243: “though these Resolutions [had] only a moral authority, that authority [was] a high one”.

322. ICJ Reports, 1949 pp. 174 et seq.Google Scholar

323. Ibid., p. 178 (italics supplied).

324. Ibid., p. 179.

325. Ibid., p. 180 (italics supplied).

326. See also the Court's advisory opinion of 13 July 1954 (Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal), ICJ Reports, 1954 pp. 56–57.Google Scholar

327. ICJ Reports, 1948 pp. 57 et seq.Google Scholar

328. ICJ Reports, 1950 pp. 4 et seq.Google Scholar

329. ICJ Reports, 1948 p. 62.Google Scholar

330. Ibid., p. 63.

331. ICJ Reports, 1950 p. 8.Google Scholar

332. Ibid.

333. ICJ Reports, 1948 pp. 85–86.Google Scholar

334. Ibid., p. 92. And see Sur, , op.cit., p. 85Google Scholar: “les Etats membres, interprétant les conditions juridiques posées par l'article 4 de la Charte des Nations-Unies, feront de considérations politiques les éléments de l'appartenance juridique de l'Etat à l'organisation”.

335. Verzijl, J.H.W., The Jurisprudence of the World Court, Vol. II, (Leyden 1966) p. 16Google Scholar. For further reading on the subject, see Ch. De Visscher, , op.cit., pp. 148–149Google Scholar, Gordon, , “The World Court and the Interpretation of Constitutive Treaties”, AJIL 1965 pp. 794 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Gutteridge, Joyce, The United Nations in a Changing World (Manchester 1969).Google Scholar

336. See “Kartels en Euromarkt” (Trusts and Common Market) (as quoted at p. 156 n. 313 supra) pp. 7–20.Google Scholar

337. Ibid., pp. 10–11 (but see Ch. De Visscher, , op.cit., p. 140Google Scholar: “règle de droit” versus “action commune”); and on traités-loi, comp. this writer in “The Recognized Manifestations” p. 24Google Scholar, McNair, , op.cit., pp. 749–752Google Scholar, and Sur, , op.cit., pp. 88–89, 249–250, 261–262, 270, and 304.Google Scholar

338. “Kartels en Euromarkt” p. 11Google Scholar. Sur, , op.cit., p. 128Google Scholar: the travaux préparatoires of the UN Charter “n'ont pas en principe de valeur juridique, et leur pertinence en ce qui concerne l'interprétation est très contestée”. But see the International Court in its advisory opinion of 21 June 1971 (Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)), ICJ Reports, 1971 p. 34Google Scholar, para. 62: “The records of the San Francisco Conference show that …”.

339. See “Principles of Rational Organization” p. 44: “The essential vocation of law, indeed, is to be an instrument of government, and its essential nature, therefore, is to be part of cybernetics”.

340. See p. 6 and pp. 159–160 supra. And comp. Ch. De Visscher, , op.cit., p. 141Google Scholar: with regard to institutional treaties, “on ne saurait leur appliquer dans toute leur rigueur les règies courantes de l'exégèse des textes”.

341. “Kartels en Euromarkt” pp. 14–16Google Scholar. See also Judge Fitzmaurice's dissenting opinion as appended to the International Court's advisory opinion of 21 June 1971 (Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)), ICJ Reports, 1971 p. 220Google Scholar: “I cannot as a jurist accept the reasoning on which [the Opinion of the Court] is based” (italics supplied).

342. Lauterpacht, , op.cit., p. 133.Google Scholar

343. See McNair, , op.cit., p. 30.Google Scholar

344. See pp. 157–158 supra.

345. See p. 29 supra.

346. See Sur, , op.cit., pp. 230–231.Google Scholar

347. See pp. 160–161 supra.

348. Ch. De Visscher, , op.cit., p. 128.Google Scholar

349. Ibid., p. 133.

350. ICJ Reports, 1951 p. 23Google Scholar; and comp. p. 16 supra.

351. De Visscher, , op.cit., pp. 134–135.Google Scholar

352. Ibid., p. 135.

353. See p. 15 supra.

354. De Visscher, , op.cit., p. 135Google Scholar. It is submitted that retroactivity as suggested by De Vissehcr is questionable: all “restatement” of customary law is creative, and why should the resulting new formula be retroactive?

355. Ibid.

356. Ibid., p. 41. Morelli, Gaetano, “Cours général de droit international public”, Rec. ADI, 1956–I p. 467Google Scholar. denies the existence of any general norm authorizing analogy in the interpretation of agreements.

357. Halleck, 's International Law, 4th Ed. by SirBaker, G. Shetston, Bt., Vol. I (London 1908) p. VI.Google Scholar

358. See Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 1954, No. 176.Google Scholar

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360. Stein, Eric and Carreau, Dominique, “Law and Peaceful Change in a Subsystem: ‘Withdrawal’ of France from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, AJIL, 1968 p. 608.Google Scholar

361. Ibid., p. 613. Comp. Kirgis, Frederic L., “Nato Consultations as a Component of National Decisionmaking”, AJIL, 1979 pp. 372 et seq.Google Scholar

362. De Martens, , Nouveau Recueil, Vol. XVI pp. 770–791.Google Scholar

363. Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A, No. 1 p. 22 (italics supplied).Google Scholar

364. As quoted by De Visscher, , op.cit., p. 132.Google Scholar

365. Series A, No. 1 p. 33.

366. As expressed by the Court in its judgment of 7 June 1932 (Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex), Series A/B, No. 46 p. 167.Google Scholar

367. SirLauterpacht, Hersch, The Development of International Law by the International Court (London 1958) p. 304.Google Scholar

368. Ibid., p. 305.

369. See pp. 153–154 supra.

370. Series A, No. 10 pp. 24–25.

371. See p. 154 supra.

372. Op.cit., p. 302, n. 8.

373. Op.cit., p. 302.

374. Op.cit., p. 304.

375. Comp. p. 136, n. 200 supra. See further on the restrictive method in interpreting treaties limiting State sovereignty: McNair, , op.cit., pp. 765–766Google Scholar, Tammelo, , op.cit., pp. 13–14Google Scholar, and Sur, , op.cit., pp. 87, 121, 244, and 354–355Google Scholar. In Judge De Castro's opinion, privileges (the opposite of limitations), too, are to be interpreted restrictively. See his separate opinion in the case of Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Reports, 1971 p. 186.Google Scholar

376. Jennings, Robert Y., General Course on Principles of International Law, Rec. ADI, 1967–II p. 594.Google Scholar

377. Ibid., p. 595.

378. de Lacharrière, Guy, “Consensus et Nations Unies”, Annuaire français de droit international, Vol. XIV (1968) pp. 9–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

379. Comp. Koers, Albert W., Het Internationale recht van de zee (The International Law of the Sea) (Deventer 1979) p. 9.Google Scholar

380. See “The Recognized Manifestations” p. 65.Google Scholar

381. Koers, , op.cit., p. 17, n. 36 and 37.Google Scholar

382. See p. 151 supra.