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Theory and Practice of Treaty Interpretation*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 May 2009

Maarten Bos
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Extract

Treaty interpretation is a matter of legal methodology, a comprehensive notion embracing a great variety of subjects. In the Diagram published together with this study, the present writer gives his own view of legal methodology as applied to international law. The “legal process” as shown therein is a complicated one, certain parts of which have been examined in earlier studies, viz., the principles of rational organization, the recognized manifestations of international law, and the existence of a hierarchy among them. Treaty interpretation as dealt with, here, belongs to the wide category of problems designated in the Diagram as those of the ascertainment of the content (meaning, message) of the recognized manifestations of international law. For reasons/which, it is hoped, will become clear in the following pages, it is important to place treaty interpretation and the whole of ascertainment of content in the context of methodology generally, not isolated from the other questions involved in the application of recognized manifestations or from the problems surrounding the latter, such as the doctrine of “sources”. As to the link between the present subject and that of the ascertainment of the content of recognized manifestations other than treaties, it is readily agreed that doctrinal treatment of the former would gain by a contrasting sketch of the latter, but since the present study already exceeds the limits of the habitual article, this writer has to forego what otherwise would be a legitimate pursuit.

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Articles
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Netherlands International Law Review , Volume 27 , Issue 1 , May 1980 , pp. 3 - 38
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Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 1980

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References

1. See “Principles of Rational Organization as Applied in the Process of Law”, Netherlands International Law Review, vol. XXIV (1977) pp. 43–54Google Scholar, and in Essays on International Law and Relations in Honour of A.J.P. Tammes (Leyden 1977) pp. 43–54Google Scholar; “The Recognized Manifestations of International Law: A New Theory of ‘Sources’”, German Yearbook of International Law, vol. 20 (1977) pp. 9–76Google Scholar; and “The Hierarchy among the Recognized Manifestations (Sources) of International Law”, Netherlands International Law Review (1978) pp. 334–344Google Scholar, also published in Estudios de Derecho Intemacional (Homenaje al Profesor Miaja de la Muela), vol. I (Madrid 1979) pp. 363–374.Google Scholar Hereinafter, these titles will be quoted in an abridged form as “Principles of Rational Organization”, “The Recognized Manifestations”, and “The Hierarchy”.

2. Paris, 1974.

3. Op.cit., pp. 74–75Google Scholar; and see further on unilateral acts: ibid., pp. 222–232.

4. Ibid., pp. 157–158.

5. Ibid., pp. 159–160.

6. Ibid., p. 182.

7. Ibid., pp. 223–224.

8. Ibid., p. 317.

9. Ibid., p. 156.

10. Ibid., pp. 90 and 91.

11. Ibid., pp. 225, 363, and 365.

12. Ibid., p. 76; and see p. 317: “L'interprétation (…) est omniprésente dans l'activité judiciaire”.

13. Op.cit., pp. 12 and 241.Google Scholar

14. Ibid., pp. 241–242.

15. Ibid., p. 242; and see ibid., p. 287, n. 121, on the difference, particularly, between the interpretation of written and that of unwritten (customary) law (quoting Ch. De Visscher and Huber); at p. 286, n. 120, the author already excluded the general principles of law from his observations, noting that their interpretation, though giving rise to no less difficulties than that of custom, on account of their declining importance is not of he same consequence as the latter.

16. Ibid., p. 242, n. 2 (quoting the International Court of Justice, using a comparable set of expressions).

17. Ibid., p. 244 and n. 7.

18. Ibid., pp. 242–243: “On appellera principe ce qui domine très largement l'interprétation, sans être spécifique aux questions qu'elle pose, mais d'une application fort générale, et qui, par conséequent, ne saurait fournir claiiement une solution équivoque”.

19. Ibid., p. 243: “une directive juridique générale et spécifique au problème”.

20. See p. 14 infra.

21. Op.cit., p. 244.Google Scholar

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27. The same suggestion was made by Verzijl, J.H.W., International Law in Historical Perspective, vol. VI (Leyden 1973) p. 298.Google Scholar

28. See p. 8 n. 22 supra on Judge De Visscher.

29. Tammelo, Ilmar, Treaty Interpretation and Practical Reason: Towards a General Theory of Legal Interpretation (Sydney 1967) p. 4.Google Scholar

30. See section 5.2 infra on Hyde's opinion on interpretation.

31. Coing, , op.cit., pp. 540–541 and 542.Google Scholar

32. Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1964) vol. II pp. 8–9 (italics supplied).Google Scholar

33. Ibid., 1966, vol. I, Part II p. 199, para. 9.

34. Op.cit., p. 98Google Scholar: “interprétation doctrinale” and “interprétation juridique”.

35. Ibid., p. 67; it is a bit odd to see doctrinal interpretation called “non juridique” at pp. 87, 94, and 98.Google Scholar

36. Ibid., pp. 98–99.

37. Ibid., pp. 180–181.

38. Ibid., p. 193; and comp. Art. 31, para. 3(b), of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

39. Ibid., pp. 335–339.

40. Ibid., pp. 362 and 388–389.

41. Ibid., pp. 343–344.

42. Recueil des décisions des Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes, vol. I p. 472.Google Scholar

43. Ibid., p. 478 (this writer's translation); and see on this case and on the question generally, the present writer's Conditions du procès en droit international public (Leyden 1957) pp. 66–75.Google Scholar

44. See p. 11 supra.

45. See p. 13 supra.

46. See p. 12 supra.

47. See this writer's “Legal Archetypes and the Normative Concept of Law as Main Factors in the Defining and Development of International Law”, NILR (1976) pp. 76–77.Google Scholar

48. See “Principles of Rational Organization” p. 52: “it is submitted that the judiciary (…) should (…) take efficiency as a guide (…) particularly in the interpretation of treaties”.

49. But see Sur, , op.cit., pp. 70–73.Google Scholar

50. Comp. Sur, ibid., pp. 59–60, quoting Ch. De Visscher who sees four categories of effectiveness.

51. Schwarzenberger, Georg, “Myths and Realities of Treaty Interpretation”, Current Legal Problems (1969) vol. 22 p. 212 (italics added).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

52. Ibid. (italics added).

53. Gaudemet, Jean, “L'interprétation des lois et des actes juridiques dans le monde antique”, Revue Internationale des droits de l'antiquité, 3e série, tome XVII (1970) p. 235.Google Scholar The expression “giving a meaning to a text” was previously used in the Harvard Law School's “Research in International Law”, vol. III, Law of Treaties, AJIL Supplt. (1935) p. 946Google Scholar, and borrowed by SirWaldock, Humphrey, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1964) vol. II p. 53.Google Scholar

54. de Vattel, Emer, The Law of Nations, translated by Fenwick, Charles G. (New York, reprint 1964)Google Scholar, Book II, Chapter XVII, para. 263. The passage was relied upon in a number of judicial decisions, e.g., by the Mixed Claims Commission United States-Germany in its opinion in the Lusitania cases of 1 11 1923Google Scholar, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. VII pp. 32–44, at p. 43Google Scholar, and by the Appeals Chamber of the Central Committee for the Navigation on the River Rhine in a case of 15 February 1969, reported in Schip en Schade, 1969, Nr. 67 (in German).Google Scholar

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56. SirLauterpacht, Hersch, International Law: Collected Papers (Cambridge 1970) p. 361.Google Scholar In a footnote, Sir Hersch refers to Fairman, Charles, “Interpretation of Treaties”, Transactions of the Grotius Society, vol. 20 (1934) pp. 129–130Google Scholar, for an analysis. ProfessorSur, , op.cit., p. 251Google Scholar, n. 25, draws attention to Arts. 1156–1164 of the French Code Civil and their influence on international law.

57. Tammelo, , op.cit., p. 9Google Scholar: “As an unsystematized collection of juristic wisdom, most principles of legal interpretation have come down to us from classical Roman jurisprudentia. All contemporary legal systems have drawn heavily from this source, either directly or through the mediation of continental civilists. Thus the application of international law has relied on a body of rules of common origin with which lawyers of all countries and civilizations are familiar and of which they have made constant use” (and see n. 23 and 24 for further literature).

58. See section 5.3.2 infra.

59. ICJ Reports, 1951 p. 24.Google Scholar

60. Ibid., p. 23; and comp. Judge Alvarez' dissenting opinion, ibid., p. 51: the Genocide Convention is part of the new international constitutional law.

61. Emer de Vattel, op.cit., Book II, Chapter XVII, para. 268.

62. SirPhillimore, Robert, Commentaries Upon International Law, 3rd. ed. (London 1879) vol. II p. 95.Google Scholar

63. Anzilotti, Dionisio, Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts, vol. I (1929) p. 82Google Scholar (this writer's translation). Anzilotti's view was subscribed to by Cheng, C.H., Essai critique sur l'interprétation des traités dans la doctrine et la jurisprudence de la Cour permanente de Justice intemationale (Paris 1941) p. 2.Google Scholar

64. Waldock, , “Third Report on the Law of Treaties”, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1964) vol. II (New York 1965) p. 54.Google Scholar

65. O'Connell, D.P., International Law, vol. I (London 1965) p. 272.Google Scholar

66. Gentili, Alberico, De iure belli (1598)Google Scholar, lib. II, cap. IV; Grotius, Hugo, De iure belli ac pacis (1625), lib. II, cap. XVI.Google Scholar

67. Comp. Ehrlich, Ludwik, “L'interprétation des traités”, Recueil de l'Académie de droit international, 1928–IV pp. 70 and 16.Google Scholar

68. Ehrlich, , op.cit., pp. 76 and 77Google Scholar; and De Visscher, Charles, op.cit., p. 50.Google Scholar

69. Bernhardt, Rudolf, Die Auslegung völkerrechtlicher Verträge (Cologne 1963) p. 28 (this writer's translation).Google Scholar

70. Degan, V.D., L'interprétation des accords en droit international (The Hague 1963) p. 163Google Scholar (this writer's translation).

71. Tammelo, , op.cit., p. 37.Google Scholar

72. Ibid., p. 41.

73. Ibid., p. 50: “The overall endeavour in the application of practical reason is to make use of, to preserve, and to enhance order in human affairs” (italics supplied).

74. Ibid., p. 48.

75. Ibid., pp. 49–50 (echoing Basdevant and Hambro – and so many others: see Degan, , op. cit., p. 164Google Scholar, Sur, , op.cit., pp. 82–83, 264, and 305–306).Google Scholar

76. Ibid., p. 55. See Pascal, Pensées, ed. Brunschvicg, , Section premièreGoogle Scholar, No. 1, on the difference between the two esprits, the relevance of which in treaty interpretation was already hinted at by Charles De Visscher (Degan, , op.cit., p. 164)Google Scholar, and later was by Sur, , op.cit., p. 264.Google Scholar

77. Sur, , op.cit., pp. 27–28Google Scholar, has interesting observations to offer on the nature des choses.

78. See the annexed Diagram. In international law, the recognized manifestations not of a “legislative” origin (certain judicial decisions, the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and complementary natural law) are, nevertheless, considered to be included in this growing process: see pp. 4–6 supra.

79. Comp. Sur, , op.cit., p. 11Google Scholar, who takes as the starting-point of his study of interpretation the question “what is law?”.

80. See “The Hierarchy” p. 338.Google Scholar In the same vein, Sur, , op.cit., p. 19Google Scholar, refers to the “idéologie intégrée” permeating the entire legal mecanism.

81. See “Principles of Rational Organization” p. 44.Google Scholar

82. An analogous, though too unqualified, statement is to be found in Sur, , op.cit., pp. 369–370Google Scholar, according to whom the methods of interpretation aim at establishing “le sens et la portée d'une disposition par reconstitution du travail des rédacteurs” and, in the end, are analogous to those used in the drafting of a treaty, “explication profonde de la maxime” ejus est interpretari cujus est condere“”, and see ibid., pp. 205–206: both Lauterpacht and Charles De Visscher were of opinion that judges have the same discretionary power as legislative organs and contracting parties in determining the rational purpose of a treaty; and p. 53: “Aussi les problèmes politiques posés par la formation du droit se retrouvent-ils très souvent au moment de son application”.

83. “Principles of Rational Organization” p. 45.Google Scholar The requirement of reason is clearly reflected in Art. 32(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. An early example of the formula used there is to be found in the advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice of 16 May 1925 (Polish Postal Service in Danzig), Series B, No. 11 p. 39.Google Scholar

84. Ibid.

85. Adaptability not to be confused with the capability of generalization of judicial decisions: see “The Recognized Manifestations” p. 59.Google Scholar Nor with the tampering with judicial decisions the enforcement of which meets with obstacles.

86. See Diagram.

87. “Absence of prejudice” understood here as “an approach irrespective of persons”, see “Principles of Rational Organization” p. 45.Google Scholar

88. Ibid., p. 50.

89. Ibid., p. 52 (and comp. p. 14 n. 50 supra).

90. Ibid., p. 47.

91. See Scholten, Paul, “Algemeen Deel”Google Scholar (General Part) of MrAsser, C.'s Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlandsch Burgerlijk Recht, 2nd ed. (Zwolle 1934) pp. 173–181Google Scholar; and comp. Wiarda, Gerard J., Drie typen van rechtsvinding (Three Types of Legal Method) (Zwolle 1972) pp. 70–71.Google Scholar

92. See “Principles of Rational Organization” pp. 47–48.Google Scholar

93. Ibid., p. 46.

94. Ibid., p. 48.

95. See p. 17, n. 73 supra).

96. See Diagram.

97. Op.cit., p. 46.Google Scholar

98. Ibid., p. 47.

99. Ibid., p. 53.

100. Comp. this writer's “Legal Archetypes and the Normative Concept of Law as Main Factors in the Defining and Development of International Law”, NILR (1976) p. 86, on integrity and flexibility.Google Scholar

101. Comp. “The Recognized Manifestations” p. 23: those treaties only are “sources” of law, which augment or codify the body of already existing rules. The fact implies a qualification of the statement in the text above.

102. Note, however, that Arts. 31–33 are of an optional nature and, consequently, may be contracted away. Comp. Sur, , op. cit., p. 367.Google Scholar

103. SirLauterpacht, Hersch, The Development of International Law by the International Court (London 1958) p. 27Google Scholar; Guggenheim, Paul, Traité de droit international public (Geneva 1967), vol. I pp. 247–248Google Scholar; Bernhardt, , op. cit., p. 30.Google Scholar

104. Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, , International Law, vol. I, 8th ed. (London 1955) pp. 950–951Google Scholar; Degan, , op. cit., pp. 162–163Google Scholar; and see Bernhardt, , op. cit., p. 26, for further examples.Google Scholar

105. McNair, , The Law of Treaties (Oxford 1961) p. 366Google Scholar; in the same vein already the Harvard Law School's Research in International Law, vol. III, Law of Treaties, AJIL, Suppl. 1935 p. 947Google Scholar; and see Dahm, Georg, Völkerrecht, vol. III (Stuttgart 1961) pp. 56–57Google Scholar, and Tammelo, , op. cit., pp. 22 (quoting Basdevant) and 23.Google Scholar

106. Seep. 16 supra.

107. Waldock, , op. cit., p. 54 (italics supplied).Google Scholar

108. Sur, , op. cit, p. 71 n. 9Google Scholar: Waldock himself meanwhile admitted the controversial and partly contradictory character of the rules belonging to this “strietly legal basis” of interpretation.

109. Seep. 18 supra.

110. Sur, , op. cit., p. 338Google Scholar: the International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of an Organization the political raison d'être of which is the maintenance of peace. In terms of the normative concept of law of the Organization, this cannot fail to produce its effect.

111. ICJ Reports, 1949 pp. 174 et seq.Google Scholar

112. In “The Recognized Manifestations” pp. 32 and 74–75Google Scholar, this writer still advocated the customary law character of the methods and rules of interpretation. At pp. 74–75, however, he in fact already demonstrated to what absurdity this view must necessarily lead. This is why it is now abandoned, and an additional argument to the same effect is that of the indispensable discretion proposed here.

113. “Legal Archetypes and the Normative Concept of Law as Main Factors in the Defining and Development of International Law”, NILR 1976 pp. 74–77.Google ScholarProfessorSur, , op. cit., p. 160Google Scholar, rightly speaks of the “compétence dérivée” of the judge, thus stressing the “service” character of his function.

114. Ibid., p. 81.

115. Jean Etienne Marie Portalis (1746–1807) took an active part in the drafting of the French Code Civil. The words quoted are from his celebrated speech made on the occasion of the presentation of the final draft of the Code. In this speech he, inter alia, analysed the different tasks of law-giver and judge. On this discours préliminaire, see Wiarda, , op. cit., pp. 10–12.Google Scholar

116. “Legal Archetypes” p. 81.Google Scholar

117. Ibid., p. 76.

118. Ibid., pp. 79–81.

119. “Old Germanic Law Analogies in International Law, or: The State as Homo Liber”, NILR 1978 pp. 58–59Google Scholar (also published in Mélanges Fernand Dehousse, vol. 1 (Les progres du droit des gens) (Paris-Brussels 1979) pp. 25–30).Google Scholar

120. See “The Recognized Manifestations” p. 71Google Scholar; the phrase, of course, is not intended to do away with those recognized manifestations of international law which are not of the States' making.

121. As the present writer did in NILR 1976 p. 78.

122. Comp. Sur, , op. cit., pp. 347–359Google Scholar, on the fear of a “government by judges”.

123. As quoted by Sur, , op. cit., p. 318Google Scholar; and comp. p. 321 on the threefold weakness of the Court, and p. 383 on the risk involved in a premature development of institutions of international law.

124. See Sur, , op. cit., p. 319; at pp. 178–179Google Scholar, the author himself already asked whether a without a legislator could remain a judge: did he not become a pseudo-legislator?

125. In a way, because they cannot be deemed identical to the point where they have an identical mission to accomplish. This is how this writer could say that, “to a point, the legislative and the judicial function must always remain separate” (“Legal Archetypes” p. 75).Google Scholar

126. Comp. p. 19, n. 82 supra.

127. Sur, , op. cit, p. 321.Google Scholar

128. Seep. 24 supra.

129. “Legal Archetypes” p. 78.Google Scholar

130. Sur, , op. cit., pp. 312–313.Google Scholar

131. See p. 19 supra.

132. Seep. 11 supra.

133. “Legal Archetypes” p. 76.Google Scholar

134. Sur, , op. cit., pp. 223–225.Google Scholar Comp. the present writer's Presidential Address to the International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-Fifth Conference, New York 1972 p. 6: “the lawyer is more important than the law especially in the kind of circumstances in which nowadays international law is supported to operate”.

135. See “The Recognized Manifestations” p. 63.Google Scholar

136. On the influence of doctrine generally, see Fitzmaurice, , Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1957, vol. I p. 185Google Scholar: “It [international law] had always been made by the practice of States, but their debt to the professors was enormous; … admitted that States made international law, it must also be recognized that a very large part of their ideas came from professors and publicists”; and see François, J.P.A., “L'influence de la doctrine des publicistes sur le développement du droit international”, Mélanges Gilbert Gidel (Paris 1961) pp. 275–281.Google Scholar

137. Comp. p. 8 supra quoting Professor Coing.

138. Sur, , op. cit., pp. 99 and 107Google Scholar; on the technical imperfection of international law, see ibid., pp. 375–380 (distinguishing three situations: contradictory rules, general imperfection of international law, and imperfection due to the impossibility to foresee future needs).

139. Ibid., pp. 54–55 (this writer's translation).

140. Ibid., p. 109.

141. Ibid., p. 245.

142. Ibid., p. 306.

143. Ibid., p. 156.

144. Ibid., p. 99; but see ibid., p. 251, where Sur contradicts himself by saying: “L'interprétation unilatérale ne forme qu'une prévention de droit à l'égard des autres parties.”

145. Ibid., p. 55.

146. Ibid., pp. 122–123.

147. Ibid., pp. 379–380; and see ibid., p. 366, for an explanation of the term intended for such phrases as “Nothing in this treaty may be interpreted as …”; Sur also recognizes a tacit (implied) form of preconstitution: the mere text of a treaty is considered to hold an interpretation (see p. 7 supra).

148. Ibid., p. 361; ibid.: in case not all parties partake in the interpretation, Sur speaks of “plurilateral” interpretation, a form of interpretation which he deems to be a sign of incoherence rather than a means to promote coherence; both (quasi-)authentic and plurilateral interpretation he unites under the name of interpretation concertée, in his opinion the most important form of interpretation in international law (ibid.).

149. Ibid., p. 175. The former two of these devices, in the present writer's opinion, are wrongly considered to represent forms of “interpretation”. Re vera, they are nothing but agreements which have to be interpreted instead of interpreting themselves. Comp. p. 9 supra for this writer's rejection of Sur's wide concept of interpretation. Sur himself, op. cit, pp. 361–362Google Scholar, virtually acknowledges this writer's criticism when writing: “Authentique ou quasi-authentique, l'interprétation se laisse en dernière analyse malaisément dissocier de la formation d'une nouvelle règle de droit ou de la révision de l'ancienne”.

150. Ibid., p. 239.

151. Ibid., p. 124, quoting the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 11 July 1950 (International Status of South-West Africa), ICJ Reports 1950 pp. 135–136.Google Scholar

152. But with the possible exception of the Secretary-General, supposing him to be the impersonation of the Secretariat which, under Art. 7, para. 1, of the Charter, is one of the principal organs of the United Nations (and see Arts. 97–101 of the Charter). Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, indeed, pursuing political power, claimed the freedom himself to interpret the Charter, but failed. See Sur, , op. cit., p. 133.Google Scholar

153. Comp. Sur, , op. cit., pp. 126–156Google Scholar; and see pp. 135–138 and 155–156, especially, for Professor Sur's interesting observations on the Members' right to challenge Security Council decisions on the strength of their freedom of interpretation.

154. ICJ Reports 1950 pp. 4 et seq.Google Scholar; and comp. Sur, , op. cit., pp. 132 and 134.Google Scholar

155. Comp. Sur, , op. cit., pp. 144–145.Google Scholar

156. ICJ Reports 1962 pp. 151 et seq.Google Scholar

157. Comp. Sur, , op. cit., pp. 139–142.Google Scholar

158. Comp. Sur, , op. cit, pp. 147, 150 and 152.Google Scholar

159. Ibid., pp. 237–238.

160. Ibid., pp. 245, 289, 299–302 and 312.

161. Ibid., pp. 238 and 386–387.

162. Comp. the questions raised in this respect by Sur, , op. cit., p. 179Google Scholar; and see ibid., pp. 178–179: does not a Court empowered to decide whether a rule is a rule of ius cogens become a “pseudo legislator”? At p. 358, the author himself answers in the affirmative, and at p. 383, he sides with the International Law Commission which did not go beyond Art. 65, para. 3, of the Convention.

163. See p. 22 supra.

164. See section 5.2.2 infra.

165. Comp. Sur, , op. cit., pp. 269–270Google Scholar: “En dernière analyse, les débats de la CDI révèlent que la liberté de l'interprète est pour la majorité de ses membres aussi importante à sauvegarder que la fixation d'une règle directrice leur semble nécessaire”; and ibid., p. 273: the ILC left many doors open and, thus, the interpreter's freedom came to take a place in the foreground; and ibid., p. 275: “C'est done, toujours, la liberté de l'interprète qui apparait, à côte de l'unité et de la souplesse des règles, la préoccupation principale de la Commission, ce qui ne va pas sans laisser nombre de problèmes peu ou mal résolus”.

166. On good faith in interpretation, see Sur, , op. cit., pp. 76–78Google Scholar (quoting Ehrlich, Basdevant, Ch. De Visscher, and Lauterpacht).

167. See section 5.2.1 infra.

168. As advocated by Schwarzenberger, , International Law, vol. I, 3rd Ed. (London 1957) p. 491Google Scholar; at p. 53, the author defines the “ius aequum rule” as “the exercise of judicially tempered discretion (….) necessarily inspired by considerations of common sense, reasonableness and good faith or, in short equitable considerations”.

169. The three classical types of the judicial officer: see Wiarda, , op. cit., p. 68Google Scholar; and comp. Tammelo, , op. cit., pp. 53–54.Google Scholar

170. See p. 22 supra.

171. See p. 15 supra and section 5.3.2 infra.

172. See section 5.2.3 infra.

173. See section 5.2.3 infra.

174. Series A, no. 10.

175. Bourquin, Maurice, “Règies générales du droit de la paix”, Rec.A.D.I., 1931 – I p. 72Google Scholar (author's emphasis).

176. Dutch readers may at this point be referred to the present writer's “Van Panhuys' ‘Carnaval des Animaux’”, Nederlands Juristenblad, 1975 pp. 1120–1123Google Scholar, where the same ideas are expressed in a slightly more detailed way.

177. See p. 29 supra, and comp. Sur, , op. cit., p. 145Google Scholar, calling the interpretation of 3 November 1950 “éminemment politique”; and see ibid., pp. 143–145, for further observations and references to doctrine.

178. See p. 22 supra.

179. Verzijl, J.H.W., “Vijftien jaren Internationale rechtspraak” (Fifteen Years of International Case-Law), Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandsche Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, vol. I, no. 2 (Amsterdam 1938) p. 146Google Scholar, in the translation appearing in Fockema Andreae, J.P., An Important Chapter from the History of Legal Interpretation (Leyden 1948) pp. 75–76.Google Scholar

180. SirLauterpacht, Hersch, “Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties”, BYIL 1949 p. 53.Google Scholar

181. Andreae, J.P. Fockema, op. cit., p. 74.Google Scholar

182. Doctrinal note appended to the Hoge Raad's decision of 24 02 1950Google Scholar, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1950, no. 742.Google Scholar

183. Pitlo, A., Evolutie in net privaatrecht (Evolution in Private Law) (Haarlem 1969) p. 129 (this writer's translation).Google Scholar

184. Sur, , op. cit., pp. 18, 83–84, and 313.Google Scholar

185. Ibid., p. 85.

186. Ibid., p. 51: “le droit est la continuation de la politique par d'autres moyens”.

187. It is with these observations in mind that one has to read the present writer's contribution to the Festschrift for Hijmans van den Bergh, L.J., Met eerbiedigende werking (Deventer 1971)Google Scholar, under the title “Het politiek karakter van het zogenaamd intertemporaal volkenrecht” (The Political Character of so-called Intertemporal International Law) pp. 53–66Google Scholar, especially p. 63.

188. Comp. this writer's “De betekenis van het rechterlijk proces voor de rechtsvorming” (The Significance of Judicial Proceedings in the Process of Law), in Quid Juris (Deventer 1977) p. 33.Google Scholar

189. The International Law Commission in codifying “secondary” rules only on State responsibility, and no “primary” rules, showed some restraint in this matter, at least “Secondary” rules are those regarding imputability, the consequences of imputation, and the implementation of responsibility. “Primary” rules are rules holding the basic obligations the violation of which gives rise to the questions answered in the “secondary” ones. See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1969, vol. II p. 233Google Scholar (paras. 80–82), and 1978, vol. II, Part Two pp. 75–76 (paras. 82–84). On the problem of codification generally, see this writer's Rondom de codificatie van het volkenrecht (Around the Codification of International Law) (Leyden 1959).Google Scholar

190. Tammelo, , op. cit., p. 34Google Scholar, and Lachs, , “The Law of Treaties (Some General Reflections on the Report of the International Law Commission)” in Recueil d'études de droit international en hommage à Paul Guggenheim (Geneva 1968) p. 401.Google Scholar

191. See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1964, vol. II pp. 53–55.Google Scholar

192. Italics in these quotations are the present writer's.

193. See section 5.2.2 infra.

194. See “The Hierarchy” p. 337.Google Scholar

195. Sur, , op. cit., pp. 245 and 285.Google Scholar

196. Seep. 22 supra.

197. See “The Recognized Manifestations” p. 73.Google Scholar