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State Responsibility for Multilateral Treaty Violations: Identifying the ‘Injured State‘ and its Legal Status

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 May 2009

K. Sachariew
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Extract

Multilateral treaties play an increasingly important role in the structure and process of present-day international law. They have proved to be a flexible, ‘multi-purpose’ instrument for finding a common denominator to the interests of a growing number of States and co-ordinating the international effort for dealing with global problems facing mankind. There is a growing awareness that the traditional bilateralist approach is inadequate for the solution of problems such as the maintenance of international peace and security, ensuring world-wide respect for human rights, democratizing international economic relations, preserving the human environment, etc. These problems generate ‘community interests’ on a global and regional level and require co-ordinated multilateral efforts for their solution.

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Articles
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Netherlands International Law Review , Volume 35 , Issue 3 , December 1988 , pp. 273 - 289
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Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 1988

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References

1. The notion of ‘countermeasures’ is also relatively new. It was introduced in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility – a codification project within the UN International Law Commission (ILC) – in 1979. It was decided to adopt this term mainly in order to avoid discussions on the scope of the ‘classical’ notion of ‘sanction’. Cf., Yearbook of the International Law Commission (YBILC) (1979) Vol. I, pp. 55–63Google Scholar, Vol. II, Part 1, pp. 39–47, and Part 2, pp. 115–122. The concept of countermeasures, as adopted by the 1LC, seems to encompass such measures as reprisals, measures of reciprocity and eventually certain sanctions by international organizations, and to exclude measures of ‘retortion’ even if adopted against an internationally wrongful act. Cf., Draft Arts. 8, 9 and 14 of Part Two of the project, in YBILC (1985) Vol. II, Part 1, pp. 10–13. The new Special Rapporteur on the topic of State Responsibility has questioned the usefulness of this notion for defining the range of legitimate measures, which may be taken by the injured State. Cf., Arangio-Ruiz, G., Preliminary Report on Slate Responsibility, UN. Doc, A/CN.4/416, n. 8 on p. 5Google Scholar. Cf., also Graefrath, B., ‘Ausschluβ der Völkerrechtswidrigkeit, Selbstverteidigung, Sanktion’, in Durchsetzungsprobleme des Völkerrechts (1983) pp. 13–26Google Scholar.

2. Cf., the provision of Draft Art. 5 of Part II of the ILC project and the commentary thereto in YBILC (1985) Vol. II, Part 2, pp. 25–28. In particular, para. 2(a) defines as ‘injured State’ in the case of bilateral treaties ‘the other State party to the treaty’.

3. ICJ Rep. 1970, Judgment in the Barcelona Traction case, para. 35.

4. Riphagen, W., ‘Fourth Report on State Responsibility’, YBILC (1983) Vol. II, Part 1, p. 3 et seq., para. 34Google Scholar.

5. Certain exceptions to this rule are possible in the case of ‘obligations stipulated in favour of third States’ (Art. 36 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).

6. Cf., Art. 17 of Part I of the Draft on State Responsibility, YBILC (1976) Vol. 1, pp. 235–253Google Scholar.

7. Commentary to Art. 17, ibid., Vol. II, Part 2, p. 87, para. 27.

8. Ago, R., ‘Second Report on State Responsibility’, YBILC (1970) Vol. II, Part 1, p. 192 et seqGoogle Scholar.

9. Ibid., p. 192.

10. Ibid.

11. Riphagen, , loc.cit. n.4, para. 34Google Scholar.

12. Bleckmann, A., Probleme der Anwendung multilateraler Verträge (1974)Google Scholar; Graefrath, B., ‘Zur Bedeutung der grundlegenden Prinzipien für die Struktur des allgemeinen Völkerrechts’, in Mollnau, K.A., ed., Probleme einer Strukturtheorie des Rechts (1985)Google Scholar; Simma, B., Das Reziprozitätselement im Zustandekommen völkerrechtlicher Verträge (1972)Google Scholar; Alaimo, M.L., ‘La natura del consenso nel illecito internazionale’, Rivista di diritto internazionale (1982) p. 257 et seq.Google Scholar; Riphagen, W., ‘State Responsibility: New Theories of Obligation in Interstate Relations’, in The Structure and Process of International Law (1983)Google Scholar. For a survey of literature on the topic cf., also Simma, B. and Spinedi, M., eds., The UN Codification of State Responsibility (1987)Google Scholar; and Sachariew, K., Die Rechtsstellung der betroffenen Staaten bei Verletzungen multilateraler Verträge (1986) pp. 32–44Google Scholar.

13. There is still no universally recognized term for this kind of obligation structure. The notion of ‘integral’ obligations was introduced by Sir G. Fitzmaurice, the ILC's Special Rapporteur on the subject of the law of treaties in 1957. Cf., the commentary to Art. 19 in YBILC (1957) Vol. II, p. 54Google Scholar. Sometimes other terms are used to define this type of structure, such as ‘multilateral’, ‘collective’ or ‘erga omnes’ obligations. The present author prefers the term ‘integral’, because it is (traditionally) limited to multilateral treaty obligations and makes it possible to deal with them separately from erga omnes obligations which exist towards the international community as a whole and are not necessarily based on multilateral treaty provisions. Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that the main ‘features’ of ‘integral’ and erga omnes obligations are very similar.

14. Cf., on this subject, Klein, E., Statusverträge im Völkerrecht (1980)Google Scholar.

15. See Simma, , op.cit. n. 12, p. 153Google Scholar; Sachariew, , op.cit. n. 12, pp. 58–76Google Scholar; Riphagen, , loc.cit. n.12, p. 583 et seqGoogle Scholar.

16. In fact, it is assumed that, historically, multilateral treaties have evolved from ‘bundles’ of bilateral agreements.

17. Graefrath, , loc.cit. n. 12, p. 186Google Scholar.

18. Agreement for Co-operation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil, in National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea, UN.Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/16, p. 435.

19. According to Gaja: ‘The great majority of international norms impose obligations which exist in specific situations only towards one or more directly affected States… If State A stops State B's ship on the high seas, this is a breach of the freedom of the high seas, but only State B's right is infringed'.: Gaja, G., ‘Jus Cogens beyond the Vienna Convention’, 172 Hague Recueil (1981) p. 280Google Scholar.

20. On the definition of ‘legal interest’ cf., Rosenne, S., The Law and Practice of the I.C.J., Vol. 2 (1965) p. 629Google Scholar and, more recently, Fritzemeyer, W., Die Intervention vor dem Internationalen Gerichtshof (1984) pp. 113–115Google Scholar.

21. The existence of such a prejudicial effect on other parties was recognized by the ICJ in the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya) when the Court had to decide on the intervention in the case by Malta. It recognized that the judgment ‘may afterwards have a prejudicial effect on Malta's own legal interests in future settlement of its own continental shelf boundaries with Libya and Tunisia’: ICJ Rep. 1981, p. 17, para. 29. Malta's application was rejected for other reasons. Ibid., para. 34.

22. Art. 19 of the ILC's Draft on State Responsibility (Part One), YBILC (1976) Vol. I, pp. 7–19Google Scholar, 55–91, 298–299, Vol. II, Part 1, pp. 24–54 and Vol. II, Part 2, pp. 95–122. Para. 3 of Art. 19 defines as international crimes, acts such as aggression, colonialism, slavery, genocide, apartheid and massive environmental pollution. On the topic of international crimes, see Mohr, M., ‘The ILC's Distinction between “International Crimes” and “International Delicts” and its Implications’, in Spinedi, and simma, , op.cit. n. 12, pp. 115–142Google Scholar; and Spinedi, M., Les crimes international de I'Etat dans les traveaux de codification de la responsabilite des Etats entrepris par les Nations Unies, EUI Working Paper No. 88 (1984)Google Scholar.

23. In the case of international crimes the traditional concept of ‘third States’ is not applicable, since such crimes affect all States (although a different degree of ‘affectedness’ may exist).

24. ICJ Rep. 1980, p. 42, para. 92.

25. For an analysis of the measures taken by the USA and other countries, cf., de Guttry, A., Le rappresaglie non comportanti la coercizione militare net diritto internazionale (1985) p. 100 et seqGoogle Scholar.

26. See, e.g., Frowein, J., ‘Die Verpflichtungen erga omnes im Völkerrecht und ihre Durchsetzung’, in Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung. Festschrift für H. Mosler (1973) p. 253 et seqGoogle Scholar.

27. ICJ Rep. 1970, p. 30 et seq., paras. 33–34.

28. Guttry, De, op.cit. n. 25, p. 108Google Scholar.

29. UN.Doc.S/PV.2191/Add.1, p. 16 and p. 54 et seq.

30. The text of the relevant joint-statement of the nine EEC members is reproduced in Bulletin of the European Communities (1980) IV, p. 23Google Scholar.

31. The CPSU General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, stressed the importance of the rule of law and the ‘primacy of international law over politics’ in international relations. Cf., his programmatic article on foreign policy and international law in Pravda (17 September 1987) p. 1.

32. Cf., supra n. 13.

33. On the notion of ‘collective interests’, see Riphagen, , op.cit. n. 12, p. 600Google Scholar.

34. YBILC (1985) Vol. II, Part 2, pp. 25–28, except for sub-para. e(i)Google Scholar.

35. Riphagen, W., ‘Commentary to Article 5’, YBILC (1985) Vol. II, Part 1, p. 8, para. 21Google Scholar.

36. These are certain exceptions, sometimes referred to as ‘defensive measures’ which are primarily intended to prevent further damage or to stop the violation. See Graefrath, B., ‘Responsibility and Damages Caused: Relationship between Responsibility and Damages’, 185 Hague Recueil (1984) p. 65Google Scholar.

37. See, e.g., Hanz, M., Zur völkerrechtlichen Aktivlegitimation zum Schutze der Menschenrechte, Europarecht-Völkerrecht (1985) p. 108Google Scholar; Simma, B., ‘Self-Contained Regimes’, 16 NYIL (1985) p. 129 et seqCrossRefGoogle Scholar. Unilaterally decided measures are also accepted by Zoller, E., Peacetime Unilateral Measures. An Analysis of Countermeasures (1984) p. 91Google Scholar et seq., and p. 138.

38. Cf., Dupuy, P.M., ‘Observations sur la pratique récente des “sanctions” de l'illicite’, 87 RGDIP (1983) p. 505 et seq.Google Scholar; Simon, D. and Sicilianos, L.A., ‘La contre-violence unilaterale – Pratique étatique et Droit international’, AFDI (1986) p. 53 et seq.Google Scholar; Guttry, De, op.cit. n. 25, pp. 96–142Google Scholar.

39. Carella, G., La responsabilitá dello stato per crimini internazionali (1985) p. 200 et seq.Google Scholar

40. Loc.cit. n. 4, para. 34.

41. Riphagen, , loc.cit. n. 12, p. 607Google Scholar.

42. Cf., Sachariew, , op.cit. n. 12, pp. 98–107Google Scholar.

43. This is especially evident in the work of Hanz. He states that, since all parties are injured by the breach, they are entitled to act bilaterally ‘in a State to State relationship’: op.cit. n. 37, p. 108.

44. Cassese, A., ‘Remarks on the Present Legal Regulation of Crimes of States’, in International Law at the Time of its Codification. Essays in Honour of R. Ago, Vol. III (1987) p. 56Google Scholar.

45. Ibid.

46. Cf., e.g., the enquiry procedure provided for in Arts. 52, 53, 132 and 149, respectively, of the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the fact-finding procedure in Art. 90 of the Additional Protocol I thereto from 10 June 1977. On the substantive and procedural aspects of State complaint procedures in the field of human rights, cf., recently Leckie, S., ‘The Inter-State Complaint Procedure in International Human Rights: Hopeful Prospects or Wishful Thinking?’, 10 Human Rights Q. (1988) no. 2, p. 249 et seqCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

47. See GA Res. 2660 (XXV) of December 1970, annex.

48. Cf., Sachariew, , op.cit. n. 12, p. 101 et seqGoogle Scholar.

49. Hanz, , op.cit. n. 37, p. 45Google Scholar; Zoller, , op.cit. n. 37, p. 92Google Scholar; Simma, B., ‘Fragen der zwischenstaatlichen Durchsetzung vertraglich vereinbarter Menschenrechte’, in Festschrift für H.-J. Schlochauer (1981) p. 639Google Scholar.

50. Cf., within the ILC, I. Sinclair in YBILC (1985) Vol. I, p. 89, para. 23: ‘the States which formulate a multilateral treaty for the purpose of promoting and protecting the collective interests of States parties would insist on including in-built mechanisms with a view to securing its purpose’. Thus, such mechanisms would prevail over general rules on responsibility.

51. De Guttry, op.cit. n. 25.

52. Indeed, sometimes the (collective or co-operative) nature of the implementation measures is the only indication for the existence of integral structures of obligation. Cf., Sachariew, , op.cit. n. 12, p. 78 et seq.Google Scholar, and Picone, P., ‘Obblighi reciproci ed obblighi erga omnes degli Stati nel campo della protezione internazionale dell' ambiente marino’, in Diritto internazionale e protezione dell' ambiente marino (1983) p. 94 et seqGoogle Scholar.

53. ICJ Rep. 1986, p. 134, para. 267.

54. The International Law Commission discussed the question of different levels of affectedness mainly within the context of international crimes of States. It recognized the existence of ‘directly’ and ‘indirectly’ injured States: cf., Ushakow, A/CN.4/SR.1895, p. 12; McCaffrey, ibid., SR.1892, p. 5.

According to Flitan: ‘The victim of aggression is particularly injured and should enjoy more rights’: ibid., SR.1899, p. 3. Some members, however, also mentioned the possibility of a different level of affectedness in the case of violation of multilateral treaties not amounting to international crimes, e.g., Yagota, ibid., SR.1901, p. 4 and Francis, ibid., SR.1894, p. 7.

55. In accordance with Art. V, para. 5 of the 1977 ENMOD Convention the UN Security Council may establish that a State has been injured as a result of a violation. This State is entitled to request assistance from other States parties. Another example is Art. 9, para. 2 of the 1976 Barcelona Convention for the protection of the Mediterranean Sea according to which, ‘any Party which becomes aware of a pollution emergency … shall without delay notify the Organization and, either through the Organization or directly, any Contracting Party likely to be affected by such emergency’. In this case the general interest of the parties is satisfied through the Organization and, in addition, the especially affected State has an individual, separate right to be informed. A similar provision is stipulated in the 1986 IAEA Convention on notification in cases of nuclear accidents in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Art. 2.

56. According to Picone, the breach of an erga omnes rule may affect not only collective rights but also the individual rights of a certain State: Picone, , loc.cit., n. 52, p. 78Google Scholar. The idea that erga omnes breaches may be accompanied by additional breaches of individual rights was also recognized by the ILC's former Special Rapporteur on State responsibility, W. Riphagen. Unfortunately, he did not elaborate on it, limiting himself to the statement that ‘an international crime is always an internationally wrongful act, accordingly, there may be an injured State (or States) under Article 5, sub-paragraphs (a) to (d)’: W. Riphagen, Sixth Report on State Responsibility, Commentary to Art. 14, A/CN.4/389, p. 26.

57. E.g., the breach of a duty not to dump black-listed substances into a certain environment affects the rights of all parties to the treaty in question and their collective interest in the preservation of this environment. The same breach, however, may cause material damage to one or more parties which would be entitled to specific reparation. In the case of dumping into a river, only lower riparian States would suffer material damage. Damage as a factor giving rise to special affectedness was mentioned in the ILC by Huang, A/CN.4/SR.1894, p. 4; Mahiou, ibid., SR.1897, p. 4 and Arangio-Ruiz, ibid., SR.1900, p.9.

58. Cf., Sachariew, , op.cit. n. 12, p. 114 et seqGoogle Scholar.

59. Cf., heads (a), (b) and (c), (d), (e), respectively, of New Zealand's application in French Nuclear Testing in the Pacific. International Court of Justice. Nuclear Tests Case New Zealand vs. France, a publication of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1973) Vol. II, p. 73Google Scholar.

60. Ibid., p. 74.

61. Ibid., p. 82.

62. Cf., supra, p. 17 et seq.