No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Some Comparative Aspects of the Protection of the Accused During his Interrogation in Preliminary Investigations
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 May 2009
Extract
The difference between the system of criminal procedure in common law countries and that in civil law countries is often described in terms of an adversary or accusatory, as opposed to a non-adversary, investigatory, or inquisitorial system of procedure.1 In the adversary system the proceedings are seen as a conflict between two parties with opposing roles, who in principle are on an equal footing. The parties can determine the limits of their contest between themselves. In principle, the role of the judge is a passive one; he ensures that the procedural rules are observed by all parties and decides on the outcome of the conflict. In this system the accused cannot be interrogated as such but he can be questioned as a witness, although only if he so desires. In the continental inquisitorial system, on the other hand, the trial is seen as an ‘official and thorough inquiry’ 2 into whether an offence has been committed and if so which sanctions should be imposed. The notion of ‘objective truth’ is central to this system and as a consequence the ‘parties’ cannot limit the fact-finding by mutual consent. The accused can be interrogated, even if he does not want to be.
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 1985
References
1. See in particular Damaska, M., ‘Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A comparative study’, 121 Pennsylvania Law Review (1973) p. 506. In this paper I will use the term ‘inquisitorial’ for the criminal procedure in civil law countries because it is clearer for continental lawyers than the terms ‘investigatory’ or ‘non-adversary’CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2. Damaska, , loc. cit., p. 564Google Scholar.
3. One could ask if there are essential differences between the nature of the preliminary investigation as a whole in the adversary and inquisitorial systems. The existence of an actively investigating judge does not appear to be an essential characteristic of the preliminary investigation in the inquisitorial system, now that West Germany has abolished this institution. In the countries where it still exists the investigating judge generally acts only in more serious cases. It is not true that the whole investigation is under his control, nor is this the theory behind the institution. Cf., in this connection, Goldstein, A. S. and Marcus, M., ‘The Myth of Judicial Supervision in three ‘Inquisitorial’ Systems: France, Italy and West Germany’, 81 Yale LJ (1977) p. 240 at p. 242CrossRefGoogle Scholar and the reply from Langbein, J. H. and Weinreb, L. L., ‘Continental Criminal Procedure: Myth and Reality’, 87 Yale LJ (1978) p. 549CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4. For purposes of uniformity, I will use as a rule the term ‘accused’. For the same reason I will, in principle, use the term ‘interrogation’. Some variations may be lost in this manner.
5. See, for example, Arizona, Miranda v., 384 US 436, 460 (1966); Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, Report, Cmnd. 8092 (London 1981) paras. 4.34, 4.35Google Scholar. See also in this vein Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 32: Questioning Suspects (Ottawa/Montreal 1984) p. 1Google Scholar.
6. See also Lidstone, K. W. and Early, T. S., ‘Questioning Freedom: Detention for Questioning in France, Scotland and England’, 31 ICLQ (1982) p. 488CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
7. Damaska, , loc. cit., n. 1 pp. 522–525, 583–584Google Scholar.
8. At the moment of preparing this paper for publication (December 1984), the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (with accompanying codes of practice) has not yet become effective. Important changes are discussed in the text.
9. Practice Note (Judges' Rules) (1964) 1 WLR 152, 153. The formulation is derived from Ibrahim v. R [1914] AC 599 per Lord Sumner. The words which were added to this formulation: ‘or by oppression’ were approved by the courts: see Archbold, J. F., Criminal Pleading, Practice & Evidence, (Londen 1982) 41st ed. (ed. Mitchell, S.), paras. 15–24. It is assumed that ‘exercised’ should be read as ‘excited’Google Scholar; see SirCross, Rupert, Cross on Evidence, (London 1979) 5th edn. p. 535 n. 1Google Scholar.
10. See for example R v. Zaveckas [1970] 1 All ER 413, CA. In this case the suspect had asked the police officer if he would be granted bail if he made a statement. The officer's answer was affirmative and the suspect made a confession. The Court of Appeal ruled the confession involuntary. For other examples, see Cross, , op. cit., n. 9, pp. 539–540Google Scholar. See also R v. Rennie [1982] 1 WLR 64, CA, R v. Challinor and Cross [1983] Crim. LR 37.
11. DPP v. Ping Lin [1975] 3 WLR 419, HL.
12. See, for example, Cross, , op. cit., [n. 9] p. 32Google Scholar; Inman, M., ‘The Admissibility of Confessions' (1981Google Scholar) Crim. LR 469, 473. Less popular are the principles nemo tenetur se ipsum prodere and the ‘disciplinary principle’ see for example Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure: Report (Cmnd. 8092) (London 1981) para. 4.123.
13. According to s. 76 (8) ‘oppression’ includes torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, and the use or threat of violence (whether or not amounting to torture). Cf., Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950. See also Zander, M., ‘Police and Criminal Evidence Bill-VII: Evidence in Criminal Cases’ NLJ (1983) pp. 365, 366Google Scholar; Report, op. cit., n. 12 para. 4.68.
14. See Rules II and III; see also Rule V.
15. See, for example, R v. Prager [1972] 1 WLR 260, CA; Greaves v. D. and Another [1980] Crira. LR 435. The Rules do not have the status of law as they are formulated by the judges of the Queen's Bench Division. From the Preamble to the Judges' Rules the restrained attitude of English judges is apparent: ‘The judges control the conduct of trials and the admission of evidence against persons on trial before them: they do not control or in any way initiate or supervise police activities or conduct’, (1964) 1 WLR 152, per Lord Parker, CJ.
16. Cf., for example on the one hand Cross, , op. cit., [n. 9 ] p. 548Google Scholar, and on the other hand Archbold, op. cit., [n. 9] paras. 15–77Google Scholar and Lidstone, K. W. ‘Voluntariness, Discretion and the Judges’ Rules', NLJ (1982) p. 1065Google Scholar. See also the commentary added by D.J. Birch to R v. Platt [1981] Crim. LR 622.
17. Cross, , op. cit., [n. 9] p. 547. The judge under present law does not have a general discretion to exclude evidence which has been obtained unlawfully, see R v. Sang [1979] 3 WLR 263, HLGoogle Scholar.
18. See s. 78; Zander, M., ‘Police and Criminal Evidence Bill VI: Codes of Practice’;, NLJ (1983) pp. 339, 342, ‘The Amendments-H’, NLJ (1983) pp. 673, 674. The first caution must be administered when the officer 'has grounds to believe that a person has committed an offence: When questioning is interrupted, the caution will have to be given afresh upon resumptionGoogle Scholar.
19. R v. Lemsatef [1977] 1 WLR 812, CA.
20. Administrative Direction 7 on Interrogation and the Taking of Statements, Home Office Circular No. 89/1978. Appendix B. The Directions also contain, among other things, special rules for questioning children and young people, and mentally handicapped people (cf., paras. 3 and 4).
21. Administrative Direction 7, loc. cit., n. 20, Section 162 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 and Home Office Circular No. 74/1978.
22. E.g., Baldwin, J. and McConville, M., ‘Police Interrogation and the Right to See a Solicitor’ Crim. LR (1979) p. 145Google Scholar; Softley, P., ‘Police Interrogation: An Observational Study in Four Police Stations’, Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 4 (London 1980) pp. 67–70Google Scholar.
23. See Zander, M., ‘Police and Criminal Evidence Bill-V: Treatment of Suspects by Police’ NLJ (1982) pp. 318, 319. See for the right to have someone informed when arrested s. 56 and for special provisions for children and young persons s. 57Google Scholar.
24. Cross, , op. cit., n. 9 p. 549Google Scholar; Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure: Law and Procedure Volume (London 1980) paras. 82–83Google Scholar.
25. Cross, op. cit., n. 9.
26. R v. Chandler [1976] 1 WLR 585, CA. For the rest the law is not very clear on this point. Cf., Law and Procedure Volume (op. cit., n. 24) para. 80, which states, on the authority of Chandler, that this only applies for the period before the caution, with Cross, , op cit., n. 9 pp. 531, 549Google Scholar, who does not make a distinction. See also Archbold, , op. cit., n. 9 paras. 15–67Google Scholar.
27. See for exampleWilliams, G., ‘Questioning by the Police: Some Practical Considerations’ (1960) Crim. LR p. 325Google Scholar; Lidstone, and Early, , loccit., n. 6 p. 491Google Scholar.
28. See sections 37, 40, 42, 43, 47.
29. See R v. Holmes [1982] 1 All ER 612, 615.
30. Cf., R v. Gowan and others [1982] Crim. LR 821; R v. Hudson [1981] Crim. LR 107, CA.
31. See on the privilege in general, Berger, Mark, Talcing the Fifth: The Supreme Court and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination (Lexington 1980)Google Scholar. The privilege is applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Malloy v. Hogan 378 US 1 (1964). The States are free to offer wider protection than the Federal Constitution demands, see Brennan, William J., ‘State Constitution and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. LR (1977) p. 489Google Scholar.
32. 384 US 436 (1966). An excellent book on this decision is: Baker, L., Miranda — Crime, Law and Politics (New York 1983)Google Scholar. See for a review of decisions of the Supreme Court until 1977, Stone, G. R., ‘The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court’, The Supreme Court Review (1977) p. 99Google Scholar.
33. Mincey v. Arizona 437 US 385 (1978) citing Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 US 519, 521. For an outline of what is prohibited, see for example Wharton, Francis, Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 13th ed.Torcia, C. E. (Rochester, San Francisco)Google Scholar.
34. See, for example, Rogers v. Richmond 365 U 534 (1961); Mincey v.Arizona, supra n. 33; White, W. S., ‘Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions’, 127 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1979) p. 581CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
35. Mincey v. Arizona, supra n. 33. ‘Impeachment’ is the testing of the reliability of a witness.
36. See, for example, Stone v. Powell 428 US 465 (1976); United States v. Leon 52 USLW 5155 (1984); Lane v. Sunderland, ‘ Liberals, Conservatives, and the Exclusionary Rule’, 71 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology (1980) p. 343CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
37. E.g., Wald, M. et al. , ‘Interrogations in New Haven: The impact of Miranda’ 76 Yale LJ (1976) p. 1519Google Scholar; Medalie, R. J. et al. , ‘Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The attempt to implement Miranda’, 66 Michigan Law Review (1968) p. 1347CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
38. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 1968, 18 USC 3501. See, for example, Saltzburg, S. A., American Criminal Procedure — Cases and Commentary (St. Paul, Minn. 1980) pp. 452–453Google Scholar;Baker, , op. cit., n. 32 pp. 267, 330, 396–397, 404Google Scholar.
39. Rhode Island v. Innis 446 US 291, 304 (1980), concurring in the judgment. Cf., the liberal interpretation of Miranda in Estelle v. Smith 49 USLW 4490 (1981)
40. Quarles v. New York 52 USLW 4796 (1984). However, the seriousness of an offence makes no difference, see Beckemer v. McCarty 52 USLW 5023 (1984).
41. See also Beckwith v. United States 425 US 341 (1967); Oregon v. Mathiason 429 US 492 (1977). The interrogation methods rejected by the Supreme Court do not occur as often as is supposed, see e.g.,Wald, et al. , loc. cit., n. 37 p. 1542Google Scholar.
42. Innis, Rhode Island v., supra n. 39, p. 301Google Scholar, in which the Supreme Court ‘interrogation’ defined as referring ‘not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect’ (footnotes omitted).See in this connectionWhite, W. S., ‘Interrogation without Question: Rhode Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry’, 78 Mich. LR (1980) p. 1209CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
43. Arizona, Miranda v., supra n. 32, p. 475; Edwards v. Arizona 451 US 477, 484 (1981)Google Scholar.
44. Cf., in connection with resumption of interrogation Michigan v. Mosley 423 US 96 (1975).
45. Arizona, Edwards v., supra n. 43, p. 485. See for the problems of interpretation arising from Edwards, among others, Oregon v. Bradshaw 51 USLW 4940 (1983)Google Scholar.
46. Arizona, Miranda v., supra n. 32, p. 470Google Scholar
47. Harris v. New York 401 US 222 (1971); Oregon v. Hass 420 US 714 (1975); United States v. Havens 446 US 620 (1980).
48. See Massiah v. United States 377 US 201 (1964); Brewer v. Williams 430 US 387 (1977); United States v. Henry 447 US 264 (1980); Kamisar, Yale, ‘Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What is ‘Interrogation’? When does it matter?’, 67 Georgetown Law Journal (1978)Google Scholar, also published in Kamisar, Yale, Police Interrogation and Confessions: Essays in Law and Policy (Ann Arbor 1980) p. 139Google Scholar. ‘Adversary proceedings’ begin with, among others, ‘indictment’.
49. Griffin v. California 380 US 609 (1965); further, among others, Lakeside v. Oregon 435 US 333 (1978), Carter v. Kentucky 450 US 288 (1981).
50. Arizona, Miranda v., supra n. 32, p. 468 n. 37Google Scholar.
51. Doyle v. Ohio 426 US 610 (1976).
52. Jenkins v. Anderson 447 US 231 (1980).
53. See Keene, J. P., ‘The Ill-Advised State Court Revival of the McNabb-Mallory Rule, 72 J Crim. L&C (1981) p. 204CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
54. Keene, , loc. cit., n. 53 p. 234; alsoGoogle ScholarBerger, op. cit., n. 31 p. 118Google Scholar.
55. Keene, loc. cit., n. 53 passim. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 1968, 18 USC 3501 was a reaction to the so-called McNabb-Mallory rule where confessions obtained after an unreasonable delay in bringing the suspect before a court were excluded per se.
56 .See in this connection also Glasbeek, H. J. and Prentice, D. D., ‘The Criminal Suspect's Illusory Right to Silence in the British Commonwealth’, 53 Cornell LR (1968) p. 473Google Scholar.
57. See for I'enquête préliminaire Art. 75, for I'enquête sur crime ou délit flagrant Art. 53, and for the instruction Art. 79 C.proc.pén.
58. Art. 14 (2) C.procpén. Stéfani, G.et al., Procédure Pénale (Précis Dalloz), 11th ed. (Paris 1980) p. 294Google Scholar.
59. E.g., Merle, R. and Vitu, A., Traité de droit criminel, Tome II: procedure penale, 3rd ed. (Paris 1979) pp. 167–170Google Scholar; Bouzat, P., ‘La loyauté dans la recherche des preuves’ in: Problèmes contemporains de procedure penale (Paris 1964) p. 155Google Scholar; Vouin, R., ‘La preuve obtenue par des moyens illegaux’, Revue Internationale de police criminelle (1955) pp. 241–245. The case law on this subject is not extensiveGoogle Scholar.
60. Merle, and Vitu, , op. cit., n. 59Google Scholar; Blondet, M., ‘Les ruses et les artifices de la police au cours de l'enquête préliminaire’ Juris Classeur Périodique (1958) I p. 1419Google Scholar.
61. Bouzat, , loc. cit., n. 59 p. 172Google Scholar.
62. Bouzat, , loc. cit., n. 59 p. 172Google Scholar; Blondet, loc. cit., n. 60
63. E.g., Denis, G., L'enquête préliminaire (Aix-en-Provence 1973) p. 666Google Scholar.
64. Chambon, P., Le juge d'instruction: théorie et pratique de la procédure, 2nd ed. (Paris 1980) p. 199Google Scholar.
65. See Art. 115 C. proc.pén., which also provides that the proces-verbal should state the reason for the urgency.
66. E.g., Cass.crim. 15 March 1973, Recueil Dalloz Sirey 1973, 338 with commentary P.F.
67. E.g., Cass.crim. 9 February 1982 D 1982, 544 comm. J. Pradel. The period is at present two days. If Art. 29 of act nr. 83–446 dated 20.06.1983 becomes effective the period will become four working days. The period for making the dossier available will then be two working days.
68. The procedure cannot be rendered void if the concerned party's interests have not been prejudiced, Art. 802 C.proc.pén. See for the procedure of nullification especially Arts. 171, 173, 174 C.proc.pén. Further on nullification e.g., Chambon, , op. cit., n. 64 p. 447Google Scholar.
69. E.g., Cass.crim. 21 March 1968 JCP 1968 II 15647 comm. Chambon; Cass.crim. 4 October 1968 D 1968, 689; Cass.crim. 2 March 1972 Gazette de Palais (1972) I p. 348Google Scholar; commentary Jeandidier on Cass.crim. 18 May 1983 D 1984, 188.
70. Merle and Vitu give a definition of l'inculpation, op. cit., n. 59 p. 437: Timputation officielle, à une personne suspecte, des faits délictueux au sujet desquels le juge déinstruction conduit son information’
71. See Merle, and Vitu, , op. cit., n. 59 pp. 441–444;Google ScholarChambon, , op. cit., n. 64 pp. 215–222. Art. 105 does not apply to the enquêtes by the police. See also Art. 104 C.proc.pén.: ‘Toute personne nommément visée par une plainte assortie d'une constitution de partie civile peut refuser d'êetre entendue comme témoin. Le juge d'instruction Ten avertit après lui avoir donné connaissance de la plainte (…)’, see e.g., Cour d'Appel de Bordeaux 29 April 1980, D. 1981, 232 comm. J. PradelGoogle Scholar.
72. See for example Merle, and Vitu, , op. cit., n. 59 p. 171Google Scholar.
73. The more extensive possibilities created by the law of 2 February 1981 (‘Securité et liberté’) have in the meantime been abrogated by the act of 10 June 1983.
74. See for example, Cass.crim. 21 October 1980 D 1981, 104 comm. Mayer, Danièle; Denis, , op. cit., n. 63 p. 464Google Scholar.
75. See Arts. 78–1 — 78–5 C.proc.pén. (act of 10 June 1983).
76. See Art. 122 C.proc.pén. Chambon, , op. cit., n. 64 p. 279Google Scholar.
77. Especially the right to counsel, see below. See in this connection among others Hof Leeuwarden 1 March 1983, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (1983) p. 461 comm. Th.W.v.V.; Hoge Raad 1 February 1983, NJ 337 comm. Th.W.v.V.; Zwerver, S., ‘Het OM tussen verdachte en rechtercommissaris’, Trema (1983) pp. 185–189Google Scholar.
78. See also Enschedé's commentary on HR 22 April 1969, NJ 1970, 125.
79. See in particular Arts. 185 and 200 WvSv.
80. This warning has a remarkable history. After being incorporated in the Wetboek van Strafvordering, but before becoming effective in 1926, the obligation was declared to be nonapplicable to trial. In 1937 the obligation was scrapped, but it was reintroduced in 1973.
81. See, for example, HR 2 October 1979 NJ 1980, 243 comm. G.E.M.
82. See, for example, Remmelink, J., ‘Het verhoor in strafzaken’, RM Themis (1966) pp. 307–358. But see HR 12 June 1984 DD 84.470. In this decision the HR ruled that an exculpating statement of the accused that was given under the influence of hypnosis, may be given in evidence for the defence. This would not be in contravention with Art. 29 WvSv, because this provision would only be given for the protection of the accusedGoogle Scholar.
83. See, for example, HR 8 January 1980 NJ 1980, 202 comm. Th.W.v.V.; HR 22 January 1980 NJ 1980, 203 comm. Th.W.v.V.
84. See, for example, HR 7 June 1977 NJ 1978, 482; HR 16 November 1982 NJ 1983, 283 comm. A.C. 't Hart.
85. See, for example, HR 25 March 1980 NJ 1980, 437; HR 22 September 1981 NJ 1981, 660.
86. Cf., HR 2 March 1982 NJ 1982, 460 comm. Th.W.v.V.
87. Cf., Melai, A. L., Het Wetboek van Strafvordering (Arnhem), note 2 on Art. 30Google Scholar.
88. Counsel does receive a copy of all documents which, pursuant to the WvSv, are brought to the attention of the accused (Art. 51 WvSv).
89. Cf., HR 22 November 1983 NJ 1984, 805 comm. Th.W.v.V.; HR 26 November 1978 NJ 1979, 61 comm. Th.W.v.V.
90. HR 22 November 1983 NJ 1984, 805.
91. See Bijlagen Handelingen Tweede Kamer, zitting 1981–1982, 17480, No. 1–3; vergaderjaar 1983–1984, 17480, No. 4.
92. E.g., HR 18 November 1980, NJ 1981, 134; HR 12 November 1974 NJ 1975, 41 comm. Th.W.v.W.
93. See Article 57, 58, 61 WvSv. The assistent Officier van Justitie is a high-ranking official who has certain authority as a result of that rank. Detention can only be ordered for serious offences.
94. See Löwe/Rosenberg, , Die Strafprozessordnung und das Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, 23rd ed. (Berlin 1976) para. 136a. Rdnr. 1. Paras. 163a III and IV, state that para. 136a is applicable to questioning in the Ermittlungsverfahren. Before 1950 heavier forms of coercion were only prohibited by para. 343 Strafgesetzbuch.Google Scholar.
95. E.g., Löwe/Rosenberg, , op. cit., n. 94 para. 136a, Rdnr. 1, 3Google Scholar. Peters, K., Strafprozess — Ein Lehrbuch, 3rd ed. (Heidelberg-Karlsruhe 1981) pp. 311–312Google Scholar.
96. See on this point among others Löwe/Rosenberg, op. cit., n. 94 para. 136a, Rdnr. 11; Peters, , op. cit., n. 95 p. 312Google Scholar; Roxin, C., Strafverfahrensrecht: Ein Studienbuch, 17th ed. (Munich 1982) p. 135Google Scholar.
97. This edition dates from 1964. Before that time the accused had to be asked if he had anything to say about the offence he was charged with. This was an unclear warning that he had the right to remain silent; see for example Schmidt, E., ‘Sinn und Tragweite des Hinweises auf die Aussagefreiheit des Beschuldigten’ Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1968) p. 1209Google Scholar, also in:Strafprozess und Rechtsstaat (Göttingen 1970) p. 129Google Scholar. Para. 136 is in para. 163a III and IV declared to be applicable to the Ermittlungsverfahren.
98. BVerfG NJW 1981, 1431. See on this piinciple also Rogall, K., Der Beschuldigte also Beweismittel gegen sich selbst — Ein Beitrag zur Geltung des Satzes ‘Nemo tenetur se ipsum prodere’ im Strafprozess (Berlin 1977)Google Scholar; further e.g., Eser, A., ‘Der Schutz vor Selbstbezichtigung im deutschen Strafprozessrecht’, Deutsche Strafrechtliche Landesreferate zum IX. Internationalen Kongress für Rechtsvergleichung (Teheran 1974), Beiheft zur Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (1974) p. 136Google Scholar.
99. Para. 111 Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz.
100. BGHSt 25 325, 330: ‘(para. 243 Abs. 4 Satz 1 StPO) beugt eventueller Benachteiligung auf Grund von Unkenntnis vor’.
101. See BGHSt 22 129; 22 170. See for criticism among others Fincke, M. ‘Verwertbarkeit von Aussagen des nicht belehrten Beschuldigten’, NJW (1969) p. 1014Google Scholar.
102. BGHSt 31 395; NStZ 1983, 2205.
103. The accused is not prejudiced if he knew of the possibilities of defending himself, or if he would also have made a statement had he known such a possibility: see BGHSt 25 325. On the earlier decisions on the omission of warnings in the preliminary investigation, the Bundesgerichtshof only remarked that there was no contradiction (p. 331). See on ‘Beweisverbote’ and ‘Beweisverwertungsverbote’ among othersSchäfer, K., Strafprozessrecht — Eine Einführung (Berlin 1976) p. 271Google Scholar; Rogall, K., ‘Gegenwärtiger Stand und Entwicklungstendenzen der Lehre von den strafprozessuellen Beweisverboten’, ZStrW (1979) p. 1Google Scholar.
104. See paras. 163a, 168c StPO. Endangering the results of the investigation does not only mean that by informing the accused of his rights the investigation could be delayed, but also that through that warning the chances of obtaining a truthful statement would be at real risk. Cf., BGH JZ 1980, 149, discussed in Welp, J., ‘Anwesenheitsrechte und Benachrichtungspflichte’, JZ (1980) p. 134Google Scholar. See also Löwe/Rosenberg, op. cit., n. 94 para. 168c Rdnr. 25Google Scholar
105. BGHSt 26 332, 334/5.
106. Riess, P., ‘Die Vernehmung des Beschuldigten im Strafprozess’, Juristische Arbeitsblätter (1980) pp. 293, 298Google Scholar.
107. E.g., Roxin, , op. cit., n. 96 p. 102Google Scholar; Müller, E., ‘Strafverteidigung’ NJW (1981) p. 1801Google Scholar. Some authors argue that according to current law counsel may be present during interrogation, e.g., Schaefer, H., ‘Zum Anwesenheitsrecht des Verteidigers bei polizeilichen Vernehmungen des Beschuldigten’, Monatschrift für deutsches Recht (1977) p. 980Google Scholar; Gössel, K. H., ‘Die Stellung des Verteidigers im rechtsstaatlichen Strafverfahren‘, 94 ZStrW (1982) pp. 5, 35Google Scholar. See also Eser, A., ‘Aussagefreiheit und Beistand der Verteidigers im Ermittlungsverfahren’, 79 ZStrW (1967) pp. 565, 601Google Scholar.
108. See, for example, Rogall, , op. cit., n. 98 pp. 20–31Google Scholar; Müller-Diets, H., ‘Die Stellung des Beschuldigten im Strafprozess’, 93 ZStrW (1981) pp. 1177, 1223–1225Google Scholar.
109. E.g., BGHSt 20 298, 300; 25 365, 368; Löwe/Rosenberg, , op. cit., n. 94 para. 136 Rdnr. 28–33Google Scholar.
110. BGHSt 20 298, 300. This does not apply when the silence concerns another case (‘Lebenssachverhalt’), see BGH NStZ 1984, 377.
111. See paras. 133, 135, 163a StPO.
112. See para. 112, 112a, 127, 128, 163b, 163c StPO.
113. Approved by the General Assembly 9 December 1975 (resolution 3452 (XXX)).
114. See A39/ 7O8. See in this connection also the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, Art. 5.
115 .See E/2256 ECOSOC OR, 14th Sess. (1952), suppl. 4, para. 215 (p. 32).
116. For an overall view see e.g., Duffy, P. J., ‘Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ 32 ICLQ (1983) p. 317CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dijk, P. van and van Hoof, G. J. H., De Europese Conventie in theorie en praktijk, 2nd ed (Nijmegen 1982) pp. 223–233Google Scholar.
117. Publ. E.C.H.R. Series A Vol. 25 (1978).
118. Paras. 165–168.
119. See for example Myjer, E., Van Duimschroef tot Bloedproef: beschouwingen over de regel dat niemand gedwongen mag worden zkhzelfte belasten, preadvies voor de Nederlandse Vereniging voor Rechtsvergelijking no. 27 (Deventer 1978) pp. 25–28Google Scholar.
120. See International Commission of Jurists — The Review (December 1983) pp. 50–59.
121. See Glasbeek, and Prentice, loc. cit., n. 56 pp. 480–481Google Scholar.
122. Damaska, , loc.cit., n. 1 p. 564Google Scholar; see also p. 578.
123. E.g., Langbein, J. H., Comparative Criminal Procedure — Germany (St. Paul, Minn. 1977) pp. 68–70Google Scholar; Miiller, O. W., ‘Beweisverbote im amerikanischen Strafprozess’, in: Verhandlungen des sechsundvierzigsten deutschen Juristentages (Munich 1966) I3 B, pp. 33, 40Google Scholar.