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Sanctions in International Law: the Contributions of International Organizations
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 May 2009
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One of the major weaknesses of international law has been the absence of centrally organized machinery to enforce breaches of the law, as well as institutionalized sanctions against suchbreaches. This situation inspired misgivings “in the breasts of legal theorists”, and gave rise to the question whether international law was really law. Hobbes, and Pufendorf, gave a negative answer to the question; and during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Austin, s and his followers, who regard sanction as an indispensable element of a legal norm, adopted the same attitude.
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References
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23. The adoption of the resolution was also opposed by the delegates of the United Kingdom; Brazil; Colombia; Malawi; Spain; Mexico; Australia; France; Canada; New Zealand; and the United States of America: Minutes of the Executive Committee, 17th Session of the ICAO Assembly (1971), pp. 97–98Google Scholar.
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30. See below, pp. 17–19.
31. Articles of Agreement, Art. XXVI, Section 2(a).
32. Ibid., Section 2(b).
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44. Articles of Agreement, Article XVIII, Section l(a).
45. Ibid., Article XVII, Section 2.
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47. Article XXII, Section 2(a).
48. Article XXII, Section 2(b).
49. Article XXIII, Section 2(e).
50. Article XXIII, Section 2(0).
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