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International Responsibility of States for Their Administration of Justice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 May 2009

Béla Vitányi
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Extract

Like any legal system, international law assigns a place to responsibility. The very recognition of the existence of international law implies the principle of responsibility for the violation of the international legal duties imposed on the State. As formulated by Max Huber, the first president of the Permanent Court of International Justice: “La responsabilité est le corollaire nécessaire du droit. Tous droits d'ordre international ont pour conséquence une responsabilité internationale.” Ch. de Visscher regards the international responsibility of States as a logical consequence of their equality in the international legal system. The mutual recognition of their sovereignty implies on the one hand the freedom of action essential to the accomplishment of their objectives, while on the other hand it imposes upon them the restrictions necessarily ensuing from the existence of different States that have equal rights. “Une fois reconnu par la communauté Internationale, l'Etat … apparait comme capable d'enfreindre le droit international et d'assumer de ce chef des responsabilités.”

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Articles
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Netherlands International Law Review , Volume 22 , Issue 2 , August 1975 , pp. 131 - 163
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Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 1975

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References

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