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Interest Analysis: No More than a ‘Protest Song’?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 May 2009

L. Strikwerda
L. Strikwerda
Affiliation:
Advocate-General Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [Supreme Court of the Netherlands]; Professor of Law at the University of Groningen.
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Extract

Having close links with the mutinous tradition in choice of law thinking of the Amsterdam University Law School, Voskuil does not think highly of the traditional choice of law rules. In his address as doctor honoris causa of the University of Zagreb Voskuil submits that the choice of law rules constitute just a choice mechanism, devoid of any philosophical or ideological basis and that they form a defective tool in that they push international cases into a national legal environment and also that they lean heavily on corrective devices that tend to blur the judicatory process.

Type
Research Article
Information
Netherlands International Law Review , Volume 39 , Special Issue S1: Law and Reality , October 1992 , pp. 301 - 313
Copyright
Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 1991

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References

1. Translated in Croatian and published in: Sveučilišnivjesnik Sveučilišta u Zagrebu [University Newspaper of the University of Zagreb], No. 519-521-SEPARAT (Zagreb 1988) pp. 12–17.

2. See also Voskuil, C.C.A., Book Review E. Cohen Henriquez, I.P.R.-Trends, in RM Themis (1985) p. 92 et seq.Google Scholar

3. Cuirie, B., ‘Law and the Future – Legal Education’, Nw. U.L. Rev. (1956) p. 266Google Scholar. See also Currie, B., Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1963) p. 481.Google Scholar

4. Currie, , Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1963) p. 417.Google Scholar

5. Currie, , op. cit. n. 4, p. 726.Google Scholar

6. Currie, , op. cit n 4, p. 178.Google Scholar

7. Currie, , op. cit n 4, p. 377.Google Scholar

8. Ibid.

9. Currie, B., ‘Comment on Babcock v. Jackson’, Colum, L. Rev. (1963) p. 1242.Google Scholar

10. Currie, , op. cit. n. 4, p. 621Google Scholar; see also pp. 189, 210, 571 and 737.

11. Currie, , op. cit. n. 4, p. 727; see also p. 590.Google Scholar

12. As he views law as an instrument of social control and states as legitimately concerned with the welfare of their people, Currie not surprisingly places emphasis on the residence of the parties as an important ground for assuming a state interest in the application of its policy. Discussing Hughes v. Fetter 341 U.S. 609 (1951), Currie argues as to the governmental interest of a state in the application of its wrongful-death statute: ‘In its domestic context, such a statute represents a choice between conflicting interests of individuals: as between members of the community who have suffered because of a death and the member whose fault was the cause, the loss is to be borne by the latter. The question then becomes: how should the statute be applied to cases that are not wholly domestic in order to effectuate the community's policy? Rather clearly, its benefits should be made available whenever those who are the objects of its protection are members of the community—i.e., residents or domiciliarles of the state’. Currie, , op. cit n 4, p. 292Google Scholar. See also, pp. 86, 144, 420 (‘the dominant concern of law is with people’), 450 and 730.

13. Cases in which the laws of the two states do not differ with respect to the point at issue, strictly speaking, do not fall into the category of ‘false conflicts’. Since there is no conflict at all, these cases lie outside the reach of conflict of laws — or, in any rational approach to choice of law, should he outside the reach of conflict of laws.

14. Currie, , op. cit n 4, p. 182Google Scholar; see also pp. 602 and 607.

15. Currie, , op. cit. n. 4, p. 117.Google Scholar

16. Currie, , op. cit. n. 4, p. 119Google Scholar; see also pp. 90 and 191.

17. Currie, , op. cit. n. 4, p. 156Google Scholar. In my view the ‘unprovided-for case’ is a fallacy, but then I endorse a broad interpretation of policies and interests. See Strikwerda, L., Semipubliekrecht in het conflictenrecht [Semi-public law in conflict of laws] (1978) p. 156 et seq.Google Scholar

18. Currie, B., ‘The Disinterested Third State’, Law & Contemp. Probs. (1963) p. 754 et seq.Google Scholar

19. Currie, , loc. cit. n. 18, p. 772.Google Scholar

20. Currie, , loc. cit. n. 18, p. 779.Google Scholar

21. Obviously, the frequency of disinterested third state cases depends largely on the liberality of the grounds for jurisdiction.

22. Battifol, H., ‘Le pluralisme des méthodes en droit international privé’, Hague Recueil (1973–II) p. 75 et seq.Google Scholar

23. See de Boer, Th.M., Beyond Lex Loci Delicti, Conflicts Methodology and Multistate Torts in American Case Law (1987)Google Scholar, reviewing comprehensively the American judicial experience in interest analysis.

24. See among others Herma Hill Kay, ‘A Defense of Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis’, Hague Recueil (1989–III) p. 19 et seq.; Sedler, Robert A., ‘Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to “New Critics’”, Mercer L. Rev. (1983) p. 593Google Scholar et seq.; Brilmayer, Lea, ‘Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent’, Mich. L. Rev. (1980) p. 392 et seq.Google Scholar

25. See among many others Kegel, G., ‘The Crisis of Conflict of Laws’, Hague Recueil (1964–II) p. 95Google Scholar et seq., at p. 180; Loussouarn, Y., ‘Cours général de droit international privé’, Hague Recueil (1973–II) p. 271Google Scholar et seq., at p. 346; Vitta, E., ‘The Impact in Europe of the American “Conflicts Revolution’”, Am. J. Comp. L. (1982) p. 1 et seq., at p. 8.Google Scholar

26. See e.g., Brilmayer, , loc. cit n. 24, p. 417Google Scholar et seq.; Juenger, F.K., ‘Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis’, Am. J. Comp. L. (1984) p. 1Google Scholar et seq., at pp. 35–37; De Boer, , op. cit n. 23, p. 426Google Scholar et seq., at p. 464: ‘In my opinion, this stage represents the Achilles heel of interest analysis’.

27. Currie, , op. cit n. 4, p. 434.Google Scholar

28. Cf., Kay, Hill, loc. cit n. 24, pp. 122–123.Google Scholar

29. Shapira, A., The Interest Approach to Choice of Law, with Special Reference to Tort Problems (1970) pp. 77–78.Google Scholar

30. Currie, , op. cit n. 4, p. 610.Google Scholar

31. Obviously, substantive justice as a criterion to solve true conflict is not a weighing-device; a governmental interest does not depend on the quality of the rule in terms of justice. Currie's solution for the disinterested third state dilemma actually comes down to application of die ‘better’ rule of the conflicting laws. See supra, section 6.

32. Currie, , op. cit. n. 4, p. 153.Google Scholar

33. Baxter, William F., ‘Choice of Law and the Federal System’, Stan. L.Rev. (1963) p. 1 et seq., at p. 6.Google Scholar

34. In practice courts will pronounce forum law better than foreign law. Therefore, application of the better law comes down to a strong lex fori preference. See Strikwerda, L., Naar een gereduceerd conflictenrecht? [Heading towards a reduced role of conflict of laws?] (1986) pp. 21–24.Google Scholar

35. See for a survey De Boer, , op. cit n. 23, p. 274 et seq.Google Scholar

36. Currie, , loc. cit n. 18, p. 763.Google Scholar

37. Carrie, , loc. cit. n. 18, p. 757Google Scholar. See also Currie, , op. rit n. 4, pp. 616–617.Google Scholar

38. Jayme, E., ‘The American Conflicts Revolution and Its Impact on European Private International Law’Google Scholar, in de Boer, Th.M., ed., Forty Years on: The Evolution of Postwar Private International Law in Europe (1990) p. 15 et seq., at p. 18.Google Scholar