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Grotius' Doctrine of the Social Contract

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 May 2009

D.F. Scheltens
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Extract

In George H. Sabine's great work, A History of Political Thought, he makes the following overall judgment on Grotius’ writing:

“Grotius' importance in the history of jurisprudence rests not upon a theory of the state or upon anything that he had to say about constitutional law, but upon his conception of a law regulating the relations between the sovereign states.”

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Articles
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Netherlands International Law Review , Volume 30 , Issue 1 , May 1983 , pp. 43 - 60
Copyright
Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 1983

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References

1. Dryden Press, Hinsdale, Illinois, 1973, fourth edition, revised by Thomas L. Thorson, p. 391.

2. “That body of law, however, which is concerned with the mutual relations among states or rulers of states, whether derived from nature, or established by divine ordinances, or having its origin in custom and tacit agreement, few have touched upon. Up to the present time no one has treated it in a comprehensive and systematic manner; yet the welfare of mankind demands that this task be accomplished.” Prolegomena, 1, 9.

3. Vecchio, Georges Del, Leçons de philosophic du droit, Sirey, Paris 1936, p. 64Google Scholar, in which the author is extremely critical of Grotius' representation of the social contract. He writes, inter alia: “Enfin, il ne faut pas oublier que, dans certains cas, le contenu du prétendu contrat peut être tel qu'il exclut de lui-même la liberté et par suite la validité du consentement. Quand on se trouve en présence d'un contrat stipulant l'aliénation totale, accomplie par l'un des contractants, de tout ce qu'il est et possède, sans aucune compensation correspondante de la part de l'autre partie, nous pouvons affirmer a priori, sans crainte d'erreur, qu'un tel contrat, s'il a été conclu, est nul devant le droit. Mais Grotius, préoccupé seulement d'établir l'obligation de Fobeissance chez les sujets, attribue une valeur absolue au pretendu fait du contrat social qui, comme tel, n'existe pas. L'hypothèse du contrat n'a done, dans son système, aucune valeur rationnelle. Elle représente uniquement un expédient, ou une fiction destinée à valoriser et ratifier le fait établi.”

In his Grundlagen und Grundfragen des Rechts (Rechtsphilosophische Abhandlungen) Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Gottingen, 1963, pp. 276–277Google Scholar, Del Vecchio's criticism is even more severe: “Unter rein logischem Aspekt ist das, was der Lehre des Grotius Abbruch tut, weniger die Tatsache, dass er ihn auf gleicher Ebene mit jeder anderen Regierungsform zugelassen und gerechtfertigt hat. Das ist, um es kurz zu sagen, ein Bankrott der Philosophie. Vom philosophischen Standpunkt aus ist daher diese Lehre, in der sich ein leerer Vernunftglaube in den oberflachlichsten Empirismus auflöst, auch der Doktrin Hobbes' unterlegen, die trotz des bekannten falschen Ausgangspunktes den Vorzug der grösseren Folgerichtigkeit und eines ungewöhnlichen dialektischen Scharfsinns hat… In Wahrheit hat das Naturrecht, das er im Rahmen klassischer Reminiszensen am Anfang und hier und da im Verfolg seines Werkes bejaht, in der Struktur seines Systems fast gar keine Funktion. Dieses is ganz auf die Idee des jus gentium abgestellt…

Weit mehr als der rechta ratio vertraut er den historischen Präzedenzfällen, denen er sich ständig beugen zu müssen glaubt. Daraus resultiert die häufige Verwechslung von Faktum und Recht die schon Rousseau… scharf beanstandet hat.” cfr Hegel, , Philosophie der Geschichte, Suhrkamp, 12, p. 522Google Scholar;

4. Le contrat social, I, 2.Fasso, G. is less critical than Del Vecchio and Rousseau, and writes in his Dizionario deifllosofi, (Sansoni), p. 497Google Scholar: “Poiché il solo mezzo per assicurare tale fondamento appare a Grotius l'attribuire validità assoluta al patto, concependolo come istituto di diritto naturale, egli è portato a giustificare genericamente gli instituti di diritto positivo, nella forma in cui storicamente gli si presentano, come legittimati dal contratto sociale; senza porsi il problema specifico della legittimità di ciascuno di essi in quella sua forma.”

5. I refer to the philosophy of the social contract as “contract philosophy” and the advocates of this philosophy as “contract philosophers”.

6. Schweigman, F.A.A., De eigendomsphilosophie van Hugo de Groot, 1929, p. 142Google Scholar : “For a long time Grotius was considered to be the founder of the contract theory: the time has come to assess whether this opinion is justified or not… As regards the contract of the state, Grotius can in no way be considered to be the founder of the contract theory.”

7. It is clear that Locke considers the absolute power of the sovereign as a state of nature, see for example, The Second Treatise, ed. Laslett, P., The New English Library, London, 1965Google Scholar, p. 405. It is also clear that Beccaria and Rousseau are diametrically opposed.

8. § 258 Anmerkung. I quote from Knox, T.M., Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Oxford University Press, 1967Google Scholar.

9. Ibid.

10. Metaphysik dcr Sitten, AA, VI, p. 313.

11. Vom Verhaltnis der Theorie zur Praxis im Staatsrecht, AA, VIII, p. 297 (translation Murphy, Jeffrie G., Kant: The Philosophy of Right, p. 111)Google Scholar

12. For this point see De jure belli ac pacis, I, 1, 10, 38.

13. In view of the importance of this consideration I should also like to give the original Latin. This reads: “Et haec quidem quae iam diximus, locum aliquem haberent etiamsi daremus, quod sine summo scelere dari nequit, non esse Deum, aut non curari ab eo negotia humana.”

14. cfr. Welzel, Hans, Die Naturrechtslehre Samuel Pufendorfs, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1958, p. 36Google Scholar : “Auch heute noch wird oft behauptet, dass Grotius mit dieser Erkenntnis das moderne Naturrecht begründet habe. In Wahrheit sind jene Sätze altes scholastischer Gedankengut das Grotius für das Naturrecht lediglich präzise formuliert hat. Selbst der Satz, dass das Naturrecht gelten würde, auch wenn es keinen Gott gäbe, stammt aus der Scholastik. Der damaligen Zeit war die Herkunft dieser Gedanken aus der Scholastik wohl bekannt.”

15. James St. Leger, M. M., The ‘etiamsi daremus'of Hugo Grotius. A Study of the Origins of International Law, Univ. Grogoriana, Rome, 1961, p. 53Google Scholar. J.J.M. van der Ven, … Etiamsi daremus non esse Deum… Gottesdämmerung. See also: In Grotius Naturrechtslehre in his collected articles the title Jus humanum. Das Menschliche und das Rechtliche, p. 365–373.

16. Leger, James St., O.c. p. 47–48: “We have already seen something of Pufendorf s lengthy article condemning the “etiamsi daremus” as an absurd hypothesis of the Scholastics. Pufendorf explicitely mentions a number of these Scholastics: Zentgravius, Suarez, Vasquez, Durandus a S. Porciano, and of these he refers especially to the opinion of Vasquez. Although he professes a great respect of Grotius Pufendorf rebutes the Dutchman for this dependence on the despicable Schoolmen. Barbeyrac also links the concept of Grotius to the Scholastics.”Google Scholar

17. James St. Leger expresses this, argument in the words of Johann Gottlieb Heinecke (1681–1741). It reads as follows in Leger's, St. translation: “Nevertheless this teaching is completely false. There are no rights (ius) without an obligation, no obligation without law (lex), no law without a legislator. If therefore we posit that God does not exist, there would be no legislator, no law, no obligation, and finally no rights (ius).” O.c, p. 49Google Scholar.

18. In Prolegomena, 11, 13 Grotius continues after his atheistic hypothesis: “The very opposite of this view has been implanted in us partly by reason, partly by unbroken tradition, and confirmed by many proofs as well by miracles attested by all ages. Hence it follows thatwe must without exception render obedience to God as our Creator to Whom we owe all that we are and have; expecially since, in manifold ways, He has shown Himself supremely good and supremely powerful, so that those who obey Him He is able to give supremely great rewards, even rewards that are eternal, since He Himself is eternal. We ought, moreover, to believe that He has willed to give rewards and all the more should we cherish such a belief if He has so promised in plain words that He has done this, we Christians believe, convinced by the indubitable assurance of testimonies.”

19. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edwards, P., T. 3 en 4, p. 394Google Scholar.

20. Cfr. Prolegomena, 15, 14: “Again, since it is a rule of the law of nature to abide by pacts (for it was necessary that among men there be some method of obligating themselves one to another, and no other natural method can be imagined), out of his source the bodies of municipal law have arisen. For those who had associated themselves with some group, or had subjected themselves to a man or to men, had either expressly promised, or from the nature of the transaction must be understood impliedly to have promised that they would conform to that which should have been determined, in the one case by the majority, in the other by those upon whom authority had been conferred.” Gr. fasso 15 justified in stating in his Dizionario dei filosofi (ed. Sansoni, ) p. 497Google Scholar: “II principio, di diritto naturale, che i patti debbono essere osservati sembra essere assunto cosi da Grotius come catcgoria fondamentale dell’ ordine giuridico in genre; esso funge da elemento mediatore tra l'assolutezza del diritto naturale e la contingenza dei diritti positivi che vengono grazie ad esso a partecipare del valore assoluto del primo.”

21. Friedmann, Wolfgang, o.c, p. 334, 394, Cfr.Google ScholarVecchio, Del, Leçons de philosophic du droit, p. 63–64: “Grotius entend combattre l'opinion, mise en valeur dcpuis pcu, p.e. par Althusius, d'après laquelle les peuples auraient toujours le droit de reprendre la souveraineté originellé… L'idée du contrat social est mise en avant par Grotius dans le seul but de démontrer que le peuple a l'obligation perpétuelle d'obéir au souverain. Le contrat social, à cet égard est quasi une praesumptio juris et de jure, par laquelle l'oeuvre des gouvernants est supposée avoir le consentement des sujets…”Google Scholar

22. Cfr. O.c, p. 65 “II fait état avant tout d'exemples historiques, de sorte que souvent il réussit une exposition dc faits plus que de principes.”

23. Cf. Schweigman, F.A.A., De eigendomsphilosophie van Hugo de Groot, 1929Google Scholar, § 8, De Groot en de theorie van het oorspronkelijk communisme, pp. 140–145: “We have seen that even before Grotius the theory that the order of private ownership may have been established by means of consensus had been put forward, in particular, by Molina; it seems that Grotius adopted Molina's concept of the contract as the way in which the order of private ownership was created. However, Grotius’ originality consists in the fact that according to this theory, it is not merely possible, but actually the case that private ownership owes its existence to a contract.” p. 141.

24. Fasso, G. came to the same conclusion in Dizionario del fllosofl (Sansoni) p. 497 … il De jure belli ac pads resta un opera tecnica e, per certi aspetti, politica, i cui presupposti filosofici, in realta marginali, sono assai incerti e di scarsissima a originalità.”Google Scholar