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The Arab League and Regional Peacekeeping

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 May 2009

I. Pogany
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Extract

The Middle East has experienced more peacekeeping activity, both in volume and variety, than any other region in the world. At the present time the United Nations Interim Force in the Lebanon (UNIFIL) is active in southern Lebanon, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) is maintaining its vigil on the Golan Heights, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) are stationed in the Sinai, and Observers of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) are serving in various sectors of the Middle East.

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Articles
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Netherlands International Law Review , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , May 1987 , pp. 54 - 74
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Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 1987

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References

1. UNIFIL, UNDOF and UNTSO were established by the UN Security Council. On the establishment of UNIFIL see SC Res. 425 (19 March 1978); SC Res. 426 (19 March 1978). On UNDOF see SC Res. 350 (31 May 1974). UNTSO was not expressly established by any Security Council Resolution: however, see SC Res. S/727 (23 April 1948); SC Res. S/801 (29 May 1948); SC Res. S/1376, II (11 August 1949). The MFO was established independently of the United Nations, in accordance with a Protocol concluded between Israel and Egypt. For the text of the Protocol, and of other relevant documents see, e.g., 20 ILM (1981) p. 1190.

2. The three military forces which have been established by the Arab League are: the Arab League Force in Kuwait (September 1961 – February 1963); the Symbolic Arab Security Force (June 1976 – October 1976); the Arab Deterrent Force (October 1976 – March 1983). These are examined below. The Symbolic Arab Security Force and the Arab Deterrent Force are generally treated as distinct phases of a single peacekeeping operation.

3. See section 3.3 infra.

4. For a detailed analysis of the proposed revisions to the League Pact, see Chaabane, S., ‘La Réforme du Pacte de la Ligue des États Arabes’, 86 RGDIP (1982) p. 508Google Scholar. See, also, Amara, S. Ben, ‘Le Monde Arabe’, in Pellet, A., ed., Les Forces Régionales du Maintien de la Paix(1983) p. 107, at pp. 153–155Google Scholar. On earlier proposals to reform the Pact see, e.g., Anabtawi, M., Arab Unity in Terms of law (1963) pp. 158–164Google Scholar.

5. On the background to the founding of the League of Arab States see, e.g., Gomaa, A., The Foundation of the League of Arab States (1977)Google Scholar. For an influential discussion of the development of Arab nationalism see, Antonius, G., The Arab Awakening (1938)Google Scholar.

6. In accordance with Article l of the Pact, membership of the League is open to any ‘independent Arab State’. Palestine was admitted as a member of the League in September 1976, following a unanimous decision of the League Council. See 22 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1976) 27955Google Scholar. Earlier, in October 1974, an Arab Summit Conference had recognised the PLO as ‘the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people’. For the text of the Communiqué see, e.g., Lukacs, Y., ed., Documents on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (1984) p. 223Google Scholar. For the text of the League Pact, see, e.g., 39 AJIL Supp. (1945) p. 266.

7. Following the Camp David Agreements of September 1978, which envisaged the conclusion of the bilateral Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, an Arab Summit Conference was convened in Baghdad which ‘call [ed] on the Egyptian Government to go back on these agreements and not to sign any reconciliation treaty with the enemy’. See, Lukacs, , ed., op.cit. n.6, at p. 231Google Scholar. In March 1979, after Egypt signed a Treaty of Peace with Israel, the League Council was convened in Baghdad. Meeting at Foreign Minister level, the Council resolved, inter alia, to suspend Egypt's membership of the League and to transfer the headquarters of the Organisation from Cairo to Tunis. For the text of the resolutions adopted by the Council see ibid., at p. 233.

8. Art. 3, League Pact.

9. Ibid., Art. 2.

10. Ibid., Art. 11.

11. Ibid., Art. 7.

12. See, generally, on the Political Committee, Anabtawi, , op.cit. n.4, pp. 152–153Google Scholar. See also, MacDonald, R., The League of Arab States (1965) pp. 63–65Google Scholar; Boutros-Ghali, B., ‘The Arab League (1945–1970)’, 25 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International (1969) p. 67 at pp. 74–75Google Scholar; El-Kurai, A., ‘The Arab League and Arab International Affairs’, 1 Arab Affairs (1983) p. 5 at pp. 7–8Google Scholar.

13. See, generally, on the status and significance of Arab Summit Conferences, Hassouna, H., The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes (1975) p. 389Google Scholar. See also, MacDonald, , op.cit. n. 12, p. 69Google Scholar; Boutros-Ghali, B., ‘La ligue des États arabes’, 137 Hague Recueil, vol. 3 (1972) pp. 43–44Google Scholar.

14. Art. 5, League Pact.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. The UN Charter does not define a ‘regional arrangement’ for the purpose of Art. 52. Nor has the Arab League received explicit recognition as a ‘regional arrangement’ by the United Nations. See, generally, Goodrich, L. et al. , Charter of the United Nations, 3rd rev. edn., (1969) pp. 356–357Google Scholar. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that the League of Arab States is a regional organisation, within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the Charter. See, e.g., Hassouna, , op.cit. n.13, pp. 11–12Google Scholar. See also, Moore, J.N., ‘The Role of Regional Arrangements in the Maintenance of World Order’, in Black, C. and Falk, R., eds., The Future of the International Legal Order, vol. III (1971) p. 122 at p. 124Google Scholar; Kourula, E., ‘Peace-keeping and Regional Arrangements’, in Cassese, A., ed., United Nations Peacekeeping (1978) p. 95 at p. 102Google Scholar; Moussa, A.R., ‘Rapports entre les nations unies et la ligue des états arabes’, 29 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International (1973) p. 67 at pp. 69–70, 72–73Google Scholar.

19. See, generally, Goodrich, et al. , op.cit. n.18, pp. 355–360Google Scholar.

20. See, e.g., Fabian, L.; Soldiers Without Enemies (1971) p. 16Google Scholar; Wainhouse, D., International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads (1973) p. 1Google Scholar; Rikhye, I et al. , The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future (1974) p. 10Google Scholar; Rikhye, I., The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping (1984) p. 2Google Scholar.

21. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, ICJ Rep. (1962) p. 151 at pp. 170–172, 175–177.

22. GA Res. 998 (4 November 1956).

23. SC Res. 143 (14 July 1960).

24. SC Res. 161 (21 February 1961). See also, SC Res. 169 (24 November 1961).

25. ICJ Rep. (1962) p. 151 at p. 177.

26. See, e.g., Higgins, R., United Nations Peacekeeping, vol. 3 (1980) p. 58Google Scholar. However, other commentators have suggested that the finding of the International Court was based on the assumption that ‘enforcement action’ is inapplicable to domestic conflicts, i.e., where armed force is directed at insurgents rather than against States. See, e.g., Abi-Saab, G., The United Nations Operation in the Congo 1960–1964 (1978) p. 104, fn. 165Google Scholar.

27. It has been argued that, even though peacekeeping may not amount to enforcement action, prior Security Council authorisation is still necessary before a regional organisation may initiate such an operation. See, e.g., Kourula, , loc.cit. n.18, pp. 116–118Google Scholar. See also, Eide, A., ‘Peacekeeping and Enforcement by Regional Organisations’, 3 Journal of Peace Research (1966) p. 133 at pp. 141–142Google Scholar. However, this argument is unsupported by State practice. Thus, there was no criticism of the Arab League for ‘failing’ to secure Security Council authorisation for the establishment of the Symbolic Arab Security Force or for its subsequent transformation into the Arab Deterrent Force.

28. See, generally, on the Arab League operation in Kuwait, Hassouna, , op.cit. n.13, pp. 91–130.Google ScholarSee also, MacDonald, , op.cit. n.12, pp. 235–237Google Scholar; Amara, Ben, op.cit. n.4, pp. 123–136Google Scholar.

29. Hassouna, , op.cit. n.13, p. 98Google Scholar.

30. Ibid.

31. Mansfield, P., The Ottoman Empire and its Successors (1973) p. 143Google Scholar.

32. League Council Resolution No. 1777 (20 July 1961). The operative part of the resolution is reproduced, in English, in Hassouna, , op.cit. n.13, p. 101Google Scholar. Iraq was absent when the vote was taken.

33. Ibid.

34. The text of the Agreement is reproduced as Appendix G in Hassouna, , op.cit. n.13, p. 447Google Scholar.

35. Ibid., pp. 99–101.

36. Rikhye, , op.cit. n.20, p. 133Google Scholar.

37. MacDonald, , op.cit. n.12, p. 237Google Scholar.

38. Ibid.

39. Hassouna, , op.cit. n.13, p. 105Google Scholar.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., pp. 105–106.

42. Ibid., p. 106.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., p. 107.

46. Ibid., pp. 125–126. See also, Hassouna, H., ‘The League of Arab States and the United Nations: Relations in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes’, in Andemicael, B., ed., Regionalism and the United Nations (1979) p. 299 at p. 317Google Scholar; Boutros-Ghali, , loc.cit. n.13, p. 53Google Scholar; Wainhouse, , op.cit. n.20, p. 414Google Scholar; Rikhye, , op.cit. n.20, p. 133Google Scholar.

47. See, supra, n.32.

48. For contrasting analyses of the concept of collective self-defence see, e.g., Bowett, D.W., Self-defence in International Law (1958) Ch. 10Google Scholar; Brownlie, I., International Law and the Use of Force by States (1963) pp. 328–331Google Scholar. On the distinction between collective self-defence and collective security see, e.g., Kelsen, H., ‘Collective Security and Collective Self-defence under the Charter of the United Nations’, 42 AJIL (1948) p. 783Google Scholar.

49. See, supra, nn.20, 21, 25, 26 and the accompanying text.

50. See League Council Resolution No. 3456 (9 June 1976). The text is available, in French, in Le Monde (10 June 1976) p. 2.

51. For the texts of the PLO and Egyptian requests for the convening of the League Council see, Nielsen, J., ed., International Documents on Palestine 1976 (1978) pp. 425–428Google Scholar.

52. On the background to the Lebanese civil war see, e.g., Salibi, K., Crossroads to Civil War (1976)Google Scholar. See also, Rabinovich, I., The War for Lebanon, rev. edn. (1985) pp. 34–43Google Scholar.

53. See e.g., Khalidi, W., Conflict and Violence in Lebanon (1983) p. 51Google Scholar.

54. The Syrian intervention in favour of the Maronites followed a period of mounting tension between the Palestinian-leftist coalition and Syria's President Assad. The Syrians sought to preserve the status quo in the Lebanon and to prevent the ascendancy of the Palestinian-leftist forces. See, e.g., Cobban, H., The Making of Modern Lebanon (1985) pp. 145–146Google Scholar. See also, Khalidi, , op.cit. n.53, pp. 56–58Google Scholar; Rabinovich, , op.cit. n.52, pp. 53–54Google Scholar.

55. See, supra, n.50.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. League Council Resolution No. 3457 (10 June 1976). For details see, e.g., Le Monde (11 June 1976) p. 1.

63. Le Monde (11 June 1976) p. 1.

64. Le Monde (15 June 1976) p. 2.

65. Le Monde (10 June 1976) p. 2. See also, the message from President Frangieh of the Lebanon to the Secretary-General of the Arab League, reproduced in 6 Journal of Palestine Studies (1976/1977) p. 170Google Scholar.

66. See the Communiqué issued by the office of the Presidency of the Lebanon, 16 June 1976. The text is reproduced in Nielsen, , ed., op.cit. n.51, p. 433Google Scholar.

67. See, generally, 22 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1976) 28119.

68. Ibid.

69. See the cable from President Frangieh of the Lebanon to Secretary-General Riad of the Arab League, dated 30 June 1976, in Nielsen, , ed., op.cit. n.51, p. 436Google Scholar.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Bulloch, J., Death of a Country (1977) p. 156Google Scholar.

73. 22 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1976) 28120Google Scholar.

74. See, e.g., the statement by Dr. Hasan Sabri al Kholi, the Arab League envoy in Beirut, on the relations between the Syrian Forces in the Lebanon and the Symbolic Arab Security Force, dated 27 July 1976. The statement is reproduced in 6 Journal of Palestine Studies (1976/1977) pp. 187–188Google Scholar.

75. Bulloch, , op.cit. n.72, p. 156Google Scholar. See also, Khalidi, , op.cit. n.53, pp. 59–60Google Scholar.

76. Bulloch, , op.cit. n.72, p. 156Google Scholar. See also, Khalidi, , op.cit. n.53, p. 61Google Scholar.

77. See, generally, Bulloch, , op.cit. n.72, pp. 174–182Google Scholar. See also, Khalidi, , op.cit. n.53, p. 61Google Scholar.

78. See generally, Khalidi, , op.cit. n.53, p. 62Google Scholar.

79. Ibid., pp. 62–63.

80. Ibid., p. 63.

81. Dawisha, A., Syria and the Lebanese Crisis (1980) p. 161Google Scholar.

82. Ibid., p. 162.

83. See, generally, Khalidi, , op.cit. n.53, p. 64Google Scholar. See also, Bulloch, , op.cit. n.72, p. 182Google Scholar.

84. See, supra, n.62.

85. For the text of the resolution adopted by the Riyadh Summit Conference see, e.g., 22 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1976) 28122Google Scholar. See also, Khalidi, , op.cit. n.53, p. 197Google Scholar.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. The Cairo Conference was the 8th Arab Summit Conference. On the legal and institutional significance of plenary Arab Summit Conferences see supra n.13, and the accompanying text.

90. For the text of the resolutions adopted by the Cairo Summit Conference see, e.g., 22 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1976) 28123Google Scholar. See also, Khalidi, , op.cit. n.53, p. 201Google Scholar.

91. In accordance with Art. 7 of the Pact: ‘Unanimous decisions of the Council shall be binding upon all member States of the League; majority decisions shall be binding only upon those States which have accepted them’. This rule is applicable, mutatis mutandis, to resolutions adopted by Arab Summit Conferences.

92. For the text of the resolutions adopted by the Riyadh and Cairo Summit Conferences see, supra, nn.85, 90. Thus, as noted above, the forces are often treated as successive phases of a single operation.

93. 22 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1976) 28123Google Scholar.

94. International Herald Tribune (27 October 1976).

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

98. Le Monde (28 October 1976) p. 3.

99. The Times (26 October 1976) p. 8.

100. The Times (28 October 1976) p. 8.

101. 22 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1976) 28123Google Scholar.

102. Le Monde (28 October 1976) p. 3.

103. See, supra, nn.85, 90.

104. 22 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1976) 28123Google Scholar.

105. Le Monde (6 November 1976) p. 3.

106. See, supra, n.90.

107. Le Monde (28 October 1976) p. 5.

108. Ibid.

109. See the author's forthcoming book: The Arab League and Peacekeeping in The Lebanon (1987).

110. 22 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1976) 28123Google Scholar.

111. Ibid., at 28124.

112. 24 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1978) 29032-3Google Scholar; 25 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1979) 30005-8Google Scholar.

113. 27 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1981) 30917-8Google Scholar.

114. 25 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1979) 30005Google Scholar.

115. 29 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1983) 32037Google Scholar. On Israel's intervention in the Lebanon, commenced in June 1976, see, Schiff, Z. and Ya'ari, E., Israel's Lebanon War (1984)Google Scholar.

116. 29 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1983) 32037Google Scholar.

117. Ibid.

118. Ibid., at 32164.

119. See the statement by Mahmoud Riad, Secretary-General of the League, Arab, in The Times (27 10 1976) p. 8Google Scholar. Thus, the ADF was authorised to ‘deter’ any violation of the ceasefire. See, supra, n.88, and the accompanying text.

120. See, supra, n.20 and the accompanying text.

121. See, supra, n.24.

122. SC Res. S/5002 (24 November 1961).

123. See, supra, nn.21–25 and the accompanying text.

124. See, e.g., Bowett, D.W., United Nations Forces (1964) pp. 274–312Google Scholar. See also, the chapters entitled ‘Constitutional Basis’ in Higgins, op.cit. n.26.

125. There are various provisions of the Pact which can be construed as validating the creation of peacekeeping forces. Art. 2 enumerates the aims of the League. These include the co-ordination of the policies of members ‘in order to achieve co-operation between them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty’. The purposes of the Organisation include, in addition, ‘a general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab countries’. The creation of the Deterrent Force can be viewed as a means of fulfilling one of the aims of the League, i.e., safeguarding the ‘independence and sovereignty’ of member States. This was, without doubt, the principal objective of the Riyadh and Cairo Summit Conferences which established the Arab Deterrent Force. The establishment of the ADF can also be seen as a means of giving expression to ‘a general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab countries’. By October 1976, the Lebanese conflict had escalated to a point where it threatened regional peace and security. See, generally, on the constitutional basis of Arab League peacekeeping, Amara, Ben, op.cit. n.4, pp. 124–126Google Scholar.

126. ICJ Rep. (1962) p. 151 at p. 168.

127. Goodrich, et al. , op.cit. n.18, p. 358Google Scholar.

128. In accordance with Art. 1 of the Pact: ‘Any independent Arab State has the right to become a member of the League’. The term ‘Arab’ has been defined by reference to language and culture, rather than religion or ethnic origin. See, e.g., Boutros-Ghali, , loc.cit. n.13, pp. 28–33Google Scholar. On the grounds of language, and probably culture, Iran is ineligible for membership of the League. Israel is clearly disqualified on all counts.

129. See, e.g., the disputes chronicled in Hassouna, op.cit. n.13, Chs. II–X. More recent inter-Arab conflicts include the Syrian intervention in Jordan in 1970, recurrent tensions along the Egyptian-Libyan border, and the situation in the Western Sahara, where Algeria supports indigenous Polisario guerrillas against a Moroccan occupying army.

130. See, generally, on the United Nations Observer Group in the Lebanon (UNOGIL), Higgins, , op.cit. n.26, vol. 1, pp. 535–603Google Scholar.

131. Hassouna, , op.cit. n.13, p. 62Google Scholar.

132. See UN Doc. S/4007 (22 May 1958).

133. SC Res. 128 (11 June 1958). For a recent assessment of the effectiveness of UNOGIL see Pogany, I., ‘The Evaluation of United Nations Peace-keeping Operations’, 58 BYIL (1987) p. 357Google Scholar.

134. For the mandate of the MNF see, e.g., the exchange of letters between Lebanon's Deputy Prime Minister, Fouad Boutros and the US Ambassador to the Lebanon, Robert Dillon. The letters, which are dated 25 September 1982, are reproduced in Pelcovits, N., Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts (1984) pp. 139–141Google Scholar.

135. This was, in fact, the second Multinational Force. The first MNF had been constituted in late August 1982, to supervise the withdrawal of Palestinian guerrillas from Beirut. MNF I left the Lebanon by 10 September following the successful completion of its mission. See, e.g., Rikhye, , op.cit. n.20, p. 75Google Scholar.

136. See, generally, on Israel's intervention in the Lebanon, Schiff and Ya'ari, op.cit. n. 115. See also, Jansen, M., The Battle of Beirut (1982)Google Scholar.

137. Schiff and Ya'ari, op.cit. n. 115, Ch. 13. M. Jansen, op.cit. n.136, Ch. 5.

138. SC Res. 521 (19 September 1982).

139. These explanations are based on interviews with Lebanese, US and UN officials who cannot be named.

140. The Pact of the Arab League, drafted in 1945, contains an ‘Annex Regarding Palestine’. This notes, inter alia, that Palestine's ‘international existence and independence in the legal sense cannot…be questioned any more than could the independence of the other Arab countries’. The cause of Palestinian self-determination has remained one of the principal concerns of the Arab League See, generally, Hassouna, op.cit. n.13, Ch. XI.

141. At the Arab Summit Conference in Fez, in early September 1982, President Assad offered to withdraw Syrian troops from the Lebanon in the context of an Israeli withdrawal. The communiqué adopted by the Summit Conference noted, with deliberate ambiguity, that ‘the Lebanese and Syrian Governments will start negotiations on measures to be taken in the light of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon’; 29 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1983) 32037Google Scholar. As no Israeli withdrawal had materialised, President Assad had not been confronted with the necessity of removing his own troops.

142. The Israeli Government had asserted, repeatedly, that it would not withdraw its troops from the Lebanon while Syrian and Palestinian forces remained in place. See 29 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1983) 32037Google Scholar.

143. See, supra, n.112.

144. See, e.g., Cobban, , op.cit. n.54, p. 190Google Scholar.

145. For earlier suggestions for reform see, e.g., Anabtawi, , op.cit. n.4, pp. 158–164Google Scholar.

146. League Council Resolution No. 3842 (28 June 1979).

147. See, e.g., Chaabane, , loc.cit. n.4, p. 510Google Scholar.

148. Art. 19 of the Pact provides: ‘This Pact may be amended with the consent of two-thirds of the States belonging to the League … Final action on an amendment cannot be taken prior to the session following the session in which the motion was initiated’. However, the revised text has not yet been formally presented to an Arab Summit Conference. Art. 19 provides: ‘If a State does not accept such an amendment it may withdraw at such time as the amendment goes into effect’.

149. See, e.g., Chaabane, , loc.cit. n.4, p. 515Google Scholar.

150. Ibid., p. 525.

151. Ibid. See, generally, Amara, Ben, op.cit. n. 4, pp. 154–155Google Scholar.

152. On the causes of the mutual antipathy between the Ba'ath regimes in Syria and Iraq see, e.g., Helms, C., Iraq, Eastern Flank of the Arab World (1984) pp. 72, 80Google Scholar.