Empire depends not only upon the strength of the center but upon compliant behavior in the periphery, and the nature of interactions between center and periphery. Each of these three variables is changing rapidly in the former Soviet empire.

The territory of this new European state is crossed by strategically important passes, the lowest in the entire Alps, leading from the Danubian basin to the Mediterranean (Italy). Thus, the Slovenes had been under cultural, civilizational and political domination of centers from these two parts of Europe until 1918. Because the mountainous land forms, dissected also by valleys and basins, were prone to processes of diffusion rather than fusion, the Slovenes became a national and political subject of their own as late as the nineteenth century. From 1918 to 1990 they were joined to Yugoslavia, a South-East European state, and learnt, to their cost, all the differences between the cultures of West and Central Europe on the one hand, and South-East and Eastern Europe and the Near East on the other. Hence the plebiscite decision by the nation for an independent state.

When we talk about Slovenia in Europe, we are talking about a two-way relationship: what does Slovenia mean for Europe? and, what is Slovenia's place in Europe? The first question requires an answer to an additional question: what is Europe, and where is its development leading? As part of Europe, and as a part of its system, Slovenia must also be in harmony with it or, rather, Slovenia's attributes must not be in conflict with those of Europe, otherwise Slovenia would not integrate properly. Europe could not then accept it as a composite part, for Slovenia's development would not align with the direction in which Europe is moving.

In the spring of 1990, Lithuanians surprised the world by first declaring their independence and then, after Moscow had declared the act illegal, refusing to retract their declaration even in the face of military occupation and economic blockade. Many foreign observers despaired of their “stubbornness,” but the Lithuanians' determination was based on their newly regained national pride as expressed in their concept of statehood (valstybingumas in Lithuanian and gosudarstvennost' in Russian). Lithania, they insisted, had a right and a historical destiny to be an independent state.

There has been considerable speculation as to which of the former Soviet republics could become viable economic entities following the Putsch of August 19-21, 1991, and the resultant dissolution of the USSR. The consensus is that after Russia, Ukraine has the best chances of survival as a European state with a highly developed economy. Yet the picture remains a bleak one. Although Ukraine has advanced industry and has been a major source of grain crops (of winter wheat in particular), a declining standard of living had been forecast by its economic experts for the period 1991-1995, even before the August 24 declaration of independence. The following study will show Ukraine's major advantages and weaknesses, and what sort of prospects lie ahead for an independent Ukraine. As with any statements on the future of the former territories of the Soviet Union, they have to be qualified with the phrase “pending future political developments.” For the most part, the assumption is made that relations between Ukraine and its once and future economic partners will be amicable.

As a people, the Slovenes have never had their own national state. Integrated into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slovenes have lived on a subnational level. Only Yugoslavia was recognized as an international subject and remains a member of the United Nations Organization to this day; thus, Slovenia—the homeland of Slovenes—did not enjoy the full status of a nation and the Slovene national identity was not internationally recognized until recently. Slovenes are now determined to achieve permanent recognition, no matter the cost.

Although the Tuvinskaya ASSR is one of the latest and, in fact, the largest of the territorial acquisitions of the Soviet Union (its area exceeds that of all three Baltic states at 170,500 sq. kilometers), there are few, if any, detailed accounts of its annexation in 1944.

My discussion of the position of the Slovenes in “Post-modern” Europe is based on certain premises. First, I perceive the present and the future situation of Europe as one in which so-called post-modern phenomena and values are being realized; secondly, I perceive the current developments in Slovenia as processes of cooperation with and participation in European processes; and thirdly, I view the state independence of Slovenia achieved this year as a prerequisite of the above-mention cooperation and participation. However, these premises require explanation and verification. In providing the explanation and the proof, I would like to point to the problems of a small state existing in the modern world, and outline the challenges that await us, Slovenes.

It is an indisputable historical fact that between 1933 and 1945 groups and individuals in many countries of Europe, as well as in other parts of the world, sympathized (for different reasons and motives) with Nazi public pronouncements, especially those critical of the post-World War I settlement. It is also an indisputable historical fact that other groups and individuals in many European countries resisted (for different reasons and motives) Nazi domination, policies and practices. Unfortunately, current historical literature does not reflect clearly this dichotomy. Some nations, because of the activities of a few, are portrayed as Nazi collaborators, regardless of the human losses they suffered under Nazi rule; and, conversely, others are presented as anti-Nazi resisters, regardless of their actual contributions.

This chapter is concerned with the swift and unexpected political and social breaks that occurred at the end of the eighties in Eastern and Central Europe and which we have been experiencing as necessary, inevitable, foreseen but delayed. A simultaneous, particularly media-created analysis, has characterized them as a “peaceful revolution,” but at least two questions arise.

In the eyes of the European public, Slovenia is still considered a Catholic country. Since before the last World War, this has had a double meaning. First of all, the Roman Catholic Church has been the leading ecclesiastical institution since the Christianization of the territory settled by Slovenes, decisively influencing the constitution of the cultural and political life of the Slovene nation, as well as its character. In spite of changed social conditions and its fate in the period of “real-socialist” rule from 1945 to 1990, the Church has preserved this role to the present time, although in different forms.

By the year 1453, when the vestigial remains of the Byzantine Empire were destroyed with the fall of Constantinople, much of the Balkan peninsula was already in the hands of the conquering Ottoman Turks. The overthrow of Byzantium in that year was the capstone in a century-long process that transformed an originally militant Muslim Anatolian border emirate into a powerful Muslim empire that straddled two continents and represented a major contender in contemporary European great power politics. Over half of the population subject to the Ottoman sultan were Christian European inhabitants of the Balkans: Greeks, Serbs, Vlahs, Albanians and Bulgarians. With the conquest of Constantinople, Sultan Mehmed II Fatih, the victorious Turkish ruler, faced the quarrelsome problem of devising a secure means of governing his vast, Muslim-led empire that contained a highly heterogeneous non-Muslim population.