It has often been declared that the CPSU cannot cope with the problems of its national minorities because it cannot understand, or rather is not willing to understand, the very nature of the beast. There is much to be said for this proposition, mirrored as it is in the agricultural sphere where Professor Peter Wiles has long insisted that to put a Marxist in a field is to pave the way for famine in no time. The Party in power, from Lenin onwards, has constantly sought to analyze the complex ethnic structure of Russia and the USSR with a view to “solving” it as a problem once and for all. Quite apart from the question of whether there is in fact “a” solution (or even solutions) to such a complex melange of problems, much of what has resulted has been more concerned with the idealistic world as it could be, or should be, rather than with an acceptance of the world as it is.

The solutions adopted have variously involved planned economic development and redistribution to achieve a greater measure of equality and levels of development; temporary federation during the process of adjustment; uniform education and socialization programs; population mixing across boundaries; de facto Russification; and a measure of stick to go with the carrots, as and where necessary.

Ladies and gentlemen, permit me to welcome you to the Nationality and Siberian Studies Program's first annual conference on “The Soviet Nationalities and Gorbachev.” With so distinguished a collection of experts, I am certain that our discussion will prove to be both a stimulating intellectual experience and a permanent addition to the debate on Soviet nationality policy.

In determining what Gorbachev's policies are, I consider the topic of law a very congenial one because he is a lawyer. While he is no longer a practitioner, he attended the same law school as I did long ago. His attitude towards law is as an implementation of policy, and, therefore, I believe that by reading the law, we can, through what is sometimes called reverse engineering, determine what his policies are in the matter of national minority concerns as well as on other matters. We can look upon what is seen on the surface as an indication of what is more deeply enshrined in his thinking. I always remember that Lenin said (and I was taught this my first day of school over there) that law was a political instrument, and I think Gorbachev is very much influenced by Lenin and Leninism. Consequently, I believe he accepts the position that law is indeed a political instrument. He would never accept what is now so popular in Europe: the theories of Lumans, who said that law has a life of its own, not because of its natural-law base, but because of what Lumans states, biological analogy.

By 1920 nationalist forces had won independent statehood for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. But they owed their victory to a propitious sequence of world-shaking events: first, the German defeat of Russia followed by the Entente defeat of Germany; second, the subsequent assistance the Entente rendered nationalist Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians in beating back the Red tide. Peter the Great's “window on Europe” was thereby reduced to a Soviet aperture on Europe. Only the narrow Gulf of Finland, flanked by a “White” Finland and a “White” Estonia, afforded the USSR direct access to the Baltic Sea.

The resurgence of Germany under Hitler and Soviet Russia under Stalin overturned the configuration of world power that had attended the birth of the Baltic Republics. In treating the fate that befell the Baltic States confronted by the resurgence of German and Soviet power in 1939, this article has three aims: first, to give due attention to German policy towards the Baltic States; second, to assess the efficacy and wisdom of the policies pursued by the Baltic States to avoid being ground between the Hitler and the Stalin millstones; and third, to incorporate pertinent new information published in the USSR since 1989. Even under the “Gorbachev Revolution,” publication of newly declassified diplomatic papers in the USSR has been conducted, so far, by dozirovka; i.e., the measuring out of information in small doses. This previously unpublished material, though exiguous, can at least begin to fill certain glaring “blank spots” in the history of the Baltic Question in 1939.

The regional and local dimension entered the debate over economic decentralization and perestroika as different republics or provinces provided laboratories for experiments with new forms of economic management, and as public officials below the all-union level were ordered to take more initiative in critical areas such as consumer goods production. Now, however, the regional dimension in economic reform has moved to the top of the political agenda. In part, it moved there after last year's Party Conference where regional leaders discussed economic strains in perestroika, in part due to economic strains that have become more visible at the local level. As Gorbachev told the Supreme Soviet, this year marks a new stage in perestroika, one that is to harmonize inter-ethnic relations and redefine the relationship—especially the economic relationship—between center and periphery.

My comments on ideology, unlike the two presentations that preceded mine, which were substantive and had something to report on, will be similar to the story about the dog that did not bark: a dog that barked incessantly in the Brezhnev era, ideology has literally stopped barking since then. In this sense, the most striking aspect of contemporary Soviet ideology is its silence. From one of the most insistent features of Soviet reality under Brezhnev, ideology has retreated into a dark corner, where, presumably, it is licking its wounds and plotting a return. Ideology is far from dead, however. The ace up ideology's sleeve is, of course, the Party. As long as the Party purports to play a leading role in Soviet society—and, as Gorbachev has suggested, its role will increase under conditions of perestroika—then something like ideology will be necessary to justify and legitimate the one-party rule of a party that, even by its own criteria, does not deserve to rule, let alone to rule alone.

On October 20, 1989 the Harriman Institute's Nationalities and Siberian Studies Program of Columbia University sponsored a panel discussion entitled, “The Baltic Republics Fifty Years After the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.” The panel, consisting of Dr. Allen Lynch, Dr. Stephan Kux, Mr. Jenik Radon and Mr. William Hough, analyzed the current situation in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as in the other republics from a variety of perspectives, and debated the motivations and appropriateness of the response of the Western powers to the growing strength of the various independence movements in the Baltic republics. The following edited transcript of those proceedings points up the complex and contentious nature of the status of the Baltic republics in the era of Gorbachev, in both the domestic (Soviet) and international contexts. Nationalist leaders within the Soviet Union debate the appropriate tactics and pace to pursue their goals. The Soviet leadership dabates the extent to which autonomy may be granted to the nationalities. Western leaders consider their options in responding to the changes in the Soviet Union, changes which necessitate an overhaul of policies nearly a half-century old as well as some “new thinking” on their parts.

The discussion centered on two issues: (1) What in general has been the response of the West to nationalist movements in the USSR and how appropriate has that response been? (2) Is there any validity to claims of Baltic “exceptionalism”? The following introduction comments briefly on these issues and places them into perspective by drawing on the discussion and exploring several key points.

As everybody is well aware, human rights is an extremely broad topic, so what I would like to do is make a few basic points with some illustrations and then sum up with some ideas and discussion. Much of the grand scheme for reforming the Soviet system has touched on issues that fall under the rubric of human rights, broadly construed. Human rights discussions are no longer constrained by the traditional Soviet emphasis on social and economic rights and now encompass a variety of civil and political rights. As I see it, the fundamental issue with respect to human rights is the propping up of the rule of law. The concept of the rule of law has been elevated to previously unknown heights and is extolled as a fundamental underpinning of the entire process of democratization. It lends itself to the reduction of arbitrary actions (or at least it should), it encourages glasnost', and it enhances support for perestroika because it is intrinsic to any process of democratization. This reliance on the rule of law is absolutely essential as a component of any process that is linked to de-Stalinization. The abuses of the Stalin years are routinely excoriated, and the message being conveyed is that constitutionally guaranteed rights of citizens will be upheld, constitutional reform will proceed, and legislation will be enacted to protect a host of rights not addressed by the Constitution.

I guess after the atmospherics of ideology and so on, Alexander Motyl thought that, like Anteus, we could not stay in the air the whole time, that we would have to come down to the ground with resources.

Charles Furtado

Professor Motyl, you mentioned that there seemed to be a lack of conception among the Soviet elite about the nature of ideology, or about the definition of ideology, as one that would lead the regime through perestroika. It seems to me that the regime, or the elite, is somewhat bifurcated on this issue and that there are elements of the elite who have a clearer idea of what they would like to see promulgated. That would be the Ligachev faction, which is more conservative in its orientation towards social change. My question is: do you discern any differences in the Ligachev variation on Brezhnev's developed socialism? And have they come up with anything that is different, or is it basically more of the same?

Michael Rywkin: Perestroika in Central Asia

I will cover only a few points. It is obvious that, as far as the nationalities are concerned, perestroika has affected them in different ways. It is very hard to say that there is a uniform situation as far as perestroika's impact is concerned. We know well what is going on with the national fronts in the Baltic; we also know about the Caucasian situation's being complicated by difficulties not only between the local nationalities and the Muscovites, but also among the local nationalities themselves, and minorities within minorities. We have still a different situation in Belorussia, and yet another in Central Asia. Some of the events in Central Asia are directly connected with republics, while other trends already started beforehand.