Worldwide, ethnopolitics takes on various shapes. Yet, while politics involving ethnicity can be either conflictual, competitive, or cooperative, analysts typically focus either on instances of conflict or ignore the multiethnicity of states by sticking to “the comfortable integrationist presumptions of the 1950s.” All too rarely does one find analyses of policies that work in difficult situations. This global trend is intensified in the case of Eastern Europe. As this region has suffered instances of ethnic politics gone wrong—most recently in the former Yugoslavia—many analysts assume that constructive approaches to ethnic relations are impossible, even though they are needed more than ever. Here, I outline a model of ethnopolitics which is both democratic and constructive, has been used in East Central Europe in the past, and has potential for the future. In presenting the case for ethnopluralism, I outline a promising alternative to ethnic conflict or neglect.

Although narratives of national identity feature territory, myths, and historical memories presumably shared by members,1 national identity formation is an ongoing process with changeable membership and boundaries.2 One of the more complex challenges to a national “imagined community” has been the significant presence in Estonia of cultural Russians3 after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, at that time one-third and now some 28% of the small country's population. The often grudging accommodation of cultural Russians by the titular nationality continues to draw attention from international organizations, scholars, and policymakers alike. Undoubtedly the commentary least welcome to Estonian governments in the last decade, however, has been the thunder of denunciation from Russia. In a great spillover from domestic concerns about Slavic identity to international relations, Estonia has been ranked as Russia's greatest enemy, and political figures across the spectrum have condemned Estonian citizenship and language policies.4

The end of communism brought hopes for a wholesale liberal-democratic transformation to the republics of the former Soviet Union. However, bitter disenchantment soon followed, as resurrected nationalism undermined the republics' stability and threatened democracy. Mass nationalist movements in these countries were not observed until the regime's initial liberalization. In most cases, the high phase of nationalist mobilization was reached only after the postcommunist state elites endorsed nationalism as an official policy of the state. In each instance, nationalist strategies of the state were defined in a complex interplay of domestic and international factors. Ethnicity became politicized as a resource for political action when other resources proved inadequate or insufficient. In addition, exogenous factors often played a leading role in this development.

The Soviet military officer's motto was “I serve the Soviet Union.” He had taken an oath to a state whose leadership constantly stressed the ethnic diversity of its population. When the USSR fell apart, however, only one of its 15 successor states—the Russian Federation—did not declare itself the homeland of one specific ethnic group. The reality of the divorce was difficult to grasp for many people in the former Soviet Union. In Russia, ideas of democracy and hopes for the future of the RSFSR as an independent state were standing strong. Not all the newly independent states would be missed; the Central Asian republics were widely seen as a culturally distant periphery tapping the RSFSR of resources. However, shedding off Kazakhstan, Belarus, and above all, Ukraine was a completely different story.

In the summer of 1978, a Crimean Tatar man named Musa Mamut walked out of his home in a small village in the Crimea toward a policeman waiting for him at his front gate. He was to be taken to the station for questioning, and quite possibly arrested for “violation of the passport regime.” But Mamut had already drenched himself with gasoline and, lighting a match, was engulfed in flames. He ran toward the policeman, who ran the other way. A deliveryman tripped Musa, and two friends who had been passing by extinguished the flames. His friends took him to the Simferopol city hospital, where he died six days later, never expressing any regret for what he did.

The main objective of the ethnic policy of the government of Kyrgyzstan in the post-Soviet era was a consolidation of all people and ethnic groups on the territory of the Republic into the Kyrgyzstani nation. Such a goal is important for any nation that has just gained independence, but for the Kyrgyz Republic it was an especially important task for several reasons. First, the multiethnic composition of the country: in 1991 the Kyrgyzs, or the titular nation of the Republic, constituted roughly 52% of the population, there were around 22% Russians, and the Uzbeks represented 13% of the population. Second, interethnic relations in the Republic were especially tense at the beginning of the 1990s because of the interethnic conflicts in the southern regions of the Republic in 1989 and 1990.1 Third, the Kyrgyzs themselves lacked national cohesiveness and they often defined themselves as members of different tribes or tribal groups with distinct dialects, dress, and political affiliations.