Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 November 2018
Ten years ago, the destruction of totalitarian Soviet society led many to fear that in a country with little experience of democracy, another totalitarian regime would supersede the old one. But which regime, and in what form? The national conflicts that accompanied the disintegration of the Soviet Union suggested a feasible answer right away, namely, a national dictatorship of the fascist sort, composed of nationalistic ideology and a totalitarian social structure. No such dictatorship has occurred in contemporary Russia and none is anticipated in the near future. The “Weimar Russia” scenario, which the political science expert Alexander Ianov developed in such great detail, has not materialized.
1. Alexander Ianov, Posle Yeltsina. “Veimarskaya Rossia” [After Yeltsin. “Weimar” Russia] (Moscow: KRUK, 1995). See also Stephen Hanson and Jeffrey Kopstein, “The Weimar/Russia Comparison,” Post-Soviet Affairs, No. 13, 1997, pp. 252–283. I will not provide a substantial explanation of why the Weimar scenario did not materialize. It should be pointed out, however, that the ideas of Soviet conservatism, of committed communism, and of extreme and moderate Russian ethnic nationalism, when taken together, have not been supported by even 50% of the population and are steadfastly rejected by the dominant majority of the political elite (including the business elite, the power structures and the mass media).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2. Ibid. Google Scholar
3. Alexander Verkhovsky, Anatoly Papp and Vladimir Pribylovsky, Politicheskii ekstremizm v Rossii [Political Extremism in Russia] (Moscow: Panorama, 1996), pp. 7–10.Google Scholar
4. Alexander Verkhovsky, Ekaterina Mikhailovskaya and Vladimir Pribylovsky, Natsionalizm i Ksenofobia v Rossiiskom Obschestve [Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russian Society] (Moscow: Panorama, 1998), pp. 22–23.Google Scholar
5. Ibid., pp. 114–115, 146, 158.Google Scholar
6. We have already undertaken detailed classification in the following publications: Verkhovsky, Papp and Pribylovsky, Politicheskii ekstremizm, pp. 42–46, 51–61; Verkhovsky and Pribylovsky, Natsional-patriticheskie organizatsii v Rossii [National-Patriotic Organizations in Russia] (Moscow: Panorama, 1996), pp. 28–29, 92–104; Pribylovsky, National-Patriots at the Third State Duma Election (Moscow: Panorama, 1999), pp. 2–4.Google Scholar
7. For more detail, see Viacheslav Likhachcv and Vladimir Pribylovsky, Russkoe Natsional'noe Edinstvo: istoria, politika, ideologia [Russian National Unity: History, Politics, Ideology] (Moscow: Panorama, 2000). It should also be noted that in Russia, political organizations must be registered as “federal organizations” in order to be allowed to participate in federal elections. The requirement for acquiring the status of “federal organization” is that the organization must have branches in more than half of the 89 regions of the Russian Federation. In the case of Spas, the Ministry of Justice ruled that there had been irregularities in the registration process of three of the branches of Spas. Their registration was declared invalid, which meant that Spas no longer had registered branches in half of the 89 regions.Google Scholar
8. Daniel Rancour-Lafferiere, “Imagining Russia: Ethnic Identity and the National Mind,” typescript, pp. 19–26. Also see Vladimir Pribylovsky, National-Patriots at the Third State Duma Election. Google Scholar
9. Alexander Prokhanov's ideology, reflected in his numerous articles, statements and interviews, unfortunately has not yet become subject of academic research. It can be noted that Prokhanov's ideology is a moderate version of Alexander Dugin's ideology (see below).Google Scholar
10. See, for example, Sergei Gorodnikov, Istoricheskoe prednaznachenie russkogo natsionalizma [Historic Mission of Russian Nationalism] (Moscow: Russkoe slovo, 1994).Google Scholar
11. V. Zaginailo, “Reshenie chechenskoi problemy” [Resolution of the Chechen Problem], Russkii vestnik [Russian Herald], Nos 9–11, 1996.Google Scholar
12. See Verkhovsky, Papp and Pribylovsky, Politicheskii ekstremizm, pp. 51–54; Verkhovsky, Mikhailovskaya and Pribylovsky, Politicheskaia ksenofobiya. Radikal'nye gruppy. Predstavleniya liderov. Rol' Tserkvi [Political Xenophobia. Radical Groups. Mentality of the Leaders. Role of the Church] (Moscow: Panorama, 1999), pp. 18–59.Google Scholar
13. Statement of the leadership of Sverdlovsk regional branch of the Russian National Union. Personal archive of the author.Google Scholar
14. Ekaterina Volkova. “Svobodu russkomu spermatozoidu!” (“Freedom to Russian Sperm!”), Segodnya [Today], 15 February 1999.Google Scholar
15. For more detail see Verkhovsky, Mikhailovskaya and Pribylovsky, Politicheskaia ksenofobiya…, pp. 101–107, 123–133.Google Scholar
16. For some details see: ibid, pp. 102–104; Vladimir Il'ushenko, “Russkii fashizm I religia” [Russian Fascism and Religion], Dia-Logos. 1998–1999 (Moscow: Istina; Zhizen, 1999) pp. 160–171.Google Scholar
17. The Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods is a politicized association of organizations of Russian Orthodox laymen oriented towards national-patriotic ideology. See Verkhovsky, Mikhailovskaya and Pribylovsky, Politicheskaia ksenofobiya …, pp. 105–106Google Scholar
18. In the Russian tradition, last names of monks are always written in parenthesis.Google Scholar
19. For more details, see Verkhovsky, Mikhailovskaya and Pribylovsky, Politicheskaia ksenofobiya …, pp. 98–100.Google Scholar
20. Alexander Dugin's ideology is not sufficiently studied either. For more information, see Verkhovsky, Papp and Pribylovsky, Politicheskii ekstremizm v Rossii [Political Extremism in Russia], pp. 70–75; the web-site of Alexander Dugin: http://www.arctogaia.com Google Scholar
21. The program documents of the movement can be found at http://www.rusaction.da.ru Google Scholar
22. Verkhovsky, Results of the Parliamentary Election-1999 for Radical National-Patriots. Single-Mandate Districts (Moscow: Panorama, 2000).Google Scholar
23. For a more detailed account, see Pribylovsky, National-Patriots at the Presidential Election-2000 (Moscow: Panorama, 2000).Google Scholar
24. For more detail, see Verkhovsky, “Ne pobeda KPRF, a porazhenie kommuno-patriotov. No chto dal'she?” [Not the CPRF's Victory, but the Failure of Communist-Patriots but What is Next?], Russkaya Mysl' [Russian Thought], No. 4299, 6–12 January 2000, p. 1; also see Mikhailovskaya, Results of the Parliamentary Election-1999 for the National-Patriots (Including the Ones of Pro-empire Orientation). Drowning by Numbers (Moscow: Panorama, 2000).Google Scholar
25. Data of the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Research. For somewhat outdated but very detailed information, see Lev Gudkov, Antisemitizm v postsovetskoi Rossii//Neterpimost' v Rossii: starye I novye fobii [Anti-Semitism in the Post-Soviet Russia//Intolerance in Russia: Old and New Phobias], ed. G. Vitkovskaya and A. Malashenko (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).Google Scholar