Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 November 2018
The Crimean question developed as one of the major crises of the post-Soviet period among the two largest Slavic states of the former Soviet Union. It is an issue with several dimensions: the historical background; the case of the Crimean Tatars as an ipso facto aboriginal population deported en masse toward the end of the Second World War; the military-strategic question, with Crimea as the base for the Black Sea Fleet; economic and social developments; and the legality of the 1954 transfer of the peninsula from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) to Ukraine in 1954.
1. The Black Sea Fleet issue, for example, represents a related but complex problem that merits a separate treatment.Google Scholar
2. Tamara Tershakovec, “An interview with Crimean Tatars: We deserve our homeland back,” Ukrainian Weekly, LX (21), p. 4 (24 May 1992).Google Scholar
3. Alan W. Fisher, The Crimean Tatars (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 2.Google Scholar
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5. Ibid., p. 3.Google Scholar
6. The Crimea appears to have been absorbed into the Empire, but the evidence for this conclusion is by no means definitive. The status of the Khanate and the independence of its leaders under the Ottomans is a hotly debated historiographical issue. Ibid., pp. 8–16.Google Scholar
7. Ibid., p. 27.Google Scholar
8. Ibid., pp. 28–30; see also John Parkinson, A Tour of Russia, Siberia, and the Crimea, 1792–1794, William Collier, ed. (London, 1971), pp. 193–195, for a description of the architecture of the Khanate.Google Scholar
9. Fisher, The Crimean Tatars, pp. 49–50.Google Scholar
10. Alan W. Fisher, The Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772–1783 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 82–84.Google Scholar
11. Ibid., pp. 49–51.Google Scholar
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13. Peter J. Potichnyj, “The Struggle of The Crimean Tatars,” Canadian Slavonic Papers, 17 (2–3), p. 302 (1975). Potichnyj bases his estimate on information contained in Bol'shaia Sovietskaia Entsiklopediia, first edition, XXXV (1937), pp. 279–234. Significantly, however, Alan Fisher's estimates of Tatar emigration in this period are only one-tenth of Potichnyj's, namely, some 20,000–30,000 individuals. Fisher, The Crimean Tatars, p. 78.Google Scholar
14. Ibid., p. 303.Google Scholar
15. Fisher, The Crimean Tatars, p. 88.Google Scholar
16. Robert Conquest, The Nation Killers (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 57.Google Scholar
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21. Ibid. Google Scholar
22. A. Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, La presse et le mouvement national chez les musulmans de Russie avant 1920, (Paris, 1964), p. 141.Google Scholar
23. Fisher, The Crimean Tatars, p. 110.Google Scholar
24. Ibid. Google Scholar
25. Potichnyj, “The Struggle of The Crimean Tatars,” p. 304.Google Scholar
26. Ibid., pp. 304–305.Google Scholar
27. Edige Kirimal, Der nationale Kampf der Krimtürken (Emsdetten: Lechte, 1952), p. 282.Google Scholar
28. Fisher, The Crimean Tatars, p. 137.Google Scholar
29. Ibid., p. 138.Google Scholar
30. Edige Kirimal, “Mass deportations and Massacres in the Crimea,” Cultura Turcica 1(2), p. 256 (1964).Google Scholar
31. Ibid. Google Scholar
32. M. F. Buhay, “Deportatsiya Kryms'kykh Tatar v 1944g,” Ukrainsk'yi istorychnyi zhurnal, No. 1, p. 29 (1992).Google Scholar
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34. Ibid., pp. 32–33.Google Scholar
35. Ibid., p. 34.Google Scholar
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37. Robitnycha hazeta, p. 3, (14 February 1992).Google Scholar
38. Buhay, p. 35. The Tatars were transferred to a number of remote areas of the former USSR, including Kazakhstan, Kemerovo Oblast, Gorkov Oblast; Ivanovo Oblast, and others. Within Uzbekistan, the largest numbers were transported to Tashkent and Samarkand regions (about 87,000 persons in total). See Buhay, p. 38.Google Scholar
39. Ibid. Google Scholar
40. Potichnyj, “The Struggle of The Crimean Tatars,” p. 307. A detailed discussion of this transfer follows in the second section of this paper.Google Scholar
41. Conquest, The Nation Killers, p. 162.Google Scholar
42. Potichnyj, “The Struggle of The Crimean Tatars,” p. 308.Google Scholar
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44. Peter Reddaway, ed., Uncensored Russia: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union (New York: American Heritage Press, 1972), p. 262.Google Scholar
45. Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: Edict on Citizens of Tatar Nationality Who Lived in Crimea, 5 September 1967. Reprinted in Edward All worth, ed., Tatars of the Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), p. 145.Google Scholar
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47. Potichnyj, “The Struggle of The Crimean Tatars,” p. 310.Google Scholar
48. Ludmilla Alexeyeva, “Mustafa Jemilev, His Character and Convictions,” in Edward Allworth, ed., op. cit., pp. 57–58.Google Scholar
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50. Ibid., p. 312.Google Scholar
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52. Vardas, “The Case of The Crimean Tatars,” p. 105.Google Scholar
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54. In his memoirs Sakharov writes: “In 1971, I became interested in the tragedy of the Crimean Tatar people. On May 18, 1944, Stalin had ordered the deportation of all Tatars living in the Crimea, and since most of the younger men were in the Soviet army, it was mainly women and children, and old people who were jammed into freight cars by special KGB troops under the command of Bogdan Kobulov. Many died on their way into exile in Central Asia (they could not even be buried according to Islamic custom), and tens of thousands died of hunger and disease in the first year of exile. Nearly half the Crimean Tatar population was lost as a result of the deportation—an act of genocide.” Andrei Sakharov, Memoirs, trans. Richard Lourie (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), p. 331.Google Scholar
55. Potichnyj, “The Struggle of The Crimean Tatars,” p. 315.Google Scholar
56. Ibid. Google Scholar
57. Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (RLSB), RL 476/86, p. 11 (19 December 1986).Google Scholar
58. Ann Sheehy, “Crimean Tatars Demonstrate for Restoration of Autonomous Republic in Crimea,” RLSB, RL 305/87, p. 4 (27 July 1987).Google Scholar
59. RLSB, RL 294/87, p. 11 (24 July 1987). Other members of the committee included Gromyko's deputy, Petr Demichev, CC CPSU secretary Aleksandr Yakovlev, Ukrainian SSR Party first secretary Vladimir Shcherbitsky, and KGB chairman Viktor Chebrikov. Ann Sheehy, “Crimean Tatar Commission Works Against Background of Continuing Protests,” RLSB, RL 405/87, p. 3 (13 October 1987).Google Scholar
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61. Ann Sheehy, “Crimean Tatars Demonstrate …,” pp. 5–6.Google Scholar
62. Ibid., p. 4.Google Scholar
63. RLSB, RL 320/87, p. 2 (7 August 1987); Ann Sheehy, “Crimean Tatar Commission …,” p. 6.Google Scholar
64. See, for example, RLSB, RL 320/87, p. 7 (7 August 1987); RLSB, RL 366/87, p. 11 (11 September 1987).Google Scholar
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66. Ann Sheehy, “Crimean Tatar Commission …,” p. 4.Google Scholar
67. RLSB, RL 414/87, p. 11 (15 October 1987).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
68. RLSB, RL 108/88, p. 10 (10 March 1988).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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71. Report on the USSR, RL 570/89, v. 1:51 (13 December 1989).Google Scholar
72. Report on the USSR, RL 396/90, v. 2:38 (8 September 1990); Report on the USSR, RL 486/90, v. 2:47 (12 November 1990).Google Scholar
73. Kathleen Mihalisko, “The Other Side of Separatism: Crimea Votes for Autonomy,” Report on the USSR, v. 3:5, p. 36 (1 February 1991).Google Scholar
74. Ibid., p. 37.Google Scholar
75. Report on the USSR, RL 236/91, v. 3:26 (19 June 1991).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
76. Report on the USSR, RL 242/91, v. 3:27 (28 June 1991).Google Scholar
77. See, for example, Robitnycha hazeta, p. 3, (14 February 1992).Google Scholar
78. For a discussion of the events of 1654, see John Basarab, Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1982).Google Scholar
79. These issues are discussed in ibid. Google Scholar
80. Roman Solchanyk, “The Politics of State Building: Center-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine,” Europe-Asia Studies, 46(1), p. 50 (1994).Google Scholar
81. Ibid., and USSR State Committee of Statistics, Natsional'nyy sostav naseleniya SSSR: po dannym vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1989g (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991), p. 82.Google Scholar
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83. The Ukrainian parliamentary deputy and lawyer, Serhiy Holovaty, has pointed out the judicial discrepancies of this decree. He indicates that the first article of the February 1991 law decided to restore the Crimean ASSR within Ukraine. However, he notes one can only restore that which existed previously, and for the entire period of Ukraine's existence, it never contained within itself a Crimean autonomous republic. In 1921, the Crimean ASSR was part of Russia, which in 1945, transformed it into an oblast of Russia. The entire process, therefore, never pertained in any legal sense to Ukraine. Literaturna Ukraina, No. 19, p. 2 (5 May 1992).Google Scholar
84. Peter J. Potichnyj, “The Referendum and Presidential Elections in Ukraine,” Canadian Slavonic Papers, XXXIII(2), pp. 124–25 (June 1991).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
85. Demokratychna Ukraina, p. 1 (21 April 1992).Google Scholar
86. See David Marples, “New Calls to halt work on Crimean Nuclear Power Plant,” Report on the USSR, v. 1:6 (10 February 1989).Google Scholar
87. Molod’ Ukrainy, p. 1 (12 December 1991).Google Scholar
88. Solchanyk, p. 54.Google Scholar
89. Reported, for example, on Mayak, 1900 (20 April 1992).Google Scholar
90. This and the following comments are based on the account published in Literaturna Ukraina, No. 19 (14 May, 1993).Google Scholar
91. The two cities are about the same size—between 330,000 and 350,000 in population—and together comprise about 29% of the total population in Crimea. The third largest city, Kerch, has approximately half the population of Simferopol, i.e., 168,000. See USSR Central Statistical Administration, Narodnoe khozyaystvo SSSR v 1984g (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1985), pp. 22, 24.Google Scholar
92. By April 1992, some 250,000 signatures had been collected, which supported a plebiscite on the question: “Are you for an independent Republic of Crimea in union with other states?” Radio Ukraina, 2210 (22 April, 1992).Google Scholar
93. Literaturna Ukraina, (14 May, 1993), & ff.Google Scholar
94. This is an unfortunate phrase, coined by Erich Koch, the former Reichskommissar of Ukraine during the Nazi occupation of 1941–44. Koch had claimed that Ukrainians needed to be controlled by a combination of “vodka and the whip” and proceeded to develop a brutal occupation regime in Ukraine.Google Scholar
95. Solchanyk, p. 53.Google Scholar
96. Cited in Robitnycha hazeta, p. 2, (14 February 1992).Google Scholar
97. Ibid. Google Scholar
98. Radio Ukraina, 2150 (23 April 1992).Google Scholar
99. Radio Rossiya, 2100 (17 April 1992).Google Scholar
100. Pravda Ukrainy, p. 1 (27 May 1992). This same article also pointed out the substantial support on the peninsula for the Democratic Crimea movement, which boasted 23 parliamentary deputies in the republic, and substantial support in the cities of Yalta, Feodosiya, Kerch and the northern regions of the Crimea. The party supported the presence of Crimea within Ukraine on a federative basis, something akin to the role of Bavaria in Germany.Google Scholar
101. Radio Ukraina, 2215 (20 April 1992).Google Scholar
102. Demokratychna Ukraina, p. 1, (21 April 1992).Google Scholar
103. See Solchanyk, pp. 53–54.Google Scholar
104. Ukrinform, (22 April 1992); and Radio Ukraina, (29 April 1992).Google Scholar
105. Radio Ukraina, (29 April 1992).Google Scholar
106. Literaturna Ukraina, May 28, 1992, p. 2.Google Scholar
107. Ibid. Google Scholar
108. Pravda Ukrainy, p. 1 (27 May 1992).Google Scholar
109. Literaturna Ukraina, p. 2 (28 May 1992).Google Scholar
110. Ibid. Google Scholar
111. Izvestiya, p. 1, (13 May, 1992).Google Scholar
112. Roman Solchanyk, “The Crimean Imbroglio,” RFE/RL Research Report, 1(33), pp. 15–16 (21 August 1992). The author comments that the crisis was “defused” rather than “resolved.”Google Scholar
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114. Robitnycha hazeta, p. 1 (21 October 1993).Google Scholar
115. Holos Ukrainy, (19 October 1993).Google Scholar
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117. For example, the Tatars picketed the parliament buildings in July 1992; Radio Ukraina, 1800 and 2200, (14 July 1992). For an account of the return of Tatars to their homeland in the recent period, see Ukraina, No. 26, p. 16 (1991).Google Scholar
118. Natsiona'nyy sostav naseleniya SSSR, p. 82.Google Scholar
119. Robitnycha hazeta, p. 1 (26 October 1993).Google Scholar
120. Holos Ukrainy, p. 1(22 January 1994).Google Scholar
121. Holos Ukrainy, p. 4 (18 January 1994).Google Scholar
122. Uryadovyi kur'yer, No. 19–20, p. 1 (3 February, 1994); and The Ukrainian Weekly, p. 2 (6 February 1994). For a detailed account of these events, see Roman Solchanyk, “Presidential elections and continuing tensions in Crimea,” The Ukrainian Weekly, p. 2 (27 March 1994).Google Scholar
123. Visti z Ukrainy, No. 5, p. 1 (27 January-2 February 1994).Google Scholar
124. Respublika (1 February 1994).Google Scholar
125. For a detailed breakdown of the various factions in the Ukrainian parliament, see Holos Ukrainy, pp. 3–4 (12 July, 1994); and the thoughtful analysis by Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, “The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections,” RFE/RL Research Report, 3(26), pp. 6–17 (1 July 1994).Google Scholar