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Pamyat's Political Platform: Myth and Reality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

Paul Midford*
Affiliation:
Institute for East-West Security Studies

Extract

The Patriotic Front Pamyat has received a name recognition and notoriety in the Soviet and western academic literature and press which is unrivaled to this day by any other Russian nationalist organization. The vast majority of observers view Pamyat as a neo-fascist or neo-Stalinist movement. This view of Pamyat is often reenforced by drawing links between the Front and conservatives in the Party and bureaucracy. Thus, many see Pamyat either as a vehicle for conservative reaction from “above” or as a manifestation from “below” of a significant segment of the Russian population opposed to the decentralizing, liberalizing, and westernizing tendencies of perestroika. More often than not, Pamyat is viewed as both.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1991 by the Association for the Study of the Nationalities of the USSR and Eastern Europe, Inc. 

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References

Notes

1. Fascism is herein defined as the glorification of the state as the highest form of human expression. Fascism is often, though it is not always, accompanied by anti-semitism. Stalinism is defined to mean those who favor a highly centralized command economy, collectivization of agriculture, and repression of religion in favor of a secular religion glorifying the state. These two terms, since they both, in some measure, refer to so-called “totalitarian” systems, have a lot in common. Indeed, given the current climate of the Soviet debate on Stalin, when Stalin is explicitly compared with Hitler, it's hardly surprising that fascism and Stalinism are seen as quite similar. Concerning the definition of fascism, see David Miller et al., eds., The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought, New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987, p. 150.Google Scholar

2. See Julia Wishnevsky, “Ligachev, the Writers' Union, and Pamyat”, Radio Liberty (RL), Report On The USSR, and Evgenii Evtushenko, “False Alarm”, Moscow News, no. 6, 1989, p. 6.Google Scholar

3. See John Dunlop, “The Contemporary Russian Nationalist Spectrum,” RL Special Edition, December 19, 1988.Google Scholar

4. A word about sources. In addition to the usual Western and Soviet secondary sources, this study will draw on several original sources, including Pamyat publications, an interview I conducted with a Pamyat member, and a reprinted transcript of a 1985 meeting. Two Pamyat publications, Declaration of The Patriotic Association Pamyat Concerning the Beginning of a Political Hunger Strike In Protest of The Slanderous Persecution of Its Members, (henceforth to be known as “Hunger Strike”), which was published March 9, 1988, in Moscow and has never been cited by a western source before; and “Appeal of the Patriotic Association Pamyat in Connection with the Current Slander Campaigns In Answer To ‘The Appeal of the Appeal of the Patriotic Association Pamyat to the Russian People, to Patriots of All Countries and Nations’,”(hereafter cited as “Answer”) which was published on February 1, 1988 (and cited twice in the West since then), signed by the eight members of the Pamyat Council and written by Dmitrii Vasiliev, were personally obtained by the author from a Pamyat member during a visit to Moscow in 1988. A third document, “Appeal of the Patriotic Association Pamyat to the Russian People And To the Patriots of All Countries and Nations,” (hereafter cited as “Appeal” and also written by Dmitrii Vasiliev, was reprinted in the Western publication Arkhiv Samizdata. Finally, this author has more recently obtained from Arkhiv Samizdata a special edition of the journal Merkurii, number 17, dated December 1988, in Leningrad. This edition contains a stenogram of Pamyat's meetings in the Rumiantsev gardens in the summer of 1988, and an interview with Dmitrii Vasiliev by one Ia. Evglovskii. This author would like to take this opportunity to thank Arkhiv Samizdata for their great help in obtaining and recopying this issue of Merkurii. Google Scholar

5. Since Pamyat's leaders appear to have been closet monarchists all along, this development perhaps marks the end of Pamyat's evolution. See John Dunlop, “A Conversation with Dmitrii Vasiliev, the Leader of Pamyat”, Report on the USSR, December 15, 1989, pp. 12–16.Google Scholar

6. For details, see Julia Wishnevsky, “The Origins of Pamyat”, Survey, October 1988, p. 80.Google Scholar

7. In addition to Vasiliev's Pamyat', Dunlop identifies one lead by Igor Sychev, another (also known as Patriot) in Leningrad lead by Aleksandr Romanenko, and, finally, another Leningrad group lead by Iurii Riverov. See Dunlop, “Dmitrii Vasiliev, p. 13. One other group not mentioned by Dunlop is a Moscow society lead by the now infamous Smirnov-Otashvili, which is widely believed to have been responsible for the attack on the Moscow Writers'meeting in January 1990.Google Scholar

8. Concerning the views of Soviet journalists who belong to and study Soviet grass root political movements (Neformaly), see Informatsionnoe Agentstvo, SMOT, “Informatsionnyi biulleten”' (Information Bulletin), no. 7, June 1988, Arkhiv Samizdata 6300, part II, pp. 44–45.Google Scholar

9. “Appeal,” p. 14. Underlining in original.Google Scholar

10. See Izvestiia, “Nechistaia Igra Na Chistikh Chustvakh” (A Dirty Play on Pure Feelings) August 14, 1988, p. 6. Also, Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP), vol. XL, no. 33, (1988), p. 7–8. Also see Daugava (a Russian language literary journal in Latvia), no. 2, 1989, p. 82–91, as cited by Julia Wishnevsky, “Soviet Media Sound Alarm over Anti-Semitism”, Report on the USSR, March 3, 1989, p. 7. In the later article, Latvians are blamed along with Jews for the murder of Tsar Nicholas II.Google Scholar

11. This conclusion, which is based upon my own survey of Pamyat's literature, is supported by Gleb Anishchenko, “Who is Guilty?, Glasnost, no. 15, 1989, p. 57.Google Scholar

12. “Answer”, p. 3. At the Summer 1988 Rumiantsev Garden meetings in Leningrad it was stated that “even Russians” could be Zionists. Merkurii, Rumiantsev Meeting.Google Scholar

13. See W. Korey, “The Pamyat Phenomenon,” Present Tense, no. 36, January-February 1988, p. 37. Also, see Hunger Strike, p. 2, in which Trotsky is referred to as “Judas Trotsky”, whereas, Zinoviev, it is said, “despised' Slavophile Rus”. See “Demonstratsiia 6 Maia 1987” AS no. 5975, p. 2 (in which Kaganovich is described as a “butcher”); E. Losoto, “In a Frenzy of Forgetfulness—Where the Leaders of the So-Called Memory Association are Leading,” Komsomolskaia Pravda, May 22, 1987, translated in CDSP, Vol. XXXIX, no. 21, June 24, 1987, p, 3; Gary Lee, “Gorbachev's Dead Rival,” Washington Post, p, A18, May 17, 1988. Also targeted according to Korey, is Yemelian Iaroslavskii, an early Stalin aide who headed the Organization of Militant Atheists.Google Scholar

14. See Merkurii, Vasiliev interview; “Vnimanie: Opasnost” (Attention: Danger!), Kontinent, no. 50, 1986, p. 224, which is the text of a speech by Vasiliev to a December, 1985 meeting of “Pamyat” at the Gorbunov House of Culture in Moscow. See also Wishnevsky, “Origins, p. 80; and Adrian Karatnycky, 'The Secret of Pamyat's Success”, Wall Street Journal, April 3, 1989, p. 15.Google Scholar

15. Merkurii, Vasiliev interview.Google Scholar

16. “Answer”, p. 7. Also undermining the claim that Pamyat is not antisemitic is Vasiliev's Merkurii interview, in which the Pamyat leader claims further that the origins of Judaism are tainted by “betrayal” against their own God.Google Scholar

17. Several spin-off groups have, however, both advocated and committed acts of violence.Google Scholar

18. Apartheid is here defined, in a way which broadly parallels Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, as a policy of strict separation of racial or ethnic groups and discrimination of one or more groups by a politically dominant one. See the 1983 edition, p. 84.Google Scholar

19. The Leningrad summer meetings are the only time Pamyat has been known to have taken this position. See “Still Horrified,” Moscow News, no. 32, p. 2, Also, Wishnevsky, “Origins, p. 83; The Boston Globe, August 6, 1988. p. 17, The New York Times, August 15, 1988, p, A13, and The Washington Post, August 14, 1988, p. A13.Google Scholar

20. See Ibid, Moscow News, New York Times, The Washington Post, and Izvestiia, “Nechistaia”; and The Los Angeles Times, August 14, 1988, p. 2.Google Scholar

21. Concerning these analogies, see The Christian Science Monitor, June 18, 1987, p. A1; Ibid., Moscow News, Izvestiia, and CDSP; Anotolii Golovkov, Aleksei Pavlov, “O chem Shumite Vy“ (What are You Making so Much Noise About?), Ogonek, no. 21, 1987, pp, 4–5 ¡ G. Alimov, R. Lynev, ”Kuda Pamyat 'Vedet” (Where is Memory Leading?), Izvestiia, June 3, 1987, p. 3, For abbreviated translations of both the Ogonek and Izvestiia articles, see CDSP, vol. XXXIX, no. 21, 1987, pp. 4–7, 27.Google Scholar

22. Vasiliev, in an interview with Gary Lee, of the Washington Post, explicitly denied that Pamyat supported the recent upswing in antisemitic activity, or those who were calling for a pogrom to coincide with the millennium of Christian Rus. See Gary Lee, “Gorbachev's Dead Rival,” Washington Post, May 17, 1988, p. A18. The public reading of Jewish sounding surnames at meetings in Leningrad in July 1988, with an accompanying claim that, “we know where they live”, is the closest that Pamyat has come. The purpose of these readings, however, seems to be aimed at intimidation of those listed rather than incitement to violence. See Izvestiia, “Nechistaia”. At one of these July, 1988 meetings, a speaker is also reported to have said, “It's time to shift to guerilla actions.” This statement is rhetorical and directed at more targets than Jews alone.Google Scholar

23. See Moscow News, “Still Horrified”.Google Scholar

24. See Los Angeles Times, June 12, 1988, p. 12; and New York Times, May 31, 1988, p. 16. Also see Alexander Yanov, “Russian Nationalism as the Ideology of Counterreform,” RL Special Edition, p. 47 & note 14. In addition, many of the Pamyat spinoffs mentioned earlier do openly advocated violence.Google Scholar

25. See Izvestiia, “Nechistaia”; Moscow News, “Still Horrified”; Los Angeles Times, August 14, 1988, p. 2; New York Times, August 15, 1988, p. 17; The Boston Globe, August 6, 1988, p. 17. The Washington Post, August 14, 1988, p. A13; The Washington Post article erroneously cited the Izvestiia and Moscow News stories as saying the marriage restrictions and deportations would apply only to Jews.Google Scholar

26. Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, 2nd. ed., Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953, pp, 87–88, Deutsch defines a “society” as “a group of individuals made interdependent by the division of labor, the production and distribution of goods and services…a society refers to a group of people who have learned to work together”. A “community” or “culture” is defined by Deutsch as “based upon an invisible conf iguration of values, Positive elements, and taboos are two parts of this.” He argues that culture is like a sieve which historically created selective processes which channel men's reactions both to internal and external stimuli, insofar as a common culture facilitates communication, it forms a community.”Google Scholar

27. See Essays on Nationalism, pp. 93–125.Google Scholar

28. “Appeal”, p. 13. Original spacing and capitalization.Google Scholar

29. Merkurii, Rumiantsev.Google Scholar

30. “Appeal,” p. 16. Also suggestive of Pamyat's and Russia's special place in the world are the addresses of the “Appeal” (in order): “To the Russian People, and To All Countries and Nations.” Some western accounts claim that Pamyat explicitly places the Russian nation and the Slavic peoples above all others. See Los Angeles Times, June 12, 1988, p. 12.Google Scholar

31. “Answer,” p. 2.Google Scholar

32. “Appeal,” p. 15. On p. 7 of the “Appeal,” Pamyat credits the “folk wisdom” of all peoples, as “the secrets of the future”.Google Scholar

33. “Appeal,” p. 14.Google Scholar

34. See “Appeal,” “Answer,” and Wishnevsky, “‘Origins,’” p. 91.Google Scholar

35. “Appeal,” p. 15.Google Scholar

36. “Appeal,” p. 2. Also see, Antero Pietilla, Baltimore Sun, January 10, 1988, p. 2A. The concept of Socialist patriotism is also faulted for having destroyed the sense of Russian self-awareness. See Merkurii, Rumiantsev.Google Scholar

37. “Answer,” p. 3; Moscow News, “Still Horrified”. Also see Wishnevsky, “Origins,” p. 83.Google Scholar

38. “Appeal,” p. 3; Pietilla, Baltimore Sun. Google Scholar

39. “Answer,” p. 5; “Appeal,” p. 3; Also see Paul Midford, “Soviet Glasnost Fuels a Virulent Anti-West Voice,” Los Angeles Times, October 23, 1988, pp. V2, V6.Google Scholar

40. “Appeal,” p. 8. The destruction of rural architecture is denounced by Vasiliev in “Danger,” Kontinent, p. 216.Google Scholar

41. “Appeal,” p. 8.Google Scholar

42. This analogy has also been made by Franz Kossler, an Austrian journalist, who has interviewed Vasiliev. According to Kossler, the Green movement in Austria is also a right-wing movement. See Kossler's interview with Moscow News, “Shadows Off Screen,” no. 7, 1988, p. 4.Google Scholar

43. See Vladimir Sumovskii, “Understanding Pamyat,” Moscow News, no. 8, 1988, p. 4.Google Scholar

44. “Answer,” p. 3.Google Scholar

45. See Golovkov and Pavlov, Ogonek. Also see Anishchenko, p. 57.Google Scholar

46. “Appeal,” p. 3. Pietilla, Baltimore Sun. Google Scholar

47. “Answer,” p. 3, and see Midford, Los Angeles Times. Also see Paul Quinn-Judge, Christian Science Monitor, September 28, 1987, p. 11, which includes an interview with Vasiliev, in which collectivization was directly cited as the “first blow” against agriculture.Google Scholar

48. “Appeal,” p. 8.Google Scholar

49. “Appeal,” pp. 12–13.Google Scholar

50. “Appeal,” p. 13.Google Scholar

51. Revisionism as here used is meant to denote a reinterpretation of history which directly challenges the prevailing orthodox interpretation. The only major difference with the liberal interpretation is that Pamyat's version prominently includes Jews among those who are to be blamed.Google Scholar

52. See Michael Dobbs, “Russians Debate Stalin and Democracy,” International Herald Tribune, March 7, 1989. This is also suggested by Esther Fein, New York Times, February 27, 1989, p. A3; and by Felicity Barringer, “Russian Nationalists Test Gorbachev,” New York Times, May 24, 1987, p. 10. Also see Golovkov and Pavlov, Ogonek and Evgenii Evtushenko, “False Alarm,” Moscow News, no. 6, 1989, p.6.Google Scholar

53. Anishchenko, p. 57, has made a very similar observation. One segment of the organization was reported, at least as of 1987, to directly accuse Stalin of being a “contemptible marionette”. See Russkaia Mysl', July 31, 1987, p. 7.Google Scholar

54. “Answer,” p. 3. Hunger Strike, p. 2, claims the “extermination of a huge number of people.” In the “Appeal,” pp. 3–4, reference is made to “millions of human lives, seas and rivers of blood,” which, it is claimed, are the result of the entire 70 year Soviet period. In February 1988, when “Answer” was published, Soviet estimates on the number who perished varied, but were still quite conservative.Google Scholar

55. See Daugava, no. 2, 1989, pp. 82–91, as cited by Julia Wishnevsky, “Soviet Media Sound Alarm over Anti-Semitism,” Report on the USSR, March 3, 1989, p. 7. This position is in sharp contrast with that taken by current neo-Stalinists. In fact, the neo-Stalinist journal Molodaia Gvardiia ran an article in August, 1990 which defended the 1937–38 Tukhachevskii trial and the associated purge of 40, 000 officers from the military leadership. See RFE/RL Daily Report, September 7, 1990, p. 7Google Scholar

56. See Losoto, and G. Alimov and R. Lynev, Izvestiia, June 3, 1987, p. 3.Google Scholar

57. Russkaia mysl', July 31, 1987, p. 7.Google Scholar

58. “Appeal,” p. 16.Google Scholar

59. Most of Vladimir Ilyich's comrades, however, were part of the evil “Conspiracy”. See Korey, p. 37; Losoto; Lee, Washington Post. Google Scholar

60. See Moscow News, “Still Horrified,” and Izvestiia, “Nechistaia”. Yet, as recently as February 1, 1988, “Answer,” quoting “Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza” (History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) adhered to the Party's condemnation of the Black Hundreds. Pamyat is also known to have adopted St. George the Victorious as its symbol–also the symbol of the Black Hundreds. See Evtushenko, “False Alarm”. This author's encounters with Pamyat members is consistent with these reports. Many Pamyat members wore pins of St. George slaying the serpent, with a star of David etched onto the serpent.Google Scholar

61. Izvestiia, “Nechistaia”. The rehabilitation of the Hundreds contradicts Alexander Yanov's earlier observation that Russian right-wing/messianic movements conceal their ideological roots. See Alexander Yanov, The Russian Challenge and The Year 2000, New York: Basil Blackwell, p. 54.Google Scholar

62. See Karatnycky, “The Secret of Pamyat's Success.”Google Scholar

63. Put another way, if we are unwilling to take self-proclaimed democrats at face value, why should we treat self-proclaimed fascists any differently?Google Scholar

64. “Answer,” p. 3.Google Scholar

65. “Appeal,” pp. 2–3, and Pietilla, Baltimore Sun. Pamyat's anti-Soviet orientation is symbolized by a report in the Soviet press that the Association views the hammer and sickle and the five-pointed star are masonic symbols. See Andrei Cherkizov, Sovetskaia Kul'tura, June 18, 1987, and CDSP, vol. XXXIX, no. 30, 1987, p. 7.Google Scholar

66. See Korey, p. 37, and “Demonstratsiia,” p. 12.Google Scholar

67. See Lee, Washington Post. Google Scholar

68. See “Answer,” pp. 2, 7–8; “Appeal,” p. 5; Pietilla, Baltimore Sun, pp. A1–A2; Lee, Washington Post; Quinn-Judge, Christian Science Monitor, p. 1, 11.Google Scholar

69. See “Demonstratsiia,” p. 2; Daugava; and Wishnevsky, “Alarm”.Google Scholar

70. See “Appeal””, pp. 8–9, “Answer,” pp. 1–2, Indeed, Pamyat's negation of the press in the Soviet period is complete: “Never in the days of repression, the cult of personality, volunteerism, and ‘stagnation’, was the press, radio, or television TRUTHFUL!”Google Scholar

71. See Losoto; Alimov and Lynev. Pamyat has also charged that the entire Main Department for Architecture and Planning in Moscow is a tool of “the main enemy of ancient Russian architecture…international Zionism.” See Korey, p. 37.Google Scholar

72. “Appeal,” p. 7.Google Scholar

73. See Julia Wishnevsky, “The Emergence of Pamyat and Otechestvo,” RL 342/87; Wishnevsky, “Soviet Newspaper Expresses Concern Over Russian Nationalist Gathering In Leningrad,” RL 485/87, p. 7; and Anishchenko, pp. 58–59. Anishchenko, however, questions the sincerity of the Association's praise for Lenin.Google Scholar

74. “Answer,” p, 3.Google Scholar

75. One report to the contrary comes from Paul Quinn-Judge, of the Christian Science Monitor, who reported being approached by a self-proclaimed leader of Pamyat. This “leader” described Gorbachev as “a tool of the Jews” See Quinn Judge, Christian Science Monitor, p. 13.Google Scholar

76. See Russkaia mysl', July 31, 1987, p. 7.Google Scholar

77. Merkurii, Vasiliev interview.Google Scholar

78. Merkurii, Rumiantsev.Google Scholar

79. Ibid.Google Scholar

80. See Dobbs, International Herald Tribune, which is the clearest expression of this phenomenon. Also see Fein, New York Times. Even if some members of Pamyat ‘continue to worship Stalin the man, these people cannot properly be called Stalinist as long as they, like Pamyat itself, continue to reject virtually all of Stalin's policies.Google Scholar

81. See Daugava, and Wishnevsky, “Alarm,” p. 8. According to this article, Pamyat leaders also claimed that both Tsar Nicholas II and Lenin had been murdered by the “Conspiracy”.Google Scholar

82. See Alimov and Lunev; and Russkaya Mysl', July 31, 1987, p. 7Google Scholar

83. See Philip Pomper, The Russian Revolutionary Intelligentsia, p. 124; also see Geroid Tanquary Robinson, Rural Russia Under the Old Regime, University of California Press, 2nd. edition, 1960, p. 50.Google Scholar

84. See for example, Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985, p. 58, who provides a compelling description of the this phenomenon.Google Scholar

85. Pamyat also has a very negative view of cultural policy in the '20s, arguing that there was a “pogrom” against Russian national culture. See, “Vnimanie, Kontinent, pp. 216–218.Google Scholar

86. See, Anishchenko, p. 58, as does Informatsionnoe Agentstvo, SMOT, “Informatsionyi biulleten',” no. 7, June 1988, AC, 6300, part II, pp. 44–45.Google Scholar

87. “Appeal,” p. 8.Google Scholar

88. “Appeal”“, p. 4; “Answer,” p. 3.Google Scholar

89. “Appeal,” p. 8.Google Scholar

90. Russkaya mysl', July 31, 1987, p.7.Google Scholar

91. “Appeal,” pp. 12–13.Google Scholar

92. Merkurii, Rumiantsev, p. 9.Google Scholar

93. See “Nechistaia,” Izvestiia. Google Scholar

94. According to one Soviet press account, this same demand is carried in a “draft charter” of the Association. See Alimov and Lynev, Izvestiia, p. 3.Google Scholar

95. “Appeal,” p. 12; “Answer”, p. 8.Google Scholar

96. “Appeal,” p. 12. Emphasis in the original.Google Scholar

97. See Pravda, August 27, 1987, p. 2; Izvestiia, August 28, 1987; as translated in CDSP, vol. XXXIX, no. 34, 1987, pp. 13–15, 24.Google Scholar

98. Ibid. Also see Celestine Bohlen, “Two Politburo Members Criticize Openness in Soviet Culture, Washington Post, September 29, 1987, pp. A13, A15. On Ligachev's views more recently see Pravda, February 9, 1989 Christian Science Monitor, February 22, 1989, and Julia Wishnevsky, “Ligachev, Pamyat and Conservative Writers,” Report on the USSR, p. 12.Google Scholar

99. Bohlen.Google Scholar

100. Ibid.Google Scholar

101. Pravda, August 27, 1987, p. 2; Izvestiia, August 28, 1987; as translated in CDSP, vol. XXXIX, no. 34, 1987, pp. 13–15, 24.Google Scholar

102. See Pravda, September 11, 1987, p. 3; Izvestiia, September 12, 1987, p. 2, as translated in CDSP, Vol. XXXIX, no. 37, pp. 78, 24. Also see Bohlen.Google Scholar

103. For this passage, see FBIS-Soviet Union, March 16, 1988, p.53Google Scholar

104. See Nina Andreeva, “I Can't Forego Principles,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, March 13, 1988, p. 3, and CDSP, vol. XL, no. 13, pp. 1–5, For a similar interpretation of Andreeva's letter, see John B, Dunlop, “The Contemporary Russian Nationalist Spectrum,” RL Special Edition, December 19, 1988, pp. 8–9.Google Scholar

105. See Julia Wishnevsky, “Nash sovremennik Provides Focus for ‘Opposition Party’” Report on the USSR, vol, 1, no. 3, p. 4.Google Scholar

106. See Julia Wishnevsky, “Reactionaries Tighten Their Hold On the Writers'Union,” RL, 148/88, p. 4.Google Scholar

107. See Molodaia gvardiia, no. 7, 1987, pp. 227–28, as cited in Julia Wishnevsky, “Molodaia gvardiia: A Leading Voice of Opposition To Restructuring,” RL, 1/88, p. 3.Google Scholar

108. See Ibid.; Wishnevsky, “Opposition Party,” pp. 4–5.Google Scholar

109. See a review of the writings of Anatolii Salutsky, Literaturnoe obozrenie, no. 8, 1988, p. 93, and Wishnevsky, “Molodaia gvardiia,” p. 3. Salutskii was one of the main speakers at a December 1988 plenum meeting of the Union.Google Scholar

110. Concerning adherence to the Zionist-Masonic conspiracy theory, see Julia Wishnevsky, “Nash sovremennik Talks To Soviet TV Viewers,” RL 346/88, p. 2; Wishnevsky, “Molodaia gvardiia,” pp. 7–8; Wishnevsky, Survey; and Wishnevsky, “Opposition,” pp. 3–5. At Writers' Union plenums in Ryazan and Moscow in October and December respectively, several speakers, some prominent, advanced theories that the Soviet western press were part of a world wide conspiracy because of their common stand concerning Russian nationalism, that new joint-venture reforms were threatening to turn the USSR into a natural resources colony, and that the Black Hundreds should be rehabilitated. All three ideas were first circulated by Pamyat.Google Scholar

111. See note 4.Google Scholar

112. Late July 1988, in Moscow.Google Scholar

113. See Lee, Washington Post; Midford; Karatnycky; and Informatsionnoe Agentstvo, SMOT, Informatsionnyi biulleten', no. 7, June 1988, Arkhiv Samizdata 6300, part II, pp. 44–45. Also see the Moscow News interview with Franz Kossler, p. 5. Kossler, an Austrian television journalist who had recently interviewed Vasiliev, quoted only 30 chapters outside of Moscow, as does SMOT, whereas Karatnycky cites only 20 chapters.Google Scholar

114. See Russkaia mysl', November 21, 1987; Cherkizov, Sovetskaia kul'tura. Also see Sovetskaia kul'tura, July 23, 1987; and Komsomolskaia Pravda, June 24, 1987, as cited by Wishnevsky, Survey, p. 84.Google Scholar

115. For a comparison of the two organizations, see Wishnevsky, Survey, pp. 84–85.Google Scholar

116. The infamous Valerii Yemelianov is one example. See below.Google Scholar

117. See Izvestiia, July 15, 1987, p. 3, as translated in CDSP, no. 30, 1987, p. 8. Although only identified as K. Smirnov, he appears to be no other than the infamous Konstantin Otashvili-Smirnov, who later broke off from Vasiliev's Pamyat, and founded his own chapter. It was Otashvili-Smirnov's chapter which was responsible for the attack on the Moscow Writers'Meeting in January 1990. Otashvili-Smirnov's trial on spreading inter-ethnic hatred over the summer of 1990 made international headlines.Google Scholar

118. See Cherkizov, Sovetskaia kul'tura. On the topic of worker participation more generally, see, Komsomolskaia pravda. A. V. Krupenin, listed as a war veteran, worker, and party member since 1941, in a letter to the editor, says he observed that a Pamyat meeting he attended was noticeably lacking in workers. These facts seem to refute the claim of Michael Dobbs, that most of the movement's support comes from workers frustrated by declining living standards. See Dobbs, International Herald Tribune. Google Scholar

119. See Wishnevsky, “The Emergence of Pamyat,” RL 342/87, “Appendix”.Google Scholar

120. See Losoto. On Gladkov's record in this regard also see Ibid., Wishnevsky.Google Scholar

121. See Russkaya mysl', July 31, 1987, and Ibid., Wishnevsky.Google Scholar

122. See Karatnycky.Google Scholar

123. See Darrell P. Hammer, “Glasnost and The Russian Idea”' RL Special Edition, December 19, 1988, p. 19, especially note 51.Google Scholar

124. Ibid., note 51.Google Scholar

125. At one Association meeting, Vasiliev, after condemning the opening of a bar and grill in a former church, added that he didn't even know what a grill was, See Golovkov and Pavlov, Ogonek. Google Scholar

126. “Appeal,” p, 7, Though Vasiliev's poor command of Russian grammar and syntax is reknown, and reflected in the “Appeal,” he accuses most propagandists and journalists of cliche ridden language which lacks poetry or vividness.Google Scholar

127. See Golovkov and Pavlov, Ogonek. Google Scholar

128. See Sovetskii voin, no. 6, 1988, pp. 14–16, as cited in Julia Wishnevsky, “Conflict Between the Military and the Intelligentsia,” RL 372/88, p. 3.Google Scholar

129. See Nedelia, no. 13, pp. 8–9; no. 15, pp. 10–11, 1988; as cited in Wishnevsky, “Conflict,” pp. 3–4.Google Scholar

130. See “Demonstratsiia, p. 2, and Wishnevsky, “Emergence, p. 15.Google Scholar

131. Ibid., “Demonstratsiia.”Google Scholar

132. Ibid., and also Wishnevsky, “Emergence,” p. 15.Google Scholar

133. Ibid. “Demonstratsiia”.Google Scholar

134. See Literaturnaia gazeta, no. 32, 1988, p. 2; and Wishnevsky, Survey, p. 82. More recently, Riverov apparently left Vasiliev's Pamyat to form his own chapter. See Dunlop, p. 13.Google Scholar

135. See “Demonstratsiia, p. 4; Russkaia mysl', July 31, 1987; Yanov, Challenge, pp. 256–258; Wishnevsky, Survey, pp. 9091, and Wishnevsky, “Emergence,” p. 14.Google Scholar

136. Ibid., “Demonstratsiia,” p. 3, 137.Google Scholar

137. See Ibid; Hammer, p. 19. Yemelianov has since founded his own society, Rus, for pursuing his pagan inclinations.Google Scholar

138. See Losoto, note 15. Losoto's own theory is that Pamyat's members are comparable to the frustrated petite bourgeoisie who are trying to use nationalism to promote upward mobility.Google Scholar

139. Hunger Strike, p, 1, 140. “Appeal,” p. 8.Google Scholar

140. Ibid.Google Scholar

141. “Appeal,” p. 15.Google Scholar

142. See “Danger, Kontinent, p. 223. When it was pointed out to Vasiliev that this claim could only be true if practically every Jewish man, woman, and child was a professional, Vasiliev retorted that there are in reality 7 million Jews in the USSR, not the two million claimed by Soviet census statistics. Indeed, he claimed that there were two million Jews in Moscow alone. According to Vasiliev, “Jews are everywhere,” Merkurii, Vasiliev interview.Google Scholar

143. Julia Wishnevsky, “Reactionaries Tighten Their Hold On The Writers'Union, RL 148/88, March 28, 1988, p. 6; and Wishnevsky, “Opposition, p. 4.Google Scholar

144. See Natalia Ilyina in Ogonek, no. 2, 1988, pp. 23–26; and Julia Wishnevsky, Ogonek Exposes Corruption in Literature, RL 40/88. On the provincial writers, see Wishnevsky, “Opposition,” pp. 1–6. On the “village writers, see Wishnevsky, “Korotich under Fire,” Report on the USSR, February 3, 1989, pp. 21–22.Google Scholar

145. See Wishnevsky, “Opposition.”Google Scholar

146. It is important to note, however, that there are some segments of the conservative nationalist coalition which controls both the Writers'Union and Nash sovremennik, including some prominent nationalist writers who tend to take a rather antiSoviet stance quite similar to Pamyat's, See Dunlop, pp. 6–8.Google Scholar

147. Merkurii, Vasiliev interview.Google Scholar

148. The zealousness with which Russian monuments were desecrated in the '20s and '30s and the strong aversion the Soviet state has expressed in the past to any expression of nationalism are other symptoms.Google Scholar

149. At the Rumiantsev meetings, Pamyat leader Victor Antonov blamed socialist patriotism for having destroyed Russian national consciousness. Merkurii, Rumiantsev.Google Scholar

150. Concerning the KGB see Wishnevsky, Survey, p. 87; and Midford. For the Leningrad party leadership, see “Nechistaia, Izvestiia. About the presence of Interior Ministry Officials at a recent Pamyat rally, see “Understanding, Moscow News. Google Scholar

151. In support of this view, see Kossler, Moscow News, and Dunlop. For an opposing view see Yanov “Counterreform”, and more generally, Yanov, Challenge. On differing tendencies in the Russian right just before perestroika, see John Dunlop, The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism, Princeton University Press, 1984, particularly his definitions of “National Bolshevism” and “vozrozhdentsy,” or “renaissancers”. On fascism, see Miller, The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought. Google Scholar

152. See Andrej Wallicki, The Slavophile Controversy, London: Oxford University Press, 1975, especially pp. 156–157. The central place of religion in Pamyat's platform also sets it aside from fascism, which views organized religion as, at best, a national symbol.Google Scholar