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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 November 2018
* This paper was prepared for the 1978 AAASS National convention in Columbus, Ohio.Google Scholar
1. For a more detailed discussion of the nationality problem see: Stanisław Potocki's Poiozenie mniejszości niemieckiej w Polsce 1918-1939 (Gdansk, 1969); John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945 (New York, 1963); Stephan M. Horak, Poland and Her National Minorities, 1919-39 (New York, 1961); Rudolf Laun's “Nationalitaetenfrage einschliesslich des Minderheitsrecht”, Strupps Woerterbuch des Voelkerrechts un der Diplomatie, vol. 2 (Hamburg, 1949); C. G. Bruns, Gesammelte Schriften zur Minderheitenfrage (Berlin, 1933). For a German perspective of the minority issue see: Theodor Bierschenk, Die deutsche Volksgruppe in Polen, 1934-1939 (Kitzingen on Main, 1954); Richard Breyer, Das deutsche Reich and Polen, 1932-1937. Aussenpolitik und Volksgruppenfragen (Wuerzburg, 1955); and Otto Heike, Das Deutschtum in Polen, 1918-1939 (Bonn, 1955). For further discussions of German-Polish diplomatic relations, see especially the following: Josef Korbel, Poland between East and West: Polish-Soviet and Polish-German Relations, 1919-1933 (Princeton, 1964); Jerzy Krasuski, Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1918-1925 (Poznan, 1962); Harald von Riekhoff, German-Polish Relations, 1918-1933 (Baltimore, 1971); Hans Roos, Polen und Europa, Studien zur polnischen Aussenpolitik, 1931-1939, 2nd Ed. (Tuebingen, 1965); and Marian Wojciechowski, Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1933-1938 (Poznan, 1965).Google Scholar
2. Data taken from the May Rocznik Statystyczny (Warsaw, 1922) which incorporated the findings of the 1921 census.Google Scholar
3. For more discussion see especially the following: Werner Markert, ed., Polen. Osteuropa-Handbuch, Arbeitsgemeinschaft fuer Osteuropaforschung, (Cologne and Graz, 1959); Ludwig Bernard, Die Polenfrage. Der Nationalitaetenkampf der Polen (Munich and Leipzig, 1920); Herbert Truhart, Voelkerbund und Minderheitenpetitionen (Leipzig, 1931); Friedrich Lange, Volksdeutsche Kartenskizzen (Berlin, 1934); S. Horak, Poland and Her National Minorities; G. E. Simpson and J. M. Yinger, Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination (New York, 1965); and a good account of Poland's problems with the minorities question in international affairs, Włodzimierz Michowicz's Polska wobec traktatu i procedury miniejszościowej w Latach 1920-1934 (Łódź, 1960).Google Scholar
4. See Mornik, Stanislaus, Polens Kampf gegen seine nichtpolnische Volksgruppen (Berlin-Leipzig, 1931); and Karl Trampler's Die Krise des Nationalstaates, Das Nationalitaetenproblem im neuen Europa (Munich, 1932).Google Scholar
5. Barandon, Paul, “Der Vertrag von Versailles in seiner Bedeutung fuer Deutschlands Osten und die Nachbarstaaten”, Das oestliche Deutschland. Handbuch, Ein, ed. the Goettinger Arbeitskreis (Goettingen, 1959) pp. 429-74.Google Scholar
6. Horak, , Poland and Her National Minorities, pp. 62–63; For further discussion see Max Rosenfeld, Die polnische Judenfrage (Vienna, 1918); Simon Segal, The New Poland and the Jews (New York, 1938); B. Midezinski's Uwagi o sprawie źydowskiej (Warsaw, 1938); E. D. Wynot, “‘A Necessary Cruelty’; The Emergence of Official Anti-Semitism in Poland, 1936-1939,” American Historical Review 76 (1971): 1035-58; and Celia Heher, On the Edge of Destruction: Jews of Poland between the Two World Wars (New York, 1977).Google Scholar
7. League of Nations Publication, Geneva, 1927, C.L. 110. I Annexe.Google Scholar
8. It should be noted that 285 members of the Sejm voted in favor of ratifying the Minorities Treaty while 11 were opposed to it. For more detail see, Horak, Poland and Her National Minorities, pp. 61-79 and 213-17.Google Scholar
9. Reprinted in the League of Nations publication C.8. M. 5. 193 I. For more detail see H. V. Temperley, ed. A History of the Paris Peace Conference, 5 (London, 1924): 432-37.Google Scholar
10. Wynot, Edward D. Jr., “The Polish Germans, 1919-1939. National Minority in a Multinational State,” The Polish Review, 17 (1971): 4–5.Google Scholar
11. Komarnicki, Tadeusz, The Rebirth of the Polish Republic (London, 1957) p. 296.Google Scholar
12. Information taken from Antony Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland 1921-1939 (Oxford, 1972) pp. 43–52; and Das oestliche Deutschland, pp. 485-92.Google Scholar
13. Kraus, Herbert and Roediger, Gustav, Urkunden zum Friedensvertrag von Versailles, 1 (Berlin, 1920/21): 1920.Google Scholar
14. Recueil de Traités et des Engagements Internationaux enregistrés par le Secrétariat de la Société des Nations, 6:122.Google Scholar
15. It is of interest to note that not just the Soviet Union and Germany but also other countries often assumed the role of “protector” of the Ukrainian minority in interwar Poland. Some countries exploited this issue so that Poland would be weakened internally as well as embarrassed in the international forum. Furthermore, many Ukrainian exiled groups in the West often found a sympathetic ear for their cause and were thus able to draw attention to their plight. In some countries committees were formed supporting the Ukrainians, e.g., the group in Great Britain under the leadership of Lord Noēl-Buxton, other members of the House of Lords, and Arnold Toynbee. These pro-Ukrainian groups submitted petitions to the League's Council on behalf of the Ukrainians under Polish administration. For more information see, especially the following: Heinrich von Truhart, “Der Weg der nichtdeutschen Voelkerbundseingaben,” Nation und Staat 8 (1934/35): 228-56 and 241-45; M. Hrushevsky, A History of the Ukraine (New Haven, 1941); F. Lange, Die Ukrainer Galiziens im Kampf um die Aufrichtung des Ukrainischen Staates (Berlin, 1943); R. Ilnytzkyj, Deutschland und die Ukraine, 1934-1945, 1 (Munich, 1955); and E. D. Wynot, “The Ukrainians and the Polish Regime, 1937-1939,” The Ukrainian Historian 7 (1970): 44-60.Google Scholar
16. Debicki, Roman, Foreign Policy of Poland 1919-1939 (New York, 1962) pp. 38–39.Google Scholar
17. For more detailed information concerning this topic see, especially the following: C. Höltje's Die Weimarer Republik und das Ostlocarno-Problem, 1919-1934 (Wuerzburg, 1958); Z. J. Gasiorowski, “Stresemann and Poland after Locarno,” Journal of Central Europen Affairs, Vol. 18, no. 1 (April, 1958), pp. 25-47; C. M. Kimmich “The Weimar Republic and the German-Polish Borders,” Essays on Poland's Foreign Policy, ed. Thaddeus V. Gromada (New York, 1970), pp. 37-45: and Korbel Poland Between East and West, pp. 188-239.Google Scholar
18. The German-Polish tariff war was the result of protests of the Deutscher Volksbund in Upper Silesia against numerous cases of repression in the political and cultural realms. It should be noted that both Poland and Germany signed a separate agreement defining the rights of minorities in this region, as well as economic and administrative provisions in the “Upper Silesia Agreement” of May 15, 1922. In reprisal for Polish maltreatment of the German minority, Germany closed its borders to shipments of coal coming from Polish Upper Silesia. This was the beginning of a nine-year tariff war. Initially, the closing of the German market had harmful effects upon the Polish economy. However, a general strike in England gave Poland other European markets. Thus, Germany's efforts to strangle Poland economically failed.Google Scholar
19. The existence of Danzig as a Free City was decreed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in fulfilment of a promise given to Poland but without consultation, and against the wishes, of the majority of its population. In short, it was a poor solution for the city, Germany, and Poland. Considering the unique status of the city, it is understandable that the inhabitants were less than happy with this arrangement, which resulted in troublesome relations between Danzig and Poland. For more detailed information see the following: George Crusen, “La Question de Dantzig,” Publication de la Conciliation Internationale (Paris, 1933); Hans A. Harder, Danzig, Polen und der Voelkerbund, (Berlin, 1928); C. M. Kimmich, The Free City: Danzig and German Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 (New Haven, 1968); and H. Strasburger, Sprawa Gdańska (Warsaw, 1937).Google Scholar
20. For detailed information see Korbel, Poland Between East and West; and H. L. Bretton Stresemann and the Revision of Versailles (Stanford, 1953).Google Scholar
21. Data taken from H. von Truhart, Voelkerbund und Minderheitenpetitionen; Otto Junghann's National Minorities in Europe (New York, 1932); and Horak's Poland and Her National Minorities. It is of interest to compare the number of charges filed against Poland to that of other countries, e.g., Greece 66, Rumania 63, Czechslovkia 60, Yugoslavia 53, Lithuania 34, and Turkey 29. For the Polish perspective see the following: K. Kierski, Ochrona praw mniejszości w Polsce (Poznań, 1933); W. Michowicz's Polska wobec traktatu i procedury mniejszościowej; and S. Potocki's Połołenie mniejszości niemieckiej w Polsce 1918-1938 (Gdańsk, 1969).Google Scholar
22. Although the Weimar Republic had no duty imposed upon it by the Versailles Treaty to safeguard the rights of its minorities, especially Danes and Poles, nevertheless, the constitution (Article 113) protected the rights of “fremdsprachigen Volksteilen des Reiches.” For further discussion see Breyer, Das deutsche Reich und Polen, pp. 272-96.Google Scholar
23. See, Breyer, Das deutsche Reich und Polen, pp. 64-115; Roos, H., Polen und Europa, pp. 170-82; and A. Wolski, “Pakt polsko-niemiecki z 134 r,” Sprawy Miedzynarodowe, 6, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1953) pp. 64-77.Google Scholar
24. Marshal Pilsudski set out to build Poland into a great power. On July 24, 1932, Poland signed a Treaty of Non-Aggression with the Soviet Union which reaffirmed the validity of the Riga Treaty. Shortly thereafter, Beck replaced Zaleski as Foreign Minister and was given the opportunity to develop his policy of equilibrium between Germany and the Soviet Union while initiating, at the same time, a policy aiming at the creation of an East Central European bloc stretching from the Baltic to the Aegean. This “Third Europe” was unrealistic because it presupposed a spirit of cooperation between states as dissimilar as Sweden and Bulgaria. Besides, Lithuania had little interest in cooperating with Poland on anything, and others like Czechoslovakia showed little enthusiasm for this concept of Intermarium. In short, Poland's independent “Great Power” role and flirtation with Germany turned out to be failures.Google Scholar
25. Polonsky, A., Politics in Independent Poland, pp. 384-85. For more detail see: Cienciala, Anna M., Poland and the Western Powers, 1938-1939 (Toronto, 1968); and Vondracek, F. J., The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia, 1918-1935 (New York, 1937).Google Scholar
26. For detailed information see the following: Budurowycz, Bohdan B., Polish-Soviet Relations, 1932-1939) (New York, 1963) pp. 3–50; and Roos, Polen und Europa, pp. 27-40. Also see the following: G. Cleinow's “Polen und die UdSSR seit dem Rigaischen Vertrage,” Volk und Reich, 10 (1934): 490-508.Google Scholar
27. Budurowycz, , Polish Soviet Relations, pp. 62–64.Google Scholar
28. Roos, , Polen und Europa, pp. 170-74.Google Scholar
29. Debicki, , Foreign Policy of Poland, p. 88.Google Scholar
30. For more discussion see, especially the following: Čelosvsky, B., Das Muenchener Abkommen, 1938 (Stuttgart, 1958); and Chudek, J., “Polska wobec wrześniowego kryzsu czechslowackiego 1938 r,” Sprawy Miedzynarodowe, Vol. 11, no. 4 (April, 1958), pp. 72–79.Google Scholar