No CrossRef data available.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 November 2018
For fifty years the Soviet Bloc constituted one pole of an essentially bipolar world power distribution. Although not unprecedented (consider Imperial Germany's defiance of most of the world during 1917–18, or later phases of Napoleon's challenge to Europe), bipolarism has usually been very brief. The sheer length of time the Soviet-American confrontation dominated world politics created, on the contrary, mind-sets and reflexes which only a conscious effort can overcome.
1. See Armstrong, John A., “The Soviet-American Confrontation: A New Stage?” Russian Review, XXIII (1964), 97–115; and “The Soviet-American Confrontation: A New Phase?” Survey, XCVII (1978), 40–51.Google Scholar
2. In part these reflexes were a response to John Foster Dulles’ premature advocacy of exploitation of national tensions in the Bloc. See Cook, Blanche V., “U.S. Foreign Relations History,” American Historical Association Perspectives, November 1991.Google Scholar
3. As early as 1941 Britain seems to have conceded Czechoslovakia to the postwar Soviet sphere. Despite revulsion at Stalin's brutality, later in the war Churchill was prepared to accept Soviet tutelage of the “northern tier”—Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary—while vainly trying to establish spheres of Balkan influence. US withdrawal from Saxony, Thuringia, and part of Czechoslovakia cemented this series of Soviet advances.Google Scholar
4. “SDI and Defensive Doctrine: The Evolving Soviet Debate,” Kennan Institute Papers, No. 240, March 29, 1990.Google Scholar
5. See especially Adam Przeworski, “The ‘East’ Becomes the ‘South’? The ‘Autumn of the Peoples’ and the Future of Eastern Europe,” PS: Political Science and Politics, May 1991, p. 4.Google Scholar
6. Merkur, Rheinischer, August 27, 1991 (trans. in German Tribune, September 1, 1991).Google Scholar
7. Translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XLIII, No.26. pp. 19–20. On April 6 (trans. in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XLIII, No. 14, pp. 19–20), Izvestia had commented that “much in Yugoslav practice is relevant to our search for a ‘renewed union of sovereign states.’ We would like to warn the authors of plans for the renewal of the Soviet federation against the bitter experience of the Yugoslavs…. The dramatic events showed once again how hard it is to retreat to national ‘apartments’ after living together under one roof.”Google Scholar
8. Maclean, Fitzroy, Escape to Adventure (Boston: Little, Brown, 1952).Google Scholar
9. Armstrong, John A., “Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant,” Journal of Modern History, XL (1968), pp. 396–410.Google Scholar
10. See especially Stepan, Alfred, “The Soviet Coup in Comparative Perspective,” Harriman Institute, V, No. 2, 1991, who (together with New York Times, November 29, 1991) provides statistics on the changing strength and nationality composition of the Yugoslav Army.Google Scholar
11. New York Times, December 3, 1991.Google Scholar
12. French Embassy, News from France, October 17, 1991.Google Scholar
13. New York Times, September 20, 1991; Mainzer Allgemeine Zeitung, September 18, 1991.Google Scholar
14. New York Times, September 17, 1991.Google Scholar
15. New York Times, “The New Germans,” December 16, 1991.Google Scholar
16. New York Times, “U.N. is Yielding to Germany,” December 16, 1951.Google Scholar
17. New York Times, January 7, 1992.Google Scholar
18. Rheinischer Merkur, August 23, 1991 (trans. in German Tribune, September 1, 1991). For a more detailed description of East European reactions, see Pravda, August 31, 1991 (trans. in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XLIII, No. 35, p. 43): “The regional cooperation between Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia that was born in the Danube town of Visegrad has now been cemented…. Some Hungarians and Czechs crossed themselves, ‘Thank God Soviet troops have already left!'”Google Scholar
19. Süddeutsche Zeitung, September 5, 1991 (trans. in German Tribune, September 15, 1991).Google Scholar
20. Meyer, Stephen M., “Hyping the Soviet Nuclear Peril,” New York Times, Op-ed, December 12, 1991.Google Scholar
21. See especially Sovetskaia Rossiia, January 9, 1991 (excerpted in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XLIII, No. 15, p. 6); Pravda, April 17, 1951 (Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XLIII, No. 16, p. 24).Google Scholar
22. New York Times, January 7, 1952.Google Scholar
23. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act (1975), Section VIII.Google Scholar
24. “The New Germans,” New York Times, December 16, 1991.Google Scholar
25. Stepan in Harriman Institute points out that “Catalonia came to see itself as a powerful region within the European Community,” hence was willing to remain in Spain, a member of EC.Google Scholar
26. See especially Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 2, 1991, and Bremer Nachrichten, September 3, 1991 (both trans. in German Tribune, September 15, 1991) on steps toward adherence to the EC treaty.Google Scholar
27. See my brief discussion in “Sources of Administrative Behavior,” American Political Science Review, LIX (1965), pp. 643–55. Those comments were based on extensive interviewing in Western Europe during 1963–64; assurance of informants’ confidentiality prevented, at that time, publication of specific details on West European contacts with the Soviet Managerial complex.Google Scholar
28. “America's in the Balcony as Europe Takes Center Stage,” New York Times, December 22, 1991.Google Scholar
29. See especially the symposium “America as a Model for the World,” PS: Political Science and Politics, December 1991.Google Scholar
30. Mueller, John E., War, Presidents and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley, 1973), chapters 3 & 5.Google Scholar
31. Gregory F. Treverton, “The New Europe,” Foreign Affairs, LXXI (1991–92), 112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar