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The Islamic Factor in Nationalism and Nation-Building in Uzbekistan: Causative Agent or Inhibitor?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

Reuel Hanks
Reuel Hanks*
Affiliation:
Kennesaw State College
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Extract

Nationalism became the bane of the Soviet empire. The disintegration of the USSR due to nationalistic forces has occurred with a swiftness that few, if any, Western Sovietologists anticipated. The four Central Asian states, with high rates of population growth and a strategic location at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and South Asia, now acquire a new significance. Of these Uzbekistan, with a population of twenty million, seventy percent of whom belong to the titular national group, looms largest in terms of demographic and economic potential. The population of Uzbekistan is almost twice as large as the other nascent Central Asian nations combined, and despite severe ecological damage, produces almost two thirds of the cotton in the region, along with natural gas, gold and other minerals.

Type
Articles
Information
Nationalities Papers , Volume 22 , Issue 2 , Fall 1994 , pp. 309 - 323
Copyright
Copyright © 1994 Association for the Study of Nationalities of Eastern Europe and ex-USSR 

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References

Notes

1. According to the results of the 1989 census, the respective increases in population between 1979 and 1989 for Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Tajikistan and Turkmenia were 29 percent, 21 percent, 34 percent, and 27 percent. The all-Union average increase was nine percent. See Argumenty i Fakty, No. 11, 1990, 7.Google Scholar

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7. See Adrian Karatnycky, “It's Not Islam That's Unifying Soviet Central Asia,” The Wall Street Journal, July 28, 1989. Karatnycky greatly overstates the forces of secularization in Soviet Central Asian society, I believe, when he claims that “Religious thinking has been virtually extinguished” and that the shift to the Cyrillic alphabet under Stalin destroyed the linkage to the Islamic past.Google Scholar

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19. As is typical for such studies conducted by Soviet scholars, the authors provide no data concerning the age, gender or ethnic makeup of the surveyed population.Google Scholar

20. A group closely related to the Uzbeks, and occupying their own autonomous republic in western Uzbekistan.Google Scholar

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22. Ibid. Google Scholar

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27. One will find a variety of spellings of this name in the Russian-language press.Google Scholar

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30. Uzbekistan declared independence from the USSR on August 21, 1991. Unlike some other republics, the Communist Party remains firmly in control of the government there.Google Scholar

31. This information was conveyed to the author by Mr. David Tyson, an Uzbek speaker who spent several months in Uzbekistan in 1990–91.Google Scholar

32. See William Fierman, “Glasnost’ in Practice: The Uzbek Experience,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1989.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

33. I. Usmankhodzhayev, the only remaining Central Asian party leader from the Andropov/Chernenko era, was ousted in January of 1988 and later convicted and sentenced to ten years on corruption charges.Google Scholar

34. Ozbekistan adabiyati va sanati, June 24, 1988, 2.Google Scholar

35. Former Communists continue to hold power in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Only Kyrghyzistan has been recognized as an independent state by the US, due to the fact that the Bush Administration considers its leadership to be more democratic. For more on this general issue, see Rywkin's chapter “Perestroika in Central Asia.”Google Scholar

36. The translations from Uzbek are “Unity,” and “Will.” For more on these organizations, see William Fierman, “The Communist Party, ‘Erk’ and the Changing Uzbek Political Environment,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 3.Google Scholar

37. Soviet Nationality Survey, No. 9, 1989, 6.Google Scholar

38. See Amir Taheri, “Future of Islam in Soviet Union,” interview by Faiza Ambah, The Muslim World League Journal, Vol. 17, Nos. 3 and 4, 1989.Google Scholar

39. The most significant of these is the Osman Koran, an ancient work held to have once been the property of Caliph Osman, one of the Prophet's early followers. Taken to St. Petersburg during Tsarist times, it was returned to Tashkent in the 1920s, where it was displayed in the State Museum of History. It was given to the Muslim Religious Board of Central Asia in February, 1989.Google Scholar

40. The policy of accepting an official Islamic presence in Central Asia while simultaneously attempting to destroy the faith has suggested to some scholars of the region that such a “two-sided policy” has had the result of reducing the political power of Islam. See Nancy Lubin, “Uzbekistan: The Challenges Ahead,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 43, No. 4, 1989.Google Scholar

41. Kazi Abdulgani Abdullah, “Sermon in Islam and Inter-Ethnic Relations,” Muslims of the Soviet East, No. 2, 1990.Google Scholar

42. “Obrashchenie Musul'man Srednei Azii…” [Appeal of the Muslims of Central Asia…], Pravda Vostoka, September 3, 1989, 1.Google Scholar

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44. Elections were held in the Uzbek SSR in February, 1990.Google Scholar

45. “Uslyshim li Drug Druga” [Let's Listen to Each Other], Ogonek, No. 6, 1990, 12.Google Scholar

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47. Koranic law.Google Scholar

48. Almaz Yestekov, “Preacher Abdulla,” interview by Ye. Belostotskaia, TRUD, 12 December 1990, 4. Translation by the Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), Soviet Union-Political Affairs, JPRS-UPA-91-010, 19 February 1991, 17–20.Google Scholar

49. Davlat Usmon, “A Party Which We Officially Do Not Have,” interview by Andrey Lukin, Komsomolets Tadzhikistana, November 21, 1990, 2. Translation by JPRS, Soviet Union—Political Affairs, JPRS-UPA-91-006, 5 February 1991, 93.Google Scholar

50. Bess Brown, “The Islamic Renaissance Party in Central Asia,” Report on the USSR, May 10, 1991.Google Scholar

51. “Kto Nuzhna Sozdanie “Islamskaia Partiia” i Pochemu?” [Who Needs the Creation of an ‘Islamic Party’ and Why?], Pravda Vostoka, February 1, 1991, 3.Google Scholar

52. Brown, 14.Google Scholar

53. R. Dzhurayev and V. Inoyatova, “Bedy Naroda” [The Troubles of the People], interview by Yevgeniya Lamikhovaia, Komsomolets Uzbekistana, July 6, 1990, 4.Google Scholar

54. Vera Tolz, “Weekly Record of Events,” Report on the USSR, July 19, 1991, 35.Google Scholar

55. Nishanov, for his part, was considerably more accommodating than the man he replaced, I. A. Usmakhodzhayev. It was during Nishanov's short stay at the helm of the Uzbek CP that the Osman Koran was returned to the Religious Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.Google Scholar

56. Vystuplenie Pervogo Sekretaria…” [Speech of the First Secretary…], Pravda Vostoka, August 23, 1989, 1.Google Scholar

57. Ibid. Google Scholar

58. “Sotsial'no-Politicheskie Problemy Mezhnatsional'nykh Otnoshenii v SSSR,” Voprosy Istorii KPSS, No. 9, 1989, 40.Google Scholar

59. Numerous reports surfaced concerning the appearance of green banners among the rioters, and leaflets were evidently distributed in some areas by a underground group calling itself “Holy Uzbeks.” Although the initial targets of the violence were Meshketian Turks, several Uzbek CP head-quarters were also attacked. An article in the journal Sovetskii Uzbekistan blamed “extremist elements” for the riots, although the author stopped short of linking these directly with Islam. See Abdulkhai Baliev, “Statistika i Ludi” [Statistics and People], Sovetskii Uzbekistan, No. 11, 1989, 9.Google Scholar

60. Mufti Mukhammad-Sadyk Mukhammad-Yusuf, “Konsolidatsiia, a ne Raskol” [Consolidation, and not Division], interview with Igor Belyaev, Literaturnaia Gazeta, September 13, 1989, 2.Google Scholar

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62. The festival of Navruz is not an Islamic celebration per se, but has become associated with Muslim tradition. It pre-dates Islam in Central Asia and is probably of Zoroastrian origin.Google Scholar

63. See for example, Abduvali Iusufkhodzhaev, “Religiia i Glasnost'” [Religion and Glasnost], Sovetskii Uzbekistan, No. 2, 1990, 14.Google Scholar

64. E. I. Fazylov, “Perestroika: Opyt', Problemy… “[Perestroika: Experience, Problems…], Interview by O. Brushlinskaia, Nauka i Religiia, No. 11, 1989, 13. Fazylov is a member of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences and reputedly a leading Turkologist.Google Scholar

65. For an example, see Igor Belyaev, “Islam: Religiia i Politika” [Islam: Religion and Politics], Agitator Uzbekistana, No. 16, 1990.Google Scholar

66. “Itogi Sentiabr'skogo (1989) Plennuma TSK KPSS…” [Summary of the September Plenum of the Central Committee CPSU], Pravda Vostoka, November 25, 1989, 1.Google Scholar

67. Large-scale disturbances took place in Parkent (March 1990), Osh (August 1990), and Namagan (December 1990).Google Scholar

68. The law seems designed to fracture and emasculate any political opposition in Uzbekistan. Individuals are forbidden to belong to more than one political group at a time, and cannot employ “pressure” against “associations of authority.” In addition, all new “public associations” must register with the government, and even symbols such as banners and flags, must meet with government approval. The complete text of the law may be found in Pravda Vostoka, February 26, 1991.Google Scholar

69. “Program of Action of the Uzbek Communist Party…,” Pravda Vostoka, December 26, 1990, 2–3. Translation by JPRS Report, Soviet Union—Political Affairs, JPRS-UPA-91-012, 4 March 1991, 78.Google Scholar

70. Akmal Saidov, an Uzbek youth leader, was quoted by the journal Sobesednik as stating that religious awareness was increasing among Uzbek youth, as well as supporting the statement that “…the intensification of Islam's positions is…a completely natural process that is linked with the growth of national self-awareness[?]” Translation by JPRS, Soviet Union—Political Affairs, JPRS-UPA-90-041, 57.Google Scholar

71. I recognize that with the exception of the Tajiks, most Central Asians speak related Turkic languages. The differences between these tongues are sufficient to make them distinct however, which is why Arabic or Persian were both employed as a lingua franca through much of Central Asian history.Google Scholar

72. Gorbachev made this assertion while visiting Germany in 1989, when the violence erupted in Uzbekistan.Google Scholar

73. See James Critchlow, “Islam in Fergana Valley: The Wahhabi ‘Threat',” Report on the USSR, December 8, 1989, as well as his book Nationalism in Uzbekistan, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991); and John Anderson, “Islam and Nationalist Unrest in Soviet Central Asia,” Religion in Communist Lands, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1989.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

74. See for example, Shireen T. Hunter, “Nationalist Movements in Soviet Asia,” Current History, Vol. 89, No. 549, (October) 1990. For an accurate description of the Meskhetians, see Ronald Wixman, The Peoples of the USSR: An Ethnographic Handbook, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1988).Google Scholar

75. Anderson, 266. Shia Islam is dominant only among Tajiks living in the southern mountain ranges of Tajikistan—most Tajiks belong to the Sunni variant.Google Scholar