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Islam in Post-Communist Bulgaria: An Aborted “Clash of Civilizations”?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

Nadege Ragaru
Nadege Ragaru*
Affiliation:
Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, IRIS, Paris, France
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Extract

During the first years of the Bulgarian transition to democracy, all indicators seemed to point towards an impending explosion of interethnic hatred. Located at the crossroads of Islam and Christianity, this predominantly Orthodox country harbors a 13.1% strong Muslim minority, which was subjected to forcible assimilation under communist rule. The assimilation policy reached a climax in 1984–1985, when around 800,000 Bulgarian Turks were forced to renounce their Turkish-Arabic names in favor of Slavic patronyms within the framework of the so-called “Revival Process,” a campaign that aimed at precipitating the unification of the Bulgarian nation. Far from achieving the intended result, the authorities' move not only fostered a reassertion of distinct ethnic and religious identification among the Turks, but also succeeded in durably upsetting intercommunitarian relationships. Significantly, the Communist Party's announcement on 29 December 1989 that it would restore Muslim rights met with sharp resistance in mixed areas, where large-scale Bulgarian protests rapidly gathered momentum. Against this background, in 1990–1991, few analysts would have predicted that Bulgaria could avoid religious conflict, especially as the country was faced with growing regional instability and a belated shift to a market economy—two conditions often said to be conducive to the exacerbation of ethnic tensions.

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Articles
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Nationalities Papers , Volume 29 , Issue 2 , June 2001 , pp. 293 - 324
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Copyright © 2001 Association for the Study of Nationalities 

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References

Notes

1. See Rezultati ot prebrojavaneto na naselenieto, vol.1, Demografski harakteristiki [Results of the census of the population. Demographic characteristics] (Sofia: National statistical institute, 1994), p. 194.Google Scholar

2. The term “clash of civilizations” was coined in 1993 by the renowned political scientist Samuel Huntington in an article that initiated a lively debate among the American and international community of social scientists on the future cleavages and conflicts in the post- Cold-War world. See Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993, pp. 22–49; The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), Samuel Huntington et al., The Clash of Civilizations?: The Debate (New York: Norton, 1997).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. This expression is borrowed from John Feffer, “Bulgaria … The Wrath of Nations,” in Shock Waves. Eastern Europe after the Revolutions (Boston: South End Press), 1992, pp. 225–252.Google Scholar

4. On minority policies before communism, see Valeri Stoyanov, Turskoto naselenie v Bălgarija mezhdu poljusite na etnicheskata politika [The Turkish population in Bulgaria between the poles of ethnic politics] (Sofia: Lik, 1998), pp. 62–119.Google Scholar

5. For a detailed description of communist policies, see among others: Mary Catherine Neuburger, “Muslim Minorities and the Mapping of National Identity in Modern Bulgaria,” doctoral thesis, University of Washington, Seattle; Wolfgang Höpfken, “From Religious Identity to Ethnic Mobilization: The Turks of Bulgaria before, under and since Communism,” in Hugh Poulton and Suha Taji-Farouki, eds, Muslim Identity and the Balkan State (London: Hurst, 1993), pp. 64–71.Google Scholar

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8. Most of the documentation on the Revival Process has either disappeared or been destroyed. It is thus difficult to know how exactly the decision was made. On 29 December 1989 in his report before the Central Committee, Alexandâr Lilov blamed the campaign on “Todor Zhivkov and his closest circle.” No names were mentioned.Google Scholar

9. The Orthodox majority had already completed its demographic transition, while Muslims were still going through it.Google Scholar

10. Some analysts also believe that Moscow had a part in the campaign. They argue that the Soviet Union thereby hoped thereby to deter religious mobilization in its Central Asian republics. Yet there is no evidence of direct Soviet involvement in the Revival Process, and much reason to believe that the USSR at that time was rather unfavorably disposed toward such an initiative, not the least because it needed Turkey as a shield against radical Islamism.Google Scholar

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12. In 1992, the share of the urban population among the Turks (31.64%) was still far below that of the “ethnic” Bulgarians (71.64%). This figure, however, contrasts with the 1.1% registered in 1900 (31.64% for the “ethnic” Bulgarians). See Ilona Tomova, The Roma in the Transition Period (Sofia: International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, 1995), p. 28.Google Scholar

13. According to Kiril Kertikov, at the end of the 1970s, 81.3% of the Turks were equipped with running water (versus 93.6% of the Bulgarians), 82.6% owned a refrigerator (versus 89.5% of the Bulgarians), and 79.7% a washing machine (versus 88.3% of the Bulgarians). See Kiril Kertikov, “Le problème ethno-national en Bulgarie (1944–1991),” Bulgarian Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1991, pp. 88–89.Google Scholar

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16. Interview with A. Zheliazkova, 23 February 1999.Google Scholar

17. Quoted in Rezultati ot prebrojavaneto, p. 194.Google Scholar

18. For more, see Antonina Zheliazkova, “Turci” [Turks], in Krâsteva, Obshtnosti i identichnosti …, p. 382; Nevena Gramatikova, “Alevii (Aliani, Kâzâlbaši),” in Pâtovoditel za Duhovnite Obshtnosti v Bâlgarija [A Guide to the Spiritual Communities in Bulgaria] (Sofia: Litavra, 1998), p. 5.Google Scholar

19. Encouraged by the communists between 1940 and 1950, the “ethnicization” of religious identities by fusion with the Turks was later opposed by Zhivkov. His regime feared the emergence of a strong compact Muslim group.Google Scholar

20. See Bernard Lory, “Strates historiques des relations bulgaro-turques,” CEMOTI, No. 15, 1993, pp. 149–167.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21. See Stoyanov, Turskoto naselenie v Bâlgarija, pp. 175–176; and Ali Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities, pp. 10–17.Google Scholar

22. Interview with BBC journalist Plamen Assenov, president of the foundation “Journalists for Tolerance”, Plovdiv, 14 November 1997.Google Scholar

23. On the May 1989 demonstrations, see Stoyanov, Turskoto naselenie v Bâlgarija, pp. 201–205; Poulton, The Balkans, pp. 153–161; Helsinki Watch, Destroying Ethnic Identity. The Expulsion of the Bulgarian Turks, Helsinki Watch Report, October 1989.Google Scholar

24. Most of the refugees crossed the border over to Turkey. Turkey was soon overwhelmed by the influx of immigrants and closed its border on 21 August 1989. The statistics quoted here are from Margareta Mommsen, ed., Nationalismus vs. Demokratie: Der Fall Bulgarien—Nationalisms in Osteuropa. Gefahrvolle Wege in die Demokratie (Munich: Beck, 1993), p. 177.Google Scholar

25. An account of the January events can be found in Stephen Ashley, “Ethnic Unrest during January,” Report on Eastern Europe, 9 February 1990, pp. 4–12. For a broader analysis of nationalist forces in post-communist Bulgaria, see Stefan Troebst, “Nationalismus als Demokratisierungungshemmnis in Bulgarien” [Nationalism as an obstacle to democracy in Bulgaria], Südosteuropa, Vol. 41, Nos 3–4, 1992, pp. 188–227.Google Scholar

26. A decree adopted in April 1990 stated that the as yet unsold houses acquired by the municipalities would be offered for purchase to their former owners.Google Scholar

27. Approximately 3,000 homes were restituted to their former proprietors. See Irina Nedeva, “Democracy-Building in Ethnically Diverse Societies: The Case of Bulgaria and Romania,” in I. Cutherbertson and J. Leibowitz, eds, Minorities: The New Europe's Old Issue (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 135.Google Scholar

28. After 1991 pupils from the third to the eighth grade were permitted to enroll in Turkish language courses, for four hours per week. In 1994–1995, these measures were extended to include first-graders (aged 6–7). See “Zakon za narodnata prosveta,” Dărzhaven Vestnik, No. 86, 18 October 1991, amended in 1996 (Dărzhaven Vestnik, No. 90, 24 October 1996) and 1998 (Dărzhaven Vestnik, No. 36, 31 March 1998).Google Scholar

29. See Duncan Perry, “Ethnic Turks Face Bulgarian Nationalism,” Report on Eastern Europe, 15 May 1991, pp. 5–8; Kjell Engelbrekt,“ Nationalism Reviving,”' Report on Eastern Europe, 29 November, 1991, pp. 1–6; Duncan Perry, “Minorities and Bulgarian Nationalism,” Report on Eastern Europe, 13 December 1991, pp. 12–16.Google Scholar

30. See Who's Who in Elections 1991? Leaders, Parties, Coalitions, Unions (Sofia, 1991), pp. 66–67.Google Scholar

31. This survey is analyzed in Antonia Zheliazkova, ed., Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria (Sofia: ICMSIR, 1995) (1994 for the Bulgarian version). Some of the results were published earlier in Zhivko Georgiev, ed., “Njakoi rezultati ot izsledvaneto ‘Etnokulturnata situacija v Bâlgarija’ 1992” [Some results from the study on “The ethnocultural situation in Bulgaria” 1992], Sociologicheski pregled, No. 3, 1993, pp. 61–78.Google Scholar

32. See Georgiev, ed., “Njakoi rezultati ot izsledvaneto,” pp. 74–75.Google Scholar

33. See Who's Who in Elections 1991, pp. 96–97, and Troebst, “Nationalismus als Demokratisierungungshemmnis in Bulgarien”, p. 194.Google Scholar

34. The only formation that could make it into parliament in June 1990 was the People's Labor Party. It obtained one seat (out of a total of 400).Google Scholar

35. Alexandâr Lilov, a pre-eminent communist who had fallen into disgrace in 1983 and was to become one of the initiators of the transition, seems to have played a decisive role in the December 29 decision. By contrast, Andrei Lukanov, the prime minister between February and November 1990, is said to have shown explicit support for the nationalists during his visit to Kurdzhali in January 1990. In the Politburo, Panteleï Pachov and Dimitâr Iovchev were particularly vocal in their opposition to the restoration of the Turks' rights. Interview with Mihaïl Ivanov, former advisor to President Zheliu Zhelev on ethnic issues (1990–1996), Sofia, 20 October 1998.Google Scholar

36. The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) was renamed the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) in March 1990 after an internal referendum.Google Scholar

37. The BSP notably demanded that the MRF be declared unconstitutional. See Engelbrekt, “Movement for Rights and Freedom to Compete in Elections,” Report on Eastern Europe, 4 October 1991, pp. 1–5.Google Scholar

38. Whether the brand of nationalism advocated by the two political forces is the same remains an open question. In effect, one might insulate a more distinctly right-wing “Great Bulgarian” nationalism among some supporters of the UDF, notably the members of the Bulgarian Democratic Forum (BDF) and of the IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization). That nationalism is not always primarily anti-Turkish. Its roots can be traced to the national conflicts at the turn of the century. At that time, the polarizing issue was the recovery of Macedonia, a land lost at the Berlin Congress in 1878 a few months after the San Stefano Treaty had attributed it to Bulgaria. For further information on the role of the IMRO in Bulgaria's post-communist politics, see Nadège Ragaru, “Le retour de l'ORIM sur la scène politique bulgare”, La nouvelle Alternative, September 1999, pp. 148–167.Google Scholar

39. In 1991, Bulgaria shifted towards a strictly proportional system but kept the 4% barrier.Google Scholar

40. The UFD emerged in December 1989 as a coalition of a dozen formations. In 1997, this mode of organization was replaced with a unified party under the aegis of Ivan Kostov, Bulgaria's current prime minister.Google Scholar

41. See Edvin Sugarev, “Mislja za hiledite koito sa se zamrăzili ma mitingite ni” [I think about the thousands of people who faced the cold at our meetings], Demokratsjia, 27 January 1993.Google Scholar

42. See for example Encho Mutafov, “SDS: politicheskijat moral nad vsichko” [UDF: political morality above all], Demokratsija, 11 January 1993.Google Scholar

43. For an illustration, see Hristofor Zrakov, “Koi se krie zad maskata na DPS v obshtina Borino?” [Who hides behind the mask of the MRF in the Borino municipality?], Demokratsija, 19 January 1993, p. 3.Google Scholar

44. In one of his contributions to Demokratsija, Asparuh Panov (of the Radical Democratic Party (RDP), a member of the UDF) argued for example that “one of the greatest errors of the UDF was that it did not tour Turkish-inhabited [regions]; it did not lay the seeds of the UFD in places where we could have accomplished the most. … Let us set out as apostles from Kurdzhali to Razgrad; let us explain to the Bulgarian people what the new [Berov] government costs.” See Asparuh Panov, “Sluchajât Ahmed Lukanov” [The Ahmed Lukanov case], Demokratsija, 1 April 1993, p. 1.Google Scholar

45. According to the state Committee on Religious Affairs, 100 to 150 mosques were restored between 1990 and 1998, and 16 new ones were built. All in all, 960 mosques are currently in working order, plus 333 meshica (Muslim religious buildings devoid of minarets).Google Scholar

46. In 1994, there were 340 students enrolled at the three Islamic high schools and 150 in the Sofia Institute. Statistics provided by the Committee on Religious Affairs.Google Scholar

47. Shahida is controlled by El Fatih Ali Hassenein. Its main correspondent in Bulgaria is believed to be Mohamed Rabiia, an Egyptian who also happens to be the head of the Board of Directors of Nedim Gendzhev's pension fund, Justice. See Georgi Milkov, “Kak terorist No. 1 pusna pipala u nas,” 24 Chasa, 21 March 1993 p. 7.Google Scholar

48. The first translation of the Koran in Bulgarian dates back to the 1930s. However, it was based on a series of commentaries of the Koran published in Germany, not on the text itself. The 1997 translation received financial support from the Irshad Foundation and the Third World Relief Agency.Google Scholar

49. According to former Chief Mufti Nedim Gendzhev, in 1994 Al Wakf al Islami, the International Relief Organization, Menar, and Irshad were all officially registered in Bulgaria. Some of them were suspected of fundamentalist leanings. With the hope of curbing their activities, the Bulgarian parliament passed a set of amendments to the Law on Persons and Family in February 1994. The new text requested that the organizations engaged in religious activities reregister with the Council of Ministers. A year later, the cooperation agreement between the Office of the Chief Mufti and Al Wakf al Islami (signed at the time of Nedim Gendzhev) was suspended. Interviews with Nedim Gendzhev, Sofia, 27 February 1998, and Mihaïl Ivanov, Sofia, 10 October 1998.Google Scholar

50. On average the Islamic Institute sends less than a dozen students abroad per year. Interview with Alexandâr Velinov, a teacher at the Islamic institute, Sofia, 3 May 1999.Google Scholar

51. See Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities, p. 69.Google Scholar

52. It should be noted that faith frequently appears as more of a cultural than a religious referent. The Bulgarian anthropologists Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov report that some Roma even go so far as to identify as “Muslims” despite the fact that they have long ceased to be such, their families having converted to Orthodoxy sometimes as early as the beginning of the twentieth century. Interview with Marushiakova and Popov, Sofia, 22 February 1999.Google Scholar

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54. Since the fall of communism, several Orthodox priests have sought to bring about (supposedly voluntary) conversions to Christianity. Father Boyan Sarâev is certainly the best known among them. In 1990, he set up the Movement for Christianity and Progress, whose stated goal was to help young Pomaks return to the “true faith.” The movement is mostly active around Krumovgrad and Zlatograd. In 1996, Sarâev claimed to have baptized 20,000 Muslims.Google Scholar

55. In official textbooks, the Pomaks are still presented as heirs to the Bulgarians who were forcibly converted to Islam during the Ottoman Empire. They are thus seen as a part of the victimized body of the Bulgarian nation. See, among others, Stoyan Raïchevski, Bâlgarskite Mohamedani (Sofia: Universitetsko izdatelstvo, 1998). The author is a UDF deputy (since 1997) and heads the Parliamentary Committee on Culture.Google Scholar

56. For an introduction to the Pomaks' history, see Boriana Panaïotova, “Bâlgari, mohamedani i hristijani v Tsentralnite Rodopi. Pogled vârhu tehnite vzaimootnoshenija” [Bulgarians, Mohamedans and Christians in the Central Rhodopes. An outlook on their relationships], in Aspekti na etnokulturnata situatsija v Bâlgarija i na Balkanite [Aspects of the Ethnocultural Situation in Bulgaria and the Balkans] (Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy & Foundation Friedrich Nauman, 1992), pp. 33–47. On the polemics over the Pomaks' origins, see Eminov, Turkish and other Muslim Minorities, pp. 99–111.Google Scholar

57. Interview with Galina Lozanova, Sofia, 3 March 1999.Google Scholar

58. See Dvizhenie na prava i svobodi, Ustav 1996, p. 1.Google Scholar

59. Quoted in Engelbrekt, “The Movement for Rights and Freedoms,” p. 7.Google Scholar

60. See Dvizhenie na prava i svobodi, Programa, 1996, p. 21.Google Scholar

61. Ibid., p. 13.Google Scholar

62. Ibid., p. 1.Google Scholar

63. See Ivanka Nedeva, “Democracy Building in Ethnically Diverse Societies,” p. 140. This does not mean that the local activists of the MRF never displayed any form of intolerant attitude. On several occasions, the MRF was accused by non-ethnic parties of turkifying the Pomak minority. The actual situation is probably more complex. As noted, the Pomaks are currently going through diverse processes of “ethnic” redefinition, some of which include identification with the Turkish minority. Yet there is no denying that the Pomak electorate represents an interesting target for the MRF, whose electoral base is shrinking as a result of continuous Turkish emigration to Turkey.Google Scholar

64. The only signficant achievement in this respect was the appointment of one of the MRF leaders (an “ethnic” Bulgarian) as deputy prime minister under Berov.Google Scholar

65. In February 1994, Hodzha left the MRF's parliamentary group to create his own political organization, the Party for Democratic Changes (PDC, Partija za demokraticheski promeni). The PDC received only 0.27% of the votes in the December 1994 general elections.Google Scholar

66. Kenan reproached Dogan with having sacrificed his original cause—the Bulgarian Turks—for the sake of widening the social base of his movement. Kenan's own formation, he argued, aimed at achieving “Bulgaria's transformation into a federation with two recognized official languages” and intended to fight for “national self-determination and self-preservation.” See Trud, 10 November 1993, pp. 1–2.Google Scholar

67. Ahmed Dogan's personal prestige has since then severely decreased. It received a serious blow in 1997, when the new UDF majority ordered that the files of state police's former agents be opened. Alongside three of his closest political associates, Yunal Lutfi, Osman Oktai, and Kemal Eiup, Dogan was on the list of collaborators with state security revealed by Interior Minister Bogomil Bonev before parliament in September. Meanwhile, the MRF's outward support for Multigroup, a financial consortium linked to the Mafia, further deteriorated its public image.Google Scholar

68. Here again, the statement holds true for the beginning of the transition period rather than the later years. As the economic crisis deepened, the use of their public office by some representatives of the MRF for private purposes met with increasing resentment among the Muslim population. In addition, the gap seems to have progressively widened between the party's ruling elite, the local mayors, and the rank-and-file activists. Faced with economic adversity, some village mayors from the MRF used their elected positions as a jumping-off point for emigration to Turkey. According to statistics from the press center of the Council of Ministers, around 25% of the local MRF mayors from the Rhodopes left the country between December 1995 and July 1999. This move created a breach of trust among their electorate.Google Scholar

69. Quoted in Sega, No. 16, 24/30 April 1997, pp. 26–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

70. See Fikrie Salifova, “DPS zagubi Kârdzhali i Kirkova.”Google Scholar

71. One of Dogan's latest statements ilustrates the existence of a risk of radicalization of the MRF if the UDF does not reconsider its current policies. See “Dogan zaplashva, che DPS mozhe da prerasne v etnicheska partija” [Dogan warns that the MRF might turn into an ethnic party], Demokratsija, 26 October 1999.Google Scholar

72. See James Brown, Hopes and Shadows. Eastern Europe after Communism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), p. 110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar