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The Hungarians in Slovakia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

Iván Gyurcsik  and
James Satterwhite
Iván Gyurcsik
Affiliation:
Coexistence Movement, Bratislava
James Satterwhite
Affiliation:
Bluffton College, OH
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Extract

The situation of Hungarians in Slovakia since 1989 has developed in the context of the political and economic transitions of the region: from post-totalitarian states towards pluralist democracies, and from centrally-planned economies toward market systems. In addition, the end of Czechoslovakia as a united entity on December 31 1992, has directly affected the Hungarian nationality. These political, economic and social changes have had a direct impact on their situation in Slovakia.

Type
II Hungary and Hungarian Minorities
Information
Nationalities Papers , Volume 24 , Issue 3 , September 1996 , pp. 509 - 524
Copyright
Copyright © 1996 Association for the Study of Nationalities of Eastern Europe and ex-USSR, Inc. 

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References

Notes

1. According to the last census of the Hungarian Kingdom (1910), the total population in the present territory of Slovakia was 2,926,824, of whom Slovaks comprised 1,686,712 (57.63 percent), and Hungarians 896,271 (30.62 percent). These figures were based on responses about native languages. The first official “Czechoslovak” census in 1921 shows that, of the total number of 2,955,998 citizens in Slovakia, there were 2,013,675 “Czechoslovaks” (1,941,942 Slovaks and 71,733 Czechs) and 634,827 Hungarians (21.47 percent). In Popély Gyula, Népfogyatkozás (Budapest: Regio, 1991), pp. 24, 59–60.Google Scholar

After the Second World War the Hungarian national minority was declared to be collectively guilty in the government program announced in Kosice (Kassa) on 4 April 1945, and the Hungarians were deprived of their civil rights as a consequence. The idea of creating a pure Slav nation-state affected the Hungarians in different ways: there were expulsions (32,000), forced exchanges of population with Hungary (75,000), forced resettlements to Bohemia (44,000), and the process of “re-Slovakization” or assimilation (327,000). The results of the first census taken after this harsh period (1950) demonstrated the negative effects of these policies, when only 354,000 Hungarians registered as Hungarians (10.3 percent of the entire population). In Szlovákiai jelentés—A magyar kisebbség állapotáról (Paris: Magyar Füzetek könyvei, 1982), p. 76.Google Scholar

2. The number of Hungarians defined according to nationality is 567,296 (10.75 percent). The difference of approximately 40,000 persons in the figures by nationality or by native language can be attributed to several different factors: mixed marriages and fears dating back to the earlier period of persecution.Google Scholar

3. These numbers only reflect the data concerning nationality, as the Slovak Statistical Office did not publish the final census data on native language in communities. These figures were higher than those based on nationality. Gyurgyík László, A szlovákiai magyarok új népszámlálási adatai (Budapest: Regio, 1992/93), p. 83.Google Scholar

4. See UN ECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, Second Progress Report, Protection of Minorities: Possible Ways and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution of Problems Involving Minorities, E/CN. 4/Sub.2/1992/37, 1 July 1992, p. 26, paragraph 133.Google Scholar

5. See Kettös elnyomásban, Dokumentumok a csehszlovákiai magyarság helyzetéröl és jogvédelméröl, 1977-78 (New York: Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, 1989); A szlovákiai magyar iskolák védelmében, HHRF, 1983; Duray Miklós, Kutyaszoritó I-II (New York: Püski Könyvkiadó).Google Scholar

6. The two basic documents are the 1988 Memorandum of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia (December 1988), and the Memorandum of the 33 (February 1989). The first memorandum was initiated by the Committee for the Protection of the Rights of the Hungarian Minority in Czechoslovakia; in addition to the demand for the protection of minority rights, it also called for democratic changes and a pluralist state. It was published in Kettös elnyomásban, p. 517. The second document was drawn up primarily by the group of so-called “68'ers,” i.e., by people persecuted after the Prague Spring reforms of 1968. This group was strongly influenced by Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika. The main part of this memorandum was published in Vasárnap, a weekly published in Bratislava at the beginning of 1990.Google Scholar

7. Václav Havel's address at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on 4 February 1992.Google Scholar

8. Fedor, Gál, “Ostrovy pozitivnej deviácie,” Z prvej ruky (Bratislava: Archa, 1991), p. 16.Google Scholar

9. “Žiadame dosledne” demokratickú federáciu Čechov a Slovákov a zakonné upravenie práv a postavenia národnosti na principe” plnej a faktickej rovnosprávnosti,” in Ked sme brali do rúk Budúc:nost, Document No. 18, Point No. 10, 25 November 1989 (Bratislava: Archa, 1990), p. 35. (Text in Slovak original).Google Scholar

10. “A Nyilvánosság az Eröszak Ellen és a Független Magyar Kezdeményezés közös nyilatkozata a nemzetek, nemzeti kisebbségek és etnikai csoportok együtteséröl Szlovákiában,” in Nap (Hungarian version), and Verejnost (Slovak version), 23 January 1990 (Bratislava).Google Scholar

11. As defined in the European Charter of Local Self-Government, 15 October, 1985, article 4, paragraph 3: “Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those authorities which are closest to the citizen. Allocation of responsibility to another authority should weigh the extent and nature of the task and requirements of efficiency and economy.”Google Scholar

12. Of the large number of presidential decrees from the period 1945-1948, two in particular are relevant here: Decree 33/1945, which deprived Germans and Hungarians of their citizenship; and, Decree 108/1945, which concerned the confiscation of enemy property and provided funds for national recovery.Google Scholar

13. The proportion of citizens with higher education in Slovakia altogether was 3.8 percent in 1980, for a total number of 187,836. At the same time, the proportion of Slovaks with higher education was 3.9 percent (166,991), while for the Hungarians it was 1.6 percent (9114). Source: Gyönyör József, ARllamalkotó nemzetiségek (Bratislava [Pozsony]: Madách, 1989), pp. 136–137.Google Scholar

14. In the 13 districts and 2 cities inhabited by Hungarians, the following proportion of pupils in primary schools held: 225,457 Slovak pupils attended Slovak primary schools in these areas, and 227 Slovak pupils attended Hungarian schools; at the same time, 48,149 Hungarian pupils attended Hungarian schools, but 16,373 Hungarian pupils attended Slovak primary schools. These numbers reflect the fact that 0.1 percent of Slovak pupils attended Hungarian schools, while 34 percent of the Hungarian pupils had to attend Slovak schools. Source: Správa o stavě slovenského skolstva, mladeže a sportu Slovenskej republiky, 13 XII 1990, č. 8464/1990-22, Table No. 4.Google Scholar

15. We can judge the influence of different parties based on the results of two parliamentary elections (June 1990 and June 1992), and one local election (November 1990):Google Scholar

(1) In the parliamentary election of June 1990 the coalition of Co-existence and the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (HCDM) got 292,636 votes (8.66 percent) to the Slovak National Council. The number of votes received by the Independent Hungarian Initiative cannot be determined since it ran as part of a coalition with Public Against Violence, which won a relative victory in the contest for representation to the Slovak National Council with 991,285 votes (29.34 percent).Google Scholar

(2) The results of the local elections of November 1990 are as follows: Co-existence—102 mayors (3.7 percent), 2416 local representatives (6.3 percent); HCDM—35 mayors (1.3 percent), 1135 local representatives (3.0 percent); Independent Hungarian Initiative [called the Hungarian Civic Party (HCP) after January 1992]—27 mayors (1.0 percent), 482 local representatives (1.3 percent).Google Scholar

(3) In the parliamentary elections of June 1992 the coalition of Co-existence, HCDM, and the Hungarian People's Party got 228,885 votes (7.42 percent), and the HCP got 70,689 votes (2.29 percent). The minimum level for achieving parliamentary representation to the Slovak National Council was 3 percent in 1990, and 7 percent for coalitions in 1992. Today, the coalition of Co-existence and HCDM has 14 MPs in the 150-seat parliament.Google Scholar

16. See the publication by Co-existence: A demokráciáért, a nemzeti kisebbségek jogaiért (Válogatás az Együttelés PM dokumentumai Közül 1990-1992) (Pozsony/Bratislava, 1992).Google Scholar

17. See Érsekkéty, “Merre tart Csehszlovákia? Az Együttélés memoranduma a csehszlovákiai nemzeti kisebbségekröl,” (5 October 1991), in Égyüttélés, A demokráciáért, a nemzeti kisebbségek jogaiërt (Bratislava [Pozsony], 1992), p. 29.Google Scholar

18. No. 23/1991.Google Scholar

19. No. 87/1991.Google Scholar

20. No. 229/1991.Google Scholar

21. No. 93/1992. See the Memorandum prepared by the Co-existence Political Movement, Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, Hungarian People's Party, and the Hungarian Civic Party, on the “Slovak Republic's Future Admission to the Council of Europe” (Bratislava, 4 February 1993).Google Scholar

22. example, For, Szabad Forum, Csehszlovákiai Magyarok Fóruma, etc. Also, Csemadok, the cultural organization of Hungarians (the only organization allowed during the communist period), which has 90,000 members and more than 500 local branches. Another example is the Hungarian Teachers' Association in Slovakia.Google Scholar

23. “Slovak Republic's Future Admission to the Council of Europe,” p. 30. See also Égyüttélés, p. 30.Google Scholar

24. The most successful vocational school started in Mostová/Hidaskürt, and the example quickly spread to other communities. In the 1992/93 school year there were 5 Hungarian parochial schools (4 Catholic, 1 Protestant), while during this same period there were more than 200 Slovak parochial schools. There were also a few private, non-parochial secondary schools (for example, Sala/Vágsellye).Google Scholar

25. Matica slovenská was a cultural organization established in 1863 which played an important role in the promotion and protection of Slovak identity. Its present role is quite different: after the November 1989 “revolution” the leaders of Matica organized mass demonstrations against minorities (October 1990), forced the adoption of discriminatory laws (such as the language law), and adopted memoranda whose aim was the extreme restriction of minority rights (March 1990, April 1992). The Matica slovenská's “National Program” of 8 August 1992 (published in Slovenské národné noviny 33/1992) listed the areas in which the rights of minorities should be restricted. The present government clearly supports this organization, both morally and materially. The local branches are organized mainly in the areas inhabited by Hungarians, with the aim of protecting the Slovaks there in accordance with the special law on Matica slovenská.Google Scholar

26. Draper, Theodore, “A New History of the Velvet Revolution,” The New York Review of Books, 14 January 1993, p. 18.Google Scholar

27. The basis of the “principle of reciprocity” is to create a hostage status for Hungarians in Slovakia, to legitimize their present oppression, and to retroactively legitimize as ethnically fair the borders which came out of the WWI peace settlement.Google Scholar

According to the propaganda version of events, there are the same number of Slovaks in Hungary as Hungarians in Slovakia. Also part of this version is the assertion that the Hungarians in Slovakia have greater rights than do the Slovaks in Hungary, and that institutional guarantees for these rights in one country depend on similar guarantees in other countries—sometimes expressed in terms of numbers, at other times in terms of values. This false premise was used after both world wars for propaganda purposes: it is false because the two minorities are totally different in numbers, history, identity, etc. Official census data show the following figures: the number of Slovaks in Hungary in 1920 was 141,877 (1.8 percent), while in 1980 it was 16,054 (0.4 percent). The number of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia in 1921 was 745,431 (5.6 percent), and in 1980 it was 579,166 (3.8 percent). Source: História (Budapest, 1992), p. 11. The greater drop in the number of Slovaks in Hungary was due to the action initiated by Czechoslovakia after the Second World War—after the failure of its attempt to forcibly expel 200,000 Hungarians to Hungary—to exchange inhabitants with Hungary, with the aim of creating in Czechoslovakia a nation-state made up of Czechs and Slovaks only. As part of this action 75,000 Slovaks went to Czechoslovakia of their own free will, and at approximately the same time the same number of Hungarians were forced to leave Czechoslovakia (mainly teachers, intellectuals, priests). For further information on this subject, see the book by Kálmán Janics, Czechoslovak Policy and the Hungarian Minority, 1945-1948 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Kálmán Janics, Nagy idök, kis emberek (Bratislava/Pozsony: Uj Szó, 16 April, 1993).Google Scholar

28. The so-called Second Memorandum of Slovaks from Southern Slovakia adopted at the 4 April, 1993, Matica slovenská meeting in Surány called for the adoption of laws for the protection of the official language and for the elimination of Hungarian-language education, as well as laws on local self-government elections and the administrative/territorial divisions of Slovakia. In addition to the above, the law on the defense of the Republic aimed at the restriction of Hungarians' political and cultural rights. A few weeks later, the parliament provided buildings for Matica's use, and the Prime Minister expressed his support for Matica as an important organization. The ideas articulated in the Second Memorandum were accepted as the government's program.Google Scholar

29. See the Memorandum of Coexistence on the Danger of Discrimination Against National Minorities in the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. This memorandum evaluates the role of the Constitution in providing a basis for legal discrimination concerning the right of free association, education, language, distrust of national minorities, denial of the right to a homeland, and denial of the right of minorities to self-government (autonomy)—thereby relegating the minorities to second-class citizenship.Google Scholar

30. Reisch, Alfred A., “Meciar and Slovakia's Hungarian Minority,” RFE/RL Research Report 43, 30 October, 1992, p. 15.Google Scholar