Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 November 2018
The mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs, barely noticeable from the capital initially but highly visible at the centre political stage between 1986 and 1988, played an important part in the political struggles of the late socialist Yugoslavia. The prevailing view in the literature is that Kosovo Serbs were little more then passive recipients of the attitudes and actions of high officials and dissident intellectuals. The elite thesis says that Belgrade-based dissident intellectuals initiated and guided the mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs, aiming to undermine the party's approach to Yugoslavia's national question and to initiate reassessment of the official policy on Kosovo and Serb–Albanian relations. According to the thesis, Milošević then took over and orchestrated the action of various groups of Kosovo Serbs in order to make the case for the removal of Kosovo's autonomy. The intellectuals and Milošević have generally supported this interpretation, claiming their role in the events leading to the constitutional change to the disadvantage of Kosovo Albanians in 1989–1990.
1. See for example Laura Silber and Allan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin and BBC, 1996), pp. 34–47, 58–59; Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 47–55; Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1998), pp. 339–343; and Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), Chapter 2.Google Scholar
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23. Ibid.Google Scholar
24. Boško Budimirović, interview with the author.Google Scholar
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29. The author's copy of the petition. See excerpts in “Iz peticije 50.000 potpisnika,” Danas, 5 July 1988, p. 23.Google Scholar
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35. Neca Jovanov, Radnički štrajkovi u SFRJ od 1958. do 1969. godine (Belgrade: Zapis, 1979), p. 75.Google Scholar
36. For details see Tijanić, Šta će biti s nama , p. 128.Google Scholar
37. James Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).Google Scholar