Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rcrh6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T20:45:24.454Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

“Ethnic Conflict” Undressed: Patterns of Contrast, Interest of Elites, and Clientelism of Foreign Powers in Comparative Perspective—Bosnia, India, Pakistan

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

Carsten Wieland
Carsten Wieland*
Affiliation:
German Press Agency (dpa) and lives in Berlin, Germany
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Ethnic conflict is not—because there are no ethnic groups in conflict. This is the main conclusion of a comparison of so-called “ethnic conflicts” in the Balkans and in colonial India. A comparison of Muslim nation building in these two regions provides several valuable insights that go far beyond the specific cases. Thus far, there have been many hints in the literature on similarities between Bosnia and Pakistan or the Balkans and the Indian subcontinent as a whole. But there have been no systematic comparisons, though many parallels emerge when we look more closely.

Type
Articles
Information
Nationalities Papers , Volume 29 , Issue 2 , June 2001 , pp. 207 - 241
Copyright
Copyright © 2001 Association for the Study of Nationalities 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Notes

1. James Manor, “‘Ethnicity’ and Politics in India,” International Affairs, Vol. 72, 1996, pp. 460–461.Google Scholar

2. Ibid., p. 465.Google Scholar

3. Holm Sundhausen, Experiment Jugoslawien: Von der Staatsgründung bis zum Staatszerfall (Mannheim: B. I. Taschenbuchverlag, 1993), p. 12.Google Scholar

4. Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1921), p. 242.Google Scholar

5. Representatives of the primordial approach include Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Burkhard Ganzer, “Zur Bestimmung des Begriffs der ethnischen Gruppe,” Sociologus, Vol. 40, 1990, pp. 3–18; Francis Robinson, Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces Muslims 1860–1923 (London: Oxford University Press, 1993).Google Scholar

6. Representatives of this approach are, for example: Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: Univeristy of California Press 1985); Paul R. Brass, ed., Riots and Pogroms (New York: New York University Press, 1996); Anthony P. Cohen, The Symbolic Construction of Community (London: Tavistock, 1985); J. Y. Okamura, “Situational Ethnicity,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 4, 1981, pp. 452–465; Michael Banton, “Rational Choice Theories,” American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 38, 1995, pp. 478–497; Susan Olzak, The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict (Stanford: Stanford Univesity Press, 1992); Albert F. Reiterer, “Die politische Konstitution von Ethnizität,” in Gerhard Seewann, ed., Minderheitenfragen in Südosteuropa (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1992); Romila Thapar, “The Theory of Aryan Race and India: History and Politics,” Social Scientist, Vol. 24, 1996, pp. 1–3; K. N. Panikkar, Communal Threat and Challenge (Madras: Earthworm Press, 1997); Wolfgang Kaschuba, “Identité, altérité et mythe ethnique,” Ethnologie française, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1997, pp. 499–515.Google Scholar

7. Brass, Riots and Pogroms, pp. 119–120 and Manor “‘Ethnicity’ and Politics in India,” pp. 459–460 in relation to India.Google Scholar

8. Cohen, The Symbolic Construction of Community, p. 118.Google Scholar

9. Georg Elwert, “Nationalismus und Ethnizität: Über die Bildung von Wir-Gruppen,” Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Vol. 41, 1989, pp. 440–464.Google Scholar

10. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 38.Google Scholar

11. Mill speaks of “feeling of nationality.” John Stuart Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government, chap. XVI: Of Nationality, as Connected with Representative Government,” in John Gray, ed., On Liberty and Other Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991 [1861]), p. 427. Mill defines the term “nationality” with construedvist connotations. Weber spoke of an “‘artificial’ kind of belief in ethnic community.” Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 237. On Weber and ethnicity, see John Stone, “Race, Ethnicity, and the Weberian Legacy,” American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 38, 1995, pp. 391–406.Google Scholar

12. Sabrina P. Ramet, “Primordial Ethnicity or Modern Nationalism: The Case of Yugoslavia's Muslims, Reconsidered,” South Slav Journal, Vol. 13, 1990, p. 2 (emphasis added).Google Scholar

13. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991), p. 70.Google Scholar

14. The most eminent representative is Anthony Smith. See, for instance, Anthony Smith, ed., Ethnicity and Nationalism (New York: E. J. Brill, 1992); Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); “Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism,” International Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 2, 1996, pp. 445–458. In his later works, such as Ethnicity and Nationalism, Brass drifts from an instrumentalist to a mixed approach. See also Sandra Freitag, Collective Action and Community (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), who describes the Indian cow protection movements.Google Scholar

15. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, p. 75 (original emphasis).Google Scholar

16. Smith, “Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism,” pp. 445ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17. Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 34ff. points to the fact that Marxists and Liberals are subject to the same error: they have underestimated the force of ethnonationalism.Google Scholar

18. Like the primordialist Geertz, and the constructivists Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). See also Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). On the Marxist approach, see Les Back and John Solomos, “Marxism, Racism and Ethnicity,” American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 38, 1995, pp. 407–420. For an overview of the discussion, see Ramet, “Primordial Ethnicity or Modern Nationalism.”Google Scholar

19. Kohn is the most eminent scholar to defend this thesis. See also Elwert “Nationalismus und Ethnizität: Über die Bildung von Wir-Gruppen;” Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. edn (London: Verso, 1991); Friedrich Heckmann, “Ethnische Vorurteile,” in ibid., ed., Ethnische Minderheiten, Volk und Nation: Soziologie interethnischer Beziehungen (Stuttgart: Enke, 1992); Albert F. Reiterer, “Die politische Konstitution von Ethnizität,” in Seewann, Ethnische Minderheiten, Volk und Nation; Habermas, “Anerkennungskämpfe im demokratischen Rechtsstaat.” Some of the debates are illustrated well by Pedro Ramet, who refers to the Yugoslavian example. See Ramet, “Die Muslime Bosniens als Nation,” in Georg Brunner, Andreas Kappeler, and Gerhardt Simon, eds, Die Muslime in der Sowjetunion und in jugoslawien: Identität, Politik (Cologne: Markus, 1989); Deutsch in Nationalism and Social Communication also contributes to this approach with his theory of social communication.Google Scholar

20. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 130–132. He does make clear that he does not defend the view of an “awakening” of nations but the constructivist approach of a new form of social organization. However, he starts from primordial elements (language, literature) as independent variables that are used in the process of nation building. From this point of view he criticizes the philosopher Immanuel Kant, who, as Gellner says, defends a “bloodless” approach detached from any tradition. Gellner holds that with Kant's concept there could never be any nation building.Google Scholar

21. Smith, “Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism,” p. 447 (emphasis added).Google Scholar

22. Dipankar Gupta, The Context of Ethnicity: Sikh Identity in a Comparative Perspective (London: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 6.Google Scholar

23. Norbert Reiter, Gruppe, Sprache, Nation (Berlin: Harrassowitz, 1984), p. 346.Google Scholar

24. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, p.18.Google Scholar

25. In rare cases it can also be more than one element. For example, in Sri Lanka religion and language mostly overlap with the groups of Sinhalese and Tamils. Both factors serve as primary contrasts. But this does not change the structure of “ethnicity” as described.Google Scholar

26. On the role of the churches and Balkan nationalisms, see Lenard Cohen, “Prelates and Politicians in Bosnia: The Role of Religion in Nationalist Mobilisation,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1997, pp. 481–499; Robin Okey, “State, Church and Nation in the Serbo-Croat speaking Lands of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1850–1914,” in Donald A. Kerr, ed., Religion, State and Ethnic Groups (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1992); Drago Ocvirk, “Les religions dans les relations interéthniques: Le cas Yougoslave,” in Silvo Devetak, Sergej Flere, and Gerhard Seewann, eds, Kleine Nationen und Ethnische Minderheiten im Umbruch Europas (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1993).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

27. For definitions of “community” and “communalism” see Romila Tapar, Interpreting Early India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 61; Bipan Chandra, Communalism in Modern India (New Delhi: Vikas, 1987), pp. 1ff; Engineer, “India at Fifty: Fault Lines in Two-Nation Theory,” p. 6; Prahba Dixit, Communalism: A Struggle for Power (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1974), p. 1; K. N. Panikkar, Communal Threat, p.67.Google Scholar

28. Quoted from Klaus von Beyme, Systemwechsel in Osteuropa (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1994), p. 127.Google Scholar

29. John V. Fine, “The Medieval and Ottoman Roots of Modern Bosnian Society,” in Mark Pinson, ed., The Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 11ff; Hans-Michael Miedlig, “Zur Frage der Identität der Muslime in Bosnien-Herzegowina,” in Günter Scholl, ed., Südosteuropa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Fremde Wege—Eigene Wege (Berliner Jahrbuch für osteuropäische Geschichte) (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994), pp. 26ff; Wolfgang Höpken, “Die jugoslawischen Kommunisten und die bosnischen Muslime,” in Brunner, Kappeler, and Simon, eds, Die Muslime in der Sowjetunion und in Jugoslawien, pp. 181ff. For more information on the Bogumil church, see Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1998), pp. 27ff; Srecko M. Dzaja, Die “Bosnische Kirche” und das Islamisierungsproblem Bosniens und der Herzegowina in den Forschungen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1978); Konfessionalität und Nationalität Bosniens und der Herzegowina: Voremanzipatorische Phase 1463–1804 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1984); Smail Balic, Das unbekannte Bosnien: Europas Brücke zur islamischen Welt (Cologne: Böhlau, 1992), pp. 90ff.Google Scholar

30. Höpken, “Die jugoslawischen Kommunisten und die bosnischen Muslime,” p. 182. See also Atif Puritava, “On the National Phenomenon of the Moslems of Bosnia-Hercegovina,” in Dusan Blagojevic, ed., Nations and Nationalities of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: 1974), p. 307.Google Scholar

31. Purivata, “On the National Phenomenon of the Moslems of Bosnia-Hercegovina,” p. 307.Google Scholar

32. See also Zachary T. Irwin, “The Islamic Revival and the Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina,” East European Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1984, p. 445.Google Scholar

33. Purivata, “On the National Phenomenon of the Moslems of Bosnia-Hercegovina,” p. 317.Google Scholar

34. Dzaja, Die “Bosnische Kirche” und das Islamisierungsproblem Bosniens und der Herzegowina in den Forschungen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg; Henrik Birnbaum, “The Ethno-linguistic Mosaic of Bosnia and Hercegovina,” Die Welt der Sloven, Vol. 32, 1987, pp. 1–24; Raju Thomas, “History, Religion and National Identity,” in Richard H. Friman and Raju Thomas, eds, The South Slav Conflict: History, Ethnicity, and Nationalism (New York: Garland, 1996); Malcolm, Kosovo.Google Scholar

35. Dzaja, Konfessionalität und Nationalität Bosniens und der Herzegowina, pp. 28–29.Google Scholar

36. Dzaja, Die “Bosnische Kirche” und das Islamisierungsproblem Bosniens und der Herzegowina in den Forschungen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 69. He falls back on findings of V. Cubrilovic from 1935 (from sources from the fifteenth century), which have proven plausible today.Google Scholar

37. The Bosnian scholar Nedim Filipovic paid attention to this first. See Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 52; Dzaja, Die “Bosnische Kirche” und das Islamisierungsproblem Bosniens und der Herzegowina in den Forschungen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, pp. 72ff; Balic, Das unbekannte Bosnien, pp. 90ff. Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 309, points to a census from 1520 to 1530. According to this only 19% of the population in the Balkans were Muslims at that time. In Bosnia-Hercegovina the figure was 45%. Almost everywhere Muslims lived in the urban areas.Google Scholar

38. Purivata, interview with the author in Sarajevo, 27 June 2000. He stated that in the 1960s he only had available findings from the Yugoslav author Aleksandar Soloviev.Google Scholar

39. For more information, see Malcolm, Kosovo, pp. 27ff.Google Scholar

40. Dzaja, “Bosnien-Herzegowina,” in Michael Weithmann, ed., Der ruhelose Balkan (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1994), p. 152.Google Scholar

41. Malcolm, Kosovo, pp. 28–29; S. Ramet, “Primordial Ethnicity or Modern Nationalism,” p. 5.Google Scholar

42. See V. D. Savarkar, Hindutva: Who Is Hindu] (Dehli: Veer Savarkar Prakashan, 1969 [1922]); Madhar S. Golwalkar, We or Our Nationhood Defined (Bombay: Bahrat, 1938).Google Scholar

43. Romila Thapar, The Past and Prejudice (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1975), p. 6; “The Theory of Aryan Race and India: History and Politics,” Social Scientist, Vol. 24, Nos 1–3, 1996, p. 24; Satish Chandra, Historiography, Religion and the State in Medieval India (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1996), p. 33; A. K. Biswas, “The Aryan Myth,” in A. Ray and S. Mukherjee, eds, Historical Archaeology of India (New Delhi: Books & Books, 1990). Interestingly, these authors argue with the help of archeological data. Linguists, by contrast, still favor the migration theory. The arguments of the different camps can be found in George Erdosy, ed., The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia: Language, Material Culture and Ethnicity (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997).Google Scholar

44. Shrikant G. Talageri, Aryan Invasion Theory and Indian Nationalism (New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan, 1993).Google Scholar

45. An entertaining survey can be found in Ayesha Jalal, “Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1995 pp. 78ff.Google Scholar

46. Jinnah in a speech at the University of Aligarh, 10 March 1941. Asha Kaushik and Surenda N. Kaushik, “Religion as Political Ideology: The Separatist Crusade of Jinnah,” in Verinder Grover and Ranjana Arora, eds, Pakistan: Fifty Years of Independence. Vol. I: Towards Independence: The Pre-1947 Period (New Delhi: Deep and Deep, 1997), p. 44.Google Scholar

47. “Aiming Missiles,” The Economist, 9 May 1998.Google Scholar

48. See Gabriele Venzky, “Atomares Wettrennen der Erzfeinde,” Der Tagesspiegel, 19 May 1998.Google Scholar

49. Romila Thapar, Interpreting Early India (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 140.Google Scholar

50. Panikkar, Communal Threat, p. 73.Google Scholar

51. M. S. Gore, “Unity in Diversity,” Social Scientist, Vol. 24, Nos 1–3, 1996, p. 43.Google Scholar

52. The concepts of Ausbausprachen and Abstandsprachen can be found in Radoslav Katicic, “Serbokroatische Sprache—Serbisch-kroatischer Sprachenstreit,” in Reinhard Lauer and Werner Lehfeld, eds, Das jugoslawische Desaster: Historische, sprachliche und ideologische Hintergründe (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1995), p. 24.Google Scholar

53. For more on Herder's reception in the Balkans, see Sundhaussen, Der Einfluβ der Herderschen Ideen auf die Nationsbildung bei den Völkern der Habsburger Monarchic (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1973); Wolf D. Behschnitt, Nationalismus bei Serben und Kroaten, 1830–1914: Analyse und Typologie der nationalen Ideologic (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1980), p. 66; Reiter, Gruppe, Sprache, Nation, pp. 283, 386ff. On Herder's reception in India, see Vrajendra R. Mehta, Foundations of Indian Political Thought (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996), pp. 158ff, 187ff; Angadipuram Appadorai, Indian Political Thinking through the Ages (New Delhi: Khama, 1992), pp. 219ff.Google Scholar

54. For more on Vuk Karadzic, see Reinhard Lauer, Vuk Karadzic und seine Zeit (Göttingen: 1987).Google Scholar

55. On the intra-Serbian differences of language, see Birnbaum, “The Ethno-Linguistic Mosaic of Bosnia and Hercegovina,” p. 2.Google Scholar

56. On the escalating language struggle after the collapse of Yugoslavia, see Raju Thomas, “History, Religion and National Identity,” in Thomas and Friman, eds, The South Slav Conflict, p. 36. For Turkish elements in the Bosnian Muslim language, see David A. Dyker, “The Ethnic Muslims of Bosnia: Some Basic Socio-Economic Data,” Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 50, April 1972, p. 243; Birnbaum “The Ethno-Linguistic Mosaic of Bosnia and Hercegovina,” p. 18; Ludwig Steindorff, “Von der Konfession zur Nation: Die Muslime in Bosnien-Herze-gowina,” Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen, Vol. 37, No. 4, 1997, p. 288Google Scholar

57. Christopher Shackle and Rupert Snell, eds, Hindi and Urdu since 1800: A Common Reader (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1990); Hans R. Dua, “Hindi-Urdu as a Pluricentric Language,” in Michael Clyne, ed., Pluricentric Languages: Differing Norms in Different Nations (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1992); Jyotindra Das Gupta, Language Conflict and National Development: Group Politics and National Language Policy in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970); Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India.Google Scholar

58. See K. N. Panikkar, Culture, Ideology, Hegemony: Intellectuals and Social Consciousness in Colonial India (New Delhi: Tulika, 1995), p. 128; Vasudah Dalmia, The Nationalization of Hindu Traditions: Bharatendu Harischandra and Ninteenth-Century Benares (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 150. These findings underpin the arguments of Benedict Anderson.Google Scholar

59. Refer to the language conflict in the United Provinces as described in Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India, p. 130ff.Google Scholar

60. Lakhi, “Language and Regionalism in Pakistan,” p. 191.Google Scholar

61. Except for the forced missionizing of young boys in Bosnia under Ottoman rule.Google Scholar

62. Hamid Algar, “The Hamzeviye: A Deviant Movement in Bosnian Sufism,” Islamic Studies, Vol. 36, Nos 2–3, p. 243, states that syncretisms did not occur in Bosnia. Steindorff observes the opposite in “Von der Konfession zur Nation: Die Muslime in Bosnien-Herze-gowina,” p. 288. Steindorff's definition of syncretisms is very wide and suggests that he really means benevolent acceptance of other people's religious customs.Google Scholar

63. For more about sycretisms in India, see Yogendra Singh, Modernization of Indian Tradition: A Systematic Study of Social Change (New Delhi: Thomson Press, 1996), pp. 79–80; Dixit, Communalism, pp. 5, 20; Mushirul Hasan, Legacy of a Divided Nation: India's Muslims since Independence (London: Hurst, 1997).Google Scholar

64. Dominique-Sila Khan, Conversions and Shifting Identities: Ramdev Pir and the Ismails in Rajasthan (New Delhi: Manohar, 1997).Google Scholar

65. Aydin Babuna, Die nationale Entwicklung der bosnischen Muslime: Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der österreichisch-ungarischen Periode (Frankfurt: Lang, 1996), pp. 105ff; see also Dzaja, Bosnien-Herzegowina in der österreichisch-ungarischen Epoche (1878–1918), p. 61; Pinson, “The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina Under Austro-Hungarian Rule, 1878–1918,” pp. 99ff.Google Scholar

66. See Charles H. Heimsath, Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); also Panikkar, “Rationalism in the Religious Thought of Ram Mohan Roy,” in Indian History Congress Proceedings, 1973; for an introduction to Ram Mohan Roy and his ideas, see Gavin Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 251ff. On the homogenization of Hindudom, see Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics 1925–1990s: Strategies of Identity-Building, Implantation and Mobilization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). For more about the cow protection movements, see Anand Yang, “Sacred Symbol and Sacred Space in Rural India: Community Mobilization in the ‘Anti-Cow Killing’ Riot of 1893,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1980, pp. 576–596; Freitag, “Sacred Symbol as Mobilizing Ideology: The North Indian Search for a ‘Hindu Community,”’ Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1980, pp. 597–625; Peter van der Veer, “Riots and Rituals: The Construction of Violence and Public Space in Hindu Nationalism,” in: Brass, Riots and Pogroms, London.Google Scholar

67. On the Khilafat movement, see Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); B. R. Nanda, Gandhi, Pan-Islamism, Imperialism and Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 104ff.Google Scholar

68. Brass, Riots and Pogroms, p. 14.Google Scholar

69. Strategies and examples can be found in Thomas, “History, Religion and National Identity,” pp. 135–136; Marie-Janine Calic, Der Krieg in Bosnien-Herzegowina: Ursachen, Konfliktstrukturen, Internationale Lösungsversuche (Frankfurt: Shurkamp, 1996), pp. 92ff; Mirjana Morokvasic, “Krieg, Flucht und Vertreibung im ehemaligen Jugoslawien,” Demographie aktuell, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1993, p. 13; Laura Silber and Alan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin, 1995), pp. 269ff; Malcolm, Kosovo, pp. 216–217; Kursheed K. Aziz, ed., Muslims under Congress Rule 1937–39: A Documentary Record, 2 vols (Delhi: Renaissance, 1986), pp. 349ff; Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, p. 226.Google Scholar

70. Examples in Carsten Wieland, Nationalstaat wider Willen: Die Politisierung von Ethnien und die Ethnisierung der Politik, Bosnien, Indien, Pakistan (Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 2000), pp. 299ffGoogle Scholar

71. Press release, Washington, 10 February 1993, in Europa-Archiv, Vol. 7, 1993, pp. D158–D161.Google Scholar

72. Report (session 1933–1934), in Aziz, Muslims under Congress Rule 1937–39, Vol. 1, 1986, p. 13.Google Scholar

73. See Marie-Janine Calic and Volker Perthes, “Krieg und Konfliktlösung in Bosnien und Libanon: Ein Strukturvergleich,” Politik und Gesellschaft, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1995, pp. 144ff. They compare the situation with Libanon. See also the systematic approach of Laslo Sekelj in Yugoslavia: The Process of Disintegration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Vladimir Goati, “The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: The Role of Political Elites,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1997.Google Scholar

74. Sekelj, Yugoslavia, p. xxiii (original emphasis).Google Scholar

75. More than half of the Bosnian Serbs emigrated or lived together with Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the territory controlled by the government of Alija Izetbegovic (often rashly referred to as the “Muslim government”). See Wieland, “Die aktuellen Konfliktlinien in Bosnien-Herzegowina,” Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1995, pp. 188–198.Google Scholar

76. Seijfudin Tokic, “Ethnische Ideologie und Eroberungskrieg: Zur Kritik der Aufteilung Bosnien-Herzegowinas,” in Nenad Stefanov and Michael Werz, eds, Bosnien und Europa: Die Ethnisierung der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1994), pp. 175–176, 179.Google Scholar

77. Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, p. 252.Google Scholar

78. For more details see Wieland, Nationalstaat wider Willen, pp. 299ff. On the Bosnian case, see Sekelj, Yugoslavia; Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 56ff; Calic, Der Krieg in Bosnien-Herzegowina; Viktor Meier, Wie Jugoslawien verspielt wurde (Munich: Beck, 1995). On the Indian elections see Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936–1947 (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press: 1987); Sumit Sarkar, Modern India 1885–1947 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1983), p. 427; Sho Kuwajima, Muslims, Nationalism and the Partition: 1946 Provincial Elections in India (New Delhi: Manohar, 1998); Akbahr Ahmed, Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin (London: Routledge, 1997); Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).Google Scholar

79. Sekelj, Yugoslavia, pp. 17–18.Google Scholar

80. The final verdict is not spoken yet on how much the West influenced the outcomes in Yugoslavia. But even authors who place more guilt on the local elites (like Burg and Shoup) concede that the West missed many opportunities.Google Scholar

81. Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pp. 92ff; Radan, “The Badinter Arbitration Commission and the Partition of Yugoslavia,” pp. 537ff; Julia Goette, “Von Den Haag bis Dayton: Die internationale Staatengemeinschaft auf der Suche nach einer Lösung des dritten Balkankrieges (1991–1996),” in Elvert, ed., Der Balkan, p. 231; Alain Pellet, “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples,” European Journal of International Law, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1992; Miedlig (1992), in Südosteuropa, 1992, p. 120.Google Scholar

82. Johannes Vollmer, “Dayton—eine Pax Americana,” Europäische Rundschau, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1996, p. 9.Google Scholar

83. Stefan Troebst, “Balkanisches Politikmuster?, Nationalrevolutionäre Bewegungen in Südosteuropa und die “Ressource Weltöffentlichkeit,” Osteuropa, Vol. 50, No. 11, 2000, pp. 1254ff.Google Scholar

84. “UN-Vermittler: Kroaten und Bosnier sind Serben,” Der Tagesspiegel, 28 June 1995.Google Scholar

85. Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, p. 110Google Scholar

86. Descriptions and corresponding assessments of the international interventions may be found in, among others, Calic, Der Krieg in Bosnien-Herzegowina.Google Scholar

87. Radha Kumar, “Bosnia in the Annals of Partition: From Divide and Rule to Divide and Quit,” in Mushirul Hasan, ed., Islam, Communities and the Nation: Muslim Identities in South Asia and Beyond (Delhi: Manohar, 1998), pp. 426.Google Scholar

88. Jalal, The Sole Spokesman.Google Scholar

89. Bosnian lawyer Anis Bajrektarevic, interview with the author, 26 March 1998.Google Scholar

90. In both cases a Muslim “nation state” was proclaimed (Pakistan) or came close to existence (Bosnia) although many Muslims did not support this idea. In Bosnia, Izetbegovic and his colleagues in the Stranka Demokratske Akcije (SDA) (Party of Democratic Action) were at least ambiguous about this concept. See Wieland, Nationalstaat wider Willen.Google Scholar

91. Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).Google Scholar

92. Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Boston: Becaon, 1960), p. 92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

93. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, p. 528 (original emphasis).Google Scholar

94. Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism (London: Methuen, 1977), p. 5.Google Scholar

95. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 7 (original emphasis).Google Scholar

96. See also James Mayall and Mark Simpson, “Ethnicity Is Not Enough: Reflections on Protracted Secessionsism in the Third World,” in Smith, ed., Ethnicity and Nationalism, p. 8.Google Scholar

97. Hobsbawm, “Die neuen Nationalismen,” Die Zeit, 6 May 1999.Google Scholar

98. Robert Mickey and Adam Albion Smith, “Resolving Ethnic Conflict: A Rethorical Intervention,” in Devetak, Flere, and Seewann, eds, Kleine Nationen und Ethnische Minderheiten im Umbruch Europas, p. 63.Google Scholar

99. Mayall and Simpson, “Ethnicity Is Not Enough” pp. 7–8.Google Scholar

100. Louis Henkin, “The Mythology of Sovereignty,” in R. S. Macdonald, ed., Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1994). On the deconstruction of sovereignty in international law, see the arguments of Joseph Camilleri. Camilleri, “Rethinking Sovereignty in a Shrinking, Fragmented World,” in Saul H. Mendlovitz and R. B. J. Walker, eds, Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community (Boulder: L. Rienner, 1990). Otto Kimminich, Einführung in das Völkerrecht, 6th edn (Tübingen: Francke, 1997), pp. 90ff. Already Sieyès had warned of an overvaluation of the term “sovereignty;” see Adolf Dock, Revolution und Restauration über die Suveränität (Aalen: Sciencia, 1972 [1900]).Google Scholar

101. On the internal right of self-determination, see Hans-Joachim Heintze, Selbstbestimmungsrecht und Minderheitenrechte im Völkerrecht: Herausforderun-gen an den globalen und regionalen Menschenrechtsschutz (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994), pp. 84ff, 153ff.Google Scholar

102. James B. Steinberg, “International Involvement in the Yugoslav Conflict,” in Lori F. Damrosch, ed., Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. 57.Google Scholar

103. Rizman, “The Sociological Dimension of Conflicts between Ethnonationalisms,” p. 305.Google Scholar

104. Above all, in the Balkans in the first half of the twentieth century, it used to be common that even representatives of ethnonational parties, mostly of “Muslim” parties, described themselves “ethnically” as Serb or Croatian. All different combinations were possible. Examples are in S. Ramet “Primordial Ethnicity or Modern Nationalism: The Case of Yugoslavia's Muslims, Reconsidered,” p. 10.Google Scholar

105. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 442.Google Scholar

106. Riaz Hassan, “Islamization: An Analysis of Religious, Political and Social Change in Pakistan,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1985, p. 280.Google Scholar

107. In the municipal elections in April 2000 the Social Democrats trippled their share of the vote to 30% from 1997, whereas Izetbegovic's SDA suffered losses, especially in big cities like Sarajevo (data from the Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo).Google Scholar

108. Interview with Alija Izetbegovic in the Bosnian TV station TV-BH, 6 June 2000.Google Scholar

109. Mill, “On Liberty and Other Essays,” p. 434.Google Scholar

110. This contradiction is mentioned in Mayall and Simpson, “Ethnicity Is Not Enough,” p. 6; Rizman, ‘The Sociological Dimension of Conflicts between Ethnonationalisms,’' p. 304.Google Scholar

111. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, p. 318.Google Scholar

112. Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (Berlin: Duncker und Homboldt, 1991 [1932]).Google Scholar

113. For example, Lijphart's consociational model. See Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New York: Yale University Press, 1984); and Horowitz's recommendation of the Westminister majority system as mentioned in Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict. On these debates see also: Theodor Hanf and Sammy Smooha, ‘The Diverse Modes of Conflict Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies,’' in Smith, ed., Ethnicity and Nationalism, pp. 31–32; Heckmann, Ethnische Minderheiten, Volk und Nation, pp. 211–214; Vojislav Stanovcic, “Problems and Options in Institutionalizing Ethnic Relations,” International Political Science Review, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1992, pp. 364–368.Google Scholar

114. Alija Izetbegovic, The Islamic Declaration, o.O. 1970 (Sarajevo: Islamska deklaracija, 1990), p. 53.Google Scholar

115. For the Balkans, see Zivko M. Mikic, “Die Ethnogenese der Slawen aus der Sicht der Anthropologic,” in Wolfram Bernhard and Annelise Kandler-Palsson, Ethnogenese europäischer Völker (Stuttgart: Fischer, 1986), p. 339; for the Indian subcontinent, see Kenneth A. R. Kennedy, “Have Aryans Been Identified in the Prehistoric Skeletal Record from South Asia?: Biological Anthropology and Concepts of Ancient Races,” in Erdosy, ed., The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia, pp. 60–61.Google Scholar

116. The strategy of rowdies, rapers, and killers were very similar during the Bosnian war and the time of partition in India. For examples on Bosnia, see Thomas, “History, Religion and National Identity,” pp. 135–136; Calic, Der Krieg in Bosnien-Herzegowina, pp. 92ff; Morokvasic, “Krieg, Flucht und Vertreibung im ehemaligen Jugoslawien,” p. 13; Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, pp. 269ff; Malcolm, Bosnia, pp. 216–217; and on India, see Aziz, Muslims under Congress Rule 1937–39 (Vol I), pp. 349ff; Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, p. 226, Systematic Approaches: Engineer, “India at Fifty;” Brass, Riots and Pogroms.Google Scholar