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How the “Iron Minister” Kaganovich Failed to Discipline Ukrainian Historians: A Stalinist Ideological Campaign Reconsidered

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

Serhy Yekelchyk
Serhy Yekelchyk*
Affiliation:
Department of History and Classics at the University of Alberta, Canada
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Extract

In late February 1947, Stalin's trusted troubleshooter Lazar' Kaganovich arrived in Kiev as the Ukrainian Communist Party's new first secretary. Having served consecutively as the Soviet People's Commissar of Railroad Transport, Heavy Industry, and Construction Materials, the notoriously heavy-handed Kaganovich had earned the epithet of zheleznyi narkom (“iron minister”). His tenure at the head of the Ukrainian party organization in March–December 1947 was marked by intensified coercive intervention in the economy and ideological purges in culture and scholarship. In Ukraine, Kaganovich's brief rule is remembered primarily for his relentless attacks on the alleged remnants of “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism.” In the works of post-Soviet Ukrainian historians, the 1947 crusade against “nationalism” appears as a comprehensive campaign masterminded by Stalin, planned by his envoy Kaganovich, faithfully implemented by the servile republican functionaries, and submissively endured by the terrorized Ukrainian intellectuals. Clearly, modern Ukrainian historians have adopted the traditional Western concept of Stalinism as a successful totalitarian dictatorship, in which society was no more than a passive object of an all-powerful state.

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Articles
Information
Nationalities Papers , Volume 27 , Issue 4 , December 1999 , pp. 579 - 604
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 Association for the Study of Nationalities 

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References

Notes

1. See I. P. Kozhukhalo, “Vplyv kul'tu osoby Stalina na ideolohichni protsesy na Ukraini v 40-i—na pochatku 50-kh rokiv,” Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal , No. 2, 1989, pp. 14–26; L. A. Shevchenko, “Kul'tura Ukrainy v umovakh stalins'koho totalitaryzmu (druha polovyna 40-x—pochatok 50-kh rokiv,” in V. M. Danylenko, ed., Ukraina XX st.: kul'tura, ideolohiia, polityka (Kiev: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NANU, 1993), pp. 119–30; Olena Zamlyns'ka, “Ideolohichnyi teror ta represii proty tvorchoi intelihentsii u pershi povoienni roky (1945–1947 rr.),” Kyivs'ka starovyna, No. 2, 1993, pp. 73–80; V. I. Iurchuk, Kul'turne zhyttia v Ukraini u povoienni roky: svitlo i tini (Kiev: Asotsiatsiia Ukraino, 1995), pp. 26–21, 36–48.Google Scholar

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9. On the challenges that the addition of “nationalistic” Western Ukrainians represented to the Soviet nationality policy, see Yaroslav Bilinsky, “The Incorporation of Western Ukraine and Its Impact on Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine,” in Roman Szporluk, ed., The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on the USSR (New York: Praeger, 1975); Roman Szporluk, “West Ukraine and West Belorussia: Historical Tradition, Social Communication, and Linguistic Assimilation,” Soviet Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1979, pp. 76–98. On the nationalist insurgency in postwar Ukraine, see John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 3rd edn (Englewood, CO: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990); Jeffrey Burds, “Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks and the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944–48,” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1997, pp. 89–130.Google Scholar

10. This is argued in more detail in Serhy Yekelchyk, “Celebrating the Soviet Present: The Zhdanovshchina Campaign in Ukrainian Literature and the Arts, 1946–48,” in Donald J. Raleigh, ed., Provincial Landscapes: Local Dimensions of the Soviet Power, 1917–1953 (University of Pittsburgh Press, forthcoming).Google Scholar

11. See the minutes of the republican conference on the problems of propaganda (24–26 June 1946) in Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads‘kykh ob”iednan’ Ukrainy (hereafter TsDAHO), fond 1, opys 70, sprava 436.Google Scholar

12. See Yaroslav Bilinsky, The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1964), pp. 234–235; David R. Marples, “Khrushchev, Kaganovich and the 1947 Crisis,” in Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 82–96; Iu. I. Shapoval, Ukraina 20–50-kh rokiv: storinky nenapysanoi istorii (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1993), pp. 265–267; idem, Lazar Kahanovych (Kiev: Znannia, 1994), pp. 35–40.Google Scholar

13. The photograph of Kaganovich's copy of the protocol is reproduced in Lazar' Kaganovich, Pamiatnye zapiski (Moscow: Vagrius, 1995), between Pp. 288 and 289. Ponomarenko recalled that Stalin had decided to divide the offices of party leader and premier in Ukraine, Belarus, and at the federal level because combining them was “no longer necessary” after the war. Then, however, Stalin announced that he would “temporarily” continue holding both positions. See “Otvet P. K. Ponomarenko na voprosy G. A. Kumaneva 2 noiabria 1978 g.,” Otechestvennaia istoriia, No. 6, 1998, pp. 133–149, here pp. 148–149.Google Scholar

14. N. S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers , trans. and ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little ∧ Brown, 1970), p. 242. Kaganovich's account of his second appointment in Ukraine is in Pamiatnye zapiski, pp. 487–94.Google Scholar

15. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 1036, ark. 17. It is not clear just how Kryp”iakevych managed to continue his career under Soviet power after the war. A recent Ukrainian documentary publication suggests that either before or during the war he had been the Soviet secret police's informant in Western Ukrainian ecclesiastical and intellectual circles. In the autumn of 1944, the NKVD “re-established” contacts with him. See Iurii Slyvka, ed., Kul'turne zhyttia v Ukraini: zakhidni zemli: dokumenty i materialy Vol. 1:1939–1953 (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1995), p. 217.Google Scholar

16. Naukovyi arkhiv Instytutu istorii Ukrainy Natsional'noi akademii nauk Ukrainy (hereafter NAIIU), op. 1, spr. 95, ark. 3 (plan for 1947); spr. 215, ark. 1–13 (report for 1946–1950).Google Scholar

17. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 8, spr. 316, ark. 27. Interestingly, the same decree envisaged a conference of literary historians to be held in late May, but the authorities apparently abandoned the idea after the historians' meeting.Google Scholar

18. M. V. Koval' and O. S. Rubl'ov, “Instytut istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy: pershe dvadtsiatyrichchia (1936–1956 rr.),” Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal , No. 6, 1996, pp. 50–68, here pp. 60–61.Google Scholar

19. Dmytro Manuil's'kyi (1883–1959) belonged to a small group of well-educated “old Bolsheviks” who survived the Great Purges. Even within this handful of Bolshevik intellectuals, he was probably the only Lenin appointee still enjoying a position of authority after the Second World War. Manuil's'kyi studied at St Petersburg University and received a law degree from the Sorbonne (1911). After briefly serving as the Ukrainian Communist Party's general secretary in 1921–1922, he moved to Moscow as secretary of the Comintern's Executive Committee. In 1944–1950, Manuil's'kyi served as the Ukrainian republic's minister of foreign affairs, deputy premier, and head of the Ukrainian delegation to the U.N.Google Scholar

20. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 1–2 (Manuil's'kyi), 4–6 (Los'). Excerpts from the conference minutes have been recently published in V. A. Smolii, ed., U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu: pershe dvadtsiatyrichchia Instytutu istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy (1936–1956 rr.): zbirnyk dokumentiv i materially (Kiev: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NANU, 1996), Part 2, pp. 31–72, here 31–35.Google Scholar

21. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 14–27 (Petrovs'kyi), 36–38 (Brychkevych), 37 (Kaganovich); U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu, 2:38–40 (Petrovs'kyi's speech is not published). Mykola Petrovs'kyi (1894–1951) belonged to the so-called “old specialists.” A priest's son, he received his education before the revolution, briefly worked with Hrushevs'kyi during the 1920s, and was never admitted into the party. In 1942–1947, he served as director of the Institute of History of Ukraine; in 1944–1947, also as chair of Ukrainian history at Kiev University, corresponding member of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences (1945), member of the Ukrainian delegation to the U.N. Assembly in San Francisco (1945) and London (1946), as well as at the Paris Peace Conference (1946). See NAIIU, op. 1L, spr. 115; V. A. Smolii, ed., Vcheni Instytutu istorii Ukrainy: biobibliohrafichnyi dovidnyk (Kiev: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NANU, 1998), pp. 249–250.Google Scholar

22. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 47; U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu, 2: 41. Kaganovich had attended only the session on 29 April. Manuil's'kyi and secretary for ideology Kost' Lytvyn represented the Central Committee during the 30 April and 6 May sessions.Google Scholar

23. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 59–62, 82–83, 99, 166 (Petrovs'kyi), 248–250 (Huslystyi), 159–160 (Rubach). Mikhail Pokrovskii: the leading Russian Marxist historian during the first decade after the revolution. After the Stalinist “Revolution from Above,” he was denounced posthumously for “abstract sociologism.”Google Scholar

24. Ibid., 113–115 (Rubach), 139 (Bortnikov), 254 (Huslystyi).Google Scholar

25. Ibid, ark. 255 (Huslystyi), 139–152 (Bortnikov).Google Scholar

26. Ibid., 262–263; U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu, Part 2, p. 60. The Soviet government created the Order of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi—the only Soviet military order named after a non-Russian historic hero—on 10 October 1943. See Pravda, 11 October 1943, p. 1.Google Scholar

27. K. Litvin [Lytvyn], “Ob istorii ukrainskogo naroda,” Bol'shevik , No. 7, 1947, pp. 41–56, here p. 52.Google Scholar

28. TsDAHO, See, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 729, ark. 138–141 (Lytvyn's speech at the August 1946 plenary meeting of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee).Google Scholar

29. Litvin, “Ob istorii ukrainskogo naroda,” 51; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 260–261.Google Scholar

30. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 261–262; U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu , Part 2, p. 59. During this argument, Lytvyn spoke Russian and Huslystyi spoke Ukrainian.Google Scholar

31. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 311; U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu , Part 2, pp. 70–71.Google Scholar

32. Alexei Kojevnikov has shown that Soviet scientists successfully used the official Stalinist rituals of criticism and self-criticism to advance their own scholarly or personal agendas. See his “Rituals of Stalinist Culture at Work: Science and the Games of Intraparty Democracy circa 1948,” Russian Review, Vol. 57, No. 1, 1998, pp. 25–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

33. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 757, ark. 49 (Stetsiuk), 68 (Sluts'kyi).Google Scholar

34. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 536, ark. 4 (memo); spr. 754, ark. 8–10zv (resumes).Google Scholar

35. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 16, spr. 32, ark. 47 (approved in principle, reported to Moscow on 28 May), 48 (title; decision to revise the draft), 49zv (Kaganovich's note). Manuil'skyi's personal archive preserved what seems to be the first working draft of the lost anti-“nationalist” resolution. The file contains Manuil'skyi's notes apparently made during the meeting with Kaganovich or the session of the Politburo and his later draft developing these ideas. Aside from general ideological pronouncements after the 1946 model, the text contains few concrete accusations. See Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlady i upravlinnia Ukrainy (hereafter TSDAVOV), f. 4669, op. 1, spr. 44, ark. 24–29 (draft), 30–39 (notes).Google Scholar

36. Shapoval, See, Ukraina 20–50-kh rokiv, p. 271–72 and Lazar Kahanovych, p. 40; Zamlyns'ka, “Ideolohichnyi teror,” pp. 79–80. At the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1962, the then Ukrainian first secretary, Mykola Pidhirny, reported that “As a great master of intrigue and provocation, [Kaganovich] had entirely groundlessly accused the republic's leading writers and also some top-rank party workers of nationalism. On his directives, the press carried annihilating articles against the writers, who were devoted to the party and the people. But this did not satisfy Kaganovich. He began pushing for a plenary meeting of the Central Committee with the agenda ‘The Struggle against Nationalism, the Main Danger within the CP(b)U,’ although such danger did not exist at all. And could not have existed, for, happily for us, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine had long been headed by the staunch Leninist Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, who educated the communists and the Ukrainian people in the spirit of internationalism (stormy applause), friendship of peoples, selfless devotion to the great ideas of Leninism (prolonged stormy applause).” See XXII s”ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, 17–31 oktiabria 1961 g.: stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1962), Vol. 1, p. 280. Pidhirny went on to say that Khrushchev had destroyed Kaganovich's evil plans. Ukrainian historians usually take both the legend and Pidhirny's words at their face value. In contrast, David Marples treats Pidhirny's pronouncements judiciously and warns that the “image of a mild Khrushchev trying to prevent Kaganovich's repressive policies is essentially a myth.” See Marples, “Khrushchev, Kaganovich and the 1947 Crisis,” pp. 90–96, here 90.Google Scholar

37. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 1130, ark. 4 (resolution), 8–23 (directive on history text), 24–73 (resolutions and directives on literature and party history). Manuil'skyi's notes and drafts are in TSDAVOV, f. 4669, op. 1, spr. 23, 43, 134.Google Scholar

38. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 618, ark. 1–125, here 1, 34.Google Scholar

39. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 8, spr. 328, ark. 6–7.Google Scholar

40. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 1073, ark. 16–24. Published in I. F. Kuras, ed., Natsional'ni vidnosyny v Ukraini u XX st.: zbirnyk dokumentiv i materiallv (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1994), pp. 291–96 and U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu, Part 2, pp. 80–89. Manuil's'kyi's drafts are in TSDAVOV, f. 4669, op. 1, spr. 23, ark. 47–55; the variants of the final draft prepared by the apparatus of the Central Committee, are in TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 980, ark. 3–9.Google Scholar

41. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 1073, ark. 16–17.Google Scholar

42. Ibid., ark. 17, 18.Google Scholar

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45. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 621, ark. 166–208.Google Scholar

46. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 760, ark. 168–169. Petrovs'kyi's speech is recorded on ark. 28–36, comments by Stoian on ark. 44–47, by Sluts'kyi on 132–145. The archives of the Central Committee preserved no less than three copies of the minutes: see also op. 70, spr. 758 and 759.Google Scholar

47. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 760, ark. 76. Huslystyi referred to the 1940 Short Course , not the new project underway in the late 1940s. See S. M. Bielousov [Bilousov] et al., eds, Istoriia Ukrainy: korotkyi kurs (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo AN URSR, 1940).Google Scholar

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49. See TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 621, ark. 166–174.Google Scholar

50. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 744, ark. 52–56; U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu, 2:104–108. The party committee of Kiev University, where Petrovs'kyi served as chair of the History of Ukraine, reacted more eagerly: it “established control” over the professor's lectures. See TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 744, ark. 82–83zv.Google Scholar

51. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 621, ark. 175–186; spr. 1090, ark. 1–10; spr. 1494, ark. 1-10; spr. 1620, ark. 1–11.Google Scholar

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54. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 761, ark. 23–35; U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu , Part 2, pp. 93–100.Google Scholar

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56. Ibid., ark. 25–26.Google Scholar

57. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 73, spr. 398, ark. 1–22, especially 12 and 19 on Western Ukraine.Google Scholar

58. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 8, spr. 340, ark. 13–14; U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu , Part 2, pp. 119–120.Google Scholar

59. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 762, ark. 1–20 (draft); spr. 763, ark. 1 (Petrovs'kyi's letter), 2–22 (draft), 24–35 (new draft), spr. 764, ark. 1–25 (another copy of a new draft). Kasymenko was appointed director on 25 October 1947 and would remain at this post until 1964. He graduated from the Poltava Institute of People's Education in 1926 and before the war taught in Poltava and Zhytomyr. During the war, Kasymenko worked in the apparatus of the Ukrainian Central Committee and in 1945–1947 in the republican Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He would publish his first book, The Reunification of Ukraine with Russia and Its Historic Significance, only in 1954. See Smolii, ed., Vcheni Instytutu istorii Ukrainy, pp. 124–125.Google Scholar

60. The offices of the Central Committee's first secretary and premier remained separated. Khrushchev's client Dem”ian Korotchenko became Ukraine's new chairman of the Council of Ministers.Google Scholar

61. XVI z”izd Koministychnoi Partii (bil'shovykiv) Ukrainy 25–28 sichnia 1949 r.: materialy z”izdu (Kiev: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo politychnoi literatury URSR, 1949), p. 46. Note that Khrushchev got the name of the Institute of Ukrainian Literature wrong when he first mentioned it. The editors apparently missed the discrepancy.Google Scholar

62. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4956, ark. 1–5.Google Scholar

63. Radians'ka Ukraina , 8 October 1947, pp. 2–3. Unfortunately, the first series of anonymous letters is missing from the folder in the archives of the Central Committee, being apparently forwarded to the Ministry of State Security. As more anonymous letters followed, the editor started making copies for his party superiors as well. Ivan Mazepa: the Cossack hetman who, in the early eighteenth century, concluded a union against tsar Peter I with the Swedish king Charles XII. Symon Petliura: one of the leaders of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917–1920. Dmytro Dontsov: the leading theoretician of Ukrainian nationalism in the early twentieth century. Ievhen Konovalets': prewar head of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.Google Scholar

64. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4957, ark. 3. Incidentally, Dniprodzerzhyns'k was known to be a heavily Russified industrial settlement with little if any Ukrainian cultural life. Leonid Brezhnev was born and started his political career there.Google Scholar

65. Ibid., ark. 4–8.Google Scholar

66. Ibid., ark. 2.Google Scholar

67. Ibid., ark. 10–21.Google Scholar

68. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 387, ark. 18. Both Doroshenko and Mazepa fought against Muscovy and were considered “traitors” in Russian historiography.Google Scholar

69. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4956, ark. 6–7.Google Scholar

70. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 5072, ark. 13.Google Scholar

71. Ibid., ark. 24–25.Google Scholar

72. Ibid., ark. 26–28, 42.Google Scholar

73. Ibid., ark. 46–48.Google Scholar

74. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4958, ark. 22.Google Scholar

75. Ibid., ark. 27–31.Google Scholar