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The Challenge of Radical Islam in Tajikistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

Emmanuel Karagiannis
Emmanuel Karagiannis*
Affiliation:
Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict, University of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. [email protected]
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Extract

Islam is by far the dominant religious faith in Tajikistan. At the end of the seventh century and the beginning of the eighth century Arab armies led by Qutayba Ibn Muslim conquered the region of Sogdiana, which included the northern part of present-day Tajikistan. The Arab invaders converted the local population to Islam and since then the Muslim faith has become an integral part of the Tajik culture. According to Tajikistan's State Committee on Religious Affairs, 97% of the Tajik population is currently Muslim and is served by 3224 mosques, 19 medresses (Muslim theological schools) and an Islamic university. An estimated 30–40% of the rural population and 5–10% of the urban population regularly follow Muslim practices or attend mosques.

Type
Articles
Information
Nationalities Papers , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , March 2006 , pp. 1 - 20
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 Association for the Study of Nationalities 

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References

Notes

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64. Hizb ut-Tahrir Tajikistan, (leaflet) “Otnositelno referenduma provodimogo korruptsionirovannym pravitelstvom Tadzhikistana” [Concerning the referendum to be carried out by the corrupt government of Tajikistan], 19 June 2003.Google Scholar

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