GDP is forecast to grow at a rate of 1.7 per cent this year and 1.9 per cent in 2018.

Consumer price inflation is projected to peak at 3.4 per cent at the end of 2017.

We expect the MPC to keep interest rates unchanged until mid-2019, despite the temporary rise in inflation.

The current fiscal rule suggests further fiscal tightening is now needed in the next Parliament.

Global output growth is forecast to pick up from 3.1 per cent in 2016 to 3.3 per cent in 2017 and 3.6 per cent in 2018 – a slightly stronger acceleration than expected in February. Projected medium-term growth is still well below pre-crisis rates.

A striking feature of the current conjuncture is unusual uncertainty, particularly about the interpretation of recent ‘soft’ data showing increased business and consumer confidence in the advanced economies, US economic policies, and policies in Europe in the face of national elections in the largest economies.

There are significant risks to our growth forecast on both the upside and the downside but of particular concern are the downside risks related to the adoption of more populist policies in advanced economies.

The world of work is changing in ways that were not anticipated at the start of the century. Technology, globalisation and the creation of new business models based on digital platforms are creating new types of jobs, contracting arrangements and transactions. As Diane Coyle describes in her paper on work in the digital economy, temporary and flexible contracts are proliferating, with an estimated 905,000 people on ‘zero hours’, 29 per cent higher than in 2014. While remote working has been common in sectors such as IT for some time, the workplace itself has transformed for many and is in some cases virtual rather than physical. These changes offer opportunities for some, including those who are excluded from traditional work modes, and challenges for others. Platform models such as the on-line marketplace Etsy may facilitate access to the formal labour market for the economically inactive or long-term unemployed but offer little social protection. Regardless of the outcome of current legal disputes over the employment status of ‘employees’ or ‘service providers’ in the ‘gig’ economy, because of difficulties in enforcement, these new forms of work carry a strong potential to exacerbate inequalities in the labour market which are apparent in disparities by social class, ethnicity and gender.

Digital platforms have the potential to create benefits for their suppliers or workers as well as their customers, yet there is a heated debate about the character of this work and whether the platforms should be more heavily regulated. Beyond the high-profile global platforms, the technology is contributing to changing patterns of work. Yet the existing framework of employment legislation and public policy more broadly – from minimum wages to benefits and pensions – is structured around the concept of ‘the firm’ as the agent of policy delivery. To reshape policies in order to protect the interests of people as workers as well as consumers, it is important to understand why digital innovators make the choices they do, and therefore how labour market policies can improve working conditions without constraining the productivity and consumer benefits enabled by digital business models.

In this paper we explain some of the difficulties of providing forecasts of the financial benefits of early intervention programmes, focussing on those delivered during the early childhood period. We highlight the diversity of early intervention, and the complexity and multiplicity of outcomes. We summarise recent work at the Early Intervention Foundation to assess the evidence on the impacts of early intervention, recognising the diversity of approaches to delivery and the importance of innovation and local practice as well as of rigorous approaches to evaluating causal effects. We also describe new ways of assessing accurately the local fiscal costs of late intervention and consider the implications of this for addressing the well-established barriers to investment in prevention. Our analysis brings to the fore gaps in the evidence from which even the most rigorous ‘gold-standard’ research is not immune. These limitations prevent the production of an accurate and realistic cost-benefit ratio or net present value for the majority of programmes as delivered in practice. We suggest some paths towards a firmer foundation of evidence and a better alignment of evidence and policy.

We use eleven-plus test and appeals data obtained from a large local authority to explore how the process of admission to grammar schools produces such a strong social gradient in entry rates. We look at disparities between eleven-plus and subsequent SATs scores by social background for each element of the test. We then turn to whether the headteacher assessment panel seems to help or hinder poor students on the cusp of passing. Our analysis has implications for how to improve access to grammar schools for those from disadvantaged families.

Most students do not follow the ‘academic track’ (i.e. A-levels) after leaving school and only about a third of students go to university before the age of 20. Yet progression routes for the majority that do not take this path but opt for vocational post-compulsory education are not as well-known, which partly has to do with the complexity of the vocational education system and the difficulty of deciphering available data. If we are to tackle long-standing problems of low social mobility and a long tail of underachievers, it is essential that post-16 vocational options come under proper scrutiny. This paper is a step in that direction.

We use linked administrative data to track decisions made by all students in England who left compulsory education after having undertaken the national examination – the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) – at age 16 in the year 2009/10. We track them up to the age of 21, as they progress through the education system and (for some) into the labour market. We categorise the many different types of post-16 qualifications into several broad categories and we look at the probability of achieving various educational and early labour market outcomes, conditional on the path chosen at age 17. We also take into account the influence of demographics, prior attainment and the secondary school attended. Our findings illustrate the strong inequality apparently generated by routes chosen at age 17, even whilst controlling for prior attainment and schooling up to that point

In this paper we explore for the first time regional differences in the patterning of occupational social mobility in the UK. Drawing on data from Understanding Society (US), supported by the Labour Force Survey (LFS), we examine how rates of absolute and relative intergenerational occupational mobility vary across 19 regions of England, Scotland and Wales. Our findings somewhat problematise the dominant policy narrative on regional social mobility, which presents London as the national ‘engine-room’ of social mobility. In contrast, we find that those currently living in Inner London have experienced the lowest regional rate of absolute upward mobility, the highest regional rate of downward mobility, and a comparatively low rate of relative upward mobility into professional and managerial occupations. This stands in stark contrast to Merseyside and particularly Tyne and Wear where rates of both absolute and relative upward mobility are high, and downward mobility is low. We then examine this Inner London effect further, finding that it is driven in part by two dimensions of migration. First, among international migrants, we find strikingly low rates of upward mobility and high rates of downward mobility. Second, among domestic migrants, we find a striking overrepresentation of those from professional and managerial backgrounds. These privileged domestic migrants, our results indicate, are less likely to experience downward mobility than those from similar backgrounds elsewhere in the country. This may be partly explained by higher educational qualifications, but may also be indicative of a glass floor or opportunity hoarding.