We propose a nowcasting system to obtain real-time predictive intervals for the first-release of UK quarterly GDP growth that can be implemented in a menu-driven econometric software. We design a bottom-up approach: forecasts for GDP components (from the output and the expenditure approaches) are inputs into the computation of probabilistic forecasts for GDP growth. For each GDP component considered, mixed-data-sampling regressions are applied to extract predictive content from monthly and quarterly indicators. We find that predictions from the nowcasting system are accurate, in particular when nowcasts are computed using monthly indicators 30 days before the GDP release. The system is also able to provide well-calibrated predictive intervals.

The UK faces a number of economic challenges in the short to medium term. Prior to COVID-19, renegotiation of trading arrangements with the European Union was the most prominent of these. We build on existing macroeconomic analysis by assessing prospects for the UK’s regions generated by combining a global macroeconometric model and a regional computable general equilibrium of the UK. A central macroeconomic scenario shows a national average annual GDP growth rate of 1.7 per cent to 2044. When the macroeconomic scenario is applied across regions, growth rates range from 1.6 per cent for Cambridge to 2.2 per cent for Pembrokeshire; the standard deviation is low at 0.07 per cent and the coefficient of variation is 0.04 per cent. In contrast, much wider variation is observed in the standard deviation for exports (0.36 per cent), investment (0.11 per cent) and consumption (0.14 per cent). The country results favour Scotland, which grows at an annual rate of 1.8 per cent, whereas Wales is the slowest growing of the countries at 1.7 per cent. Consistent with the macroeconomic analysis, international trade is the most important contributor to the regional variation in growth rates. We also analyse the effects of higher government consumption relative to the forecasts and find most regions are predicted to experience lower economic activity except the handful in which government consumption is a much higher share of GDP than average.

Policymakers need to know if the structure of competition and the degree of banking market concentration change the incidence of financial crises. Previous studies have not always come to clear conclusions. We use a new dataset of 19 countries where we include capital adequacy and house price growth as factors affecting crisis incidence, and we find a positive role for bank concentration in reducing incidence. In addition, we look at New Industrial Economics indicators of market structure and find that increased market power also reduces crisis incidence. We conclude that attempts to increase competition in banking, although welcome for welfare reasons, should be accompanied by increases in capital standards.

I assess a novel rule that was introduced in the UK in 2015. It gave the British government fiscal flexibility whenever GDP growth warranted it. This rule lasted just a year, but it had features worth exploring. I apply solution methods for models with occasionally-binding constraints to assess the demand stabilisation properties of state-contingent fiscal rules. First it is shown that fiscal flexibility can make recessions shallower. Second, it is suggested that GDP growth, rather than measures of the output gap, is a better indicator for triggering fiscal flexibility.

Under the Trump administration, a transatlantic trade conflict has been escalating step by step. First, it was about tariffs on steel and aluminium, then about retaliation for the French digital tax, which is suspended until the end of the year. Most recently, the US administration threatened the European Union with tariffs on cars and car parts because of Canadian seafood being subject to lower import duties. As simulations with NiGEM show, a further escalation of the transatlantic trade conflict has the potential to slow down economic growth significantly in the countries involved. This is a considerable risk given the fact that the countries have to cope with the enormous negative effects of the pandemic shock. Furthermore, the damage caused by the trade conflict depends on the extent to which the affected countries use fiscal policy to stabilise their economies.