Since our last forecast, the level of sterling and its future prospects have changed dramatically, with the effective rate rising by around 10 per cent. Early signs of a shift in sentiment towards sterling could be seen in the Autumn, with the rate against the D-Mark rising from 2.31 at the end of August to 2.46 at the end of October with smaller increases against the other currencies. At that time it was not clear whether the rise would be sustained. Now, towards the end of January, sterling stands at 2.70 against the D-Mark and 1.66 against the dollar, respectively 17 per cent and 6½ per cent higher than at the end of August.

There are now widespread signs that activity in the world economy has begun to recover steadily from the pause in growth apparent at the beginning of 1996. Output rose by 0.6 per cent in the North American economies in the third quarter of last year and by 0.8 per cent in Europe. Business and consumer sentiment has improved gradually in recent months in most of the major economies. We expect world economic growth to pick up further over the course of this year as the contractionary effects from the downturn in world trade and prolonged inventory adjustment come to an end and as the effects from a more relaxed monetary stance begin to outweigh those from ongoing fiscal consolidation. Recent currency movements should help to stimulate external demand in Germany, France and Japan, but may act to constrain growth within the UK, Italy and the US. For both this year and 1998 we expect growth of around 2½ per cent per annum in the OECD economies.

The German economy is recovering hesitantly from the sharp post-unification boom and recession. Two features of recent West German performance are novel: there has been an unprecedented loss of jobs in industry, and manufacturing profitability has been pushed to its lowest level ever and is now low relative to other OECD economies. Serious problems with labour costs and innovation would be expected to show up in a weakening in the trend of export performance. That this has not yet happened is the consequence of the existence of an apparently robust innovation system which enables companies to pursue high quality incremental innovation strategies. However, the experiment of transferring the West German model to the East has proved extremely costly and has not so far established the basis for self-sustaining growth. Problems in profitability, investment and employment in West Germany reflect the failure of the bargaining system—unions, employers, Bundesbank and public sector—to negotiate the sharing of the burden of unification.

Competition in telecommunications is being promoted throughout the world with extensive liberalisation occurring in many countries. Past monopoly provision means that the new era of competition features large incumbent operators. The traditional lack of rivalry means that to accommodate competition liberalisation entails the entry of new operators. These conditions could prompt incumbents to abuse their dominant position when confronted with new entry. Foreclosure problems in telecommunications are potentially very acute because successful entry is dependent on the incumbent offering interconnection. The services provided through interconnection, such as call origination and call termination, and the charges levied for these services, access prices, lie at the heart of pro-competitive measures. The access prices set by incumbents will require scrutiny In practice regulatory authorities face difficulties in evaluating access prices that balance the competing claims of the incumbent and entrants, and ensure that reasonable prices are established which are compatible with the promotion of efficient competition. In this article I outline some theoretical contributions on access pricing which have helped regulators to design regulatory regimes to promote efficient competition.

European policymakers have repeatedly suggested that fiscal-policy coordination and fiscal federalism will play key roles in Europe's monetary union. This paper warns that this hope is misplaced. Fiscal federalism will not be available to offset recessionary shocks for the foreseeable future. The effects of coordination designed to internalise the cross-border spillovers of fiscal policies are too weak. Freeing up fiscal policy to replace national governments' loss of monetary independence requires allowing European countries' automatic stabilisers to operate. That in turn requires a flexible application of the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability Pact.

The solution suggested here is that the Excessive Deficit Procedure and any fines and sanctions associated with the Stability Pact be applied to the constant-employment budget balance, not the actual deficit. Applying them to actual deficits when European countries enter EMU up against the 3 per cent limit will render fiscal policy strongly procyclical, aggravating the problem of macroeconomic fragility created by the loss of monetary autonomy. Still, countries like Germany haunted by the spectre of fiscal pro fligacy need to be reassured that member states will not abuse their fiscal discretion. Procedural and institutional reform to offset the deficit bias in national political systems is the obvious quid pro quo.