• • The budget was expansionary, bringing about a cumulative fiscal loosening of 1.5-2 per cent of GDP over the next four years.

• • As a consequence, the pound and long-term interest rates will be higher, while immediate pressure to raise short-term rates is reduced.

• • After a further quarter point increase in the repo rate to 6.25 per cent, we expect a pause in monetary tightening for the rest of the year.

• • Sterling's strength will hit manufacturing which will grow by only 1.2 per cent in 2000, compared with overall GDP growth of 2.8 per cent.

• • Despite continuing low claimant unemployment and earnings growth of 5.5 per cent in 2000, the labour market is not over-stretched.

• • The world economy will experience a synchronised upturn for the first time since 1994, with growth accelerating in 2000 in all the major regions.

• • Despite global economic growth of over 4 per cent in 2000, inflation will remain under control at 2 per cent in the OECD area.

• • The US economy will expand by 4.5 per cent, spurring the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates to 7 per cent by the beginning of next year.

• • The euro zone will grow by 3.4 per cent, prompting the European Central Bank to raise interest rates to 4 per cent by the end of 2000 and 4.5 per cent in 2001.

• • Although the Japanese economy has technically slipped back into recession, we expect growth of 1 per cent in 2000, strengthening to 2.4 per cent in 2001.

One of the unusual features of the British economy in recent years has been the remarkable stability of inflation. RPIX inflation has not moved by more than half a percentage point of its 2½ per cent target since the end of 1996, suggesting that aggregate demand has been fairly close to supply throughout this period.

Domestic demand is expected to continue to be the driving force behind growth in the economy in 2000, while net trade offers a negative contribution. Household expenditure is forecast to grow by 3½ per cent, before slowing to 2½ per cent thereafter. Both fixed investment and government consumption are expected to grow this year at similar rates. The forecast rate of growth of domestic demand in 2000 is slightly faster than the main components at 4 per cent because of the accumulation of stocks, which were run down last year. Export growth is forecast to pick up to 5½ per cent against 3.9 per cent last year, rising further to 6 per cent in 2001. Imports on the other hand are forecast to grow at over 8 per cent this year, before slowing next year and in 2002.

Global economic activity has continued to gain momentum in recent months and a cyclical upturn is now clearly underway. The rate of growth of world GDP is projected to rise to just under 4¼ per cent this year, from an estimated outturn of 3.4 per cent last year. Growth is expected to accelerate in all the major regional markets for the first time since 1994. The improving economic prospects are already apparent in the trade statistics for the latter part of last year. World trade growth, measured in terms of merchandise trade volumes, is expected to rise by 9 per cent this year from 5½ per cent in 1999.

Two composite measures are calculated to map improvements in living standards over the 20th century: the Dasgupta–Weale index and the Human Development Index. A gendered version of the latter is also considered. Indicators of income, leisure, inequality, wealth, health, education and political rights are included. The indices reveal a century of progress. But progress has been neither continuous nor uniformly shared. Downturns are evident in some of the indicators since 1980, demonstrating that the gains are not immutable and need to be protected. Women‘s position has improved if the end of the century is compared to its beginning, but there has been little change in women's position relative to men's over the last few decades on the dimensions considered here.

The article begins with an account of the way in which the value of the pound has changed over the last 1300 years or so. This is indicated in terms of silver and, for the last 7–800 years, also in terms of gold, wheat and Phelps-Brown's general cost of living basket. It is shown, for example, that the whole of the increase in the price of silver since 1000 has occurred in the last 60 years. These prices are used to indicate how the real wage of a building labourer has changed since the 13th century. The article then proceeds to an account of the evolution of the currency itself, from its beginning as a pound of silver cut into 240 pennies (following continential practice) to the move to a gold currency and the introduction of paper money. It concludes with a discussion of whether the whole concept of currency will eventually become obsolete.

Monetary unions have been a recurring element in European history, driven by the need to overcome obstacles to trade caused by the fragmentation of political authority. Between the 14th and the 19th centuries, a series of coinage unions were set up in the German speaking world, which served as models for the Latin and Scandinavian monetary unions in 1865 and 1872. With the growing size of participating states and the transformation of money, thanks to the end of bimetallism and the wider use of bank notes and deposits, the objectives and the practical management of monetary unions became more complex and more political. Monetary union became strictly associated with European federalism and required new common institutions after the end of the classical metallic standards in 1914.

The Domesday Survey of 1086 provides high quality and detailed information on the outputs, inputs and tax assessments of most English manors. These data can be used to reconstruct the eleventh century Domesday economy. This article describes the Survey, the contemporary institutional arrangements, and the main features of Domesday agricultural production. It shows how frontier methods can be used to assess the efficiency of production and the impact of the feudal and manorial systems on input productivities and production output. The frontier analysis suggests that the average efficiency level of Domesday estates relative to the best practice of the time was similar to, or more favourable than, that of production units in more modern primary industry. Also, input rigidities induced by feudalism and manorialism resulted in widely differing input productivities across estates, and a very significant reduction in overall output.